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## Rhetoric. Selected Readings of Classical Writings for its Theory, History, and Application.

Fee Haase

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**Rhetoric.**

**Selected Readings of Classical Writings for its Theory, History, and Application.**

**Edited and Compiled by Fee-Alexandra Haase**

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## 1. Aristotle. *Rhetoric*

### Book I

1

RHETORIC the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down some states-especially in well-governed states-were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about non-essentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity-one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it. Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law-giver has not already defined for him.

Now, it is of great moment that well-drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges; and this for several reasons. First, to find one man, or a few men, who are sensible persons and capable of legislating and administering justice is easier than to find a large number. Next, laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency. The weightiest reason of all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general, whereas members of the assembly and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite cases brought before them. They will often have allowed themselves to be so much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain. In general, then, the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as few things as possible. But questions as to whether something has happened or has not happened, will be or will not be, is or is not, must of necessity be left to the judge, since the lawgiver cannot foresee them. If this is so, it is evident that any one who lays down rules about other matters, such as what must be the contents of the "introduction" or the "narration" or any of the other divisions of a speech, is theorizing about non-essentials as if they belonged to the art. The only question with which these writers here deal is how to put the judge into a given frame of mind. About the orator's proper modes of persuasion they have nothing to tell us; nothing, that is, about how to gain skill in enthymemes.

Hence it comes that, although the same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory, and although the former is a nobler business, and fitter for a citizen, than that which concerns the relations of private individuals, these authors say nothing about political oratory, but try, one and all, to write treatises on the way to plead in court. The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to talk about nonessentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues. In a political debate the man who is forming a judgement is making a decision about his own vital interests. There is no need, therefore, to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic oratory this is not enough; to conciliate the listener is what pays here. It is other people's affairs that are to be decided, so that the judges, intent on their own satisfaction and listening with partiality, surrender themselves to the disputants instead of

judging between them. Hence in many places, as we have said already, irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the law-courts: in the public assembly those who have to form a judgement are themselves well able to guard against that.

It is clear, then, that rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion. The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism, and the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches. It follows plainly, therefore, that he who is best able to see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced will also be best skilled in the enthymeme, when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict logic. The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities.

It has now been shown that the ordinary writers on rhetoric treat of non-essentials; it has also been shown why they have inclined more towards the forensic branch of oratory.

Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in the Topics when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience. Further, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. No; things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in. Again, (4) it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.

It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health. Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real and the apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic to discern the real and the apparent syllogism. What makes a man a "sophist" is not his faculty, but his moral purpose. In rhetoric, however, the term "rhetorician" may describe either the speaker's knowledge of the art, or his moral purpose. In dialectic it is different: a man is a "sophist" because he has a certain kind of moral purpose, a "dialectician" in respect, not of his moral purpose, but of his faculty.

Let us now try to give some account of the systematic principles of Rhetoric itself-of the right method and means of succeeding in the object we set before us. We must make as it were a fresh start, and before going further define what rhetoric is.

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects.

Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset—witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the other has to be invented.

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.

There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions—that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies may fairly be called political; and for this reason rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as political experts—sometimes from want of education, sometimes from ostentation, sometimes owing to other human failings. As a matter of fact, it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments. This is perhaps a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are related to each other.

With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof: just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism. I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction. Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way. And since every one who proves anything at all is bound to use either syllogisms or inductions (and this is clear to us from the *Analytics*), it must follow that enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions. The difference between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages in the *Topics* where induction and syllogism have already been discussed. When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. It is plain also that each of these types of oratory has its advantages. Types of oratory, I say: for what has been said in the *Methodics* applies equally well here; in some oratorical styles examples prevail, in others enthymemes; and in like manner, some orators are better at the former and some at the latter. Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind, but

those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause. The sources of examples and enthymemes, and their proper uses, we will discuss later. Our next step is to define the processes themselves more clearly.

A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so. In either case it is persuasive because there is somebody whom it persuades. But none of the arts theorize about individual cases. Medicine, for instance, does not theorize about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias, but only about what will help to cure any or all of a given class of patients: this alone is business: individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic knowledge of them is possible. In the same way the theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems probable to a given individual like Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems probable to men of a given type; and this is true of dialectic also. Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular subjects of debate. The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning. The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities: about things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation.

It is possible to form syllogisms and draw conclusions from the results of previous syllogisms; or, on the other hand, from premisses which have not been thus proved, and at the same time are so little accepted that they call for proof. Reasonings of the former kind will necessarily be hard to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of untrained thinkers; those of the latter kind will fail to win assent, because they are based on premisses that are not generally admitted or believed.

The enthymeme and the example must, then, deal with what is in the main contingent, the example being an induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, about such matters. The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown, it is enough to say "For he has been victor in the Olympic games", without adding "And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown", a fact which everybody knows.

There are few facts of the "necessary" type that can form the basis of rhetorical syllogisms. Most of the things about which we make decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with alternative possibilities. For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character; hardly any of them are determined by necessity. Again, conclusions that state what is merely usual or possible must be drawn from premisses that do the same, just as "necessary" conclusions must be drawn from "necessary" premisses; this too is clear to us from the Analytics. It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be "necessary", will most of them be only usually true. Now the materials of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs, which we can see must correspond respectively with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true. A Probability is a thing that usually happens; not, however, as some definitions would suggest, anything whatever that usually happens, but only if it belongs to the class of the "contingent" or "variable". It bears the same relation to that in respect of which it is probable as the universal bears to the particular. Of Signs, one kind bears the same relation to the statement it supports as the particular bears to the universal, the other the same as the universal bears to the particular. The infallible kind is a "complete proof" (tekmerhiou); the fallible kind has no specific name. By infallible signs I mean those on which syllogisms proper may be based: and this shows us why this kind of Sign is called "complete proof": when people think that what they have said cannot be refuted, they then think that they are bringing forward a "complete proof", meaning that the matter has now been demonstrated and completed (peperhasmeuou); for the word "perhas" has the same meaning (of "end" or "boundary") as the word "tekmarh" in the ancient tongue. Now the one kind of Sign (that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of particular to universal) may be illustrated thus. Suppose it were said, "The fact that Socrates was wise and just is a sign that the wise are just". Here we certainly have a Sign; but even though the proposition be true, the argument is refutable, since it does not form a syllogism. Suppose, on the other hand, it were said, "The fact that he has a fever is a sign that he is ill", or, "The fact that she is giving milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child". Here we have the infallible kind of Sign, the only kind that constitutes a complete proof, since



it is the only kind that, if the particular statement is true, is irrefutable. The other kind of Sign, that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of universal to particular, might be illustrated by saying, "The fact that he breathes fast is a sign that he has a fever". This argument also is refutable, even if the statement about the fast breathing be true, since a man may breathe hard without having a fever.

It has, then, been stated above what is the nature of a Probability, of a Sign, and of a complete proof, and what are the differences between them. In the Analytics a more explicit description has been given of these points; it is there shown why some of these reasonings can be put into syllogisms and some cannot.

The "example" has already been described as one kind of induction; and the special nature of the subject-matter that distinguishes it from the other kinds has also been stated above. Its relation to the proposition it supports is not that of part to whole, nor whole to part, nor whole to whole, but of part to part, or like to like. When two statements are of the same order, but one is more familiar than the other, the former is an "example". The argument may, for instance, be that Dionysius, in asking as he does for a bodyguard, is scheming to make himself a despot. For in the past Peisistratus kept asking for a bodyguard in order to carry out such a scheme, and did make himself a despot as soon as he got it; and so did Theagenes at Megara; and in the same way all other instances known to the speaker are made into examples, in order to show what is not yet known, that Dionysius has the same purpose in making the same request: all these being instances of the one general principle, that a man who asks for a bodyguard is scheming to make himself a despot. We have now described the sources of those means of persuasion which are popularly supposed to be demonstrative.

There is an important distinction between two sorts of enthymemes that has been wholly overlooked by almost everybody—one that also subsists between the syllogisms treated of in dialectic. One sort of enthymeme really belongs to rhetoric, as one sort of syllogism really belongs to dialectic; but the other sort really belongs to other arts and faculties, whether to those we already exercise or to those we have not yet acquired. Missing this distinction, people fail to notice that the more correctly they handle their particular subject the further they are getting away from pure rhetoric or dialectic. This statement will be clearer if expressed more fully. I mean that the proper subjects of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are the things with which we say the regular or universal Lines of Argument are concerned, that is to say those lines of argument that apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics, and many other things that have nothing to do with one another. Take, for instance, the line of argument concerned with "the more or less". On this line of argument it is equally easy to base a syllogism or enthymeme about any of what nevertheless are essentially disconnected subjects—right conduct, natural science, or anything else whatever. But there are also those special Lines of Argument which are based on such propositions as apply only to particular groups or classes of things. Thus there are propositions about natural science on which it is impossible to base any enthymeme or syllogism about ethics, and other propositions about ethics on which nothing can be based about natural science. The same principle applies throughout. The general Lines of Argument have no special subject-matter, and therefore will not increase our understanding of any particular class of things. On the other hand, the better the selection one makes of propositions suitable for special Lines of Argument, the nearer one comes, unconsciously, to setting up a science that is distinct from dialectic and rhetoric. One may succeed in stating the required principles, but one's science will be no longer dialectic or rhetoric, but the science to which the principles thus discovered belong. Most enthymemes are in fact based upon these particular or special Lines of Argument; comparatively few on the common or general kind. As in the therefore, so in this work, we must distinguish, in dealing with enthymemes, the special and the general Lines of Argument on which they are to be founded. By special Lines of Argument I mean the propositions peculiar to each several class of things, by general those common to all classes alike. We may begin with the special Lines of Argument. But, first of all, let us classify rhetoric into its varieties. Having distinguished these we may deal with them one by one, and try to discover the elements of which each is composed, and the propositions each must employ.

3

Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches. For of the three elements in speech-making—speaker, subject, and person addressed—it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object. The hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an

observer. A member of the assembly decides about future events, a juryman about past events: while those who merely decide on the orator's skill are observers. From this it follows that there are three divisions of oratory- (1) political, (2) forensic, and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display.

Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one of these two courses is always taken by private counsellors, as well as by men who address public assemblies. Forensic speaking either attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. The ceremonial oratory of display either praises or censures somebody. These three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time, though they often find it useful also to recall the past and to make guesses at the future.

Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one for each of its three kinds. The political orator aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative to this main consideration. Parties in a law-case aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some action, and they too bring in all other points as subsidiary and relative to this one. Those who praise or attack a man aim at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse, and they too treat all other considerations with reference to this one.

That the three kinds of rhetoric do aim respectively at the three ends we have mentioned is shown by the fact that speakers will sometimes not try to establish anything else. Thus, the litigant will sometimes not deny that a thing has happened or that he has done harm. But that he is guilty of injustice he will never admit; otherwise there would be no need of a trial. So too, political orators often make any concession short of admitting that they are recommending their hearers to take an inexpedient course or not to take an expedient one. The question whether it is not unjust for a city to enslave its innocent neighbours often does not trouble them at all. In like manner those who praise or censure a man do not consider whether his acts have been expedient or not, but often make it a ground of actual praise that he has neglected his own interest to do what was honourable. Thus, they praise Achilles because he championed his fallen friend Patroclus, though he knew that this meant death, and that otherwise he need not die: yet while to die thus was the nobler thing for him to do, the expedient thing was to live on.

It is evident from what has been said that it is these three subjects, more than any others, about which the orator must be able to have propositions at his command. Now the propositions of Rhetoric are Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs. Every kind of syllogism is composed of propositions, and the enthymeme is a particular kind of syllogism composed of the aforesaid propositions.

Since only possible actions, and not impossible ones, can ever have been done in the past or the present, and since things which have not occurred, or will not occur, also cannot have been done or be going to be done, it is necessary for the political, the forensic, and the ceremonial speaker alike to be able to have at their command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur. Further, all men, in giving praise or blame, in urging us to accept or reject proposals for action, in accusing others or defending themselves, attempt not only to prove the points mentioned but also to show that the good or the harm, the honour or disgrace, the justice or injustice, is great or small, either absolutely or relatively; and therefore it is plain that we must also have at our command propositions about greatness or smallness and the greater or the lesser-propositions both universal and particular. Thus, we must be able to say which is the greater or lesser good, the greater or lesser act of justice or injustice; and so on.

Such, then, are the subjects regarding which we are inevitably bound to master the propositions relevant to them. We must now discuss each particular class of these subjects in turn, namely those dealt with in political, in ceremonial, and lastly in legal, oratory.

First, then, we must ascertain what are the kinds of things, good or bad, about which the political orator offers counsel. For he does not deal with all things, but only with such as may or may not take place. Concerning things which exist or will exist inevitably, or which cannot possibly exist or take place, no counsel can be given. Nor, again, can counsel be given about the whole class of things which may or may not take place; for this class includes some good things that occur naturally, and some that occur by accident; and about these it is useless to offer counsel. Clearly counsel can only be given on matters about which people deliberate; matters, namely, that ultimately depend on ourselves, and which we have it in our power to set going. For we turn a thing over in our mind until we have reached the point of seeing whether we can do it or not.

Now to enumerate and classify accurately the usual subjects of public business, and further to frame, as far as possible, true definitions of them is a task which we must not attempt on the present occasion. For it does not belong to the art of rhetoric, but to a more instructive art and a more real branch of knowledge; and as it is, rhetoric has been given a far wider subject-matter than strictly belongs to it. The truth is, as indeed we have said already, that rhetoric is a combination of the science of logic and of the ethical branch of politics; and it is partly like dialectic, partly like sophistical reasoning. But the more we try to make either dialectic rhetoric not, what they really are, practical faculties, but sciences, the more we shall inadvertently be destroying their true nature; for we shall be re-fashioning them and shall be passing into the region of sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with words and forms of reasoning. Even here, however, we will mention those points which it is of practical importance to distinguish, their fuller treatment falling naturally to political science.

The main matters on which all men deliberate and on which political speakers make speeches are some five in number: ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation.

As to Ways and Means, then, the intending speaker will need to know the number and extent of the country's sources of revenue, so that, if any is being overlooked, it may be added, and, if any is defective, it may be increased. Further, he should know all the expenditure of the country, in order that, if any part of it is superfluous, it may be abolished, or, if any is too large, it may be reduced. For men become richer not only by increasing their existing wealth but also by reducing their expenditure. A comprehensive view of these questions cannot be gained solely from experience in home affairs; in order to advise on such matters a man must be keenly interested in the methods worked out in other lands.

As to Peace and War, he must know the extent of the military strength of his country, both actual and potential, and also the nature of that actual and potential strength; and further, what wars his country has waged, and how it has waged them. He must know these facts not only about his own country, but also about neighbouring countries; and also about countries with which war is likely, in order that peace may be maintained with those stronger than his own, and that his own may have power to make war or not against those that are weaker. He should know, too, whether the military power of another country is like or unlike that of his own; for this is a matter that may affect their relative strength. With the same end in view he must, besides, have studied the wars of other countries as well as those of his own, and the way they ended; similar causes are likely to have similar results.

With regard to National Defence: he ought to know all about the methods of defence in actual use, such as the strength and character of the defensive force and the positions of the forts-this last means that he must be well acquainted with the lie of the country-in order that a garrison may be increased if it is too small or removed if it is not wanted, and that the strategic points may be guarded with special care.

With regard to the Food Supply: he must know what outlay will meet the needs of his country; what kinds of food are produced at home and what imported; and what articles must be exported or imported. This last he must know in order that agreements and commercial treaties may be made with the countries concerned. There are, indeed, two sorts of state to which he must see that his countrymen give no cause for offence, states stronger than his own, and states with which it is advantageous to trade.

But while he must, for security's sake, be able to take all this into account, he must before all things understand the subject of legislation; for it is on a country's laws that its whole welfare depends. He must, therefore, know how many different forms of constitution there are; under what conditions each of these will prosper and by what internal developments or external attacks each of them tends to be destroyed. When I speak of destruction through internal developments I refer to the fact that all constitutions, except the best one of all, are destroyed both by not being pushed far enough and by being pushed too far. Thus, democracy loses its vigour, and finally passes into oligarchy, not only when it is not pushed far enough, but also when it is pushed a great deal too far; just as the aquiline and the snub nose not only turn into normal noses by not being aquiline or snub enough, but also by being too violently aquiline or snub arrive at a condition in which they no longer look like noses at all. It is useful, in framing laws, not only to study the past history of one's own country, in order to understand which constitution is desirable for it now, but also to have a knowledge of the constitutions of other nations, and so to learn for what kinds of nation the various kinds of constitution are suited. From this we can see that books of travel are useful aids to legislation, since from these we may learn the laws and customs of different races. The political speaker will also find the researches of historians useful. But all this is the business of political science and not of rhetoric.

These, then, are the most important kinds of information which the political speaker must possess. Let us now go back and state the premisses from which he will have to argue in favour of adopting or rejecting measures regarding these and other matters.

5

It may be said that every individual man and all men in common aim at a certain end which determines what they choose and what they avoid. This end, to sum it up briefly, is happiness and its constituents. Let us, then, by way of illustration only, ascertain what is in general the nature of happiness, and what are the elements of its constituent parts. For all advice to do things or not to do them is concerned with happiness and with the things that make for or against it; whatever creates or increases happiness or some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do.

We may define happiness as prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one's property and body and making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees.

From this definition of happiness it follows that its constituent parts are:-good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, also such bodily excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, together with fame, honour, good luck, and virtue. A man cannot fail to be completely independent if he possesses these internal and these external goods; for besides these there are no others to have. (Goods of the soul and of the body are internal. Good birth, friends, money, and honour are external.) Further, we think that he should possess resources and luck, in order to make his life really secure. As we have already ascertained what happiness in general is, so now let us try to ascertain what of these parts of it is.

Now good birth in a race or a state means that its members are indigenous or ancient: that its earliest leaders were distinguished men, and that from them have sprung many who were distinguished for qualities that we admire.

The good birth of an individual, which may come either from the male or the female side, implies that both parents are free citizens, and that, as in the case of the state, the founders of the line have been notable for virtue or wealth or something else which is highly prized, and that many distinguished persons belong to the family, men and women, young and old.

The phrases "possession of good children" and "of many children" bear a quite clear meaning. Applied to a community, they mean that its young men are numerous and of good a quality: good in regard to bodily excellences, such as stature, beauty, strength, athletic powers; and also in regard to the excellences of the soul, which in a young man are temperance and courage. Applied to an individual, they mean that his own children are numerous and have

the good qualities we have described. Both male and female are here included; the excellences of the latter are, in body, beauty and stature; in soul, self-command and an industry that is not sordid. Communities as well as individuals should lack none of these perfections, in their women as well as in their men. Where, as among the Lacedaemonians, the state of women is bad, almost half of human life is spoilt.

The constituents of wealth are: plenty of coined money and territory; the ownership of numerous, large, and beautiful estates; also the ownership of numerous and beautiful implements, live stock, and slaves. All these kinds of property are our own, are secure, gentlemanly, and useful. The useful kinds are those that are productive, the gentlemanly kinds are those that provide enjoyment. By "productive" I mean those from which we get our income; by "enjoyable", those from which we get nothing worth mentioning except the use of them. The criterion of "security" is the ownership of property in such places and under such Conditions that the use of it is in our power; and it is "our own" if it is in our own power to dispose of it or keep it. By "disposing of it" I mean giving it away or selling it. Wealth as a whole consists in using things rather than in owning them; it is really the activity-that is, the use-of property that constitutes wealth.

Fame means being respected by everybody, or having some quality that is desired by all men, or by most, or by the good, or by the wise.

Honour is the token of a man's being famous for doing good. it is chiefly and most properly paid to those who have already done good; but also to the man who can do good in future. Doing good refers either to the preservation of life and the means of life, or to wealth, or to some other of the good things which it is hard to get either always or at that particular place or time-for many gain honour for things which seem small, but the place and the occasion account for it. The constituents of honour are: sacrifices; commemoration, in verse or prose; privileges; grants of land; front seats at civic celebrations; state burial; statues; public maintenance; among foreigners, obeisances and giving place; and such presents as are among various bodies of men regarded as marks of honour. For a present is not only the bestowal of a piece of property, but also a token of honour; which explains why honour-loving as well as money-loving persons desire it. The present brings to both what they want; it is a piece of property, which is what the lovers of money desire; and it brings honour, which is what the lovers of honour desire.

The excellence of the body is health; that is, a condition which allows us, while keeping free from disease, to have the use of our bodies; for many people are "healthy" as we are told Herodicus was; and these no one can congratulate on their "health", for they have to abstain from everything or nearly everything that men do.-Beauty varies with the time of life. In a young man beauty is the possession of a body fit to endure the exertion of running and of contests of strength; which means that he is pleasant to look at; and therefore all-round athletes are the most beautiful, being naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for speed also. For a man in his prime, beauty is fitness for the exertion of warfare, together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. For an old man, it is to be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary, and to be free from all those deformities of old age which cause pain to others. Strength is the power of moving some one else at will; to do this, you must either pull, push, lift, pin, or grip him; thus you must be strong in all of those ways or at least in some. Excellence in size is to surpass ordinary people in height, thickness, and breadth by just as much as will not make one's movements slower in consequence. Athletic excellence of the body consists in size, strength, and swiftness; swiftness implying strength. He who can fling forward his legs in a certain way, and move them fast and far, is good at running; he who can grip and hold down is good at wrestling; he who can drive an adversary from his ground with the right blow is a good boxer: he who can do both the last is a good pancratiast, while he who can do all is an "all-round" athlete.

Happiness in old age is the coming of old age slowly and painlessly; for a man has not this happiness if he grows old either quickly, or tardily but painfully. It arises both from the excellences of the body and from good luck. If a man is not free from disease, or if he is strong, he will not be free from suffering; nor can he continue to live a long and painless life unless he has good luck. There is, indeed, a capacity for long life that is quite independent of health or strength; for many people live long who lack the excellences of the body; but for our present purpose there is no use in going into the details of this.

The terms "possession of many friends" and "possession of good friends" need no explanation; for we define a "friend" as one who will always try, for your sake, to do what he takes to be good for you. The man towards whom many feel thus has many friends; if these are worthy men, he has good friends.

"Good luck" means the acquisition or possession of all or most, or the most important, of those good things which are due to luck. Some of the things that are due to luck may also be due to artificial contrivance; but many are independent of art, as for example those which are due to nature-though, to be sure, things due to luck may actually be contrary to nature. Thus health may be due to artificial contrivance, but beauty and stature are due to nature. All such good things as excite envy are, as a class, the outcome of good luck. Luck is also the cause of good things that happen contrary to reasonable expectation: as when, for instance, all your brothers are ugly, but you are handsome yourself; or when you find a treasure that everybody else has overlooked; or when a missile hits the next man and misses you; or when you are the only man not to go to a place you have gone to regularly, while the others go there for the first time and are killed. All such things are reckoned pieces of good luck.

As to virtue, it is most closely connected with the subject of Eulogy, and therefore we will wait to define it until we come to discuss that subject.

6

It is now plain what our aims, future or actual, should be in urging, and what in depreciating, a proposal; the latter being the opposite of the former. Now the political or deliberative orator's aim is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means to ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good thing. We ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main facts about Goodness and Utility in general.

We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self-sufficing condition; or as self-sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites. One thing may entail another in either of two ways- (1) simultaneously, (2) subsequently. Thus learning entails knowledge subsequently, health entails life simultaneously. Things are productive of other things in three senses: first as being healthy produces health; secondly, as food produces health; and thirdly, as exercise does-i.e. it does so usually. All this being settled, we now see that both the acquisition of good things and the removal of bad things must be good; the latter entails freedom from the evil things simultaneously, while the former entails possession of the good things subsequently. The acquisition of a greater in place of a lesser good, or of a lesser in place of a greater evil, is also good, for in proportion as the greater exceeds the lesser there is acquisition of good or removal of evil. The virtues, too, must be something good; for it is by possessing these that we are in a good condition, and they tend to produce good works and good actions. They must be severally named and described elsewhere. Pleasure, again, must be a good thing, since it is the nature of all animals to aim at it. Consequently both pleasant and beautiful things must be good things, since the former are productive of pleasure, while of the beautiful things some are pleasant and some desirable in and for themselves.

The following is a more detailed list of things that must be good. Happiness, as being desirable in itself and sufficient by itself, and as being that for whose sake we choose many other things. Also justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and all such qualities, as being excellences of the soul. Further, health, beauty, and the like, as being bodily excellences and productive of many other good things: for instance, health is productive both of pleasure and of life, and therefore is thought the greatest of goods, since these two things which it causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things most highly prized by ordinary people. Wealth, again: for it is the excellence of possession, and also productive of many other good things. Friends and friendship: for a friend is desirable in himself and also productive of many other good things. So, too, honour and reputation, as being pleasant, and productive of many other good things, and usually accompanied by the presence of the good things that cause them to be bestowed. The faculty of speech and action; since all such qualities are productive of what is good. Further-good parts, strong memory, receptiveness, quickness of intuition, and the like, for all such faculties

are productive of what is good. Similarly, all the sciences and arts. And life: since, even if no other good were the result of life, it is desirable in itself. And justice, as the cause of good to the community.

The above are pretty well all the things admittedly good. In dealing with things whose goodness is disputed, we may argue in the following ways:-That is good of which the contrary is bad. That is good the contrary of which is to the advantage of our enemies; for example, if it is to the particular advantage of our enemies that we should be cowards, clearly courage is of particular value to our countrymen. And generally, the contrary of that which our enemies desire, or of that at which they rejoice, is evidently valuable. Hence the passage beginning:

Surely would Priam exult.

This principle usually holds good, but not always, since it may well be that our interest is sometimes the same as that of our enemies. Hence it is said that "evils draw men together"; that is, when the same thing is hurtful to them both.

Further: that which is not in excess is good, and that which is greater than it should be is bad. That also is good on which much labour or money has been spent; the mere fact of this makes it seem good, and such a good is assumed to be an end-an end reached through a long chain of means; and any end is a good. Hence the lines beginning:

And for Priam (and Troy-town's folk) should  
they leave behind them a boast;

and

Oh, it were shame  
To have tarried so long and return empty-handed  
as erst we came;

and there is also the proverb about "breaking the pitcher at the door".

That which most people seek after, and which is obviously an object of contention, is also a good; for, as has been shown, that is good which is sought after by everybody, and "most people" is taken to be equivalent to "everybody". That which is praised is good, since no one praises what is not good. So, again, that which is praised by our enemies [or by the worthless] for when even those who have a grievance think a thing good, it is at once felt that every one must agree with them; our enemies can admit the fact only because it is evident, just as those must be worthless whom their friends censure and their enemies do not. (For this reason the Corinthians conceived themselves to be insulted by Simonides when he wrote:

Against the Corinthians hath Ilium no complaint.)

Again, that is good which has been distinguished by the favour of a discerning or virtuous man or woman, as Odysseus was distinguished by Athena, Helen by Theseus, Paris by the goddesses, and Achilles by Homer. And, generally speaking, all things are good which men deliberately choose to do; this will include the things already mentioned, and also whatever may be bad for their enemies or good for their friends, and at the same time practicable. Things are "practicable" in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2) it is easy to do them. Things are done "easily" when they are done either without pain or quickly: the "difficulty" of an act lies either in its painfulness or in the long time it takes. Again, a thing is good if it is as men wish; and they wish to have either no evil at an or at least a balance of good over evil. This last will happen where the penalty is either imperceptible or slight. Good, too, are things that are a man's very own, possessed by no one else, exceptional; for this increases the credit of having them. So are things which befit the possessors, such as whatever is appropriate to their birth or capacity, and whatever they feel they ought to have but lack-such things may indeed be trifling, but none the less men deliberately make them the goal of their action. And things easily effected; for these are practicable (in the sense of being easy); such things are those in which every one, or most people, or one's equals, or one's inferiors

have succeeded. Good also are the things by which we shall gratify our friends or annoy our enemies; and the things chosen by those whom we admire: and the things for which we are fitted by nature or experience, since we think we shall succeed more easily in these: and those in which no worthless man can succeed, for such things bring greater praise: and those which we do in fact desire, for what we desire is taken to be not only pleasant but also better. Further, a man of a given disposition makes chiefly for the corresponding things: lovers of victory make for victory, lovers of honour for honour, money-loving men for money, and so with the rest. These, then, are the sources from which we must derive our means of persuasion about Good and Utility.

7

Since, however, it often happens that people agree that two things are both useful but do not agree about which is the more so, the next step will be to treat of relative goodness and relative utility.

A thing which surpasses another may be regarded as being that other thing plus something more, and that other thing which is surpassed as being what is contained in the first thing. Now to call a thing "greater" or "more" always implies a comparison of it with one that is "smaller" or "less", while "great" and "small", "much" and "little", are terms used in comparison with normal magnitude. The "great" is that which surpasses the normal, the "small" is that which is surpassed by the normal; and so with "many" and "few".

Now we are applying the term "good" to what is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; to that at which all things aim; to what they would choose if they could acquire understanding and practical wisdom; and to that which tends to produce or preserve such goods, or is always accompanied by them. Moreover, that for the sake of which things are done is the end (an end being that for the sake of which all else is done), and for each individual that thing is a good which fulfils these conditions in regard to himself. It follows, then, that a greater number of goods is a greater good than one or than a smaller number, if that one or that smaller number is included in the count; for then the larger number surpasses the smaller, and the smaller quantity is surpassed as being contained in the larger.

Again, if the largest member of one class surpasses the largest member of another, then the one class surpasses the other; and if one class surpasses another, then the largest member of the one surpasses the largest member of the other. Thus, if the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman, then men in general are taller than women. Conversely, if men in general are taller than women, then the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman. For the superiority of class over class is proportionate to the superiority possessed by their largest specimens. Again, where one good is always accompanied by another, but does not always accompany it, it is greater than the other, for the use of the second thing is implied in the use of the first. A thing may be accompanied by another in three ways, either simultaneously, subsequently, or potentially. Life accompanies health simultaneously (but not health life), knowledge accompanies the act of learning subsequently, cheating accompanies sacrilege potentially, since a man who has committed sacrilege is always capable of cheating. Again, when two things each surpass a third, that which does so by the greater amount is the greater of the two; for it must surpass the greater as well as the less of the other two. A thing productive of a greater good than another is productive of itself a greater good than that other. For this conception of "productive of a greater" has been implied in our argument. Likewise, that which is produced by a greater good is itself a greater good; thus, if what is wholesome is more desirable and a greater good than what gives pleasure, health too must be a greater good than pleasure. Again, a thing which is desirable in itself is a greater good than a thing which is not desirable in itself, as for example bodily strength than what is wholesome, since the latter is not pursued for its own sake, whereas the former is; and this was our definition of the good. Again, if one of two things is an end, and the other is not, the former is the greater good, as being chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; as, for example, exercise is chosen for the sake of physical well-being. And of two things that which stands less in need of the other, or of other things, is the greater good, since it is more self-sufficing. (That which stands "less" in need of others is that which needs either fewer or easier things.) So when one thing does not exist or cannot come into existence without a second, while the second can exist without the first, the second is the better. That which does not need something else is more self-sufficing than that which does, and presents itself as a greater good for that reason. Again, that which is a beginning of other things is a greater good than that which is not, and that which is a cause is a greater good than that which is not; the reason being the same in each case, namely that without a cause and a beginning nothing can exist or come into existence. Again, where there



are two sets of consequences arising from two different beginnings or causes, the consequences of the more important beginning or cause are themselves the more important; and conversely, that beginning or cause is itself the more important which has the more important consequences. Now it is plain, from all that has been said, that one thing may be shown to be more important than another from two opposite points of view: it may appear the more important (1) because it is a beginning and the other thing is not, and also (2) because it is not a beginning and the other thing is—on the ground that the end is more important and is not a beginning. So Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus, said that the man who prompted the deed was more guilty than the doer, since it would not have been done if he had not planned it. On the other hand, when accusing Chabrias he said that the doer was worse than the prompter, since there would have been no deed without some one to do it; men, said he, plot a thing only in order to carry it out.

Further, what is rare is a greater good than what is plentiful. Thus, gold is a better thing than iron, though less useful: it is harder to get, and therefore better worth getting. Reversely, it may be argued that the plentiful is a better thing than the rare, because we can make more use of it. For what is often useful surpasses what is seldom useful, whence the saying:

The best of things is water.

More generally: the hard thing is better than the easy, because it is rarer: and reversely, the easy thing is better than the hard, for it is as we wish it to be. That is the greater good whose contrary is the greater evil, and whose loss affects us more. Positive goodness and badness are more important than the mere absence of goodness and badness: for positive goodness and badness are ends, which the mere absence of them cannot be. Further, in proportion as the functions of things are noble or base, the things themselves are good or bad: conversely, in proportion as the things themselves are good or bad, their functions also are good or bad; for the nature of results corresponds with that of their causes and beginnings, and conversely the nature of causes and beginnings corresponds with that of their results. Moreover, those things are greater goods, superiority in which is more desirable or more honourable. Thus, keenness of sight is more desirable than keenness of smell, sight generally being more desirable than smell generally; and similarly, unusually great love of friends being more honourable than unusually great love of money, ordinary love of friends is more honourable than ordinary love of money. Conversely, if one of two normal things is better or nobler than the other, an unusual degree of that thing is better or nobler than an unusual degree of the other. Again, one thing is more honourable or better than another if it is more honourable or better to desire it; the importance of the object of a given instinct corresponds to the importance of the instinct itself; and for the same reason, if one thing is more honourable or better than another, it is more honourable and better to desire it. Again, if one science is more honourable and valuable than another, the activity with which it deals is also more honourable and valuable; as is the science, so is the reality that is its object, each science being authoritative in its own sphere. So, also, the more valuable and honourable the object of a science, the more valuable and honourable the science itself is—in consequence. Again, that which would be judged, or which has been judged, a good thing, or a better thing than something else, by all or most people of understanding, or by the majority of men, or by the ablest, must be so; either without qualification, or in so far as they use their understanding to form their judgement. This is indeed a general principle, applicable to all other judgements also; not only the goodness of things, but their essence, magnitude, and general nature are in fact just what knowledge and understanding will declare them to be. Here the principle is applied to judgements of goodness, since one definition of "good" was "what beings that acquire understanding will choose in any given case": from which it clearly follows that that thing is better which understanding declares to be so. That, again, is a better thing which attaches to better men, either absolutely, or in virtue of their being better; as courage is better than strength. And that is a greater good which would be chosen by a better man, either absolutely, or in virtue of his being better: for instance, to suffer wrong rather than to do wrong, for that would be the choice of the juster man. Again, the pleasanter of two things is the better, since all things pursue pleasure, and things instinctively desire pleasurable sensation for its own sake; and these are two of the characteristics by which the "good" and the "end" have been defined. One pleasure is greater than another if it is more unmixed with pain, or more lasting. Again, the nobler thing is better than the less noble, since the noble is either what is pleasant or what is desirable in itself. And those things also are greater goods which men desire more earnestly to bring about for themselves or for their friends, whereas those things which they least desire to bring about are greater evils. And those things which are more lasting are better than those which are more fleeting, and

the more secure than the less; the enjoyment of the lasting has the advantage of being longer, and that of the secure has the advantage of suiting our wishes, being there for us whenever we like. Further, in accordance with the rule of co-ordinate terms and inflexions of the same stem, what is true of one such related word is true of all. Thus if the action qualified by the term "brave" is more noble and desirable than the action qualified by the term "temperate", then "bravery" is more desirable than "temperance" and "being brave" than "being temperate". That, again, which is chosen by all is a greater good than that which is not, and that chosen by the majority than that chosen by the minority. For that which all desire is good, as we have said; " and so, the more a thing is desired, the better it is. Further, that is the better thing which is considered so by competitors or enemies, or, again, by authorized judges or those whom they select to represent them. In the first two cases the decision is virtually that of every one, in the last two that of authorities and experts. And sometimes it may be argued that what all share is the better thing, since it is a dishonour not to share in it; at other times, that what none or few share is better, since it is rarer. The more praiseworthy things are, the nobler and therefore the better they are. So with the things that earn greater honours than others-honour is, as it were, a measure of value; and the things whose absence involves comparatively heavy penalties; and the things that are better than others admitted or believed to be good. Moreover, things look better merely by being divided into their parts, since they then seem to surpass a greater number of things than before. Hence Homer says that Meleager was roused to battle by the thought of

All horrors that light on a folk whose city  
is ta'en of their foes,  
When they slaughter the men, when the burg is  
wasted with ravening flame,  
When strangers are haling young children to thraldom,  
(fair women to shame.)

The same effect is produced by piling up facts in a climax after the manner of Epicharmus. The reason is partly the same as in the case of division (for combination too makes the impression of great superiority), and partly that the original thing appears to be the cause and origin of important results. And since a thing is better when it is harder or rarer than other things, its superiority may be due to seasons, ages, places, times, or one's natural powers. When a man accomplishes something beyond his natural power, or beyond his years, or beyond the measure of people like him, or in a special way, or at a special place or time, his deed will have a high degree of nobleness, goodness, and justice, or of their opposites. Hence the epigram on the victor at the Olympic games:

In time past, heaving a Yoke on my shoulders,  
of wood unshaven,  
I carried my loads of fish from, Argos to Tegea town.

So Iphicrates used to extol himself by describing the low estate from which he had risen. Again, what is natural is better than what is acquired, since it is harder to come by. Hence the words of Homer:

I have learnt from none but myself.

And the best part of a good thing is particularly good; as when Pericles in his funeral oration said that the country's loss of its young men in battle was "as if the spring were taken out of the year". So with those things which are of service when the need is pressing; for example, in old age and times of sickness. And of two things that which leads more directly to the end in view is the better. So too is that which is better for people generally as well as for a particular individual. Again, what can be got is better than what cannot, for it is good in a given case and the other thing is not. And what is at the end of life is better than what is not, since those things are ends in a greater degree which are nearer the end. What aims at reality is better than what aims at appearance. We may define what aims at appearance as what a man will not choose if nobody is to know of his having it. This would seem to show that to receive benefits is more desirable than to confer them, since a man will choose the former even if nobody is to know of it, but it is not the general view that he will choose the latter if nobody knows of it. What a man wants to be is better than what a man wants to seem, for in aiming at that he is aiming more at reality. Hence men say that justice is of small value, since it is more desirable to seem just than to be just, whereas with health it is not so. That is better

than other things which is more useful than they are for a number of different purposes; for example, that which promotes life, good life, pleasure, and noble conduct. For this reason wealth and health are commonly thought to be of the highest value, as possessing all these advantages. Again, that is better than other things which is accompanied both with less pain and with actual pleasure; for here there is more than one advantage; and so here we have the good of feeling pleasure and also the good of not feeling pain. And of two good things that is the better whose addition to a third thing makes a better whole than the addition of the other to the same thing will make. Again, those things which we are seen to possess are better than those which we are not seen to possess, since the former have the air of reality. Hence wealth may be regarded as a greater good if its existence is known to others. That which is dearly prized is better than what is not-the sort of thing that some people have only one of, though others have more like it. Accordingly, blinding a one-eyed man inflicts worse injury than half-blinding a man with two eyes; for the one-eyed man has been robbed of what he dearly prized.

The grounds on which we must base our arguments, when we are speaking for or against a proposal, have now been set forth more or less completely.

8

The most important and effective qualification for success in persuading audiences and speaking well on public affairs is to understand all the forms of government and to discriminate their respective customs, institutions, and interests. For all men are persuaded by considerations of their interest, and their interest lies in the maintenance of the established order. Further, it rests with the supreme authority to give authoritative decisions, and this varies with each form of government; there are as many different supreme authorities as there are different forms of government. The forms of government are four-democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy. The supreme right to judge and decide always rests, therefore, with either a part or the whole of one or other of these governing powers.

A Democracy is a form of government under which the citizens distribute the offices of state among themselves by lot, whereas under oligarchy there is a property qualification, under aristocracy one of education. By education I mean that education which is laid down by the law; for it is those who have been loyal to the national institutions that hold office under an aristocracy. These are bound to be looked upon as "the best men", and it is from this fact that this form of government has derived its name ("the rule of the best"). Monarchy, as the word implies, is the constitution in which one man has authority over all. There are two forms of monarchy: kingship, which is limited by prescribed conditions, and "tyranny", which is not limited by anything.

We must also notice the ends which the various forms of government pursue, since people choose in practice such actions as will lead to the realization of their ends. The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the maintenance of education and national institutions; of tyranny, the protection of the tyrant. It is clear, then, that we must distinguish those particular customs, institutions, and interests which tend to realize the ideal of each constitution, since men choose their means with reference to their ends. But rhetorical persuasion is effected not only by demonstrative but by ethical argument; it helps a speaker to convince us, if we believe that he has certain qualities himself, namely, goodness, or goodwill towards us, or both together. Similarly, we should know the moral qualities characteristic of each form of government, for the special moral character of each is bound to provide us with our most effective means of persuasion in dealing with it. We shall learn the qualities of governments in the same way as we learn the qualities of individuals, since they are revealed in their deliberate acts of choice; and these are determined by the end that inspires them.

We have now considered the objects, immediate or distant, at which we are to aim when urging any proposal, and the grounds on which we are to base our arguments in favour of its utility. We have also briefly considered the means and methods by which we shall gain a good knowledge of the moral qualities and institutions peculiar to the various forms of government-only, however, to the extent demanded by the present occasion; a detailed account of the subject has been given in the Politics.

9

We have now to consider Virtue and Vice, the Noble and the Base, since these are the objects of praise and blame. In doing so, we shall at the same time be finding out how to make our hearers take the required view of our own characters—our second method of persuasion. The ways in which to make them trust the goodness of other people are also the ways in which to make them trust our own. Praise, again, may be serious or frivolous; nor is it always of a human or divine being but often of inanimate things, or of the humblest of the lower animals. Here too we must know on what grounds to argue, and must, therefore, now discuss the subject, though by way of illustration only.

The Noble is that which is both desirable for its own sake and also worthy of praise; or that which is both good and also pleasant because good. If this is a true definition of the Noble, it follows that virtue must be noble, since it is both a good thing and also praiseworthy. Virtue is, according to the usual view, a faculty of providing and preserving good things; or a faculty of conferring many great benefits, and benefits of all kinds on all occasions. The forms of Virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, wisdom. If virtue is a faculty of beneficence, the highest kinds of it must be those which are most useful to others, and for this reason men honour most the just and the courageous, since courage is useful to others in war, justice both in war and in peace. Next comes liberality; liberal people let their money go instead of fighting for it, whereas other people care more for money than for anything else. Justice is the virtue through which everybody enjoys his own possessions in accordance with the law; its opposite is injustice, through which men enjoy the possessions of others in defiance of the law. Courage is the virtue that disposes men to do noble deeds in situations of danger, in accordance with the law and in obedience to its commands; cowardice is the opposite. Temperance is the virtue that disposes us to obey the law where physical pleasures are concerned; incontinence is the opposite. Liberality disposes us to spend money for others' good; illiberality is the opposite. Magnanimity is the virtue that disposes us to do good to others on a large scale; [its opposite is meanness of spirit]. Magnificence is a virtue productive of greatness in matters involving the spending of money. The opposites of these two are smallness of spirit and meanness respectively. Prudence is that virtue of the understanding which enables men to come to wise decisions about the relation to happiness of the goods and evils that have been previously mentioned.

The above is a sufficient account, for our present purpose, of virtue and vice in general, and of their various forms. As to further aspects of the subject, it is not difficult to discern the facts; it is evident that things productive of virtue are noble, as tending towards virtue; and also the effects of virtue, that is, the signs of its presence and the acts to which it leads. And since the signs of virtue, and such acts as it is the mark of a virtuous man to do or have done to him, are noble, it follows that all deeds or signs of courage, and everything done courageously, must be noble things; and so with what is just and actions done justly. (Not, however, actions justly done to us; here justice is unlike the other virtues; "justly" does not always mean "nobly"; when a man is punished, it is more shameful that this should be justly than unjustly done to him). The same is true of the other virtues. Again, those actions are noble for which the reward is simply honour, or honour more than money. So are those in which a man aims at something desirable for some one else's sake; actions good absolutely, such as those a man does for his country without thinking of himself; actions good in their own nature; actions that are not good simply for the individual, since individual interests are selfish. Noble also are those actions whose advantage may be enjoyed after death, as opposed to those whose advantage is enjoyed during one's lifetime: for the latter are more likely to be for one's own sake only. Also, all actions done for the sake of others, since less than other actions are done for one's own sake; and all successes which benefit others and not oneself; and services done to one's benefactors, for this is just; and good deeds generally, since they are not directed to one's own profit. And the opposites of those things of which men feel ashamed, for men are ashamed of saying, doing, or intending to do shameful things. So when Alcacus said

Something I fain would say to thee,  
Only shame restraineth me,

Sappho wrote

If for things good and noble thou wert yearning,  
If to speak baseness were thy tongue not burning,  
No load of shame would on thine eyelids weigh;  
What thou with honour wishest thou wouldst say.

Those things, also, are noble for which men strive anxiously, without feeling fear; for they feel thus about the good things which lead to fair fame. Again, one quality or action is nobler than another if it is that of a naturally finer being: thus a man's will be nobler than a woman's. And those qualities are noble which give more pleasure to other people than to their possessors; hence the nobleness of justice and just actions. It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies and not to come to terms with them; for requital is just, and the just is noble; and not to surrender is a sign of courage. Victory, too, and honour belong to the class of noble things, since they are desirable even when they yield no fruits, and they prove our superiority in good qualities. Things that deserve to be remembered are noble, and the more they deserve this, the nobler they are. So are the things that continue even after death; those which are always attended by honour; those which are exceptional; and those which are possessed by one person alone—these last are more readily remembered than others. So again are possessions that bring no profit, since they are more fitting than others for a gentleman. So are the distinctive qualities of a particular people, and the symbols of what it specially admires, like long hair in Sparta, where this is a mark of a free man, as it is not easy to perform any menial task when one's hair is long. Again, it is noble not to practise any sordid craft, since it is the mark of a free man not to live at another's beck and call. We are also to assume when we wish either to praise a man or blame him that qualities closely allied to those which he actually has are identical with them; for instance, that the cautious man is cold-blooded and treacherous, and that the stupid man is an honest fellow or the thick-skinned man a good-tempered one. We can always idealize any given man by drawing on the virtues akin to his actual qualities; thus we may say that the passionate and excitable man is "outspoken"; or that the arrogant man is "superb" or "impressive". Those who run to extremes will be said to possess the corresponding good qualities; rashness will be called courage, and extravagance generosity. That will be what most people think; and at the same time this method enables an advocate to draw a misleading inference from the motive, arguing that if a man runs into danger needlessly, much more will he do so in a noble cause; and if a man is open-handed to any one and every one, he will be so to his friends also, since it is the extreme form of goodness to be good to everybody.

We must also take into account the nature of our particular audience when making a speech of praise; for, as Socrates used to say, "it is not difficult to praise the Athenians to an Athenian audience." If the audience esteems a given quality, we must say that our hero has that quality, no matter whether we are addressing Scythians or Spartans or philosophers. Everything, in fact, that is esteemed we are to represent as noble. After all, people regard the two things as much the same.

All actions are noble that are appropriate to the man who does them: if, for instance, they are worthy of his ancestors or of his own past career. For it makes for happiness, and is a noble thing, that he should add to the honour he already has. Even inappropriate actions are noble if they are better and nobler than the appropriate ones would be; for instance, if one who was just an average person when all went well becomes a hero in adversity, or if he becomes better and easier to get on with the higher he rises. Compare the saying of Iphicrates, "Think what I was and what I am"; and the epigram on the victor at the Olympic games,

In time past, bearing a yoke on my shoulders,  
of wood unshaven,

and the encomium of Simonides,

A woman whose father, whose husband, whose  
brethren were princes all.

Since we praise a man for what he has actually done, and fine actions are distinguished from others by being intentionally good, we must try to prove that our hero's noble acts are intentional. This is all the easier if we can make out that he has often acted so before, and therefore we must assert coincidences and accidents to have been intended. Produce a number of good actions, all of the same kind, and people will think that they must have been intended, and that they prove the good qualities of the man who did them.

Praise is the expression in words of the eminence of a man's good qualities, and therefore we must display his actions as the product of such qualities. Encomium refers to what he has actually done; the mention of accessories, such as good birth and education, merely helps to make our story credible-good fathers are likely to have good sons, and good training is likely to produce good character. Hence it is only when a man has already done something that we bestow encomiums upon him. Yet the actual deeds are evidence of the doer's character: even if a man has not actually done a given good thing, we shall bestow praise on him, if we are sure that he is the sort of man who would do it. To call any one blest is, it may be added, the same thing as to call him happy; but these are not the same thing as to bestow praise and encomium upon him; the two latter are a part of "calling happy", just as goodness is a part of happiness.

To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of action. The suggestions which would be made in the latter case become encomiums when differently expressed. When we know what action or character is required, then, in order to express these facts as suggestions for action, we have to change and reverse our form of words. Thus the statement "A man should be proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself", if put like this, amounts to a suggestion; to make it into praise we must put it thus, "Since he is proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself." Consequently, whenever you want to praise any one, think what you would urge people to do; and when you want to urge the doing of anything, think what you would praise a man for having done. Since suggestion may or may not forbid an action, the praise into which we convert it must have one or other of two opposite forms of expression accordingly.

There are, also, many useful ways of heightening the effect of praise. We must, for instance, point out that a man is the only one, or the first, or almost the only one who has done something, or that he has done it better than any one else; all these distinctions are honourable. And we must, further, make much of the particular season and occasion of an action, arguing that we could hardly have looked for it just then. If a man has often achieved the same success, we must mention this; that is a strong point; he himself, and not luck, will then be given the credit. So, too, if it is on his account that observances have been devised and instituted to encourage or honour such achievements as his own: thus we may praise Hippolochus because the first encomium ever made was for him, or Harmodius and Aristogeiton because their statues were the first to be put up in the market-place. And we may censure bad men for the opposite reason.

Again, if you cannot find enough to say of a man himself, you may pit him against others, which is what Isocrates used to do owing to his want of familiarity with forensic pleading. The comparison should be with famous men; that will strengthen your case; it is a noble thing to surpass men who are themselves great. It is only natural that methods of "heightening the effect" should be attached particularly to speeches of praise; they aim at proving superiority over others, and any such superiority is a form of nobleness. Hence if you cannot compare your hero with famous men, you should at least compare him with other people generally, since any superiority is held to reveal excellence. And, in general, of the lines of argument which are common to all speeches, this "heightening of effect" is most suitable for declamations, where we take our hero's actions as admitted facts, and our business is simply to invest these with dignity and nobility. "Examples" are most suitable to deliberative speeches; for we judge of future events by divination from past events. Enthymemes are most suitable to forensic speeches; it is our doubts about past events that most admit of arguments showing why a thing must have happened or proving that it did happen.

The above are the general lines on which all, or nearly all, speeches of praise or blame are constructed. We have seen the sort of thing we must bear in mind in making such speeches, and the materials out of which encomiums and censures are made. No special treatment of censure and vituperation is needed. Knowing the above facts, we know their contraries; and it is out of these that speeches of censure are made.

10

We have next to treat of Accusation and Defence, and to enumerate and describe the ingredients of the syllogisms used therein. There are three things we must ascertain first, the nature and number of the incentives to wrong-doing; second, the state of mind of wrongdoers; third, the kind of persons who are wronged, and their condition. We will deal with these questions in order. But before that let us define the act of "wrong-doing".

We may describe "wrong-doing" as injury voluntarily inflicted contrary to law. "Law" is either special or general. By special law I mean that written law which regulates the life of a particular community; by general law, all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere. We do things "voluntarily" when we do them consciously and without constraint. (Not all voluntary acts are deliberate, but all deliberate acts are conscious-no one is ignorant of what he deliberately intends.) The causes of our deliberately intending harmful and wicked acts contrary to law are (1) vice, (2) lack of self-control. For the wrongs a man does to others will correspond to the bad quality or qualities that he himself possesses. Thus it is the mean man who will wrong others about money, the profligate in matters of physical pleasure, the effeminate in matters of comfort, and the coward where danger is concerned-his terror makes him abandon those who are involved in the same danger. The ambitious man does wrong for sake of honour, the quick-tempered from anger, the lover of victory for the sake of victory, the embittered man for the sake of revenge, the stupid man because he has misguided notions of right and wrong, the shameless man because he does not mind what people think of him; and so with the rest-any wrong that any one does to others corresponds to his particular faults of character.

However, this subject has already been cleared up in part in our discussion of the virtues and will be further explained later when we treat of the emotions. We have now to consider the motives and states of mind of wrongdoers, and to whom they do wrong.

Let us first decide what sort of things people are trying to get or avoid when they set about doing wrong to others. For it is plain that the prosecutor must consider, out of all the aims that can ever induce us to do wrong to our neighbours, how many, and which, affect his adversary; while the defendant must consider how many, and which, do not affect him. Now every action of every person either is or is not due to that person himself. Of those not due to himself some are due to chance, the others to necessity; of these latter, again, some are due to compulsion, the others to nature. Consequently all actions that are not due to a man himself are due either to chance or to nature or to compulsion. All actions that are due to a man himself and caused by himself are due either to habit or to rational or irrational craving. Rational craving is a craving for good, i.e. a wish-nobody wishes for anything unless he thinks it good. Irrational craving is twofold, viz. anger and appetite.

Thus every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite. It is superfluous further to distinguish actions according to the doers' ages, moral states, or the like; it is of course true that, for instance, young men do have hot tempers and strong appetites; still, it is not through youth that they act accordingly, but through anger or appetite. Nor, again, is action due to wealth or poverty; it is of course true that poor men, being short of money, do have an appetite for it, and that rich men, being able to command needless pleasures, do have an appetite for such pleasures: but here, again, their actions will be due not to wealth or poverty but to appetite. Similarly, with just men, and unjust men, and all others who are said to act in accordance with their moral qualities, their actions will really be due to one of the causes mentioned-either reasoning or emotion: due, indeed, sometimes to good dispositions and good emotions, and sometimes to bad; but that good qualities should be followed by good emotions, and bad by bad, is merely an accessory fact-it is no doubt true that the temperate man, for instance, because he is temperate, is always and at once attended by healthy opinions and appetites in regard to pleasant things, and the intemperate man by unhealthy ones. So we must ignore such distinctions. Still we must consider what kinds of actions and of people usually go together; for while there are no definite kinds of action associated with the fact that a man is fair or dark, tall or short, it does make a difference if he is young or old, just or unjust. And, generally speaking, all those accessory qualities that cause distinctions of human character are important: e.g. the sense of wealth or poverty, of being lucky or unlucky. This shall be dealt with later-let us now deal first with the rest of the subject before us.

The things that happen by chance are all those whose cause cannot be determined, that have no purpose, and that happen neither always nor usually nor in any fixed way. The definition of chance shows just what they are. Those things happen by nature which have a fixed and internal cause; they take place uniformly, either always or usually. There is no need to discuss in exact detail the things that happen contrary to nature, nor to ask whether they happen in some sense naturally or from some other cause; it would seem that chance is at least partly the cause of such events. Those things happen through compulsion which take place contrary to the desire or reason of the doer, yet

through his own agency. Acts are done from habit which men do because they have often done them before. Actions are due to reasoning when, in view of any of the goods already mentioned, they appear useful either as ends or as means to an end, and are performed for that reason: "for that reason," since even licentious persons perform a certain number of useful actions, but because they are pleasant and not because they are useful. To passion and anger are due all acts of revenge. Revenge and punishment are different things. Punishment is inflicted for the sake of the person punished; revenge for that of the punisher, to satisfy his feelings. (What anger is will be made clear when we come to discuss the emotions.) Appetite is the cause of all actions that appear pleasant. Habit, whether acquired by mere familiarity or by effort, belongs to the class of pleasant things, for there are many actions not naturally pleasant which men perform with pleasure, once they have become used to them. To sum up then, all actions due to ourselves either are or seem to be either good or pleasant. Moreover, as all actions due to ourselves are done voluntarily and actions not due to ourselves are done involuntarily, it follows that all voluntary actions must either be or seem to be either good or pleasant; for I reckon among goods escape from evils or apparent evils and the exchange of a greater evil for a less (since these things are in a sense positively desirable), and likewise I count among pleasures escape from painful or apparently painful things and the exchange of a greater pain for a less. We must ascertain, then, the number and nature of the things that are useful and pleasant. The useful has been previously examined in connexion with political oratory; let us now proceed to examine the pleasant. Our various definitions must be regarded as adequate, even if they are not exact, provided they are clear.

11

We may lay it down that Pleasure is a movement, a movement by which the soul as a whole is consciously brought into its normal state of being; and that Pain is the opposite. If this is what pleasure is, it is clear that the pleasant is what tends to produce this condition, while that which tends to destroy it, or to cause the soul to be brought into the opposite state, is painful. It must therefore be pleasant as a rule to move towards a natural state of being, particularly when a natural process has achieved the complete recovery of that natural state. Habits also are pleasant; for as soon as a thing has become habitual, it is virtually natural; habit is a thing not unlike nature; what happens often is akin to what happens always, natural events happening always, habitual events often. Again, that is pleasant which is not forced on us; for force is unnatural, and that is why what is compulsory, painful, and it has been rightly said

All that is done on compulsion is bitterness unto the soul.

So all acts of concentration, strong effort, and strain are necessarily painful; they all involve compulsion and force, unless we are accustomed to them, in which case it is custom that makes them pleasant. The opposites to these are pleasant; and hence ease, freedom from toil, relaxation, amusement, rest, and sleep belong to the class of pleasant things; for these are all free from any element of compulsion. Everything, too, is pleasant for which we have the desire within us, since desire is the craving for pleasure. Of the desires some are irrational, some associated with reason. By irrational I mean those which do not arise from any opinion held by the mind. Of this kind are those known as "natural"; for instance, those originating in the body, such as the desire for nourishment, namely hunger and thirst, and a separate kind of desire answering to each kind of nourishment; and the desires connected with taste and sex and sensations of touch in general; and those of smell, hearing, and vision. Rational desires are those which we are induced to have; there are many things we desire to see or get because we have been told of them and induced to believe them good. Further, pleasure is the consciousness through the senses of a certain kind of emotion; but imagination is a feeble sort of sensation, and there will always be in the mind of a man who remembers or expects something an image or picture of what he remembers or expects. If this is so, it is clear that memory and expectation also, being accompanied by sensation, may be accompanied by pleasure. It follows that anything pleasant is either present and perceived, past and remembered, or future and expected, since we perceive present pleasures, remember past ones, and expect future ones. Now the things that are pleasant to remember are not only those that, when actually perceived as present, were pleasant, but also some things that were not, provided that their results have subsequently proved noble and good. Hence the words

Sweet 'tis when rescued to remember pain,

and



Even his griefs are a joy long after to one that remembers  
All that he wrought and endured.

The reason of this is that it is pleasant even to be merely free from evil. The things it is pleasant to expect are those that when present are felt to afford us either great delight or great but not painful benefit. And in general, all the things that delight us when they are present also do so, as a rule, when we merely remember or expect them. Hence even being angry is pleasant-Homer said of wrath that

Sweeter it is by far than the honeycomb dripping with sweetness -

for no one grows angry with a person on whom there is no prospect of taking vengeance, and we feel comparatively little anger, or none at all, with those who are much our superiors in power. Some pleasant feeling is associated with most of our appetites we are enjoying either the memory of a past pleasure or the expectation of a future one, just as persons down with fever, during their attacks of thirst, enjoy remembering the drinks they have had and looking forward to having more. So also a lover enjoys talking or writing about his loved one, or doing any little thing connected with him; all these things recall him to memory and make him actually present to the eye of imagination. Indeed, it is always the first sign of love, that besides enjoying some one's presence, we remember him when he is gone, and feel pain as well as pleasure, because he is there no longer. Similarly there is an element of pleasure even in mourning and lamentation for the departed. There is grief, indeed, at his loss, but pleasure in remembering him and as it were seeing him before us in his deeds and in his life. We can well believe the poet when he says

He spake, and in each man's heart he awakened  
the love of lament.

Revenge, too, is pleasant; it is pleasant to get anything that it is painful to fail to get, and angry people suffer extreme pain when they fail to get their revenge; but they enjoy the prospect of getting it. Victory also is pleasant, and not merely to "bad losers", but to every one; the winner sees himself in the light of a champion, and everybody has a more or less keen appetite for being that. The pleasantness of victory implies of course that combative sports and intellectual contests are pleasant (since in these it often happens that some one wins) and also games like knuckle-bones, ball, dice, and draughts. And similarly with the serious sports; some of these become pleasant when one is accustomed to them; while others are pleasant from the first, like hunting with hounds, or indeed any kind of hunting. For where there is competition, there is victory. That is why forensic pleading and debating contests are pleasant to those who are accustomed to them and have the capacity for them. Honour and good repute are among the most pleasant things of all; they make a man see himself in the character of a fine fellow, especially when he is credited with it by people whom he thinks good judges. His neighbours are better judges than people at a distance; his associates and fellow-countrymen better than strangers; his contemporaries better than posterity; sensible persons better than foolish ones; a large number of people better than a small number: those of the former class, in each case, are the more likely to be good judges of him. Honour and credit bestowed by those whom you think much inferior to yourself-e.g. children or animals-you do not value: not for its own sake, anyhow: if you do value it, it is for some other reason. Friends belong to the class of pleasant things; it is pleasant to love-if you love wine, you certainly find it delightful: and it is pleasant to be loved, for this too makes a man see himself as the possessor of goodness, a thing that every being that has a feeling for it desires to possess: to be loved means to be valued for one's own personal qualities. To be admired is also pleasant, simply because of the honour implied. Flattery and flatterers are pleasant: the flatterer is a man who, you believe, admires and likes To do the same thing often is pleasant, since, as we saw, anything habitual is pleasant. And to change is also pleasant: change means an approach to nature, whereas invariable repetition of anything causes the excessive prolongation of a settled condition: therefore, says the poet,

Change is in all things sweet.

That is why what comes to us only at long intervals is pleasant, whether it be a person or a thing; for it is a change from what we had before, and, besides, what comes only at long intervals has the value of rarity. Learning things and wondering at things are also pleasant as a rule; wondering implies the desire of learning, so that the object of

wonder is an object of desire; while in learning one is brought into one's natural condition. Conferring and receiving benefits belong to the class of pleasant things; to receive a benefit is to get what one desires; to confer a benefit implies both possession and superiority, both of which are things we try to attain. It is because beneficent acts are pleasant that people find it pleasant to put their neighbours straight again and to supply what they lack. Again, since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation must be pleasant—for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry and every product of skilful imitation; this latter, even if the object imitated is not itself pleasant; for it is not the object itself which here gives delight; the spectator draws inferences ("That is a so-and-so") and thus learns something fresh. Dramatic turns of fortune and hairbreadth escapes from perils are pleasant, because we feel all such things are wonderful.

And since what is natural is pleasant, and things akin to each other seem natural to each other, therefore all kindred and similar things are usually pleasant to each other; for instance, one man, horse, or young person is pleasant to another man, horse, or young person. Hence the proverbs "mate delights mate", "like to like", "beast knows beast", "jackdaw to jackdaw", and the rest of them. But since everything like and akin to oneself is pleasant, and since every man is himself more like and akin to himself than any one else is, it follows that all of us must be more or less fond of ourselves. For all this resemblance and kinship is present particularly in the relation of an individual to himself. And because we are all fond of ourselves, it follows that what is our own is pleasant to all of us, as for instance our own deeds and words. That is why we are usually fond of our flatterers, [our lovers,] and honour; also of our children, for our children are our own work. It is also pleasant to complete what is defective, for the whole thing thereupon becomes our own work. And since power over others is very pleasant, it is pleasant to be thought wise, for practical wisdom secures us power over others. (Scientific wisdom is also pleasant, because it is the knowledge of many wonderful things.) Again, since most of us are ambitious, it must be pleasant to disparage our neighbours as well as to have power over them. It is pleasant for a man to spend his time over what he feels he can do best; just as the poet says,

To that he bends himself,  
To that each day allots most time, wherein  
He is indeed the best part of himself.

Similarly, since amusement and every kind of relaxation and laughter too belong to the class of pleasant things, it follows that ludicrous things are pleasant, whether men, words, or deeds. We have discussed the ludicrous separately in the treatise on the Art of Poetry.

So much for the subject of pleasant things: by considering their opposites we can easily see what things are unpleasant.

12

The above are the motives that make men do wrong to others; we are next to consider the states of mind in which they do it, and the persons to whom they do it.

They must themselves suppose that the thing can be done, and done by them: either that they can do it without being found out, or that if they are found out they can escape being punished, or that if they are punished the disadvantage will be less than the gain for themselves or those they care for. The general subject of apparent possibility and impossibility will be handled later on, since it is relevant not only to forensic but to all kinds of speaking. But it may here be said that people think that they can themselves most easily do wrong to others without being punished for it if they possess eloquence, or practical ability, or much legal experience, or a large body of friends, or a great deal of money. Their confidence is greatest if they personally possess the advantages mentioned: but even without them they are satisfied if they have friends or supporters or partners who do possess them: they can thus both commit their crimes and escape being found out and punished for committing them. They are also safe, they think, if they are on good terms with their victims or with the judges who try them. Their victims will in that case not be on their guard against being wronged, and will make some arrangement with them instead of prosecuting; while their judges will favour them because they like them, either letting them off altogether or imposing light sentences. They are not likely to be found out if their appearance contradicts the charges that might be brought against them: for instance, a

weakling is unlikely to be charged with violent assault, or a poor and ugly man with adultery. Public and open injuries are the easiest to do, because nobody could at all suppose them possible, and therefore no precautions are taken. The same is true of crimes so great and terrible that no man living could be suspected of them: here too no precautions are taken. For all men guard against ordinary offences, just as they guard against ordinary diseases; but no one takes precautions against a disease that nobody has ever had. You feel safe, too, if you have either no enemies or a great many; if you have none, you expect not to be watched and therefore not to be detected; if you have a great many, you will be watched, and therefore people will think you can never risk an attempt on them, and you can defend your innocence by pointing out that you could never have taken such a risk. You may also trust to hide your crime by the way you do it or the place you do it in, or by some convenient means of disposal.

You may feel that even if you are found out you can stave off a trial, or have it postponed, or corrupt your judges: or that even if you are sentenced you can avoid paying damages, or can at least postpone doing so for a long time: or that you are so badly off that you will have nothing to lose. You may feel that the gain to be got by wrong-doing is great or certain or immediate, and that the penalty is small or uncertain or distant. It may be that the advantage to be gained is greater than any possible retribution: as in the case of despotic power, according to the popular view. You may consider your crimes as bringing you solid profit, while their punishment is nothing more than being called bad names. Or the opposite argument may appeal to you: your crimes may bring you some credit (thus you may, incidentally, be avenging your father or mother, like Zeno), whereas the punishment may amount to a fine, or banishment, or something of that sort. People may be led on to wrong others by either of these motives or feelings; but no man by both—they will affect people of quite opposite characters. You may be encouraged by having often escaped detection or punishment already; or by having often tried and failed; for in crime, as in war, there are men who will always refuse to give up the struggle. You may get your pleasure on the spot and the pain later, or the gain on the spot and the loss later. That is what appeals to weak-willed persons—and weakness of will may be shown with regard to all the objects of desire. It may on the contrary appeal to you as it does appeal to self-controlled and sensible people—that the pain and loss are immediate, while the pleasure and profit come later and last longer. You may feel able to make it appear that your crime was due to chance, or to necessity, or to natural causes, or to habit: in fact, to put it generally, as if you had failed to do right rather than actually done wrong. You may be able to trust other people to judge you equitably. You may be stimulated by being in want: which may mean that you want necessities, as poor people do, or that you want luxuries, as rich people do. You may be encouraged by having a particularly good reputation, because that will save you from being suspected: or by having a particularly bad one, because nothing you are likely to do will make it worse.

The above, then, are the various states of mind in which a man sets about doing wrong to others. The kind of people to whom he does wrong, and the ways in which he does it, must be considered next. The people to whom he does it are those who have what he wants himself, whether this means necessities or luxuries and materials for enjoyment. His victims may be far off or near at hand. If they are near, he gets his profit quickly; if they are far off, vengeance is slow, as those think who plunder the Carthaginians. They may be those who are trustful instead of being cautious and watchful, since all such people are easy to elude. Or those who are too easy-going to have enough energy to prosecute an offender. Or sensitive people, who are not apt to show fight over questions of money. Or those who have been wronged already by many people, and yet have not prosecuted; such men must surely be the proverbial "Mysian prey". Or those who have either never or often been wronged before; in neither case will they take precautions; if they have never been wronged they think they never will, and if they have often been wronged they feel that surely it cannot happen again. Or those whose character has been attacked in the past, or is exposed to attack in the future: they will be too much frightened of the judges to make up their minds to prosecute, nor can they win their case if they do: this is true of those who are hated or unpopular. Another likely class of victim is those who their injurer can pretend have, themselves or through their ancestors or friends, treated badly, or intended to treat badly, the man himself, or his ancestors, or those he cares for; as the proverb says, "wickedness needs but a pretext". A man may wrong his enemies, because that is pleasant: he may equally wrong his friends, because that is easy. Then there are those who have no friends, and those who lack eloquence and practical capacity; these will either not attempt to prosecute, or they will come to terms, or failing that they will lose their case. There are those whom it does not pay to waste time in waiting for trial or damages, such as foreigners and small farmers; they will settle for a trifle, and always be ready to leave off. Also those who have themselves wronged others, either often, or in the same way as they are now being wronged themselves—for it is felt that next to no wrong is done to people when it is the

same wrong as they have often themselves done to others: if, for instance, you assault a man who has been accustomed to behave with violence to others. So too with those who have done wrong to others, or have meant to, or mean to, or are likely to do so; there is something fine and pleasant in wronging such persons, it seems as though almost no wrong were done. Also those by doing wrong to whom we shall be gratifying our friends, or those we admire or love, or our masters, or in general the people by reference to whom we mould our lives. Also those whom we may wrong and yet be sure of equitable treatment. Also those against whom we have had any grievance, or any previous differences with them, as Callippus had when he behaved as he did to Dion: here too it seems as if almost no wrong were being done. Also those who are on the point of being wronged by others if we fail to wrong them ourselves, since here we feel we have no time left for thinking the matter over. So Aenesidemus is said to have sent the "cottabus" prize to Gelon, who had just reduced a town to slavery, because Gelon had got there first and forestalled his own attempt. Also those by wronging whom we shall be able to do many righteous acts; for we feel that we can then easily cure the harm done. Thus Jason the Thessalian said that it is a duty to do some unjust acts in order to be able to do many just ones.

Among the kinds of wrong done to others are those that are done universally, or at least commonly: one expects to be forgiven for doing these. Also those that can easily be kept dark, as where things that can rapidly be consumed like eatables are concerned, or things that can easily be changed in shape, colour, or combination, or things that can easily be stowed away almost anywhere-portable objects that you can stow away in small corners, or things so like others of which you have plenty already that nobody can tell the difference. There are also wrongs of a kind that shame prevents the victim speaking about, such as outrages done to the women in his household or to himself or to his sons. Also those for which you would be thought very litigious to prosecute any one-trifling wrongs, or wrongs for which people are usually excused.

The above is a fairly complete account of the circumstances under which men do wrong to others, of the sort of wrongs they do, of the sort of persons to whom they do them, and of their reasons for doing them.

13

It will now be well to make a complete classification of just and unjust actions. We may begin by observing that they have been defined relatively to two kinds of law, and also relatively to two classes of persons. By the two kinds of law I mean particular law and universal law. Particular law is that which each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other. It is this that Sophocles' Antigone clearly means when she says that the burial of Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition: she means that it was just by nature.

Not of to-day or yesterday it is,  
But lives eternal: none can date its birth.

And so Empedocles, when he bids us kill no living creature, says that doing this is not just for some people while unjust for others,

Nay, but, an all-embracing law, through the realms of the sky  
Unbroken it stretcheth, and over the earth's immensity.

And as Alcidas says in his Messeniac Oration....

The actions that we ought to do or not to do have also been divided into two classes as affecting either the whole community or some one of its members. From this point of view we can perform just or unjust acts in either of two ways-towards one definite person, or towards the community. The man who is guilty of adultery or assault is doing wrong to some definite person; the man who avoids service in the army is doing wrong to the community.

Thus the whole class of unjust actions may be divided into two classes, those affecting the community, and those affecting one or more other persons. We will next, before going further, remind ourselves of what "being wronged"

means. Since it has already been settled that "doing a wrong" must be intentional, "being wronged" must consist in having an injury done to you by some one who intends to do it. In order to be wronged, a man must (1) suffer actual harm, (2) suffer it against his will. The various possible forms of harm are clearly explained by our previous, separate discussion of goods and evils. We have also seen that a voluntary action is one where the doer knows what he is doing. We now see that every accusation must be of an action affecting either the community or some individual. The doer of the action must either understand and intend the action, or not understand and intend it. In the former case, he must be acting either from deliberate choice or from passion. (Anger will be discussed when we speak of the passions the motives for crime and the state of mind of the criminal have already been discussed.) Now it often happens that a man will admit an act, but will not admit the prosecutor's label for the act nor the facts which that label implies. He will admit that he took a thing but not that he "stole" it; that he struck some one first, but not that he committed "outrage"; that he had intercourse with a woman, but not that he committed "adultery"; that he is guilty of theft, but not that he is guilty of "sacrilege", the object stolen not being consecrated; that he has encroached, but not that he has "encroached on State lands"; that he has been in communication with the enemy, but not that he has been guilty of "treason". Here therefore we must be able to distinguish what is theft, outrage, or adultery, from what is not, if we are to be able to make the justice of our case clear, no matter whether our aim is to establish a man's guilt or to establish his innocence. Wherever such charges are brought against a man, the question is whether he is or is not guilty of a criminal offence. It is deliberate purpose that constitutes wickedness and criminal guilt, and such names as "outrage" or "theft" imply deliberate purpose as well as the mere action. A blow does not always amount to "outrage", but only if it is struck with some such purpose as to insult the man struck or gratify the striker himself. Nor does taking a thing without the owner's knowledge always amount to "theft", but only if it is taken with the intention of keeping it and injuring the owner. And as with these charges, so with all the others.

We saw that there are two kinds of right and wrong conduct towards others, one provided for by written ordinances, the other by unwritten. We have now discussed the kind about which the laws have something to say. The other kind has itself two varieties. First, there is the conduct that springs from exceptional goodness or badness, and is visited accordingly with censure and loss of honour, or with praise and increase of honour and decorations: for instance, gratitude to, or requital of, our benefactors, readiness to help our friends, and the like. The second kind makes up for the defects of a community's written code of law. This is what we call equity; people regard it as just; it is, in fact, the sort of justice which goes beyond the written law. Its existence partly is and partly is not intended by legislators; not intended, where they have noticed no defect in the law; intended, where they find themselves unable to define things exactly, and are obliged to legislate as if that held good always which in fact only holds good usually; or where it is not easy to be complete owing to the endless possible cases presented, such as the kinds and sizes of weapons that may be used to inflict wounds—a lifetime would be too short to make out a complete list of these. If, then, a precise statement is impossible and yet legislation is necessary, the law must be expressed in wide terms; and so, if a man has no more than a finger-ring on his hand when he lifts it to strike or actually strikes another man, he is guilty of a criminal act according to the unwritten words of the law; but he is innocent really, and it is equity that declares him to be so. From this definition of equity it is plain what sort of actions, and what sort of persons, are equitable or the reverse. Equity must be applied to forgivable actions; and it must make us distinguish between criminal acts on the one hand, and errors of judgement, or misfortunes, on the other. (A "misfortune" is an act, not due to moral badness, that has unexpected results: an "error of judgement" is an act, also not due to moral badness, that has results that might have been expected: a "criminal act" has results that might have been expected, but is due to moral badness, for that is the source of all actions inspired by our appetites.) Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature; to think less about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he said than about what he meant; not to consider the actions of the accused so much as his intentions, nor this or that detail so much as the whole story; to ask not what a man is now but what he has always or usually been. It bids us remember benefits rather than injuries, and benefits received rather than benefits conferred; to be patient when we are wronged; to settle a dispute by negotiation and not by force; to prefer arbitration to motion—for an arbitrator goes by the equity of a case, a judge by the strict law, and arbitration was invented with the express purpose of securing full power for equity.

The above may be taken as a sufficient account of the nature of equity.

14

The worse of two acts of wrong done to others is that which is prompted by the worse disposition. Hence the most trifling acts may be the worst ones; as when Callistratus charged Melanopus with having cheated the temple-builders of three consecrated half-obols. The converse is true of just acts. This is because the greater is here potentially contained in the less: there is no crime that a man who has stolen three consecrated half-obols would shrink from committing. Sometimes, however, the worse act is reckoned not in this way but by the greater harm that it does. Or it may be because no punishment for it is severe enough to be adequate; or the harm done may be incurable-a difficult and even hopeless crime to defend; or the sufferer may not be able to get his injurer legally punished, a fact that makes the harm incurable, since legal punishment and chastisement are the proper cure. Or again, the man who has suffered wrong may have inflicted some fearful punishment on himself; then the doer of the wrong ought in justice to receive a still more fearful punishment. Thus Sophocles, when pleading for retribution to Euctemon, who had cut his own throat because of the outrage done to him, said he would not fix a penalty less than the victim had fixed for himself. Again, a man's crime is worse if he has been the first man, or the only man, or almost the only man, to commit it: or if it is by no means the first time he has gone seriously wrong in the same way: or if his crime has led to the thinking-out and invention of measures to prevent and punish similar crimes-thus in Argos a penalty is inflicted on a man on whose account a law is passed, and also on those on whose account the prison was built: or if a crime is specially brutal, or specially deliberate: or if the report of it awakes more terror than pity. There are also such rhetorically effective ways of putting it as the following: That the accused has disregarded and broken not one but many solemn obligations like oaths, promises, pledges, or rights of intermarriage between states-here the crime is worse because it consists of many crimes; and that the crime was committed in the very place where criminals are punished, as for example perjurers do-it is argued that a man who will commit a crime in a law-court would commit it anywhere. Further, the worse deed is that which involves the doer in special shame; that whereby a man wrongs his benefactors-for he does more than one wrong, by not merely doing them harm but failing to do them good; that which breaks the unwritten laws of justice-the better sort of man will be just without being forced to be so, and the written laws depend on force while the unwritten ones do not. It may however be argued otherwise, that the crime is worse which breaks the written laws: for the man who commits crimes for which terrible penalties are provided will not hesitate over crimes for which no penalty is provided at all.-So much, then, for the comparative badness of criminal actions.

15

There are also the so-called "non-technical" means of persuasion; and we must now take a cursory view of these, since they are specially characteristic of forensic oratory. They are five in number: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, oaths.

First, then, let us take laws and see how they are to be used in persuasion and dissuasion, in accusation and defence. If the written law tells against our case, clearly we must appeal to the universal law, and insist on its greater equity and justice. We must argue that the juror's oath "I will give my verdict according to honest opinion" means that one will not simply follow the letter of the written law. We must urge that the principles of equity are permanent and changeless, and that the universal law does not change either, for it is the law of nature, whereas written laws often do change. This is the bearing the lines in Sophocles' *Antigone*, where Antigone pleads that in burying her brother she had broken Creon's law, but not the unwritten law:

Not of to-day or yesterday they are,  
But live eternal: (none can date their birth.)  
Not I would fear the wrath of any man  
(And brave God's vengeance) for defying these.

We shall argue that justice indeed is true and profitable, but that sham justice is not, and that consequently the written law is not, because it does not fulfil the true purpose of law. Or that justice is like silver, and must be assayed by the judges, if the genuine is to be distinguished from the counterfeit. Or that the better a man is, the more he will follow and abide by the unwritten law in preference to the written. Or perhaps that the law in question contradicts

some other highly-esteemed law, or even contradicts itself. Thus it may be that one law will enact that all contracts must be held binding, while another forbids us ever to make illegal contracts. Or if a law is ambiguous, we shall turn it about and consider which construction best fits the interests of justice or utility, and then follow that way of looking at it. Or if, though the law still exists, the situation to meet which it was passed exists no longer, we must do our best to prove this and to combat the law thereby. If however the written law supports our case, we must urge that the oath "to give my verdict according to my honest opinion" not meant to make the judges give a verdict that is contrary to the law, but to save them from the guilt of perjury if they misunderstand what the law really means. Or that no one chooses what is absolutely good, but every one what is good for himself. Or that not to use the laws is as ahas to have no laws at all. Or that, as in the other arts, it does not pay to try to be cleverer than the doctor: for less harm comes from the doctor's mistakes than from the growing habit of disobeying authority. Or that trying to be cleverer than the laws is just what is forbidden by those codes of law that are accounted best.-So far as the laws are concerned, the above discussion is probably sufficient.

As to witnesses, they are of two kinds, the ancient and the recent; and these latter, again, either do or do not share in the risks of the trial. By "ancient" witnesses I mean the poets and all other notable persons whose judgements are known to all. Thus the Athenians appealed to Homer as a witness about Salamis; and the men of Tenedos not long ago appealed to Periander of Corinth in their dispute with the people of Sigeum; and Cleophon supported his accusation of Critias by quoting the elegiac verse of Solon, maintaining that discipline had long been slack in the family of Critias, or Solon would never have written,

Pray thee, bid the red-haired Critias do what  
his father commands him.

These witnesses are concerned with past events. As to future events we shall also appeal to soothsayers: thus Themistocles quoted the oracle about "the wooden wall" as a reason for engaging the enemy's fleet. Further, proverbs are, as has been said, one form of evidence. Thus if you are urging somebody not to make a friend of an old man, you will appeal to the proverb,

Never show an old man kindness.

Or if you are urging that he who has made away with fathers should also make away with their sons, quote,

Fool, who slayeth the father and leaveth his sons to avenge him.

"Recent" witnesses are well-known people who have expressed their opinions about some disputed matter: such opinions will be useful support for subsequent disputants on the same oints: thus Eubulus used in the law-courts against the reply Plato had made to Archibius, "It has become the regular custom in this country to admit that one is a scoundrel". There are also those witnesses who share the risk of punishment if their evidence is pronounced false. These are valid witnesses to the fact that an action was or was not done, that something is or is not the case; they are not valid witnesses to the quality of an action, to its being just or unjust, useful or harmful. On such questions of quality the opinion of detached persons is highly trustworthy. Most trustworthy of all are the "ancient" witnesses, since they cannot be corrupted.

In dealing with the evidence of witnesses, the following are useful arguments. If you have no witnesses on your side, you will argue that the judges must decide from what is probable; that this is meant by "giving a verdict in accordance with one's honest opinion"; that probabilities cannot be bribed to mislead the court; and that probabilities are never convicted of perjury. If you have witnesses, and the other man has not, you will argue that probabilities cannot be put on their trial, and that we could do without the evidence of witnesses altogether if we need do no more than balance the pleas advanced on either side.

The evidence of witnesses may refer either to ourselves or to our opponent; and either to questions of fact or to questions of personal character: so, clearly, we need never be at a loss for useful evidence. For if we have no evidence of fact supporting our own case or telling against that of our opponent, at least we can always find

evidence to prove our own worth or our opponent's worthlessness. Other arguments about a witness-that he is a friend or an enemy or neutral, or has a good, bad, or indifferent reputation, and any other such distinctions-we must construct upon the same general lines as we use for the regular rhetorical proofs.

Concerning contracts argument can be so far employed as to increase or diminish their importance and their credibility; we shall try to increase both if they tell in our favour, and to diminish both if they tell in favour of our opponent. Now for confirming or upsetting the credibility of contracts the procedure is just the same as for dealing with witnesses, for the credit to be attached to contracts depends upon the character of those who have signed them or have the custody of them. The contract being once admitted genuine, we must insist on its importance, if it supports our case. We may argue that a contract is a law, though of a special and limited kind; and that, while contracts do not of course make the law binding, the law does make any lawful contract binding, and that the law itself as a whole is a of contract, so that any one who disregards or repudiates any contract is repudiating the law itself. Further, most business relations-those, namely, that are voluntary-are regulated by contracts, and if these lose their binding force, human intercourse ceases to exist. We need not go very deep to discover the other appropriate arguments of this kind. If, however, the contract tells against us and for our opponents, in the first place those arguments are suitable which we can use to fight a law that tells against us. We do not regard ourselves as bound to observe a bad law which it was a mistake ever to pass: and it is ridiculous to suppose that we are bound to observe a bad and mistaken contract. Again, we may argue that the duty of the judge as umpire is to decide what is just, and therefore he must ask where justice lies, and not what this or that document means. And that it is impossible to pervert justice by fraud or by force, since it is founded on nature, but a party to a contract may be the victim of either fraud or force. Moreover, we must see if the contract contravenes either universal law or any written law of our own or another country; and also if it contradicts any other previous or subsequent contract; arguing that the subsequent is the binding contract, or else that the previous one was right and the subsequent one fraudulent-whichever way suits us. Further, we must consider the question of utility, noting whether the contract is against the interest of the judges or not; and so on-these arguments are as obvious as the others.

Examination by torture is one form of evidence, to which great weight is often attached because it is in a sense compulsory. Here again it is not hard to point out the available grounds for magnifying its value, if it happens to tell in our favour, and arguing that it is the only form of evidence that is infallible; or, on the other hand, for refuting it if it tells against us and for our opponent, when we may say what is true of torture of every kind alike, that people under its compulsion tell lies quite as often as they tell the truth, sometimes persistently refusing to tell the truth, sometimes recklessly making a false charge in order to be let off sooner. We ought to be able to quote cases, familiar to the judges, in which this sort of thing has actually happened. [We must say that evidence under torture is not trustworthy, the fact being that many men whether thick-witted, tough-skinned, or stout of heart endure their ordeal nobly, while cowards and timid men are full of boldness till they see the ordeal of these others: so that no trust can be placed in evidence under torture.]

In regard to oaths, a fourfold division can be made. A man may either both offer and accept an oath, or neither, or one without the other-that is, he may offer an oath but not accept one, or accept an oath but not offer one. There is also the situation that arises when an oath has already been sworn either by himself or by his opponent.

If you refuse to offer an oath, you may argue that men do not hesitate to perjure themselves; and that if your opponent does swear, you lose your money, whereas, if he does not, you think the judges will decide against him; and that the risk of an unfavourable verdict is prefer, able, since you trust the judges and do not trust him.

If you refuse to accept an oath, you may argue that an oath is always paid for; that you would of course have taken it if you had been a rascal, since if you are a rascal you had better make something by it, and you would in that case have to swear in order to succeed. Thus your refusal, you argue, must be due to high principle, not to fear of perjury: and you may aptly quote the saying of Xenophanes,

"Tis not fair that he who fears not God  
should challenge him who doth.



It is as if a strong man were to challenge a weakling to strike, or be struck by, him.

If you agree to accept an oath, you may argue that you trust yourself but not your opponent; and that (to invert the remark of Xenophanes) the fair thing is for the impious man to offer the oath and for the pious man to accept it; and that it would be monstrous if you yourself were unwilling to accept an oath in a case where you demand that the judges should do so before giving their verdict. If you wish to offer an oath, you may argue that piety disposes you to commit the issue to the gods; and that your opponent ought not to want other judges than himself, since you leave the decision with him; and that it is outrageous for your opponents to refuse to swear about this question, when they insist that others should do so.

Now that we see how we are to argue in each case separately, we see also how we are to argue when they occur in pairs, namely, when you are willing to accept the oath but not to offer it; to offer it but not to accept it; both to accept and to offer it; or to do neither. These are of course combinations of the cases already mentioned, and so your arguments also must be combinations of the arguments already mentioned.

If you have already sworn an oath that contradicts your present one, you must argue that it is not perjury, since perjury is a crime, and a crime must be a voluntary action, whereas actions due to the force or fraud of others are involuntary. You must further reason from this that perjury depends on the intention and not on the spoken words. But if it is your opponent who has already sworn an oath that contradicts his present one, you must say that if he does not abide by his oaths he is the enemy of society, and that this is the reason why men take an oath before administering the laws. 'My opponents insist that you, the judges, must abide by the oath you have sworn, and yet they are not abiding by their own oaths.' And there are other arguments which may be used to magnify the importance of the oath. [So much, then, for the "non-technical" modes of persuasion.]

## 2. *Rhetorica ad Herennium*

### Book I

[1] Etsi [in] negotiis familiaribus impediti vix satis otium studio suppeditare possumus et id ipsum, quod datur otii, libentius in philosophia consumere consuevimus, tamem tua nos, Gai Herenni, voluntas commovit, ut de ratione dicendi conscriberemus, ne aut tua causa noluisse aut fugisse nos laborem putares. Et eo studiosius hoc negotium suscepimus, quod te non sine causa velle cognoscere rhetoricam intellegebamus: non enim in se parum fructus habet copia dicendi et commoditas orationis, si recta intellegentia et definita animi moderatione gubernetur. Quas ob res illa, quae Graeci scriptores inanis adrogantiae causa sibi adsumpserunt, reliquimus. Nam illi, ne parum multa scisse viderentur, ea conquisierunt, quae nihil adtinebant, ut ars difficilior cognitu putaretur, nos autem ea, quae videbantur ad rationem dicendi pertinere, sumpsimus. Non enim spe quaestus aut gloria commoti venimus ad scribendum, quemadmodum ceteri, sed ut industria nostra tuae morem geramus voluntati. Nunc, ne nimium longa sumatur oratio, de re dicere incipiemus, [sed] si te unum illud monuerimus, artem sine adsiduitate dicendi non multum iuvare, ut intellegas hanc rationem praeceptionis ad exercitationem adcommodari oportere.

1 My private affairs keep me so busy that I can hardly find enough leisure to devote to studies, and the little that is vouchsafed to me I have usually preferred to spend on philosophy. Yet your desire, Gaius Herennius, has spurred me to compose a work on the Theory of Public Speaking, lest you should suppose that in a matter which concerns you I either lacked the will or shirked the labour. And I have undertaken this project the more gladly because I knew that you had good grounds in wishing to learn rhetoric, for it is true that copiousness and facility in expression bear abundant fruit, if controlled by proper knowledge and a strict discipline of the mind.

That is why I have omitted to treat those topics which, for the sake of futile self-assertion, Greek writers<sup>1</sup> have adopted. For they, from fear of appearing to know too little, have gone in quest of notions irrelevant to the art, in order that the art might seem more difficult to understand. I, on the other hand, have treated those topics which seemed pertinent to the theory of public speaking. I have not been moved by hope of gain<sup>2</sup> or desire for glory, as the rest have been, in undertaking to write, but have done so in order that, by my painstaking work, I may gratify your wish. To avoid prolixity, I shall now begin my discussion of the subject, as soon as I have given you this one injunction: Theory without continuous practice in speaking is of little avail; from this you may understand that the precepts of theory offered ought to be applied in practice.

[2] Oratoris officium est de iis rebus posse dicere, quae res ad usum civilem moribus et legibus constitutae sunt, cum adsensione auditorum, quoad eius fieri poterit.

2 The task of the public speaker is to discuss capably those matters which law and custom have fixed for the uses of citizenship, and to secure as far as possible the agreement of his hearers. There are three kinds of causes which the speaker must treat: Epideictic, Deliberative, and Judicial. The epideictic kind is devoted to the praise or censure of some particular person. The deliberative consists in the discussion of policy and embraces persuasion and dissuasion. The judicial is based on legal controversy, and comprises criminal prosecution or civil suit, and defence.

Tria genera sunt causarum, quae recipere debet orator: demonstrativum, deliberativum, iudiciale.

Demonstrativum est, quod tribuitur in alicuius certae personae laudem vel vituperationem.

Deliberativum est in consultatione, quod habet in se suasionem et dissuasionem.

Now I shall explain what faculties the speaker should possess, and then show the proper means of treating these causes.<sup>8</sup>

Iudiciale est, quod positum est in controversia et quod habet accusationem aut petitionem cum

defensione.

Nunc quas res oratorem habere oporteat, docebimus, deinde quo modo has causas tractari conveniat, ostendemus.

[3] Oportet igitur esse in oratore inventionem, dispositionem, elocutionem, memoriam, pronuntiationem.

Inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similium, quae causam probabilem reddant.

Dispositio est ordo et distributio rerum, quae demonstrat, quid quibus locis sit conlocandum.

Elocutio est idoneorum verborum et sententiarum ad inventionem adcommodatio.

Memoria est firma animi rerum et verborum et dispositionis perceptio.

Pronuntiatio est vocis, vultus, gestus moderatio cum venustate.

Haec omnia tribus rebus adsequi poterimus: arte, imitatione, exercitatione.

Ars est praeceptio, quae dat certam viam rationemque dicendi.

Imitatio est, qua inpellimur cum diligenti ratione ut aliquorum similes in dicendo valeamus esse.

Exercitatio est adsiduus usus consuetudineque dicendi.

Quoniam ergo demonstratum est, quas causas oratorem recipere quasque res habere conveniat, nunc, quemadmodum possit oratio ad rationem oratoris officii adcommodari, dicendum videtur.

[4] INVENTIO in sex partes orationis consumitur: in exordium, narrationem, divisionem, confirmationem, confutationem, conclusionem.

Exordium est principium orationis, per quod animus auditoris constituitur ad audiendum.

3 The speaker, then, should possess the faculties of Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory, and Delivery. Invention is the devising of matter, true or plausible, that would make the case convincing. Arrangement is the ordering and distribution of the matter, making clear the place to which each thing is to be assigned. Style is the adaptation of suitable words and sentences to the matter devised. Memory is the firm retention in the mind of the matter, words, and arrangement. Delivery is the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture.

All these faculties we can acquire by three means: Theory, Imitation, and Practice. By theory is meant a set of rules that provide a definite method and system of speaking. Imitation stimulates us to attain, in accordance with a studied method, the effectiveness of certain models in speaking. Practice is assiduous exercise and experience in speaking.

Since, then, I have shown what causes the speaker should treat and what kinds of competence he should possess, it seems that I now need to indicate how the speech can be adapted to the theory of the speaker's function.

4 Invention is used for the six parts of a discourse: the Introduction, Statement of Facts, Division, Proof, Refutation, and Conclusion. The Introduction is the beginning of the discourse, and by it the hearer's mind is prepared for attention. The Narration or Statement of Facts sets forth the events that have occurred or might have occurred. By means of the Division we make clear what matters are agreed upon and what are contested, and announce what points we intend to take up. Proof is the presentation of our arguments, together with their corroboration. Refutation is the destruction of our adversaries' arguments. The Conclusion is the end of the discourse, formed in accordance with the principles of the art.

Along with the speaker's functions, in order to make the subject easier to understand, I have been led also to discuss the parts of a discourse, and to adapt these to the theory of Invention. It seems, then, that I must at this juncture first discuss the Introduction.

5 Given the cause, in order to be able to make a more appropriate Introduction, we must consider what kind of cause it is. The kinds of causes are four: honourable, discreditable, doubtful, and petty. A cause is regarded as of the honourable kind when we either defend what seems to deserve defence by all men, or attack what all men seem in duty bound of the

Narratio est rerum gestarum aut proinde ut gestarum expositio.

Divisio est, per quam aperimus, quid conveniat, quid in controversia sit, et per quam exponimus, quibus de rebus simus acturi.

Confirmatio est nostrorum argumentorum expositio cum adseveratione.

Confutatio est contrariorum locorum dissolutio.

Conclusio est artificiosus orationis terminus.

Nunc, quoniam una cum oratoris officiis, quo res cognitu facilius esset, producti sumus, ut de orationis partibus loqueremur et eas ad inventionis rationem adcommodaremus, de exordio primum dicendum videtur.

[5] Causa posita, quo commodius exordiri possimus, genus causae est considerandum. Genera causarum sunt quattuor: honestum, turpe, dubium, humile.

Honestum causae genus putatur, cum aut id defendimus, quod ab omnibus defendendum videtur, aut obpugnabimus, quod ab omnibus videtur obpugnari debere ut pro viro forti contra parricidam.

Turpe genus intellegitur, cum aut honesta res obpugnatur aut defenditur turpis.

Dubium genus est, cum habet in se causa et honestatis et turpitudinis partem.

Humile genus est, cum contempta res adfertur.

[6] Cum haec ita sint, conveniet exordiorum rationem ad causae genus adcommodari. Exordiorum duo sunt genera: principium, quod Graece prohemium appellatur, et insinuatio, quae epodos nominatur.

Principium est, cum statim auditoris animum nobis idoneum reddimus ad audiendum. Id ita sumitur, ut attentos, ut dociles, ut benivolos auditores habere possimus.

attack; for example, when we defend a hero, or prosecute a parricide. A cause is understood to be of the discreditable kind when something honourable is under attack or when something discreditable is being defended. A cause is of the doubtful kind when it is partly honourable and partly discreditable. A cause is of the petty kind when the matter brought up is considered unimportant.

6 In view of these considerations, it will be in point to apply the theory of Introductions to the kind of cause. There are two kinds of Introduction: the Direct Opening, in Greek called the Proimion, and the Subtle Approach, called the Ephodos. The Direct Opening straightway prepares the hearer to attend to our speech. Its purpose is to enable us to have hearers who are attentive, receptive, and well-disposed. If our cause is of the doubtful kind, we shall build the Direct Opening upon goodwill, so that the discreditable part of the cause cannot be prejudicial to us. If our cause is of the petty kind, we shall make our hearers attentive. If our cause is of the discreditable kind, unless we have hit upon a means of capturing goodwill by attacking our adversaries, we must use the Subtle Approach, which I shall discuss later. And finally, if our cause is of the honourable kind, it will be correct either to use the Direct Opening or not to use it. If we wish to use it, we must show why the cause is honourable, or else briefly discuss what matters we are going to discuss. But if we do not wish to use the Direct Opening, we must begin our speech with a law, a written document, or some argument supporting our cause.

7 Since, then, we wish to have our hearer receptive, well-disposed, and attentive, I shall disclose how each state can be brought about. We can have receptive hearers if we briefly summarise the cause and make them attentive; for the receptive hearer is one who is willing to listen attentively. We shall have attentive hearers by promising to discuss important, new, and unusual matters, or such as appertain to the commonwealth, or to the hearers themselves, or to the worship of the immortal gods; by bidding them listen attentively; and by enumerating the points we are going to discuss.

8 We can by four methods make our hearers well-disposed: by discussing our own person, the person of our adversaries, that of our hearers, and the facts themselves.

5 From the discussion of our own person we shall secure goodwill by praising our services without arrogance and revealing also our past conduct toward the republic, or toward our parents, friends, or the audience, and by making some reference to . . . provided that all such references are pertinent to the matter in question; likewise by setting forth our disabilities, need, loneliness, and misfortune, and pleading for

Si genus causae dubium habebimus, a benivolentia principium constituemus, ne quid illa turpitudinis pars nobis obesse possit.

Sin humile genus erit causae, faciemus attentos.

Sin turpe causae genus erit, insinuatione utendum est, de qua posterius dicemus, nisi quid nacti erimus, qua re adversarios criminando benivolentiam captare possimus.

Sin honestum genus causae erit, licebit recte vel uti vel non uti principio. Si uti volumus, aut id oportebit ostendere, qua re causa sit honesta, aut breviter, quibus de rebus simus dicturi, exponere. Sin principio uti nolemus, ab lege, ab scriptura, aut ab aliquo nostrae causae adiumento principium capere oportebit.

[7] Quoniam igitur docilem, benivolum, attentum auditorem habere volumus, quo modo quidque effici possit, aperiemus.

Dociles auditores habere poterimus, si summam causae breviter exponemus et si attentos eos faciemus; nam docilis est, qui attente vult audire.

Attentos habebimus, si pollicebimur nos de rebus magnis, novis, inusitatis verba facturos aut de iis, quae ad rem publicam pertineant, aut ad eos ipsos, qui audient, aut ad deorum immortalium religionem; et si rogabimus, ut attente audiant; et si numero exponemus res, quibus de rebus dicturi sumus.

[8] Benivolos auditores facere quattuor modis possumus: ab nostra, ab adversariorum nostrorum, ab auditorum persona, et ab rebus ipsis.

Ab nostra persona benivolentiam contrahemus, si nostrum officium sine adrogantia laudabimus, atque in rem publicam quales fuerimus aut in parentes aut in amicos aut in eos, qui audiunt aliquid referemus, dum haec omnia ad eam ipsam rem, qua de agitur, sint adcommodata. Item si nostra incommoda proferemus, inopiam, solitudinem, calamitatem; et si orabimus, ut nobis sint auxilio et simul ostendemus nos in aliis noluisse spem habere.

our hearers' aid, and at the same time showing that we have been unwilling to place our hope in anyone else.

From the discussion of the person of our adversaries we shall secure goodwill by bringing them into hatred, unpopularity, or contempt. We shall force hatred upon them by adducing some base, high-handed, treacherous, cruel, impudent, malicious, or shameful act of theirs. We shall make our adversaries unpopular by setting forth their violent behaviour, their dominance, factiousness, wealth, lack of self-restraint, high birth, clients, hospitality, club allegiance, or marriage alliances, and by making clear that they rely more upon these supports than upon the truth. We shall bring our adversaries into contempt by presenting their idleness, cowardice, sloth, and luxurious habits.

From the discussion of the person of our hearers goodwill is secured if we set forth the courage, wisdom, humanity, and nobility of past judgements they have rendered, and if we reveal what esteem they enjoy and with what interest their decision is awaited.

From the discussion of the facts themselves we shall render the hearer well-disposed by extolling our own cause with praise and by contemptuously disparaging that of our adversaries.

9 Now I must explain the Subtle Approach. There are three occasions on which we cannot use the Direct Opening, and these we must consider carefully: when our cause is discreditable, that is, when the subject itself alienates the hearer from us; when the hearer has apparently been won over by the previous speakers of the opposition; or when the hearer has become wearied by listening to the previous speakers.

If the cause has a discreditable character, we can make our Introduction with the following points: that the agent, not the action, ought to be considered; that we ourselves are displeased with the acts which our opponents say have been committed, and that these are unworthy, yes, heinous. Next, when we have for a time enlarged upon this idea, we shall show that nothing of the kind has been committed by us. Or we shall set forth the judgement rendered by others in an analogous case, whether that cause be of equal, or less, or greater importance; then we shall gradually approach our own cause and establish the analogy. The same result is achieved if we deny an intention to discuss our opponents or some extraneous matter and yet, by subtly inserting the words, do so.

10 If the hearers have been convinced, if our opponent's speech has gained their credence — and this will not be hard for us to know, since we are well aware of the means by which belief is

Ab adversariorum persona benivolentia captabitur, si eos in odium, in invidiam, in contemptionem adducemus.

In odium rapiemus, si quid eorum spurce, superbe, perfidiose, crudeliter, confidenter, malitiose, flagitiose factum proferemus.

In invidiam trahemus, si vim, si potentiam, si factionem, divitias, incontinentiam, nobilitatem, clientelas, hospitium, sodalitatem, adfinitates adversariorum proferemus, et his adiumentis magis quam veritati eos confidere aperiemus.

In contemptionem adducemus, si inertiam, ignaviam, desidiam, luxuriam adversariorum proferemus.

Ab auditorum persona benivolentia colligitur, si res eorum fortiter, sapienter, mansuete, magnifice iudicatas proferemus; et si, quae de iis existimatio, quae iudicii expectatio sit, aperiemus.

Ab rebus ipsis benivolum efficiemus auditorem, si nostram causam laudando extollemus, adversariorum per contemptionem deprimemus. Deinceps de insinuatione aperiendum est.

Tria sunt tempora, quibus principio uti non possumus, quae diligenter sunt consideranda: aut cum turpem causam habemus, hoc est, cum ipsa res animum auditoris a nobis alienat; aut cum animus auditoris persuasus esse videtur ab iis, qui ante contra dixerunt; aut cum defessus est eos audiendo, qui ante dixerunt.

Si causa turpitudinem habebit, exordiri poterimus his rationibus: rem, hominem spectari oportere; non placere nobis ipsis, quae facta dicantur ab adversariis, et esse indigna aut nefaria; deinde cum diu rem auxerimus, nihil simile a nobis factum ostendemus; aut aliquorum iudicium de simili causa aut de eadem aut de minore aut de maiore proferemus, deinde ad nostram causam pedetemptim accedemus et similitudinem conferemus. Item si negabimus nos de adversariis aut de aliqua re dicturos, et tamen occulte dicemus interiectione verborum.

[10] Si persuasus auditor <fuerit, id est>, si oratio adversariorum fecerit fidem auditoribus - neque

ordinarily effected — if, then, we think belief has been effected, we shall make our Subtle Approach to the cause by the following means: the point which our adversaries have regarded as their strongest support we shall promise to discuss first; we shall begin with a statement made by the opponent, and particularly with that which he has made last; and we shall use Indecision, along with an exclamation of astonishment: "What had I best say?" or "To what point shall I first reply?"

If the hearers have been fatigued by listening, we shall open with something that may provoke laughter — a fable, a plausible fiction, a caricature, an ironical inversion on the meaning of a word, an ambiguity, innuendo, banter, a naïvety, an exaggeration, a recapitulation, a pun, an unexpected turn, a comparison, a novel tale, a historical anecdote, a verse, or a challenge or a smile of approbation directed at some one. Or we shall promise to speak otherwise than as we have prepared, and to talk as others usually do; we shall briefly explain what the other speakers do and what we intend to do.

11 Between the Subtle Approach and the Direct Opening there is the following difference. The Direct Opening should be such that by the straightforward methods I have prescribed we immediately make the hearer well-disposed or attentive or receptive; whereas the Subtle Approach should be such that we effect all these results covertly, through dissimulation, and so can arrive at the same vantage-point in the task of speaking. But though this three-fold advantage — that the hearers constantly show themselves attentive, receptive, and well-disposed to us — is to be secured throughout the discourse, it must in the main be won by the Introduction to the cause.

Now, for fear that we may at some time use a faulty Introduction, I shall show what faults must be avoided. In the Introduction of a cause we must make sure that our style is temperate and that the words are in current use, so that the discourse seems unprepared. An Introduction is faulty if it can be applied as well to a number of causes; that is called a banal Introduction. Again, an Introduction which the adversary can use no less well is faulty, and that is called a common Introduction. That Introduction, again, is faulty which the opponent can turn to his own use against you. And again that is faulty which has been composed in too laboured a style, or is too long; and that which does not appear to have grown out of the cause itself in such a way as to have an intimate connection with the Statement of Facts; and, finally, that which fails to make the hearer well-disposed or receptive or attentive.

enim non facile scire poterimus, quoniam non sumus nescii, quibus rebus fides fieri soleat - ergo si fidem factam putabimus, his nos rebus insinuabimus ad causam: de eo, quod adversarii firmissimum sibi adiumentum putarint, primum nos dicturos pollicebimur; ab adversarii dicto exordiemur, et ab eo maxime, quod ille nuperrime dixerit; dubitatione utemur quid potissimum dicamus aut quoi loco primum respondeamus, cum admiratione.

Si defessi erint audiendo, ab aliqua re, quae risum movere possit, ab apologo, fabula verei simili, imitatione depravata, inversione, ambiguo, suspitione, inrisione, stultitia, exuperatione, collectione, litterarum mutatione, praeter expectationem, similitudine, novitate, historia, versu, ab alicuius interpellatione aut adrisione; <si promiserimus> aliter ac parati fuerimus, nos esse dicturos, nos non eodem modo, ut ceteri soleant, verba facturos; quid alii soleant, quid nos facturi sumus, breviter exponemus.

[11] Inter insinuationem et principium hoc interest. Principium eius modi debet esse, ut statim apertis rationibus, quibus praescripsimus, aut benivolum aut attentum aut docilem faciamus auditorem: at insinuatio eiusmodi debet esse, ut occulte per dissimulationem eadem illa omnia conficiamus, ut ad eandem commoditatem in dicendi opere venire possimus. Verum hae tres utilitates tametsi in tota oratione sunt comparandae, hoc est, ut auditores sese perpetuo nobis adtentos, dociles, benivolos praebeant, tamen id per exordium causae maxime comparandum est. Nunc, ne quando vitioso exordio utamur, quae vitia vitanda sint, docebo.

Exordienda causa servandum est, ut lenis sit sermo et usitata verborum consuetudo, ut non adparata videatur oratio esse.

Vitiosum exordium est, quod in plures causas potest adcommodari, quod vulgare dicitur.

Item vitiosum est, quo nihilo minus adversarius potest uti, quod commune appellatur; item illud, quo adversarius ex contrario poterit uti. Item vitiosum est, quod nimium apparatus compositum est aut nimium longum est; et quod non ex ipsa causa natum videatur, ut proprie cohaereat cum

narratione; et quod neque benivolum neque  
docilem neque adtentum facit auditorem.



### 3. Cicero. *De Optimo Genere Oratorum.*

[I] [1] Oratorum genera esse dicuntur tamquam poetarum; id secus est, nam alterum est multiplex. Poematis enim tragici, comici, epici, melici, etiam ac dithyrambici, quod magis est tractatum a Graecis quam a Latinis, suum cuiusque est, diversum a reliquis. Itaque et in tragoedia comicum vitiosum est et in comoedia turpe tragicum; et in ceteris suus est cuique certus sonus et quaedam intellegendibus nota vox. [2] Oratorum autem si quis ita numerat plura genera, ut alios grandis aut gravis aut copiosos, alios tenuis aut subtilis aut brevis, alios eis interiectos et tamquam medios putet, de hominibus dicit aliquid, de re parum. In re enim quid optimum sit quaeritur, in homine dicitur quod est. Itaque licet dicere et Ennium summum epicum poetam, si cui ita videtur, et Pacuvium tragicum et Caecilium fortasse comicum. [3] Oratorem genere non divido; perfectum enim quaero. Unum est autem genus perfecti, a quo qui absunt, non genere differunt, ut Terentius ab Accio, sed in eodem genere non sunt pares. Optimus est enim orator qui dicendo animos audientium et docet et delectat et permovet. Docere debitum est, delectare honorarium, permovere necessarium. [4] Haec ut alius melius quam alius, concedendum est; verum id fit non genere sed gradu. Optimum quidem unum est et proximum quod ei simillimum. Ex quo perspicuum est, quod optimo dissimillimum sit, id esse deterrimum.

[II] Nam quoniam eloquentia constat ex verbis et ex sententiis, perficiendum est, ut pure et emendate loquentes, quod est Latine, verborum praeterea et propriorum et translatorum elegantiam persequamur: in propriis ut lautissima eligamus, in translatis ut similitudinem secuti verecunde utamur alienis. [5] Sententiarum autem totidem genera sunt quot dixi esse laudum. Sunt enim docendi acutae, delectandi quasi argutae, commovendi graves. Sed et verborum est structura quaedam duas res efficiens, numerum et levitatem, et sententiae suam compositionem habent, et ad probandam rem accommodatum ordinem. Sed earum omnium rerum ut aedificiorum memoria est quasi fundamentum, lumen actio.

[6] Ea igitur omnia in quo summa erunt, erit perfectissimus orator; in quo media, mediocris; in

I. There are said to be classes of orators as there are of poets. But it is not so; for of poets there are a great many divisions; for of tragic, comic, epic, lyric, and also of dithyrambic poetry, which has been more cultivated by the Latins, each kind is very different from the rest. Therefore in tragedy anything comic is a defect, and in comedy anything tragic is out of place. And in the other kinds of poetry each has its own appropriate note, and a tone well known to those who understand the subject. But if any one were to enumerate many classes of orators, describing some as grand, and dignified, and copious, others as thin, or subtle, or concise, and others as something between the two and in the middle as it were, he would be saying something of the men, but very little of the matter. For as to the matter, we seek to know what is the best; but as to the man, we state what is the real case. Therefore if any one likes, he has a right to call Ennius a consummate epic poet, and Pacuvius an excellent tragic poet, and Caecilius perhaps a perfect comic poet. But I do not divide the orator as to class in this way. For I am seeking a perfect one. And of perfection there is only one kind; and those who fall short of it do not differ in kind, as Attius does from Terentius; but they are of the same kind, only of unequal merit. For he is the best orator who by speaking both teaches, and delights, and moves the minds of his hearers. To teach them is his duty, to delight them is creditable to him, to move them is indispensable. It must be granted that one person succeeds better in this than another; but that is not a difference of kind but of degree. Perfection is one thing; that is next to it which is most like it; from which consideration it is evident that that which is most unlike perfection is the worst.

II. For, since eloquence consists of words and sentences, we must endeavour, by speaking in a pure and correct manner, that is to say in good Latin, to attain an elegance of expression with words appropriate and metaphorical. As to the appropriate words, selecting those which are most suitable; and when indulging in metaphor, studying to preserve a proper resemblance, and to be modest in our use of foreign terms. But of sentences, there are as many different kinds as I have said there are of panegyrics. For if teaching, we want shrewd sentences; if aiming at giving pleasure, we want musical ones; if at exciting the feelings, dignified ones. But there is a certain arrangement of words which produces both harmony and smoothness; and different sentiments have different arrangements suitable to them, and an order naturally calculated to prove their point; but of all those things memory is the foundation, (just as a

quo minima, deterrimus. Et appellabuntur omnes oratores, ut pictores appellantur etiam mali, nec generibus inter sese, sed facultatibus different. Itaque nemo est orator qui Demostheni se similem nolit esse; at Menander Homeri noluit; genus enim erat aliud. Id non est in oratoribus aut, etiam si est ut alius gravitatem sequens subtilitatem fugiat, contra alius acutiorem se quam ornatiorem velit, etiam si est in genere tolerabilis, certe non est optimus, si quidem, quod omnis laudes habet, id est optimum.

building has a foundation,) and action is the light. The man, then, in whom all these qualities are found in the highest perfection, will be the most skilful orator; he in whom they exist in a moderate degree will be a mediocre orator; he in whom they are found to the slightest extent will be the most inferior sort of orator. All these, indeed, will be called orators, just as bad painters are still called painters; not differing from one another in kind, but in ability. So there is no orator who would not like to resemble Demosthenes; but Menander did not want to be like Homer, for his style was different.

This difference does not exist in orators; or if there be any such difference, that one avoiding gravity aims rather at subtlety; and on the other hand, that another desires to show himself acute rather than polished: such men, although they may be tolerable orators, are certainly not perfect ones; since that is perfection which combines every kind of excellence.

[III] [7] Haec autem dixi brevius quidem quam res petebat, sed ad id quod agimus non fuit dicendum pluribus; unum enim cum sit genus, id quale sit quaerimus. Est autem tale quale floruit Athenis; ex quo Atticorum oratorum ipsa vis ignota est, nota gloria. Nam alterum multi viderunt, vitiosi nihil apud eos esse, alterum pauci, laudabilia esse multa. Est enim vitiosum in sententia si quid absurdum aut alienum aut non acutum aut subinsulsum est; in verbis si inquinatum, si abiectum, si non aptum, si durum, si longe petatum. [8] Haec vitaverunt fere omnes qui aut Attici numerantur aut dicunt Attice. Sed qui eatenus valuerunt, sani et sicci dumtaxat habeantur, sed ita ut palaestritae; spatiari in xysto ut liceat, non ab Olympiis coronam petant. Qui, cum careant omni vitio, non sunt contenti quasi bona valetudine, sed viris, lacertos, sanguinem quaerunt, quandam etiam suavitatem coloris, eos imitemur si possumus; si minus, illos potius qui incorrupta sanitate sunt, quod est proprium Atticorum, quam eos quorum vitiosa abundantia est, qualis Asia multos tulit. [9] Quod cum faciemus—si modo id ipsum assequemur; est enim permagnum—imitemur, si potuerimus, Lysiam et eius quidem tenuitatem potissimum; est enim multis locis grandior, sed quia et privatas ille plerasque et eas ipsas aliis et parvarum rerum causulas scripsit, videtur esse ieiunior, cum se ipse consulto ad minutarum causarum genera limaverit. [IV] Quod qui ita faciet, ut, si cupiat uberius esse, non possit, habeatur sane orator, sed de minoribus; magno autem oratori etiam illo modo saepe dicendum est in tali genere causarum. [10] Ita fit ut Demosthenes certe possit summissis dicere, elate Lysias fortasse non possit. Sed si eodem modo

III. I have stated these things with greater brevity than the subject deserves; but still, with reference to my present object, it was not worth while being more prolix. For as there is but one kind of eloquence, what we are seeking to ascertain is what kind it is. And it is such as flourished at Athens; and in which the genius of the Attic orators is hardly comprehended by us, though their glory is known to us. For many have perceived this fact, that there is nothing faulty in them: few have discerned the other point; namely, how much in them there is that is praiseworthy. For it is a fault in a sentence if anything is absurd, or foreign to the subject, or stupid, or trivial; and it is a fault of language if any thing is gross, or abject, or unsuitable, or harsh, or far-fetched. Nearly all those men who are either considered Attic orators or who speak in the Attic manner have avoided these faults. But if that is all their merit, then they may deserve to be regarded as sound and healthy, as if we were regarding athletes, to such an extent as to be allowed to exercise in the palaestra, but not to be entitled to the crown at the Olympic games. For the athletes, who are free from defects, are not content as it were with good health, but seek to produce strength and muscles and blood, and a certain agreeableness of complexion; let us imitate them, if we can; and if we cannot do so wholly, at least let us select as our models those who enjoy unimpaired health, (which is peculiar to the Attic orators,) rather than those whose abundance is vicious, of whom Asia has produced numbers. And in doing this (if at least we can manage even this, for it is a mighty undertaking) let us imitate, if we can, Lysias, and especially his simplicity of style: for in many places he rises to grandeur. But because he wrote speeches for many

putant exercitu in foro et in omnibus templis, quae circum forum sunt, collocato dici pro Milone decuisse, ut si de re privata ad unum iudicem diceremus, vim eloquentiae sua facultate, non rei natura metiuntur.

[11] Qua re quoniam non nullorum sermo iam increbruit, partim se ipsos Attice dicere, partim neminem nostrum dicere, alteros neglegamus; satis enim eis res ipsa respondet, cum aut non adhibeantur ad causas aut adhibiti derideantur; nam si rideretur, esset id ipsum Atticorum. Sed qui dici a nobis Attico more nolunt, ipsi autem se non oratores esse profitentur, si teretes auris habent intellegensque iudicium, tamquam ad picturam probandam adhibentur etiam inscii faciendi cum aliqua sollertia iudicandi; [12] sin autem intellegentiam ponunt in audiendi fastidio neque eos quicquam excelsum magnificumque delectat, dicant se quiddam subtile et politum velle, grande ornatumque contemnere; id vero desinant dicere, qui subtiliter dicant, eos solos Attice dicere, id est quasi sicce et integre. Et ample et ornate et copiose cum eadem integritate Atticorum est. Quid? dubium est utrum orationem nostram tolerabilem tantum an etiam admirabilem esse cupiamus? Non enim iam quaerimus quid sit Attice, sed quid sit optime dicere. [13] Ex quo intellegitur, quoniam Graecorum oratorum praestantissimi sint ei qui fuerint Athenis, eorum autem princeps facile Demosthenes, hunc si qui imitetur, eum et Attice dicturum et optime, ut, quoniam Attici nobis propositi sunt ad imitandum, bene dicere id sit Attice dicere.

[V] Sed cum in eo magnus error esset, quale esset id dicendi genus, putavi mihi suscipiendum laborem utilem studiosis, mihi quidem ipsi non necessarium.

[14] Converti enim ex Atticis duorum eloquentissimorum nobilissimas orationes inter seque

private causes, and those too for others, and on very trifling subjects, he appears to be somewhat simple, because he has designedly filed himself down to the standard of the inconsiderable causes which he was pleading.

IV. And a man who acts in this way, even if he be not able to turn out a vigorous speaker as he wishes, may still deserve to be accounted an orator, though an inferior one; but even a great orator must often also speak in the same manner in causes of that kind. And in this way it happens that Demosthenes is at times able to speak with simplicity, though perhaps Lysias may not be able to arrive at grandeur. But if men think that, when an army was marshalled in the forum and in all the temples round the forum, it was possible to speak in defence of Milo, as if we had been speaking in a private cause before a single judge, they measure the power of eloquence by their own estimate of their own ability, and not by the nature of the case. Wherefore, since some people have got into a way of repeating that they themselves do speak in an Attic manner, and others that none of us do so; the one class we may neglect, for the facts themselves are a sufficient answer to these men, since they are either not employed in causes, or when they are employed they are laughed at; for if the laughter which they excite were in approbation of them, that very fact would be a characteristic of Attic speakers. But those who will not admit that we speak in the Attic manner, but yet profess that they themselves are not orators; if they have good ears and an intelligent judgment, may still be consulted by us, as one respecting the character of a picture would take the opinion of men who were incapable of making a picture, though not devoid of acuteness in judging of one. But if they place all their intelligence in a certain fastidiousness of ear, and if nothing lofty or magnificent ever pleases them, then let them say that they want something subtle and highly polished, and that they despise what is dignified and ornamented; but let them cease to assert that those men alone speak in the Attic manner, that is to say, in a sound and correct one. But to speak with dignity and elegance and copiousness is a characteristic of Attic orators. Need I say more? Is there any doubt whether we wish our oration to be tolerable only, or also admirable? For we are not asking now what sort of speaking is Attic: but what sort is best. And from this it is understood, since those who were Athenians were the best of the Greek orators, and since Demosthenes was beyond all comparison the best of them, that if any one imitates them he will speak in the Attic manner, and in the best manner, so that since the Attic orators are proposed to us for imitation, to speak well is to speak Attically.

V. But as there was a great error as to the question, what

contrarias, Aeschinis et Demosthenis; nec converti ut interpretes, sed ut orator, sententiis isdem et earum formis tamquam figuris, verbis ad nostram consuetudinem aptis. In quibus non verbum pro verbo necesse habui reddere, sed genus omne verborum vimque servavi. Non enim ea me adnumerare lectori putavi oportere, sed tamquam appendere. [15] Hic labor meus hoc assequetur, ut nostri homines quid ab illis exigant, qui se Atticos volunt, et ad quam eos quasi formulam dicendi revocent intellegant.

'Sed exorietur Thucydides; eius enim quidam eloquentiam admirantur.' Id quidem recte; sed nihil ad eum oratorem quem quaerimus. Aliud est enim explicare res gestas narrando, aliud argumentando criminari crimenve dissolvere; aliud narrantem tenere auditorem, aliud concitare. 'At loquitur pulchre.' [16] Num melius quam Plato? Necesse est tamen oratori quem quaerimus controversias explicare forensis dicendi genere apto ad docendum, ad delectandum, ad permovendum. [VI] Qua re si quis erit qui se Thucydideo genere causas in foro dicturum esse profiteatur, is abhorrebit etiam a suspicione eius quod versatur in re civili et forensi; sin Thucydidem laudabit, ascribat suae nostrae sententiam.

[17] Quin ipsum Isocratem, quem divinus auctor Plato suum fere aequalem admirabiliter in Phaedro laudari fecit ab Socrate quemque omnes docti summum oratorem esse dixerunt, tamen hunc in numerum non repono. Non enim in acie versatur nec ferro, sed quasi rudibus eius eludit oratio. A me autem, ut cum maximis minima conferam, gladiatorum par nobilissimum inducitur, Aeschines, tamquam Aeserninus, ut ait Lucilius, non spurcus homo, sed acer et doctus cum Pacideiano hic componitur,—optimus longe post homines natos—. Nihil enim illo oratore arbitror cogitari posse divinius.

[18] Huic labori nostro duo genera reprehensionum opponuntur. Unum hoc: 'Verum melius Graeci.' A quo quaeratur ecquid possint ipsi melius Latine? Alterum: 'Quid istas potius legam quam Graecas?' Idem Andriam et Synephebos nec minus Andromacham aut Antiopam aut Epigonos Latinos recipiunt. Quod igitur est eorum in orationibus e Graeco conversis fastidium, nullum cum sit in versibus?

[VII] [19] Sed adgrediamur iam quod suscepimus, si prius euerimus quae causa in iudicium deducta sit. Cum esset lex Athenis, ne quis populi scitum faceret ut quisquam corona donaretur in magistratu privis quam rationes rettulisset; et altera lex, eos qui a populo donarentur, in contione donari debere; qui a

kind of eloquence that was, I have thought that it became me to undertake a labour which should be useful to studious men, though superfluous as far as I myself was concerned. For I have translated the most illustrious orations of the two most eloquent of the Attic orators, spoken in opposition to one another: Aeschines and Demosthenes. And I have not translated them as a literal interpreter, but as an orator giving the same ideas in the same form and mould as it were, in words conformable to our manners; in doing which I did not consider it necessary to give word for word, but I have preserved the character and energy of the language throughout. For I did not consider that my duty was to render to the reader the precise number of words, but rather to give him all their weight. And this labour of mine will have this result, that by it our countrymen may understand what to require of those who wish to be accounted Attic speakers, and that they may recall them to, as it were, an acknowledged standard of eloquence.

But then Thucydides will rise up; for some people admire his eloquence. And they are quite right. But he has no connection with the orator, which is the person of whom we are in search. For it is one thing to unfold the actions of men in a narration, and quite a different one to accuse and get rid of an accusation by arguing. It is one thing to fix a hearer's attention by a narration, and another to excite his feelings. "But he uses beautiful language." Is his language finer than Plato's? Nevertheless it is necessary for the orator whom we are inquiring about, to explain forensic disputes by a style of speaking calculated at once to teach, to delight, and to excite.

VI. Wherefore, if there is any one who professes that he intends to plead causes in the forum, following the style of Thucydides, no one will ever suspect him of being endowed with that kind of eloquence which is suited to affairs of state or to the bar. But if he is content with praising Thucydides, then he may add my vote to his own. Moreover, even Isocrates himself, whom that divine author, Plato, who was nearly his contemporary, has represented in the Phaedrus as being highly extolled by Socrates, and whom all learned men have called a consummate orator, I do not class among the number of those who are to be taken for models. For he is not engaged in actual conflict; he is not armed for the fray; his speeches are made for display, like foils. I will rather, (to compare small things with great,) bring on the stage a most noble pair of gladiators. Aeschines shall come on like Aeserninus, as Lucilius says—

No ordinary man, but fearless all,

And skill'd his arms to wield—his equal match

Pacideianus stands, than whom the world

Since the first birth of man hath seen no greater.

For I do not think that anything can be imagined more divine than that orator. Now this labour of mine is found fault with by two kinds of critics. One set says; "But the

senatv, in senatv, Demosthenes curator muris reficiendis fuit eosque refecit pecunia sua; de hoc igitur Ctesiphon scitum fecit nullis ab illo rationibus relatis, ut corona aurea donaretur eaque donatio fieret in theatro populo convocato, qui locus non est contionis legitimae, atque ita praedicaretur, eum donari virtutis ergo benevolentiaeque quam is erga populum atheniensem haberet. [20] Hunc igitur Ctesiphontem in iudicium adduxit Aeschines quod contra leges scripsisset, ut et rationibus non relatis corona donaretur et ut in theatro, et quod de virtute eius et benevolentia falsa scripsisset, cum Demosthenes nec vir bonus esset nec bene meritus de civitate.

Causa ipsa abhorret illa quidem a formula consuetudinis nostrae, sed est magna. Habet enim et legum interpretationem satis acutam in utramque partem et meritorum in rem publicam contentionem sane gravem. [21] Itaque causa fuit Aeschini, cum ipse a Demosthene esset capitis accusatus, quod legationem ementitus esset, ut ulciscendi inimici causa nomine Ctesiphontis iudicium fieret de factis famaue Demosthenis. Non enim tam multa dixit de rationibus non relatis, quam de eo quod civis improbus ut optimus laudatus esset. [22] Hanc multam Aeschines a Ctesiphonte petivit quadriennio ante Philippi Macedonis mortem; sed iudicium factum est aliquot annis post Alexandro iam Asiam tenente; ad quod iudicium concursus dicitur e tota Graecia factus esse. Quid enim tam aut visendum aut audiendum fuit quam summorum oratorum in gravissima causa accurata et inimicitii incensa contentio? [23] Quorum ego orationes si, ut spero, ita expressero virtutibus utens illorum omnibus, id est sententiis et earum figuris et rerum ordine, verba persequens eatenus, ut ea non abhorreant a more nostro—quae si e Graecis omnia conversa non erunt, tamen ut generis eiusdem sint, elaboravimus—, erit regula, ad quam eorum dirigantur orationes qui Attice volent dicere. Sed de nobis satis. Aliquando enim Aeschinem ipsum Latine dicentem audiamus.

Greek is better." And I ask them whether the authors themselves could have clothed their speeches in better Latin? The others say, "Why should I rather read the translation than the original?" Yet those same men read the Andria and the Synephebi; and are not less fond of Terence and Caecilius than of Menander. They must then discard the Andromache, and the Antiope, and the Epigoni in Latin. But yet, in fact, they read Ennius and Pacuvius and Attius more than Euripides and Sophocles. What then is the meaning of this contempt of theirs for orations translated from the Greek, when they have no objection to translated verses?

VII. However, let us now come to the task which we have undertaken, when we have just explained what the cause is which is before the court.

As there was a law at Athens, that no one should be the cause of carrying a decree of the people that any one should be presented with a crown while invested with office till he had given in an account of the way in which he had discharged its duties; and another law, that those who had crowns given them by the people ought to receive them in the assembly of the people, and that they who had them given to them by the senate should receive them in the senate; Demosthenes was appointed a superintendent of repairs of the walls; and he did it at his own expense. Therefore, with reference to him Ctesiphon proposed a decree, without his having given in any accounts, that he should be presented with a golden crown, and that that presentation should take place in the theatre, the people being summoned for the purpose, (that is not the legitimate place for an assembly of the people;) and that proclamation should be made, "that he received this present on account of his virtue and devotion to the state, and to the Athenian people." Aeschines then prosecuted this man Ctesiphon because he had proposed a decree contrary to the laws, to the effect that a crown should be given when no accounts had been delivered, and that it should be presented in the theatre, and that he had made false statements in the words of his motion concerning Demosthenes's virtue and loyalty; since Demosthenes was not a good man, and was not one who had deserved well of the state.

That kind of cause is indeed inconsistent with the precedents established by our habits; but still it has an imposing look. For it has on each side of the question a sufficiently clever interpretation of the laws, and a very grave contest as to the respective services done by the two rival orators to the republic. Therefore the object of Aeschines was, since he himself had been prosecuted on a capital charge by Demosthenes, for having given a false account of his embassy, that now a trial should take place affecting the conduct and character of Demosthenes, that so, under pretence of prosecuting Ctesiphon, he might avenge himself on his enemy. For he did not say so much about the

accounts not having been delivered, as to the point that a very bad citizen had been praised as an excellent.

Aeschines instituted this prosecution against Ctesiphon four years before the death of Philip of Macedon. But the decision took place a few years afterwards; when Alexander had become master of Asia. And it is said that all Greece thronged to hear the issue of the trial. For what was ever better worth going to see, or better worth hearing, than the contest of two consummate orators in a most important cause, inflamed and sharpened by private enmity?

If then, as I trust, I have given such a copy of their speeches, using all their excellencies, that is to say, their sentiments, and their figures, and the order of their facts; adhering to their words only so far as they are not inconsistent with our customs, (and though they may not be all translated from the Greek, still I have taken pains that they should be of the same class,) then there will be a standard to which the orations of those men must be directed who wish to speak Attically. But I have said enough of myself--let us now hear Aeschines speaking in Latin. (These Orations are not extant.)

#### 4. Quintilian

Of the term rhetoric or oratory

1. Some who have translated ῥητορικὴ (rhētorikē) from Greek into Latin have called it ars oratoria and oratrix. I would not deprive those writers of their due praise for endeavoring to add to the copiousness of the Latin language, but all Greek words do not obey our will in attempting to render them from the Greek, as all our words, in like manner, do not obey that of the Greeks when they try to express something of ours in their own tongue. 2. This translation is no less harsh than the *essentia* and *entia* of Flavius, for the Greek οὐσία (*onsia*): nor is it indeed exact, for *oratoria* will be taken in the same sense as *elocutoria*, *oratrix* as *elocutrix*, but the word *rhētorikē*, of which we are speaking, is the same sort of word as *eloquentia*, and it is doubtless used in two senses by the Greeks. 3. In one acceptation, it is an adjective, *ars rhetorica*, as *navis piratica*: in the other a substantive, like *philosophia* or *amicitia*. We wish it now to have the signification of a substantive, just as *γραμματικὴ* (*grammatikē*) is rendered by the substantive *litteratura*, not by *litteratrix*, which would be similar to *oratrix*, nor by *litteratoria*, which would be similar to *oratoria*; but for the word *rhētorikē*, no equivalent Latin word has been found. 4. Let us not, however, dispute about the use of it, especially as we must adopt many other Greek words, for if I may use the terms *physicus*, *musicus*, *geometres*, I shall offer no unseemly violence to them by attempting to turn them into Latin. Since Cicero himself uses a Greek title for the books which he first wrote upon the art, we certainly need be under no apprehension of appearing to have rashly trusted the greatest of orators as to the name of his own art.

5. Rhetoric, then, (for we shall henceforth use this term without dread of sarcastic objections) will be best divided, in my opinion, in such a manner that we may speak first of the art, next of the artist, and then of the work. The art will be that which ought to be attained by study and is the knowledge how to speak well. The artificer is he who has thoroughly acquired the art, that is, the orator, whose business is to speak well. The work is what is achieved by the artificer, that is, good speaking. All these are to be considered under special heads, but of the particulars that are to follow, I shall speak in their several places; at present I shall proceed to consider what is to be said on the first general head.

XIV. Divisio totius operis.

[1] *Rhetoricen in Latinum transferentes tum oratoriam, tum oratricem nominaverunt. Quos equidem non fraudaverim debita laude quod copiam Romani sermonis augere temptarint: sed non omnia nos ducentes ex Graeco secuntur, sicut ne illos quidem quotiens utique suis uerbis signare [2] nostra uoluerunt. Et haec interpretatio non minus dura est quam illa Plauti 'essentia' et 'queentia', sed ne propria quidem; nam oratoria sic effertur ut elocutoria, oratrix ut elocutrix, illa autem de qua loquimur rhetorice talis est qualis eloquentia. Nec dubie apud Graecos quoque duplicem [3] intellectum habet; namque uno modo fit adpositum ars rhetorica, ut *navis piratica*, altero nomen rei, qualis est *philosophia*, *amicitia*. Nos ipsam nunc uolumus significare *subphilostantiam*, ut *grammaticae litteratura* est, non *litteratrix* quem ad modum *oratrix*, nec *litteratoria* quem ad modum *oratoria*: [4] uerum id in rhetorice non fit. Ne pugnemus igitur, cum praesertim plurimis alioqui Graecis sit utendum; nam certe et *philosophos* et *musicos* et *geometras* dicam nec uim adferam nominibus his indecora in Latinum sermonem mutatione: denique cum M. Tullius etiam ipsis librorum quos hac de re primum scripserat titulis Graeco nomine utatur, profecto non est uerendum ne temere uideamur oratori maximo de nomine artis suae credidisse.*

[5] *Igitur rhetorice (iam enim sine metu cauillationis utemur hac appellatione) sic, ut opinor, optime diuidetur ut de arte, de artifice, de opere dicamus. Ars erit quae disciplina percipi debet: ea est bene dicendi scientia. Artifex est qui percepit hanc artem: id est orator, cuius est summa bene dicere. Opus, quod efficitur ab artifice: id est bona oratio. Haec omnia rursus diducuntur in species: sed illa sequentia suo loco, nunc quae de prima parte tractanda sunt ordiar.*

## Book 5 - Introduction

Some rhetoricians have thought that the only duty of an orator is to teach; others have called this his chief duty. The necessity for this book.

1. There have been authors, and some, indeed, of high reputation, who have thought that the sole duty of an orator is to inform. Excitement of the feelings, they considered, was to be prohibited for two reasons: first, because all perturbation of the mind is an evil, and secondly, because it is inexcusable for a judge to be diverted from the truth by pity, anger, or any similar passion. To aim at pleasing the audience, when the object of speaking is to gain victory, they regarded not only as needless in a pleader, but scarcely worthy even of a man. 2. Many, too, who doubtless did not exclude those arts from the department of the orator, considered, nevertheless, that his proper and peculiar office was to establish his own propositions and to refute those of his adversary. 3. Whichsoever of these opinions is right (for I do not here offer my own judgment), this book must appear, in the estimation of both parties, extremely necessary, as the entire subject of it is proof and refutation, to which all that has hitherto been said on judicial causes is subservient. 4. For there is no other object either in an introduction or a narrative than to prepare the judge. To know the states of causes and to contemplate all the other matters of which I have treated above would be useless unless we proceed to proof. 5. In fine, of the five parts into which we have distinguished judicial pleading, whatever other may occasionally be unnecessary in a cause, there certainly never occurs a suit in which proof is not required.

As to directions regarding it, I think that I shall make the best division of them by first showing what are applicable to all kinds of questions, and next, by enlarging on what are peculiar to the several sorts of causes.

I. Fuerant et clari quidem auctores quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere (namque et adfectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant, primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio, deinde quia iudicem a veritate depelli misericordia gratia ira similibusque non oporteret: et voluptatem audientium petere, cum vincendi tantum gratia diceretur, non modo agenti supervacuum, sed vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur), II. plures vero qui nec ab illis sine dubio partibus rationem orandi summovent, hoc tamen proprium atque praecipuum crederent opus, sua confirmare et quae (ex) adverso proponerentur refutare. III. Vtrumcumque est (neque enim hoc loco meam interpono sententiam), hic erit liber illorum opinione maxime necessarius, quo toto haec sola tractantur: quibus sane et ea quae de iudicialibus causis iam dicta sunt serviunt. IV. Nam neque prohoemii neque narrationis est alius usus quam ut huic iudicem praeparent, et status nosse atque ea de quibus supra scripsimus intueri supervacuum foret nisi ad hanc perveniremus. V. Denique ex quinque quas iudicialis materiae fecimus partibus quaecumque alia potest aliquando necessaria causae non esse: lis nulla est cui probatione opus non sit. Eius praecepta sic optime divisuri videmur ut prius quae in commune ad omnis quaestiones pertinent ostendamus, deinde quae in quoque causae genere propria sunt exsequamur.

[1] I. Ac prima quidem illa partitio ab Aristotele tradita consensum fere omnium meruit, alias esse probationes quas extra dicendi rationem acciperet orator, alias quas ex causa traheret ipse et quodam modo gigneret; ideoque illas atechnous, id est inartificiales, has entechnous id est artificiales, vocaverunt. II. Ex illo priore genere sunt praeiudicia, rumores, tormenta, tabulae, ius iurandum, testes, in quibus pars maxima contentionum forensium consistit. Sed ut ipsa per se carent arte, ita summis eloquentiae viribus et adlevanda sunt plerumque et refellenda. Quare mihi videntur magnopere damnandi qui totum hoc genus a praeceptis removerant. III. Nec tamen in animo est omnia quae pro his aut contra dici solent complecti. Non enim communes locos tradere destinamus, quod esset operis infiniti, sed viam quandam atque rationem. Quibus demonstratis non modo in exsequendo suas quisque vires debet adhibere, sed etiam inveniendi similia, ut quaeque condicio litium poscet. Neque enim de omnibus causis dicere quisquam potest saltem praeteritis, ut taceam de futuris.

[4] I.



Whether there are three sorts of oratory, or more, § 1-3. Quintilian adheres to the old opinion that there are but three; his reasons, 4-8. Opinions of Anaximenes, Plato, Isocrates, 9-11. Quintilian's own method, 12-15. He does not assign particular subjects to each kind, 16.

1. BUT it is a question whether there are three or more. Certainly almost all writers, at least those of the highest authority among the ancients, have acquiesced in this tripartite distinction, following the opinion of Aristotle, who merely calls the deliberative by another name, concionalis, "suitable for addresses to public assemblies." 2. But a feeble attempt was made at that time by some of the Greek writers, an attempt which has since been noticed by Cicero in his books *De Oratore*, and is now almost forced upon us by the greatest author of our own day, to make it appear that there are not only more kinds, but kinds almost innumerable. 3. Indeed, if we distinguish praising and blaming in the third part of oratory, in what kind of oratory shall we be said to employ ourselves when we complain, console, appease, excite, alarm, encourage, direct, explain obscure expressions, narrate, entreat, offer thanks, congratulate, reproach, attack, describe, command, retract, express wishes or opinions, and speak in a thousand other ways? 4. So that if I adhere to the opinion of the ancients, I must, as it were, ask pardon for doing so and must inquire by what considerations they were induced to confine a subject of such extent and variety within such narrow limits? 5. Those who say that the ancients were in error suppose that they were led into it by the circumstance that they saw in their time orators exerting themselves for the most part in these three kinds only. For laudatory and vituperative speeches were then written; it was customary to pronounce funeral orations; and a vast deal of labor was bestowed on deliberative and judicial eloquence, so that the writers of books on the art included in them the kinds of eloquence most in use as the only kinds. 6. But those who defend the ancients make three sorts of hearers: one, who assemble only to be gratified; a second, to listen to counsel; and a third, to form a judgment on the points in debate. For myself, while I am searching for all sorts of arguments in support of these various opinions, it occurs to me that we might make only two kinds of oratory, on this consideration, that all the business of an orator lies in causes either judicial or extrajudicial. 7. Of matters in which decision is sought from the opinion of a judge, the nature is self-evident; those which are not referred to a judge have respect either to the past or to the future; the past we either praise or blame; and about the future we deliberate. 8. We may also add, that all subjects on

Sed tria an plura sint ambigitur. Nec dubie prope omnes utique summae apud antiquos auctoritatis scriptores Aristotelen secuti, qui nomine tantum alio contionalem pro deliberativa appellat, hac partitione contenti fuerunt. II. Verum et tum leviter est temptatum, cum apud Graecos quosdam tum apud Ciceronem in libris de *Oratore*, et nunc maximo temporum nostrorum auctore prope impulsus, ut non modo plura haec genera sed paene innumerabilia videantur. III. Nam si laudandi ac vituperandi officium in parte tertia ponimus, in quo genere versari videbimur cum querimur consolamur mitigamus concitamus terremus confirmamus praecipimus, obscure dicta interpretamur, narramus deprecamur, gratias agimus, gratulamur obiurgamus maledicimus describimus mandamus renuntiamus optamus opinamur, plurima alia? IV. Vt mihi in illa vetere persuasione permanenti velut petenda sit venia, quaerendumque quo moti priores rem tam late fusam tam breviter adstrinxerint. Quos qui errasse putant, hoc secutos arbitrantur, quod in his fere versari tum oratores videbant; V. nam laudes ac vituperationes scribebantur, et epitaphios dicere erat moris, et plurimum in consiliis ac iudiciis insumebatur operae, ut scriptores artium pro solis comprehenderint frequentissima. VI. Qui vero defendunt, tria faciunt genera auditorum: unum quod ad delectationem conveniat, alterum quod consilium accipiat, tertium quod de causis iudicet. Mihi cuncta rimanti et talis quaedam ratio succurrit, quod omne orationis officium aut in iudiciis est aut extra iudicia. VII. Eorum de quibus iudicio quaeritur manifestum est genus: ea quae ad iudicem non veniunt aut praeteritum habent tempus aut futurum: praeterita laudamus aut vituperamus, de futuris deliberamus. VIII. Item omnia de quibus dicendum est aut certa sint necesse est aut dubia. Certa ut cuique est animus laudat aut culpatur; ex dubiis partim nobis ipsis ad electionem sunt libera: de his deliberatur; partim aliorum sententiae commissa: de his lite contenditur. IX. Anaximenes iudicalem et contionalem generalis partes esse voluit, septem autem species: hortandi dehortandi laudandi vituperandi accusandi defendendi exquirendi (quod exetastikon dicit): quarum duae primae deliberativi, duae sequentes demonstrativi, tres ultimae iudicialis generis sunt partes. X. Protagoran transeo, qui interrogandi respondendi mandandi precandi (quod eucholen dixit) partes solas putat. Plato in *Sophiste* iudiciali et contionali tertiam adiecit prosomiletiken, quam sane permittamus nobis dicere. sermocinatricem: quae a forensi ratione diiungitur et est accommodata privatis disputationibus, cuius vis eadem profecto est quae dialecticae. XI. Isocrates in omni genere inesse laudem ac

which an orator has to speak are either certain or doubtful. The certain he praises or blames, according to the opinion which he forms of them; of the doubtful, some are left free for ourselves to choose how to decide on them, and concerning these there must be deliberation. Some are left to the judgment of others, and concerning these there must be litigation.

9. Anaximenes admitted only the general divisions of judicial and deliberative, but said that there were seven species: those, namely, of exhorting and dissuading, of praising and blaming, of accusing and defending, and of examining, which he calls the exetastic sort. But it is easy to see that the first two of these species belong to the deliberative kind of oratory, the two following to the epideictic, and the last three to the judicial. 10. I pass over Protagoras, who thinks that the only parts of oratory are those of interrogating, replying, commanding, and intreating, which he calls εὐχολή (euchōlē). Plato, in his Sophistes, has added to the judicial and deliberative a third kind which he calls προσομιλητικόν (prosomiletikon), and which we may allow ourselves to call the sermocinatory sort, which is distinct from the oratory of the forum and suited to private discussions, and of which the nature is the same as that of dialectics or logic. 11. Isocrates thought that praise and blame have a place in every kind of oratory.

To me it has appeared safest to follow the majority of writers, and so reason seems to direct. 12. There is, then, as I said, one kind of oratory in which praise and blame are included, but which is called, from the better part of its office, the panegyric; others, however, term it the demonstrative or epideictic (Both names are thought to be derived from the Greeks, who apply to those kinds the epithets ἐγκομιστικόν (enkōmiastikon) and ἐπιδεκτικόν (epideiktikon). 13. But the word epideiktikon seems to me to have the signification not so much of demonstration as of ostentation, and to differ very much from the term enkōmiastikon, for though it includes in it the laudatory kind of oratory, it does not consist in that kind alone. 14. Would any one deny that panegyric speeches are of the epideictic kind? Yet they take the suasory form and generally speak of the interests of Greece. So that there are, indeed, three kinds of oratory, but in each of them part is devoted to the subject-matter and part to display. But perhaps our countrymen, when they call a particular kind demonstrative, do not borrow the name from the Greeks, but are simply led by the consideration that praise and blame demonstrate what the exact nature of anything is. 15. The second kind is the deliberative, and the third the judicial. Other species will fall under these genera, nor will there be found any

vituperationem existimavit.

XII. Nobis et tutissimum est auctores plurimos sequi et ita videtur ratio dictare. Est igitur, ut dixi, unum genus, quo laus ac vituperatio continetur, sed est appellatum a parte meliore laudativum: idem alii demonstrativum vocant. Vtrumque nomen ex Graeco creditur fluxisse; nam enkomiastikon aut epideiktikon dicunt. XIII. Sed mihi epideiktikon non tam demonstrationis vim habere quam ostentationis videtur et multum ab illo enkomiastikoi differre; nam ut continet laudativum in se genus, ita non intra hoc solum consistit. XIV. An quisquam negaverit panegyricos epideiktikous esse? Atqui formam suadendi habent et plerumque de utilitatibus Graeciae locuntur: ut causarum quidem genera tria sint, sed ea tum in negotiis, tum in ostentatione posita. Nisi forte non ex Graeco mutantes demonstrativum vocant, verum id secuntur, quod laus ac vituperatio quale sit quidque demonstrat. XV. Alterum est deliberativum, tertium iudiciale. Ceterae species in haec tria incident genera: nec invenietur ex his ulla in qua non laudare aut vituperare, suadere aut dissuadere, intendere quid vel depellere debeamus. Illa quoque sunt communia, conciliare narrare docere augere minuire, concitandis componendisve adfectibus animos audientium fingere. XVI. Ne iis quidem accesserim, qui laudativam materiam honestorum, deliberativam utilium, iudiciale iustorum quaestione contineri putant, celeri magis ac rutunda usu distributione quam vera. Stant enim quodam modo mutuis auxiliis omnia; nam et in laude iustitia utilitasque tractatur et in consiliis honestas, et raro iudiciale inveneris causam in cuius non parte aliquid eorum quae supra diximus reperitur.

one species in which we shall not have either to praise or to blame, to persuade or to dissuade, to enforce a charge or to repel one, while to conciliate, to state facts, to inform, to exaggerate, to extenuate, and to influence the judgment of the audience by exciting or allaying the passions are common to every sort of oratory.

16. I could not agree even with those who, adopting, as I think, a division rather easy and specious than true, consider that the matter of panegyric eloquence concerns what is honorable, that of deliberative what is expedient, and that of judicial what is just; all are supported, to a certain extent, by aid one from another, since in panegyric, justice and expediency are considered, and in deliberations, honor; and you will rarely find a judicial pleading into some part of which something of what I have just mentioned does not enter.

## 5. Tacitus. *Dialogue on Oratory*

1. You often ask me, Justus Fabius, how it is that while the genius and the fame of so many distinguished orators have shed a lustre on the past, our age is so forlorn and so destitute of the glory of eloquence that it scarce retains the very name of orator. That title indeed we apply only to the ancients, and the clever speakers of this day we call pleaders, advocates, counsellors, anything rather than orators. To answer this question of yours, to undertake the burden of so serious an inquiry, involving, as it must, a mean opinion either of our capacities, if we cannot reach the same standard, or of our tastes, if we have not the wish, is a task on which I should scarcely venture had I to give my own views instead of being able to reproduce a conversation among men, for our time, singularly eloquent, whom, when quite a youth, I heard discussing this very question. And so it is not ability, it is only memory and recollection which I require. I have to repeat now, with the same divisions and arguments, following closely the course of that discussion, those subtle reflections which I heard, powerfully expressed, from men of the highest eminence, each of whom assigned a different but plausible reason, thereby displaying the peculiarities of his individual temper and genius. Nor indeed did the opposite side lack an advocate, who, after much criticism and ridicule of old times, maintained the superiority of the eloquence of our own days to the great orators of the past.

1. Saepe ex me requiris, Iuste Fabi, cur, cum priora saecula tot eminentium oratorum ingeniis gloriaeque floruerint, nostra potissimum aetas deserta et laude eloquentiae orbata vix nomen ipsum oratoris retineat; neque enim ita appellamus nisi antiquos, horum autem temporum disertis causidici et advocati et patroni et quidvis potius quam oratores vocantur. Cui percontationi tuae respondere et tam magnae quaestionis pondus excipere, ut aut de ingeniis nostris male existimandum [sit], si idem adsequi non possumus, aut de iudiciis, si nolumus, vix hercule auderem, si mihi mea sententia proferenda ac non disertissimorum, ut nostris temporibus, hominum sermo repetendus esset, quos eandem hanc quaestionem pertractantis iuvenis admodum audivi. Ita non ingenio, sed memoria et recordatione opus est, ut quae a praestantissimis viris et excogitata subtiliter et dicta graviter accepi, cum singuli diversas [vel easdem] sed probabilis causas adferrent, dum formam sui quisque et animi et ingenii redderent, isdem nunc numeris isdemque rationibus persequar, servato ordine disputationis. Neque enim defuit qui diversam quoque partem susciperet, ac multum vexata et

Tacitus: *Dialogue on Oratory* Book 1 [10]

10. Nor again do even reputation and fame, the only object of their devotion, the sole reward of their labours, by their own confession, cling to the poet as much as to the orator; for indifferent poets are known to none, and the good but to a few. When does the rumour of the very choicest readings penetrate every part of Rome, much less is talked of throughout our numerous provinces? How few, when they visit the capital from Spain or Asia, to say nothing of our Gallic neighbours, ask after Saleius Bassus! And indeed, if any one does ask after him, having once seen him, he passes on, and is satisfied, as if he had seen a picture or a statue. I do not wish my remarks to be taken as implying that I would deter from poetry those to whom nature has denied the orator's talent, if only they can amuse their leisure and push themselves into fame by this branch of culture. For my part I hold all eloquence in its every variety something sacred and venerable, and I regard as preferable to all studies of other arts not merely your tragedian's buskin or the measures of heroic verse, but even the sweetness of the lyric ode, the playfulness of the elegy, the satire of the iambic, the wit of the epigram, and indeed any other form of eloquence. But it is with you, Maternus, that I am dealing; for, when your genius might carry you to the summit of eloquence, you prefer to wander from the path, and though sure to win the highest prize you stop short at meaner things. Just as, if you had been born in Greece, where it is an honour to practise even the arts of the arena, and if the gods had given you the vigour and strength of Nicostratus, I should not suffer those giant arms meant by nature for combat to waste themselves on the light javelin or the throwing of the quoit, so now I summon you from the lecture-room and the theatre to the law court with its pleadings and its real battles. I do this the more because you cannot even fall back on the refuge which shelters many, the plea that the poet's pursuit is less liable to give offence than that of the orator. In truth, with you the ardour of a peculiarly noble nature bursts forth, and the offence you give is not for the sake of a friend, but, what is more dangerous, for the sake of Cato. Nor is this offending excused by the obligation of duty, or by the fidelity of an advocate, or by the impulse of a casual and sudden speech. You have, it seems, prepared your part in having chosen a character of note who would speak with authority. I foresee your possible answer. Hence, you will say, came the decisive approval; this is the style which the lecture-room chiefly

inrisa vetustate nostrorum temporum eloquentiam antiquorum ingeniis anteferet.

2. It was the day after Curiatius Maternus had given a reading of his Cato, by which it was said that he had irritated the feelings of certain great personages, because in the subject of his tragedy he had apparently forgotten himself and thought only of Cato. While all Rome was discussing the subject, he received a visit from Marcus Aper and Julius Secundus, then the most famous men of genius at our bar. Of both I was a studious hearer in court, and I also would follow them to their homes and when they appeared in public, from a singular zeal for my profession, and a youthful enthusiasm which urged me to listen diligently to their trivial talk, their more serious debates, and their private and esoteric discourse. Yet many ill-naturedly thought that Secundus had no readiness of speech, and that Aper had won his reputation for eloquence by his cleverness and natural powers, more than by training and culture. As a fact, Secundus had a pure, terse, and a sufficiently fluent style, while Aper, who was imbued with learning of all kinds, pretended to despise the culture which he really possessed. He would have, so he must have thought, a greater reputation for industry and application, if it should appear that his genius did not depend on any supports from pursuits alien to his profession.

2. Nam postero die quam Curiatius Maternus Catonem recitaverat, cum offendisse potentium animos diceretur, tamquam in eo tragoediae argumento sui oblitus tantum Catonem cogitasset, eaque de re per urbem frequens sermo haberetur, venerunt ad eum Marcus Aper et Iulius Secundus, celeberrima tum ingenia fori nostri, quos ego utrosque non modo in iudiciis studiose audiebam, sed domi quoque et in publico adsectabar mira studiorum cupiditate et quodam ardore iuvenili, ut fabulas quoque eorum et disputationes et arcana semotae dictionis penitus exciperem, quamvis maligne plerique opinarentur, nec Secundo promptum esse sermonem et Aprum ingenio potius et vi naturae quam institutione et litteris famam eloquentiae consecutum. Nam et Secundo purus et pressus et, in quantum satis erat, profluens sermo non defuit, et Aper omni eruditione imbutus contemnebat potius litteras quam nesciebat, tamquam maiorem industriae et laboris gloriam habiturus, si ingenium eius nullis alienarum artium adminiculis inniti videretur.

3. So we entered the study of Maternus, and found him seated with the very book which he had read the day before, in his hands. Secundus began. Has the talk of ill-natured people no effect in deterring you, Maternus, from clinging to your Cato with its provocations? Or

praises, and which next becomes the world's talk. Away then with the excuse of quiet and safety, when you are deliberately choosing a more doughty adversary. For myself, let it be enough to take a side in the private disputes of our own time. In these, if at any time necessity has compelled us on behalf of an imperilled friend to offend the ears of the powerful, our loyalty must be approved, our liberty of speech condoned.

10. Ne opinio quidem et fama, cui soli serviunt et quod unum esse pretium omnis laboris sui fatentur, aequae poetas quam oratores sequitur, quoniam mediocri poetas nemo novit, bonos pauci. Quando enim rarissimarum recitationum fama in totam urbem penetrat? Nedum ut per tot provincias innotescat. Quotus quisque, cum ex Hispania vel Asia, ne quid de Gallis nostris loquar, in urbem venit, Saleium Bassum requirit? Atque adeo si quis requirit, ut semel vidit, transit et contentus est, ut si picturam aliquam vel statuam vidisset. Neque hunc meum sermonem sic accipi volo, tamquam eos, quibus natura sua oratorium ingenium denegavit, deterream a carminibus, si modo in hac studiorum parte oblectare otium et nomen inserere possunt famae. Ego vero omnem eloquentiam omnique eius partis sacras et venerabilis puto, nec solum cothurnum vestrum aut heroici carminis sonum, sed lyricorum quoque iucunditatem et elegorum lascivias et iamborum amaritudinem [et] epigrammatum lusus et quamcumque aliam speciem eloquentia habeat, anteponendam ceteris aliarum artium studiis credo. Sed tecum mihi, Materne, res est, quod, cum natura tua in ipsam arcem eloquentiae ferat, errare mavis et summa adepturus in levioribus subsistis. ut si in Graecia natus esses, ubi ludicras quoque artis exercere honestum est, ac tibi Nicostrati robur ac vires di dedissent, non paterer inmanis illos et ad pugnam natos lacertos levitate iaculi aut iactu disci vanescere, sic nunc te ab auditoriis et theatri in forum et ad causas et ad vera proelia voco, cum praesertim ne ad illud quidem confugere possis, quod plerisque patrocinator, tamquam minus obnoxium sit offendere poetarum quam oratorum studium. Effervescit enim vis pulcherrimae naturae tuae, nec pro amico aliquo, sed, quod periculosius est, pro Catone offendis. Nec excusatur offensa necessitudine officii aut fide advocacionis aut fortuitae et subitae dictionis impetu: meditatus videris [aut] elegisse personam notabilem et cum auctoritate dicturam. Sentio quid responderi possit: hinc ingentis [ex his] adsensus, haec in ipsis auditoriis praecipue laudari et mox omnium sermonibus ferri. Tolle igitur quietis et securitatis excusationem, cum tibi sumas adversarium superiorem. Nobis satis sit privatas et nostri saeculi controversias tueri, in quibus [expressis] si quando necesse sit pro periclitante amico potentiorum aures offendere, et

have you taken up the book to revise it more carefully, and, after striking out whatever has given a handle for a bad interpretation, will you publish, if not a better, at least a safer, Cato?

You shall read, was the answer, what Maternus owed it to himself to write, and all that you heard you will recognise again. Anything omitted in the Cato Thyestes shall supply in my next reading. This is a tragedy, the plan of which I have in my own mind arranged and formed. I am therefore bent on hurrying on the publication of the present book, that, as soon as my first work is off my hands, I may devote my whole soul to a fresh task.

It seems, said Aper, so far from these tragedies contenting you, that you have abandoned the study of the orator and pleader, and are giving all your time to Medea and now to Thyestes, although your friends, with their many causes, and your clients from the colonies, municipalities, and towns, are calling you to the courts. You could hardly answer their demands even if you had not imposed new work on yourself, the work of adding to the dramas of Greece a Domitius and a Cato, histories and names from our own Rome.

3. Igitur ut intravimus cubiculum Materni, sedentem ipsum[que], quem pridie recitaverat librum, inter manus habentem deprehendimus. Tum Secundus "nihilne te" inquit, "Materne, fabulae malignorum terrent, quo minus offensas Catonis tui ames? An ideo librum istum adprehendisti, ut diligentius retractares, et sublatis si qua pravae interpretationi materiam dederunt, emitteres Catonem non quidem meliorem, sed tamen securiorem?" Tum ille "leges" inquit "quid Maternus sibi debuerit, et adgnosces quae audisti. Quod si qua omisit Cato, sequenti recitatione Thyestes dicet; hanc enim tragoediam disposui iam et intra me ipse formavi. Atque ideo maturare libri huius editionem festino, ut dimissa priore cura novae cogitationi toto pectore incumbam." "Adeo te tragoediae istae non satiant," inquit Aper "quo minus omissis orationum et causarum studiis omne tempus modo circa Medeam, ecce nunc circa Thyestem consumas, cum te tot amicorum causae, tot coloniarum et municipiorum clientelae in forum vocent, quibus vix suffeceris, etiam si non novum tibi ipse negotium importasses, [ut] Domitium et Catonem, id est nostras quoque historias et Romana nomina Graeculorum fabulis adgregares."

4. This severity of yours, replied Maternus, would be quite a blow to us, had not our controversy from its frequency and familiarity become by this time almost a regular practice. You, in fact, never cease from abusing

probata sit fides et libertas excusata."

11. Aper having said this with his usual spirit and with vehemence of utterance, Maternus replied good-humouredly with something of a smile. I was preparing to attack the orators at as great length as Aper had praised them, for I thought that he would leave his praises of them and go on to demolish poets and the pursuit of poetry, but he appeased me by a sort of stratagem, granting permission to those who cannot plead causes, to make verses. For myself, though I am perhaps able to accomplish and effect something in pleading causes, yet it was by the public reading of tragedies that I first began to enter the path of fame, when in Nero's time I broke the wicked power of Vatinius by which even the sanctities of culture were profaned, and if at this moment I possess any celebrity and distinction I maintain that it has been acquired more by the renown of my poems than of my speeches. And so now I have resolved to throw off the yoke of my labours at the bar, and for trains of followers on my way to and from the court and for crowded receptions I crave no more than for the bronzes and busts which have invaded my house even against my will. For hitherto I have upheld my position and my safety better by integrity than by eloquence, and I am not afraid of having ever to say a word in the senate except to avert peril from another.

11. Quae cum dixisset Aper acrius, ut solebat, et intento ore, remissus et subridens Maternus "parantem" inquit "me non minus diu accusare oratores quam Aper laudaverat (fore enim arbitrabar ut a laudatione eorum digressus detrectaret poetas atque carminum studium prosterneret) arte quadam mitigavit, concedendo iis, qui causas agere non possent, ut versus facerent. Ego autem sicut in causis agendis efficere aliquid et eniti fortasse possum, ita recitatione tragoediarum et ingredi famam auspicatus sum, cum quidem [imperante] Nerone inprobam et studiorum quoque sacra profanantem Vatini potentiam fregi, [et] hodie si quid in nobis notitiae ac nominis est, magis arbitror carminum quam orationum gloria partum. ac iam me deiungere a forensi labore constitui, nec comitatus istos et egressus aut frequentiam salutantium concupisco, non magis quam aera et imagines, quae etiam me nolente in domum meam intraverunt. Nam statum cuiusque ac securitatem melius innocentia tuetur quam eloquentia, nec vereor ne mihi umquam verba in senatu nisi pro alterius discrimine facienda sint.

12. As to the woods and groves and that retirement which Aper denounced, they bring such delight to me that I count among the chief enjoyments of poetry the

and inveighing against poets, and I, whom you reproach with neglect of my professional duties, every day undertake to plead against you in defence of poetry. So I am all the more delighted at the presence of a judge who will either forbid me for the future to write verses, or who will compel me by his additional authority to do what I have long desired, to give up the petty subtleties of legal causes, at which I have toiled enough, and more than enough, and to cultivate a more sacred and more stately eloquence.

4. Et Maternus: "perturbarer hac tua severitate, nisi frequens et assidua nobis contentio iam prope in consuetudinem vertisset. Nam nec tu agitare et insequi poetas intermittis, et ego, cui desidiam advocatum obicis, cotidianum hoc patrocinium defendendae adversus te poeticae exerceo. Quo laetor magis oblatum nobis iudicem, qui me vel in futurum vetet versus facere, vel, quod iam pridem opto, sua quoque auctoritate compellat, ut omissis forensium causarum angustiis, in quibus mihi satis superque sudatum est, sanctiorem illam et augustiorem eloquentiam colam."

5. For my part, said Secundus, before Aper refuses me as a judge, I will do as is usually done by upright and sensible judges, who excuse themselves in cases in which it is evident that one side has an undue influence with them. Who knows not that no one is nearer my heart from long friendship and uninterrupted intercourse than Saleius Bassus, an excellent man, as well as a most accomplished poet? Besides, if poetry is to be put on her defence, I know not a more influential defendant.

He may rest secure, said Aper, both Saleius Bassus himself, and anyone else who is devoted to the pursuit of poetry and the glory of song, if he has not the gift of pleading causes. But assuredly, as I have found an arbiter for this dispute, I will not allow Maternus to shelter himself behind a number of associates. I single him out for accusation before you on the ground that, though naturally fittest for that manly eloquence of the orator by which he might create and retain friendships, acquire connections, and attach the provinces, he is throwing away a pursuit than which it is impossible to imagine one in our state richer in advantages, more splendid in its prospects, more attractive in fame at home, more illustrious in celebrity throughout our whole empire and all the world. If, indeed, what is useful in life should be the aim of all our plans and actions, what can be safer than to practise an art armed with which a man can always bring aid to friends, succour to strangers, deliverance to the imperilled, while to malignant foes he is an actual fear and terror, himself the while secure and intrenched, so to say, within a power and a position of lasting strength? When we have a flow of prosperity, the

fact that it is composed not in the midst of bustle, or with a suitor sitting before one's door, or amid the wretchedness and tears of prisoners, but that the soul withdraws herself to abodes of purity and innocence, and enjoys her holy resting-place. Here eloquence had her earliest beginnings; here is her inmost shrine. In such guise and beauty did she first charm mortals, and steal into those virgin hearts which no vice had contaminated. Oracles spoke under these conditions. As for the present money-getting and blood-stained eloquence, its use is modern, its origin in corrupt manners, and, as you said, Aper, it is a device to serve as a weapon. But the happy golden age, to speak in our own poetic fashion, knew neither orators nor accusations, while it abounded in poets and bards, men who could sing of good deeds, but not defend evil actions. None enjoyed greater glory, or honours more august, first with the gods, whose answers they published, and at whose feasts they were present, as was commonly said, and then with the offspring of the gods and with sacred kings, among whom, so we have understood, was not a single pleader of causes, but an Orpheus, a Linus, and, if you care to dive into a remoter age, an Apollo himself. Or, if you think all this too fabulous and imaginary, at least you grant me that Homer has as much honour with posterity as Demosthenes, and that the fame of Euripides or Sophocles is bounded by a limit not narrower than that of Lysias or Hyperides. You will find in our own day more who disparage Cicero's than Virgil's glory. Nor is any production of Asinius or Messala so famous as Ovid's Medea or the Thyestes of Varius.

12. Nemora vero et luci et secretum ipsum, quod Aper increpabat, tantam mihi adferunt voluptatem, ut inter praecipuos carminum fructus numerem, quod non in strepitu nec sedente ante ostium litigatore nec inter sordes ac lacrimas reorum componuntur, sed secedit animus in loca pura atque innocentia fruiturque sedibus sacris. Haec eloquentiae primordia, haec penetralia; hoc primum habitu cultuque commoda mortalibus in illa casta et nullis contacta vitiis pectora influxit: sic oracula loquebantur. Nam lucrosae huius et sanguinantis eloquentiae usus recens et ex malis moribus natus, atque, ut tu dicebas, Aper, in locum teli repertus. Ceterum felix illud et, ut more nostro loquar, aureum saeculum, et oratorum et criminum inops, poetis et vatibus abundabat, qui bene facta canerent, non qui male admissa defenderent. Nec ullis aut gloria maior aut augustior honor, primum apud deos, quorum proferre responsa et interesse epulis ferebantur, deinde apud illos dis genitos sacrosque reges, inter quos neminem causidicum, sed Orphea ac Linum ac, si introspicere altius velis, ipsum Apollinem accepimus. vel si haec fabulosa nimis et composita videntur, illud certe mihi concedes, Aper, non

efficacy and use of this art are seen in the help and protection of others; if, however, we hear the sound of danger to ourselves, the breast-plate and the sword are not, I am well assured, a stronger defence on the battlefield than eloquence is to a man amid the perils of a prosecution. It is both a shield and a weapon; you can use it alike for defence and attack, either before a judge, before the senate, or before the emperor. What but his eloquence did Eprius Marcellus oppose the other day to the senators in their fury? Armed with this, and consequently terrible, he baffled the sagacious but untrained wisdom of Helvidius Priscus, which knew nothing of such encounters. Of its usefulness I say no more. It is a point which I think my friend Maternus will be the last to dispute.

5. "Ego vero" inquit Secundus, "antequam me iudicem Aper recuset, faciam quod probi et moderati iudices solent, ut in iis cognitionibus [se] excusent, in quibus manifestum est alteram apud eos partem gratia praevalere. Quis enim nescit neminem mihi coniunctiorem esse et usu amicitiae et assiduitate contubernii quam Saleium Bassum, cum optimum virum tum absolutissimum poetam? Porro si poetica accusatur, non alium video reum locupletiores." "Securus sit" inquit Aper "et Saleius Bassus et quisquis alius studium poeticae et carminum gloriam fovet, cum causas agere non possit. Ego enim, quatenus arbitrum litis huius [inveniri], non patiar Maternum societate plurium defendi, sed ipsum solum apud [omnes] arguam, quod natus ad eloquentiam virilem et oratoriam, qua parere simul et tueri amicitias, addiscere necessitudines, complecti provincias possit, omittit studium, quo non aliud in civitate nostra vel ad utilitatem fructuosius [vel ad voluptatem dulcius] vel ad dignitatem amplius vel ad urbis famam pulchrius vel ad totius imperii atque omnium gentium notitiam inlustrius excogitari potest. Nam si ad utilitatem vitae omnia consilia factaque nostra derigenda sunt, quid est tutius quam eam exercere artem, qua semper armatus praesidium amicis, opem alienis, salutem periclitantibus, invidis vero et inimicis metum et terrorem ultro feras, ipse securus et velut quadam perpetua potentia ac potestate munitus? cuius vis et utilitas rebus prospere fluentibus aliorum perfugio et tutela intellegitur: sin proprium periculum increpuit, non hercule lorica et gladius in acie firmiter munimentum quam reo et periclitanti eloquentia, praesidium simul ac telum, quo propugnare pariter et incessere sive in iudicio sive in senatu sive apud principem possis. Quid aliud infestis patribus nuper Eprius Marcellus quam eloquentiam suam opposuit? Qua accinctus et minax disertam quidem, sed inexercitatum et eius modi certaminum rudem Helvidii sapientiam elusit. plura de

minorem honorem Homero quam Demostheni apud posteros, nec angustioribus terminis famam Euripidis aut Sophoclis quam Lysiae aut Hyperidis includi. Pluris hodie reperies, qui Ciceronis gloriam quam qui Virgillii detrectent: nec ullus Asinii aut Messallae liber tam inlustrius est quam Medea Ovidii aut Varii Thyestes.

13. Look again at the poet's lot, with its delightful companionships. I should not be afraid of comparing it with the harassing and anxious life of the orator. Orators, it is true, have been raised to consulships by their contests and perils, but I prefer Virgil's serene, calm, and peaceful retirement, in which after all he was not without the favour of the di-vine Augustus, and fame among the people of Rome. We have the testimony of the letters of Augustus, the testimony too of the people themselves, who, on hearing in the theatre some of Virgil's verses, rose in a body and did homage to the poet, who happened to be present as a spectator, just as to Augustus himself. Even in our own day, Pomponius Serundus need not yield to Domitius Aper on the score of a dignified life or an enduring reputation. As for your Crispus and Marcellus, whom you hold up to me as examples, what is there in their lot to be coveted? Is it that they are in fear themselves, or are a fear to others? Is it that, while every day something is asked from them, those to whom they grant it feel indignant? Is it that, bound as they are by the chain of flattery, they are never thought servile enough by those who rule, or free enough by us? What is their power at its highest? Why, the freedmen usually have as much. For my self, as Virgil says, let "the sweet muses" lead me to their sacred retreats, and to their fountains far away from anxieties and cares, and the necessity of doing every day something repugnant to my heart. Let me no longer tremblingly experience the madness and perils of the forum, and the pallors of fame. Let me not be aroused by a tumult of morning visitors, or a freedman's panting haste, or, anxious about the future, have to make a will to secure my wealth. Let me not possess more than what I can leave to whom I please, whenever the day appointed by my own fates shall come; and let the statue over my tomb be not gloomy and scowling, but bright and laurel-crowned. As for my memory, let there be no resolutions in the senate, or petitions to the emperor.

13. Ac ne fortunam quidem vatum et illud felix contubernium comparare timuerim cum inquieta et anxiosa oratorum vita. licet illos certamina et pericula sua ad consulatus evexerint, malo securum et quietum Virgillii secessum, in quo tamen neque apud divum Augustum gratia caruit neque apud populum Romanum notitia. Testes Augusti epistulae, testis ipse populus, qui auditus in theatro Virgillii versibus surrexit universus et forte



utilitate non dico, cui parti minime contra dicturum Maternum meum arbitror.

6. I pass now to the pleasure derived from the orator's eloquence. Its delights are enjoyed not for a single moment, but almost on every day and at every hour. To the mind of an educated gentleman, naturally fitted for worthy enjoyments, what can be more delightful than to see his house always thronged and crowded by gatherings of the most eminent men, and to know that the honour is paid not to his wealth, his childlessness, or his possession of some office, but to himself? Nay, more; the childless, the rich, and the powerful often go to one who is both young and poor, in order to intrust him with difficulties affecting themselves or their friends. Can there be any pleasure from boundless wealth and vast power equal to that of seeing men in years, and even in old age, men backed by the influence of the whole world, readily confessing, amid the utmost affluence of every kind, that they do not possess that which is the best of all? Again, look at the respectable citizens who escort the pleader to and from the court. Look at his appearance in public, and the respect shown him before the judges. What a delight it must be to rise and stand amid the hushed crowd, with every eye on him alone, the people assembling and gathering round him in a circle, and taking from the orator any emotion he has himself assumed. I am now reckoning the notorious joys of an orator, those which are open to the sight even of the uneducated; the more secret, known only to the advocate himself, are yet greater. If he produces a careful and well-prepared speech, there is a solidity and steadfastness in his satisfaction, just as there is in his style; if, again, he offers his audience, not without some tremblings at heart, the result of a fresh and sudden effort, his very anxiety enhances the joy of success, and ministers to his pleasure. In fact, audacity at the moment, and rashness itself, have quite a peculiar sweetness. As with the earth, so with genius. Though time must be bestowed on the sowing and cultivation of some plants, yet those which grow spontaneously are the more pleasing.

6. Ad voluptatem oratoriae eloquentiae transeo, cuius iucunditas non uno aliquo momento, sed omnibus prope diebus ac prope omnibus horis contingit. Quid enim dulcius libero et ingenuo animo et ad voluptates honestas nato quam videre plenam semper et frequentem domum suam concursu splendidissimorum hominum? idque scire non pecuniae, non orbitati, non officii alicuius administrationi, sed sibi ipsi dari? ipsos quin immo orbos et locupletes et potentis venire plerumque ad iuvenem et pauperem, ut aut sua aut amicorum discrimina commendent. ullane tanta ingentium opum ac

praesentem spectantemque Virgilium veneratus est sic quasi Augustum. Ne nostris quidem temporibus Secundus Pomponius Afro Domitio vel dignitate vitae vel perpetuitate famae cesserit. Nam Crispus iste et Marcellus, ad quorum exempla me vocas, quid habent in hac sua fortuna concupiscendum? Quod timent, an quod timentur? Quod, cum cotidie aliquid rogentur, ii quibus praestant indignantur? Quod adligati omni adulatione nec imperantibus umquam satis servi videntur nec nobis satis liberi? Quae haec summa eorum potentia est? tantum posse liberti solent. Ne vero "dulces," ut Virgilius ait, "Musae," remotum a sollicitudinibus et curis et necessitate cotidie aliquid contra animum faciendi, in illa sacra illosque fontis ferant; nec insanum ultra et lubricum forum famamque pallentem trepidus experiar. Non me fremitus salutantium nec anhelans libertus excitet, nec incertus futuri testamentum pro pignore scribam, nec plus habeam quam quod possim cui velim relinquere; quandoque enim fatalis et meus dies veniet: statuarque tumulo non maestus et atrox, sed hilaris et coronatus, et pro memoria mei nec consulat quisquam nec roget."

14. Excited and, I say, full of enthusiasm, Maternus had hardly finished when Vipstanus Messala entered his room, and, from the earnest expression on each face, he conjectured that their conversation was unusually serious. Have I, he asked, come among you unseasonably, while you are engaged in private deliberation, or the preparation of some case?

By no means, by no means, said Secundus. Indeed I could wish you had come sooner, for you would have been delighted with the very elaborate arguments of our friend Aper, in which he urged Maternus to apply all his ability and industry to the pleading of causes, and then too with Maternus's apology for his poems in a lively speech, which, as suited a poet's defence, was uncommonly spirited, and more like poetry than oratory.

For my part, he replied, I should have been infinitely charmed by the discourse, and I am delighted to find that you excellent men, the orators of our age, instead of exercising your talents simply on law-business and rhetorical studies, also engage in discussions which not only strengthen the intellect but also draw from learning and from letters a pleasure most exquisite both to you who discuss such subjects and to those too whose ears your words may reach. Hence the world, I see, is as much pleased with you, Secundus, for having by your life of Julius Asiaticus given it the promise of more such books, as it is with Aper for having not yet retired from the disputes of the schools, and for choosing to employ his leisure after the fashion of modern rhetoricians rather

magnae potentiae voluptas quam spectare homines veteres et senes et totius orbis gratia subnixos in summa rerum omnium abundantia confitentis, id quod optimum sit se non habere? iam vero qui togatorum comitatus et egressus! Quae in publico species! Quae in iudiciis veneratio! Quod illud gaudium consurgendi adsistendique inter tacentis et in unum conversos! coire populum et circumfundi coram et accipere adfectum, quemcumque orator induerit! vulgata dicentium gaudia et imperitorum quoque oculis exposita percenseo: illa secretiora et tantum ipsis orantibus nota maiora sunt. Sive accuratam meditatamque profert orationem, est quoddam sicut ipsius dictionis, ita gaudii pondus et constantia; sive novam et recentem curam non sine aliqua trepidatione animi attulerit, ipsa sollicitudo commendat eventum et lenocinatur voluptati. Sed extemporalis audaciae atque ipsius temeritatis vel praecipua iucunditas est; nam [in] ingenio quoque, sicut in agro, quamquam [grata sint quae] diu serantur atque elaborentur, gratiora tamen quae sua sponte nascuntur.

7. To speak my own mind, I did not experience more joy on the day on which I was presented with the robe of a senator, or when, as a new man, born in a far from influential state, I was elected quaestor, or tribune, or praetor, than on those on which it was my privilege, considering the insignificance of my ability as a speaker, to defend a prisoner with success, to win a verdict in a cause before the Court of the Hundred, or to give the support of my advocacy in the emperor's presence to the great freedmen themselves, or to ministers of the crown. On such occasions I seem to rise above tribunates, praetorships, and consulships, and to possess that which, if it be not of natural growth, is not bestowed by mandate, nor comes through interest. Again, is there an accomplishment, the fame and glory of which are to be compared with the distinction of the orator, who is an illustrious man at Rome, not only with the busy class, intent on public affairs, but even with people of leisure, and with the young, those at least who have a right disposition and a worthy confidence in themselves? Whose name does the father din into his children's ears before that of the orator? Whom, as he passes by, do the ignorant mob and the men with the tunic oftener speak of by name and point out with the finger? Strangers too and foreigners, having heard of him in their towns and colonies, as soon as they have arrived at Rome, ask for him and are eager, as it were, to recognise him.

7. Equidem, ut de me ipso fatear, non eum diem laetorem egi, quo mihi latus clavus oblatum est, vel quo homo novus et in civitate minime favorabili natus quaesturam aut tribunatum aut praeturam accepi, quam eos, quibus mihi pro mediocritate huius

than of the old orators.

14. Vixdum finierat Maternus, concitatus et velut instinctus, cum Vipstanus Messalla cubiculum eius ingressus est, suspicatusque ex ipsa intentione singulorum altiore inter eos esse sermonem, "num parum tempestivus" inquit "interveni secretum consilium et causae alicuius meditationem tractantibus?" "Minime, minime" inquit Secundus, "atque adeo vellem maturius intervenisses; delectasset enim te et Apri nostri accuratissimus sermo, cum Maternum ut omne ingenium ac studium suum ad causas agendas converteret exhortatus est, et Materni pro carminibus suis laeta, utque poetas defendi decebat, audentior et poetarum quam oratorum similior oratio." "Me vero" inquit "[et] sermo iste infinita voluptate adfecisset, atque id ipsum delectat, quod vos, viri optimi et temporum nostrorum oratores, non forensibus tantum negotiis et declamatorio studio ingenia vestra exercetis, sed eius modi etiam disputationes adsumitis, quae et ingenium alunt et eruditionis ac litterarum iucundissimum oblectamentum cum vobis, qui ista disputatis, adferunt, tum etiam iis, ad quorum auris pervenerint. Itaque hercule non minus probari video in te, Secunde, quod Iuli Africani vitam componendo spem hominibus fecisti plurimum eius modi librorum, quam in Apro, quod nondum ab scholasticis controversiis recessit et otium suum mavult novorum rhetorum more quam veterum oratorum consumere."

15. Upon this Aper replied, You still persist, Messala, in admiring only what is old and antique and in sneering at and disparaging the culture of our own day. I have often heard this sort of talk from you, when, forgetting the eloquence of yourself and your brother, you argued that nobody in this age is an orator. And you did this, I believe, with the more audacity because you were not afraid of a reputation for ill-nature, seeing that the glory which others concede to you, you deny to yourself. I feel no penitence, said Messala, for such talk, nor do I believe that Secundus or Maternus or you yourself, Aper, think differently, though now and then you argue for the opposite view. I could wish that one of you were prevailed on to investigate and describe to us the reasons of this vast difference. I often inquire into them by myself. That which consoles some minds, to me increases the difficulty. For I perceive that even with the Greeks it has happened that there is a greater distance between Aeschines and Demosthenes on the one hand, and your friend Nicetes or any other orator who shakes Ephesus or Mitylene with a chorus of rhetoricians and their noisy applause, on the other, than that which separates Afer, Africanus, or yourselves from Cicero or Asinius.

quantulaecumque in dicendo facultatis aut reum prospere defendere aut apud centumviros causam aliquam feliciter orare aut apud principem ipsos illos liberos et procuratores principum tueri et defendere datur. tum mihi supra tribunatus et praeturas et consulatus ascendere videor, tum habere quod, si non [ultro] oritur, nec codicillis datur nec cum gratia venit. Quid? fama et laus cuius artis cum oratorum gloria comparanda est? Quid? Non inlustres sunt in urbe non solum apud negotiosos et rebus intentos, sed etiam apud iuvenes vacuos et adulescentis, quibus modo recta indoles est et bona spes sui? Quorum nomina prius parentes liberis suis ingerunt? Quos saepius vulgus quoque imperitum et tunicatus hic populus transeuntis nomine vocat et digito demonstrat? Advenae quoque et peregrini iam in municipiis et coloniis suis auditos, cum primum urbem attigerunt, requirunt ac velut agnoscere concupiscunt.

8. As for Marcellus Eprius, whom I have just mentioned, and Crispus Vibius (it is pleasanter to me to cite recent and modern examples than those of a distant and forgotten past), I would venture to argue that they are quite as great men in the remotest corners of the world as at Capua or Vercellae, where they are said to have been born. Nor do they owe this to the three hundred million sesterces of the one, although it may seem that they must thank their eloquence for having attained such wealth. Eloquence itself is the cause. Its inspiration and superhuman power have throughout all times shown by many an example what a height of fortune men have reached by the might of genius. But there are, as I said but now, instances close at hand, and we may know them, not by hearsay, but may see them with our eyes. The lower and meaner their birth, the more notorious the poverty and the straitened means amid which their life began, the more famous and brilliant are they as examples to show the efficacy of an orator's eloquence. Without the recommendation of birth, without the support of riches, neither of the two distinguished for virtue, one even despised for the appearance of his person, they have now for many years been the most powerful men in the state, and, as long as it suited them, they were the leaders of the bar. At this moment, as leading men in the emperor's friendship they carry all before them, and even the leading man himself of the State esteems and almost reverences them. Vespasian indeed, venerable in his old age and most tolerant of truth, knows well that while his other friends are dependent on what he has given them, and on what it is easy for him to heap and pile on others, Marcellus and Crispus, in becoming his friends, brought with them something which they had not received and which could

15. Tum Aper: "non desinis, Messalla, vetera tantum et antiqua mirari, nostrorum autem temporum studia inridere atque contemnere. Nam hunc tuum sermonem saepe excepi, cum oblitus et tuae et fratris tui eloquentiae neminem hoc tempore oratorem esse contenderes [antiquis], eo, credo, audacius, quod malignitatis opinionem non verebaris, cum eam gloriam, quam tibi alii concedunt, ipse tibi denegares." "Neque illius" inquit "sermonis mei paenitentiam ago, neque aut Secundum aut Maternum aut te ipsum, Aper, quamquam interdum in contrarium disputes, aliter sentire credo. Ac velim impetratum ab aliquo vestrum ut causas huius infinitae differentiae scrutetur ac reddat, quas mecum ipse plerumque conquiro. Et quod quibusdam solacio est, mihi auget quaestionem, quia video etiam Graecis accidisse ut longius absit [ab] Aeschine et Demosthene Sacerdos ille Nicetes, et si quis alius Ephesum vel Mytilenas concentu scholasticorum et clamoribus quatit, quam Afer aut Africanus aut vos ipsi a Cicerone aut Asinio recessistis."

16. The question you have raised, said Secundus, is a great one and quite worthy of discussion. But who has a better claim to unravel it than yourself, you who to profound learning and transcendent ability have added reflection and study?

I will open my mind to you, replied Messala, if first I can prevail on you to give me your assistance in our discussion. I can answer for two of us, said Maternus; Secundus and myself will take the part which we understand you have not so much omitted as left to us. Aper usually dissents, as you have just said, and he has clearly for some time been girding himself for the attack, and cannot bear with patience our union on behalf of the merits of the ancients.

Assuredly, said Aper, I will not allow our age to be condemned, unheard and undefended, by this conspiracy of yours. First, however, I will ask you whom you call ancients, or what period of orators you limit by your definition? When I hear of ancients, I understand men of the past, born ages ago; I have in my eye Ulysses and Nestor, whose time is about thirteen hundred years before our day. But you bring forward Demosthenes and Hyperides who flourished, as we know, in the period of Philip and Alexander, a period, however, which they both outlived. Hence we see that not much more than four hundred years has intervened between our own era and that of Demosthenes. If you measure this space of time by the frailty of human life, it perhaps seems long; if by the course of ages and by the thought of this boundless universe, it is extremely short and is very near

not be received from a prince. Amid so much that is great, busts, inscriptions, and statues hold but a very poor place. Yet even these they do not disregard, and certainly not riches and affluence, which it is easier to find men denouncing than despising. It is these honours and splendours, aye and substantial wealth, that we see filling the homes of those who from early youth have given themselves to practice at the bar and to the study of oratory.

8. Ausim contendere Marcellum hunc Eprium, de quo modo locutus sum, et Crispum Vibium (libentius enim novis et recentibus quam remotis et oblitteratis exemplis utor) non minores esse in extremis partibus terrarum quam Capuae aut Vercellis, ubi nati dicuntur. Nec hoc illis alterius [bis alterius] ter milies sestertium praestat, quamquam ad has ipsas opes possunt videri eloquentiae beneficio venisse, [sed] ipsa eloquentia; cuius numen et caelestis vis multa quidem omnibus saeculis exempla edidit, ad quam usque fortunam homines ingenii viribus pervenerint, sed haec, ut supra dixi, proxima et quae non auditu cognoscenda, sed oculis spectanda haberemus. Nam quo sordidius et abiectius nati sunt quoque notabilior paupertas et angustiae rerum nascentis eos circumsteterunt, eo clariora et ad demonstrandam oratoriae eloquentiae utilitatem inlustriora exempla sunt, quod sine commendatione natalium, sine substantia facultatum, neuter moribus egregius, alter habitu quoque corporis contemptus, per multos iam annos potentissimi sunt civitatis ac, donec libuit, principes fori, nunc principes in Caesaris amicitia agunt feruntque cuncta atque ab ipso principe cum quadam reverentia diliguntur, quia Vespasianus, venerabilis senex et patientissimus veri, bene intellegit [et] ceteros quidem amicos suos iis niti, quae ab ipso acceperint quaeque ipsis accumulare et in alios congerere promptum sit, Marcellum autem et Crispum attulisse ad amicitiam suam quod non a principe acceperint nec accipi possit. Ninimum inter tot ac tanta locum obtinent imagines ac tituli et statuae, quae neque ipsa tamen negleguntur, tam hercule quam divitiae et opes, quas facilius invenies qui vituperet quam qui fastidiat. His igitur et honoribus et ornamentis et facultatibus refertas domos eorum videmus, qui se ab ineunte adulescentia causis forensibus et oratorio studio dederunt.

9. As for song and verse to which Maternus wishes to devote his whole life (for this was the starting-point of his entire argument), they bring no dignity to the author, nor do they improve his circumstances. Although your ears, Maternus, may loathe what I am about to say, I ask what good it is if Agamemnon or Jason speaks eloquently in your composition. Who the more goes back to his home saved from danger and bound to you?

us. For indeed, if, as Cicero says in his Hortensius, the great and the true year is that in which the position of the heavens and of the stars at any particular moment recurs, and if that year embraces twelve thousand nine hundred and ninety four of what we call years, then your Demosthenes whom you represent as so old and ancient, began his existence not only in the same year, but almost in the same month as ourselves.

16. "Magnam" inquit Secundus "et dignam tractatu quaestionem movisti. Sed quis eam iustius explicabit quam tu, ad cuius summam eruditionem et praestantissimum ingenium cura quoque et meditatio accessit?" Et Messalla "aperiam" inquit "cogitationes meas, si illud a vobis ante impetravero, ut vos quoque sermonem hunc nostrum adiuvetis." "Pro duobus" inquit Maternus "promitto: nam et ego et Secundus exsequemur eas partis, quas intellexerimus te non tam omisisse quam nobis reliquisse. Aprum enim solere dissentire et tu paulo ante dixisti et ipse satis manifestus est iam dudum in contrarium accingi nec aequo animo perferre hanc nostram pro antiquorum laude concordiam." "Non enim" inquit Aper "inauditum et indefensum saeculum nostrum patiar hac vestra conspiratione damnari: sed hoc primum interrogabo, quos vocetis antiquos, quam oratorum aetatem significatione ista determinetis. Ego enim cum audio antiquos, quosdam veteres et olim natos intellego, ac mihi versantur ante oculos Ulixes ac Nestor, quorum aetas mille fere et trecentis annis saeculum nostrum antecedit: vos autem Demosthenem et Hyperidem profertis, quos satis constat Philippi et Alexandri temporibus floruisse, ita tamen ut utriusque superstites essent. Ex quo apparet non multo pluris quam trecentos annos interesse inter nostram et Demosthenis aetatem. Quod spatium temporis si ad infirmitatem corporum nostrorum referas, fortasse longum videatur; si ad naturam saeculorum ac respectum immensi huius aevi, perquam breve et in proximo est. Nam si, ut Cicero in Hortensio scribit, is est magnus et verus annus, par quo eadem positio caeli siderumque, quae cum maxime est, rursum existet, isque annus horum quos nos vocamus annorum duodecim milia nongentos quinquaginta quattuor complectitur, incipit Demosthenes vester, quem vos veterem et antiquum fingitis, non solum eodem anno quo nos, sed etiam eodem mense extitisse.

17. But I pass to the Latin orators. Among them, it is not, I imagine, Menenius Agrippa, who may seem ancient, whom you usually prefer to the speakers of our day, but Cicero, Caelius, Calvus, Brutus, Asinius, Messala. Why you assign them to antiquity rather than to our own times, I do not see. With respect to Cicero

Our friend Saleius is an admirable poet, or, if the phrase be more complimentary, a most illustrious bard; but who walks by his side or attends his receptions or follows in his train? Why, if his friend or relative or even he himself stumbles into some troublesome affair, he will run to Secundus here, or to you, Maternus, not because you are a poet or that you may make verses for him; for verses come naturally to Bassus in his own home, and pretty and charming they are, though the result of them is that when, with the labour of a whole year, through entire days and the best part of the nights, he has hammered out, with the midnight oil, a single book, he is forced actually to beg and canvass for people who will condescend to be his hearers, and not even this without cost to himself. He gets the loan of a house, fits up a room, hires benches, and scatters programmes. Even if his reading is followed by a complete success, all the glory is, so to say, cut short in the bloom and the flower, and does not come to any real and substantial fruit. He carries away with him not a single friendship, not a single client, not an obligation that will abide in anyone's mind, only idle applause, meaningless acclamations and a fleeting delight. We lately praised Vespasian's bounty, in giving Bassus four thousand pounds, as something marvellous and splendid. It is no doubt a fine thing to win an emperor's favour by talent; but how much finer, if domestic circumstances so require, to cultivate one, self, to make one's own genius propitious, to fall back on one's own bounty. Consider too that a poet, if he wishes to work out and accomplish a worthy result, must leave the society of his friends, and the attractions of the capital; he must relinquish every other duty, and must, as poets themselves say, retire to woods and groves, in fact, into solitude.

9. Nam carmina et versus, quibus totam vitam Maternus insumere optat (inde enim omnis fluxit oratio), neque dignitatem ullam auctoribus suis conciliant neque utilitates alunt; voluptatem autem brevem, laudem inanem et infructuosam consequuntur. licet haec ipsa et quae deinceps dicturus sum aures tuae, Materne, respuant, cui bono est, si apud te Agamemnon aut Iason diserte loquitur? Quis ideo domum defensus et tibi obligatus redit? Quis Saleium nostrum, egregium poetam vel, si hoc honorificentius est, praeclarissimum vatem, deducit aut salutatur aut prosequitur? Nempe si amicus eius, si propinquus, si denique ipse in aliquod negotium inciderit, ad hunc Secundum recurret aut ad te, Materne, non quia poeta es, neque ut pro eo versus facias; hi enim Basso domi nascuntur, pulchri quidem et iucundi, quorum tamen hic exitus est, ut cum toto anno, per omnes dies, magna noctium parte unum librum excudit et elucubrat, rogare ultro et ambire cogatur, ut sint qui dignentur audire, et ne id quidem gratis; nam et domum

himself, it was in the consulship of Hirtius and Pansa, as his freedman Tiro has stated, on the 5th of December, that he was slain. In that same year the Divine Augustus elected himself and Quintus Pedius consuls in the room of Pansa and Hirtius. Fix at fifty-six years the subsequent rule of the Divine Augustus over the state; add Tiberius's three-and-twenty years, the four years or less of Caius, the twenty-eight years of Claudius and Nero, the one memorable long year of Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, and the now six years of the present happy reign, during which Vespasian has been fostering the public weal, and the result is that from Cicero's death to our day is a hundred and twenty years, one man's life-time. For I saw myself an old man in Britain who declared that he was present at the battle in which they strove to drive and beat back from their shores the arms of Cæsar when he attacked their island. So, had this man who encountered Cæsar in the field, been brought to Rome either as a prisoner, or by his own choice or by some destiny, he might have heard Cæsar himself and Cicero, and also have been present at our own speeches. At the last largess of the Emperor you saw yourselves several old men who told you that they had actually shared once and again in the gifts of the divine Augustus. Hence we infer that they might have heard both Corvinus and Asinius. Corvinus indeed lived on to the middle of the reign of Augustus, Asinius almost to its close. You must not then divide the age, and habitually describe as old and ancient orators those with whom the ears of the self-same men might have made acquaintance, and whom they might, so to say, have linked and coupled together.

17. Sed transeo ad Latinos oratores, in quibus non Menenium, ut puto, Agrippam, qui potest videri antiquus, nostrorum temporum disertis antepone soletis, sed Ciceronem et Caesarem et Caelium et Calvum et Brutum et Asinium et Messallam: quos quid antiquis potius temporibus adscribatis quam nostris, non video. Nam ut de Cicerone ipso loquar, Hirtio nempe et Pansa consulibus, ut Tiro libertus eius scribit, septimo idus [Decembris] occisus est, quo anno divus Augustus in locum Pansae et Hirtii se et Q. Pedium consules suffecit. Statue sex et quinquaginta annos, quibus mox divus Augustus rem publicam rexit; adice Tiberii tris et viginti, et prope quadriennium Gai, ac bis quaternos denos Claudii et Neronis annos, atque illum Galbae et Othonis et Vitellii longum et unum annum, ac sextam iam felicitis huius principatus stationem, qua Vespasianus rem publicam fovet: centum et viginti anni ab interitu Ciceronis in hunc diem colliguntur, unius hominis aetas. Nam ipse ego in Britannia vidi senem, qui se fateretur ei pugnae interfuisse, qua Caesarem inferentem arma Britanniae arcere litoribus et pellere adgressi sunt. Ita si

mutuatur et auditorium exstruit et subsellia conducit et libellos dispergit. Et ut beatissimus recitationem eius eventus prosequatur, omnis illa laus intra unum aut alterum diem, velut in herba vel flore praecerta, ad nullam certam et solidam pervenit frugem, nec aut amicitiam inde refert aut clientelam aut mansurum in animo cuiusquam beneficium, sed clamorem vagum et voces inanis et gaudium volucre. laudavimus nuper ut miram et eximiam Vespasiani liberalitatem, quod quingenta sestertia Basso donasset. pulchrum id quidem, indulgentiam principis ingenio mereri: quanto tamen pulchrius, si ita res familiaris exigat, se ipsum colere, suum genium propitiare, suam experiri liberalitatem! adice quod poetis, si modo dignum aliquid elaborare et efficere velint, relinquenda conversatio amicorum et iucunditas urbis, deserenda cetera officia utque ipsi dicunt, in nemora et lucos, id est in solitudinem secedendum est.

eum, qui armatus C. Caesari restitit, vel captivitas vel voluntas vel fatum aliquod in urbem pertraxisset, aequae idem et Caesarem ipsum et Ciceronem audire potuit et nostris quoque actionibus interesse. Proximo quidem congiario ipsi vidistis plerosque senes, qui se a divo quoque Augusto semel atque iterum accepisse congiarium narrabant. Ex quo colligi potest et Corvinum ab illis et Asinium audiri potuisse; nam Corvinus in medium usque Augusti principatum, Asinius paene ad extremum duravit, ne dividatis saeculum, et antiquos ac veteres vocitatis oratores, quos eorundem hominum aures agnoscere ac velut coniungere et copulare potuerunt.

18. I have made these preliminary remarks to show that any credit reflected on the age by the fame and renown of these orators is common property, and is in fact more closely connected with us than with Servius Galba or Caius Carbo, and others whom we may rightly call "ancients." These indeed are rough, unpolished, awkward, and ungainly, and I wish that your favourite Calvus or Caelius or even Cicero had in no respect imitated them. I really mean now to deal with the subject more boldly and confidently, but I must first observe that the types and varieties of eloquence change with the age. Thus Caius Gracchus compared with the elder Cato is full and copious; Crassus compared with Gracchus is polished and ornate; Cicero compared with either is lucid, graceful, and lofty; Corvinus again is softer and sweeter and more finished in his phrases than Cicero. I do not ask who is the best speaker. Meantime I am content to have proved that eloquence has more than one face, and even in those whom you call ancients several varieties are to be discovered. Nor does it at once follow that difference implies inferiority. It is the fault of envious human nature that the old is always the object of praise, the present of contempt. Can we doubt that there were found critics who admired Appius Caecus more than Cato? We know that even Cicero was not without his disparagers, who thought him inflated, turgid, not concise enough, but unduly diffuse and luxuriant, in short anything but Attic. You have read of course the letters of Calvus and Brutus to Cicero, and from these it is easy to perceive that in Cicero's opinion Calvus was bloodless and attenuated, Brutus slovenly and lax. Cicero again was slightly spoken of by Calvus as loose and nerveless, and by Brutus, to use his own words, as "languid and effeminate." If you ask me, I think they all said what was true. But I shall come to them separately after a while; now I have to deal with them collectively.

18. Haec ideo praedixi, ut si qua ex horum oratorum fama gloriaque laus temporibus acquiritur, eam docerem

in medio sitam et propiorem nobis quam Servio Galbae aut C. Carboni quosque alios merito antiquos vocaverimus; sunt enim horridi et inpoliti et rudes et informes et quos utinam nulla parte imitatus esset Calvus vester aut Caelius aut ipse Cicero. Agere enim fortius iam et audentius volo, si illud ante praedixero, mutari cum temporibus formas quoque et genera dicendi. Sic Catoni seni comparatus C. Gracchus plenior et uberior, sic Graccho politior et ornatior Crassus, sic utroque distinctior et urbanior et altior Cicero, Cicerone mitior Corvinus et dulcior et in verbis magis elaboratus. Nec quaero quis disertissimus: hoc interim probasse contentus sum, non esse unum eloquentiae vultum, sed in illis quoque quos vocatis antiquos plures species deprehendi, nec statim deterius esse quod diversum est, vitio autem malignitatis humanae vetera semper in laude, praesentia in fastidio esse. Num dubitamus inventos qui prae Catone Appium Caecum magis mirarentur? satis constat ne Ciceroni quidem obtrectatores defuisse, quibus inflatus et tumens nec satis pressus, sed supra modum exsultans et superfluens et parum Atticus videretur. legistis utique et Calvi et Bruti ad Ciceronem missas epistulas, ex quibus facile est deprehendere Calvum quidem Ciceroni visum exsanguem et aridum, Brutum autem otiosum atque diiunctum; rursusque Ciceronem a Calvo quidem male audisse tamquam solutum et enervem, a Bruto autem, ut ipsius verbis utar, tamquam "fractum atque elumbem." si me interroges, omnes mihi videntur verum dixisse: sed mox ad singulos veniam, nunc mihi cum universis negotium est.

19. While indeed the admirers of the ancients fix as the boundary, so to say, of antiquity, the period up to Cassius Severus who was the first, they assert, to deviate from the old and plain path of the speaker, I maintain that it was not from poverty of genius or ignorance of letters that he adopted his well known style, but from preference and intellectual conviction. He saw, in fact, that, as I was just now saying, the character and type of oratory must change with the circumstances of the age and an altered taste in the popular ear. The people of the past, ignorant and uncultured as they were, patiently endured the length of a very confused speech, and it was actually to the speaker's credit, if he took up one of their days by his speech-making. Then too they highly esteemed long preparatory introductions, narratives told from a remote beginning, a multitude of divisions ostentatiously paraded, proofs in a thousand links, and all the other directions prescribed in those driest of treatises by Hermagoras and Apollodorus. Any one who was supposed to have caught a scent of philosophy, and who introduced some philosophical commonplace into

his speech, was praised up to the skies. And no wonder; for this was new and unfamiliar, and even of the orators but very few had studied the rules of rhetoricians or the dogmas of philosophers. But now that all these are common property and that there is scarce a bystander in the throng who, if not fully instructed, has not at least been initiated into the rudiments of culture, eloquence must resort to new and skilfully chosen paths, in order that the orator may avoid offence to the fastidious ear, at any rate before judges who decide by power and authority, not by law and precedent, who fix the speaker's time, instead of leaving it to himself, and, so far from thinking that they ought to wait till he chooses to speak on the matter in question, continually remind him of it and recall him to it when he wanders, protesting that they are in a hurry.

19. Nam quatenus antiquorum admiratores hunc velut terminum antiquitatis constituere solent, qui usque ad Cassium \* \* \* \* \*, quem reum faciunt, quem primum adfirmant flexisse ab illa vetere atqueirecta dicendi via, non infirmitate ingenii nec inscitia litterarum transtulisse se ad aliud dicendi genus contendo, sed iudicio et intellectu. Vidit namque, ut paulo ante dicebam, cum condicione temporum et diversitate aurium formam quoque ac speciem orationis esse mutandam. facile perferebat prior ille populus, ut imperitus et rudis, impeditissimarum orationum spatia, atque id ipsum laudabat, si dicendo quis diem eximeret. Iam vero longa principiorum praeparatio et narrationis alte repetita series et multarum divisionum ostentatio et mille argumentorum gradus, et quidquid aliud aridissimis Hermagorae et Apollodori libris praecipitur, in honore erat; quod si quis odoratus philosophiam videretur et ex ea locum aliquem orationi suae insereret, in caelum laudibus ferebatur. Nec mirum; erant enim haec nova et incognita, et ipsorum quoque oratorum paucissimi praecepta rhetorum aut philosophorum placita cognoverant. At hercule pervulgatis iam omnibus, cum vix in cortina quisquam adsistat, quin elementis studiorum, etsi non instructus, at certe imbutus sit, novis et exquisitis eloquentiae itineribus opus est, per quae orator fastidium aurium effugiat, utique apud eos iudices, qui vi et potestate, non iure et legibus cognoscunt, nec accipiunt tempora, sed constituunt, nec exspectandum habent oratorem, dum illi libeat de ipso negotio dicere, sed saepe ultro admonent atque alio transgredientem revocant et festinare se testantur.





## Chapter 2

### 1. Cassiodorus. *Institutiones Divinarum et Humanarum Litterarum*

#### 2.02. *De Rhetorica*

[2.02.01] Rhetorica dicitur \*apo tu rhetoreuin\*, id est, copia deductae locutionis, infiuere. Ars autem rhetorica est, sicut magistri tradunt saecularium litterarum, bene dicendi scientia in ciuilibus quaestionibus. Orator igitur est uir bonus dicendi peritus, ut dictum est, in ciuilibus quaestionibus. Oratoris autem officium est apposite dicere ad persuadendum. Finis persuadere dictione, quatenus rerum et personarum condicio uidetur ammittere, in ciuilibus quaestionibus. Unde nunc aliqua breuiter assumemus, ut nonnullis partibus indicatis paene totius artis ipsius summam uirtutemque intellegere debeamus. Ciuiles quaestiones sunt, secundum Fortunatianum, artigraphum nouellum, 'quae in communem animi conceptionem possunt cadere, id est, quas unusquisque potest intellegere, cum de aequo quaeritur et bono.' [2.02.02] Partes igitur rhetoricae sunt quinque: inuentio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio. Inuentio est excogitatio rerum uerarum aut uerisimilium, quae causam probabilem reddunt. Dispositio est rerum inuentarum in ordinem pulchra distributio. Elocutio est idoneorum uerborum ad inuentionem accommodata perceptio. Memoria est rerum et uerborum animi firma perceptio. Pronuntiatio est ex rerum et uerborum dignitate uocis et corporis decora moderatio.

[2.02.03] Genera causarum rhetoricae sunt tria principalia:

demonstratiuum		deliberatiuum	
/	\	/	\
in laude	in uituperatione	in suasionem	in dissuasionem
	iudiciale		
	/	\	
	in accusatione	in praemii acceptione	
	et defensione	et negatione	

Demonstratiuum genus est cum aliquid demonstramus, in quo est laus et uituperatio. Deliberatiuum genus est in quo est suasio et dissuasio. Iudiciale genus est in quo est accusatio et defensio, uel praemii petitio et negatio. [2.02.04] Status uero dicitur ea res in qua causa consistit. Fit autem ex intentione et depulsionem. Status causarum aut rationales sunt aut legales. Rationales secundum generales quaestiones sunt quattuor.

Sed, quemammodum ipse se Cicero emendans in libris de oratore dicit, translatio inter legales accipi debet status, nam et Fortunatianus ait: Nos 'translationem tantummodo legalem accipimus. Cur ita? Quoniam nulla translatio, id est, per scriptio, potest esse sine lege.' Legales sunt quinque: scriptum et uoluntas, leges contrariae, ambiguitas, collectio siue ratiocinatio, definitio legalis. [2.02.05] Coniecturalis status est cum factum, quod ab alio obicitur, ab aduersario pernegatur. Definitiuus status est cum id, quod obicitur, non hoc esse contendimus, sed quid illud sit adhibitis definitionibus approbamus. Qualitas est cum qualis res sit quaeritur, et quia de ui et genere negotii controuersia est, constitutio generalis uocatur. Cum causa ex eo pendet, quod non aut is agere uidetur quem oportet, aut non cum eo quicum oportet, aut non apud quos, quo tempore, qua lege, quo crimine, qua poena oporteat, translatiua dicitur constitutio, quod actio translationis et commutationis indigere uidetur. Iuridicialis est in qua aequi et recti natura et praemii aut poenae ratio quaeritur. Negotialis est in qua quid iuris ex ciuili more et aequitate sit consideratur. Absoluta est quae ipsa in se continet iuris et iniuriae quaestionem. Assumptiua est quae ipsa ex se nihil dat firmi ad recusationem, foris autem aliquid defensionis assumit. Concessio est cum reus non id quod factum est defendit, sed ut ignoscatur postulat, quod nos ad paenitentes probauimus pertinere. Remotio criminis est cum id

crimen, quod infertur, ab se et ab sua culpa, ui et potestate in alium reus demouere conatur. Relatio criminis est cum ideo iure factum dicitur, quod aliquis ante iniuria lacessitus sit. Comparatio est cum aliud aliquod alterius factum honestum aut utile contenditur, quod ut fieret, illud quod arguitur dicitur esse commissum. Purgatio est cum factum quidem conceditur, sed culpa remouetur. Haec partes habet tres: imprudentiam, casum, necessitatem. Deprecatio est cum et peccasse et consulto peccasse reus confitetur, et tamen ut ignoscatur postulat, quod genus perraro potest accidere. [2.02.06] Scriptum et uoluntas est, quando uerba ipsa uidentur cum sententia scriptoris dissidere. Legis contrariae status est, quando inter se duae leges aut plures discrepare noscuntur. Ambiguitas est, cum id quod scriptum est duas aut plures res significare uidetur. Collectio est, quae ratiocinatio nuncupatur, quando ex eo quod scriptum est aliud quoque quod non scriptum est inuenitur. Definitio legalis est, cum uis uerbi quasi in definitiua constitutione in qua posita sit quaeritur. Status ergo tam rationales quam legales a quibusdam certius xviii connumerati sunt. Ceterum secundum rhetoricos Tullii xviii reperiuntur, propterea quia translationem inter rationales principaliter affixit status. Unde se ipse etiam Cicero, sicut superius dictum est, reprehendens translationem legalibus statibus applicauit. [2.02.07] Omnis controuersia, sicut ait Cicero, aut simplex est aut iuncta, et si iuncta erit, considerandum est utrum ex pluribus quaestionibus iuncta sit, an ex aliqua comparatione. Simplex est quae absolutam continet unam quaestionem, hoc modo: 'Corinthiis bellum indicamus an non?' Iuncta est ex pluribus quaestionibus, in qua plura quaeruntur, hoc pacto: utrum Carthago diruatur, an Carthaginensibus reddatur, an eo colonia deducatur. Ex comparatione utrum potius aut quid potissimum quaeritur, ad hunc modum: utrum exercitus in Macedoniam contra Philippum mittatur, qui sociis sit auxilio, an teneatur in Italia, ut quam maximae contra Hannibalem copiae sint. [2.02.08] Genera causarum sunt quinque: honestum, ammirabile, humile, anceps, obscurum. Honestum causae genus est, cui statim sine oratione nostra fauet auditoris animus. Ammirabile, a quo est alienatus animus eorum qui auditori sunt. Humile est quod negleditur ab auditore, et non magnopere attendendum uidetur. Anceps est in quo aut iudicatio dubia est, aut causa et honestatis et turpitudinis particeps, ut beniuolentiam pariat et offensionem. Obscurum in quo aut tardi auditores sunt, a ut difficilioribus ad cognoscendum negotiis causa cernitur implicata. [2.02.09] Partes orationis rhetoricae sunt sex: exordium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, conclusio. Exordium est oratio animum auditoris idonee comparans ad reliquam dictionem. Narratio est rerum gestarum aut ut gestarum expositio. Partitio est quae, si recte habita fuerit, illustrem et perspicuam totam efficit orationem. Confirmatio est per quam argumentando nostrae causae fidem et auctoritatem et firmamentum adiungit oratio. Reprehensio est per quam argumentando aduersariorum confirmatio diluitur aut eleuatur. Conclusio est exitus et determinatio totius orationis, ubi interdum et epilogorum allegatio flebilis adhibetur. [2.02.10] Haec licet Cicero, latinae eloquentiae lumen eximium, per uaria uolumina copiose nimis et diligenter effuderit, et in arte rhetorica duobus libris uideatur amplexus, quorum commenta a Mario Victorino composita in bibliotheca mea uobis reliquisse cognoscor: Quintilianus tamen, doctor egregius, qui post fluuios Tullianos singulariter ualuit implere quae docuit, uirum bonum dicendi peritum a prima aetate suscipiens, per cunctas artes ac disciplinas nobilium litterarum erudiendum esse monstrauit, quem merito ad defendendum totius ciuitatis uota requirerent. Libros autem duos Ciceronis de arte rhetorica et Quintiliani duodecim Institutionum iudicauimus esse iungendos, ut nec codicis excresceret magnitudo et utriusque, dum necessarii fuerint, parati semper occurrant. Fortunatianum uero, doctorem nouellum, qui tribus uoluminibus de hac re subtiliter minute que tractauit, in pugillari codice apte forsitan congruenterque redegimus, ut et fastidium lectori tollat et quae sunt necessaria competenter insinuet. Hunc legat qui breuitatis amator est. Nam cum opus suum in multos libros non tetenderit, plurima tamen acutissima ratiocinatione disseruit. Quos codices cum praefatione sua in uno corpore reperieris esse collectos.

[2.02.11] Argumentatio dicta est quasi argutae mentis oratio. Argumentatio est enim oratio ipsa, qua inuentum probabile exsequimur argumentum. Inductio est oratio quae rebus non dubiis captat assensionem eius cum quo instituta est, siue inter philosophos siue inter rhetores siue inter sermocinantes. Propositio inductionis est quae similitudines concedendae rei necessario unius inducit aut plurium. Illatio inductionis est, quae et assumptio dicitur, quae rem de qua contenditur, et cuius causa similitudines habitae sunt, introducit. Conclusio inductionis est quae aut concessionem illationis confirmat, aut quid ex ea conficiatur ostendit. [2.02.12] Ratiocinatio est oratio, qua id de quo est quaestio comprobamus. Enthymema igitur est quod latine interpretatur mentis conceptio, quam imperfectum syllogismum solent artigraphi nuncupare. Nam in duabus partibus haec argumenti forma consistit, quando id quod ad fidem pertinet faciendam utitur, syllogismorum lege praeterita, ut est illud: 'Si tempestas uitanda est, non est igitur nauigandum.' Ex sola enim propositione et conclusione constat esse perfectum, unde magis oratoribus quam dialecticis conuenire iudicatum est. De dialecticis autem syllogismis suo loco dicemus. [2.02.13] Conuincibile est quod euidenti ratione conuincit, sicut fecit Cicero pro Milone, 'Eius igitur mortis sedetis ultores, cuius uitam si

putetis per uos restitui posse, nolitis. Ostentabile est quod certa rei demonstratione constringit, sicut Cicero in Catilinam, 'Hic ta men uiuit. Viuit? Immo etiam in senatum uenit.' Sententiale est quod sententia generalis adicit, ut apud Terentium, 'Obsequium amicos, ueritas odium parit.' Exemplabile est quod alicuius exempli comparatione euentum simile comminatur, sicut Cicero in Phil ippicis, 'Te miror, Antoni, quorum exempla imitaris, eorum exitus non pertimescere.' Collectiuum est cum in unum quae argumentata sunt colliguntur, sicut ait Cicero pro Milone, 'Quem igitur cum gratia noluit, hunc uoluit cum aliquorum querella, quae in iure, quem loco, quem tempore non est ausus, hunc iniuria, alieno tempore, cum periculo capitis non dubitauit occidere?' [2.02.14] Praeterea secundum Victorinum enthymematis est altera definitio. Ex sola propositione, sicut iam dictum est, ita constat enthymema ut est illud: 'Si tempestas uitanda est, non est nauigatio requirenda.' Ex sola assumptione, ut est illud, 'Sunt autem qui mundum dicant sine diuina amministrazione discurrere', ex sola conclusione, ut est illud, 'Vera est igitur diuina sententia.' Ex propositione et assumptione, ut est illud, 'Si inimicus est, occidit, inimicus autem est', et quia illi deest conclusio, enthymema uocatur. [2.02.15] Sequitur epichirema. Epichirema est, quod superius diximus, descendens de ratiocinatione latior exsecutio rhetorici syllogismi, latitudine distans et productione sermonis a dialecticis syllogismis, propter quod rhetoribus datur. Tripertitus epichirematicus syllogismus est qui constat membris tribus, id est, propositione, assumptione, conclusione. Quadripertitus est qui constat ex membris quattuor, propositione, assumptione et una propositionis siue assumptionis conuncta probatione, et conclusione. Quinque pertitus est itaque qui constat ex membris quinque, id est, propositione et eius probatione, assumptione eiusque probatione, et conclusione. Hunc Cicero ita facit in arte rhetorica: 'Si deliberatio et demonstratio genera sunt causarum, non possunt recte partes alicuius generis causae putari. Eadem enim res alii genus, alii pars esse potest, eidem genus et pars non potest' uel caetera, quousque syllogismi huius membra claudantur. Sed uidero quantum aliis partibus lector suum exercere possit ingenium. [2.02.16] Memoratus autem Fortunatianus in tertio libro meminit de oratoris memoria, de pronuntiatione et uoce, unde tamen monachus cum aliqua utilitate discedit, quando ad suas partes non improbe uidetur attrahere, quod illi ad exercendas controuersias utiliter aptauerunt. Memoriam siquidem lectionis diuinae recognita cautela seruabit, cum in supradicto libro eius uim qualitatemque cognouerit. Artem uero pronuntiationis in diuinae legi effatione concipiet. Vocis autem diligentiam in psalmodiae cantatione custodit. Sic instructus in opere sancto redditur, quamuis aliquantulum libris saecularibus occupetur. [2.02.17] Nunc ad logicam, quae et dialectica dicitur, sequenti ordine ueniamus. Quam quidam disciplinam, quidam artem appellare maluerunt, dicentes, quando apodicticis, id est, ueris disputationibus aliquid disserit, disciplina debeat nuncupari. Quando autem quid uerisimile atque opinabile tractat, nomen artis accipiat. Ita utrumque uocabulum argumentationis suae qualitate promeretur. Nam et pater Augustinus, hac credo ratione commonitus, grammaticam atque rhetoricam disciplinae nomine uocitauit, Varronem secutus. Felix etiam Capella operi suo de septem disciplinis titulum dedit. Disciplina enim dicta est, quia discitur plena, quae merito tali nomine nuncupatur, quoniam incommutabilis illis semper regula ueritatis obsequitur.

## 2. Tertulian. *Liber De Oratione*

Chapter I. ---General Introduction.<sup>1</sup>

[1] The Spirit of God, and the Word of God, and the Reason of God---Word of Reason, and Reason and Spirit of Word---Jesus Christ our Lord, namely, who is both the one and the other, ---has determined for us, the disciples of the New Testament, a new form of prayer; for in this particular also it was needful that new wine should be laid up in new skins, and a new breadth be sewn to a new garment. Besides, whatever had been in bygone days, has either been quite changed, as circumcision; or else supplemented, as the rest of the Law; or else fulfilled, as Prophecy; or else perfected, as faith itself. [2] For the new grace of God has renewed all things from carnal unto spiritual, by superinducing the Gospel, the obliterator of the whole ancient bygone system; in which our Lord Jesus Christ has been approved as the Spirit of God, and the Word of God, and the Reason of God: the Spirit, by which He was mighty; the Word, by which He taught; the Reason, by which He came. So the prayer composed by Christ has been composed of three parts. In speech, by which *prayer* is enunciated, in spirit, by which alone it prevails, even John had taught his disciples to pray, but all John's doings were laid as groundwork for Christ, until, when "He had increased "---[3] just as the same John used to fore-announce "that it was needful"

that "He should increase and himself decrease"<sup>2</sup> ----the whole work of the forerunner passed over, together with his spirit itself, unto the Lord. Therefore, after what form of words John taught to pray is not extant, because earthly things have given place to heavenly. "He who is from the earth," says John, "speaketh earthly things; and He who is here from the heavens speaketh those things which He hath seen." And what is the Lord Christ's----as this method of praying is----*that is not* heavenly? [4] And so, blessed *brethren*, let us consider His heavenly wisdom: first, touching the precept of praying secretly, whereby He exacted man's faith, that he should be confident that the sight and hearing of Almighty God are present beneath roofs, and extend even into the secret place; and required modesty in faith, that it should offer its religious homage to Him alone, whom it believed to see and to hear everywhere. [5] Further, since wisdom succeeded in the following precept, let it in like manner appertain unto faith, and the modesty of faith, that we think not that the Lord must be approached with a train of words, who, we are certain, takes unsolicited foresight for His own. [6] And yet that very brevity----and let this make for the third grade of wisdom----is supported on the substance of a great and blessed interpretation, and is as diffuse in meaning as it is compressed in words. For it has embraced not only the special duties of prayer, be it veneration of God or petition

for man, but almost every discourse of the Lord, every record of *His* Discipline; so that, in fact, in the Prayer is comprised an epitome of the whole Gospel.

Chapter II. ---The First Clause.

[1] The prayer begins with a testimony to God, and with the reward of faith, when we say, "Our Father who art in the heavens; "for (in so saying), we at once pray to God, and commend faith, whose reward this appellation is. It is written, "To them who believed on Him He gave power to be called sons of God." [2] However, our Lord very frequently proclaimed God as a Father to us; nay, even gave a precept "that we call no one on earth father, but the Father whom we have in the heavens: and so, in thus praying, we are likewise obeying the precept. [3] Happy they who recognize their Father! This is the reproach that is brought against Israel, to which the Spirit attests heaven and earth, saying, "I have begotten sons, and they have not recognized me." [4] Moreover, in saying "Father," we also call Him "God." That appellation is one both of filial duty and of power. [5] Again, in the Father the Son is invoked; "for I," saith He, "and the Father are One." [6] Nor is even our mother the Church passed by, if, that is, in the Father and the Son is recognized the mother, from whom arises the name both of Father and of Son. [7] In one general term, then, or word, we both honour God, together with His own,<sup>13</sup> and are mindful of the precept, and set a mark on such as have

forgotten their Father.

Chapter III. ---The Second Clause.

[1] The name of "God the Father" had been published to none. Even Moses, who had interrogated Him on that very point, had heard a different name. To us it has been revealed in the Son, for the Son is now the Father's new name. "I am come," saith He, "in the Father's name; " and again, "Father, glorify Thy name; " and more openly, "I have manifested Thy name to men." [2] That *name*, therefore, we pray may "be hallowed." Not that it is becoming for men to *wish* God *well*, as if there were any other by whom He may be wished well, or as if He would suffer unless we do so wish. Plainly, it is universally becoming for God to be *blessed* in every place and time, on account of the memory of His benefits ever due from every man. But this petition also serves the turn of a blessing. [3] Otherwise, when is the name of God not "holy," and "hallowed" through Himself, seeing that of Himself He sanctifies all others---He to whom that surrounding circle of angels cease not to say, "Holy, holy, holy? " In like wise, therefore, we too, candidates for angelhood, if we succeed in deserving it, begin even here on earth to learn by heart that strain hereafter to be raised unto God, and the function of future glory. [4] So far, for the glory of God. On the other hand, for our own petition, when we say, "Hallowed be Thy name," we pray this; that it may be hallowed *in us* who are in Him, as well in all



others for whom the grace of God is still waiting; that we may obey this precept, too, in "praying for all," even for our personal enemies. And therefore with suspended utterance, not saying, "Hallowed be it *in us*," "we say,----"*in all*."

Chapter IV. ----The Third Clause.

[1] According to this model, we subjoin, "Thy will be done in the heavens and on the earth;" not that there is some power withstanding to prevent God's will being done, and we pray for Him the successful achievement of His will; but we pray for His will to be done *in all*. For, by figurative interpretation of *flesh* and *spirit*, we are "heaven" and "earth;" [2] albeit, even if it is to be understood simply, still the sense of the petition is the same, that *in us* God's will be done on earth, to make it possible, namely, for it to be done also in the heavens. What, moreover, *does* God will, but that we should walk according to His Discipline? We make petition, then, that He supply us with the substance of His will, and the capacity to do it, that we may be saved both in the heavens and on earth; because the sum of His will is the salvation of them whom He has adopted. [3] There is, too, that will of God which the Lord accomplished in preaching, in working, in enduring; for if He Himself proclaimed that He did not His own, but the Father's will, without doubt those things which He used to do *were* the Father's will; unto which things, as unto exemplars, we are now provoked; to preach, to work,

to endure even unto death. And we *need* the will of God, that we may be able to fulfil these duties. [4] Again, in saying, "Thy will be done," we are even wishing well to ourselves, in so far that there is nothing of *evil* in the will of God; even if, proportionably to each one's deserts, somewhat other is imposed on us.[5] So by this expression we premonish our own selves unto patience. The Lord also, when He had wished to demonstrate to us, even in His own flesh, the flesh's infirmity, by the reality of suffering, said, "Father, remove this Thy cup; "and remembering Himself, *added*, "save that not my will, but Thine be done." Himself *was* the Will and the Power of the Father: and yet, for the demonstration of the patience which was due, He gave Himself up *to* the Father's Will.

Chapter V. ----The Fourth Clause.

[1] "Thy kingdom come" has also reference to that whereto "Thy will be done" refers---*in us*, that is. For when does God not reign, in whose hand is the heart of all kings? But whatever we wish for ourselves we augur for Him, and *to* Him we attribute what *from* Him we expect. And so, if the *manifestation* of the Lord's kingdom pertains unto the will of God and unto our anxious expectation, how do some pray for some protraction of the age, when the kingdom of God, which we pray may arrive, tends unto the consummation of the age? Our wish is, that our reign be hastened, not our servitude protracted. [2] Even

if it had not been prescribed in the Prayer that we should ask for the advent of the kingdom, we should, unbidden, have sent forth that cry, hastening toward the realization of our hope. [3] The souls of the martyrs beneath the altar cry in jealousy unto the Lord "How long, Lord, dost Thou not avenge our blood on the inhabitants of the earth?" for, of course, their avenging is regulated by the end of the age. [4] Nay, Lord, Thy kingdom come with all speed,---the prayer of Christians the confusion of the heathen, the exultation of angels, for the sake of which we suffer, nay, rather, for the sake of which we pray!

Chapter VI. ---The Fifth Clause.

[1] But how gracefully has the Divine Wisdom arranged the order of the prayer; so that *after* things heavenly---that is, after the "Name" of God, the "Will" of God, and the "Kingdom" of God---it should give earthly necessities also room for a petition! For the Lord had withal issued His edict, "Seek ye first the kingdom, and then even these shall be added:" [2] albeit we may rather understand, "Give us this day our daily bread," *spiritually*. For *Christ* is our Bread; because Christ is Life, and bread is life. "I am," saith He, "the Bread of Life;" and, a little above, "The Bread is the Word of the living God, who came down from the heavens." Then *we find*, too, that His body is reckoned in bread: "This is my body." And so, in petitioning for "daily bread," we ask for perpetuity in Christ, and indivisibility from His body. [3] But,

because that word is admissible in a carnal sense too, it cannot be so used without the religious remembrance withal of spiritual Discipline; for (the Lord) commands that *bread* be prayed for, which is the only *food* necessary for believers; for "all other things the nations seek after." The like lesson He both inculcates by examples, and repeatedly handles in parables, when He says, "Doth a father take away *bread* from his children, and hand it to dogs? " and again, "Doth a father give his son a stone when he asks for *bread*? " For He *thus* shows what it is that sons expect from their father. Nay, even that nocturnal knocker knocked for "*bread*." [4] Moreover, He justly added, "Give us *this day*," seeing He had previously said, "Take no careful thought about the morrow, what ye are to eat." To which subject He also adapted the parable of the man who pondered on an enlargement of his barns for his forthcoming fruits, and on seasons of prolonged security; but that very night he dies.

Chapter VII. ----The Sixth Clause.

[1] It was suitable that, after contemplating the liberality of God, we should likewise address His clemency. For what will aliments profit us, if we are really *consigned* to them, as it were a bull destined for a victim? The Lord knew Himself to be the only guiltless One, and so He teaches that we beg "to have our debts remitted us." A petition for pardon is a full confession; because he who begs for pardon fully admits

his guilt. Thus, too, penitence is demonstrated acceptable to God who desires it rather than the death of the sinner. [2] Moreover, *debt* is, in the Scriptures, a figure of *guilt*; because it is equally due to the sentence of judgment, and is exacted by it: nor does it evade the justice of exaction, unless the exaction be remitted, just as the lord remitted to that slave *in the parable* his debt; for hither does the scope of the whole parable tend. For the fact withal, that the same servant, after liberated by his lord, does not equally spare his own debtor; and, being on that account impeached before his lord, is made over to the tormentor to pay the uttermost farthing----that is, every guilt, however small: corresponds with our profession that "we also remit to our debtors;" [3] indeed elsewhere, too, in conformity with this Form of Prayer, He saith, "Remit, and it shall be remitted you." And when Peter had put the question whether remission were to be granted to a brother seven times, "Nay," saith He, "seventy-seven times; "

in order to remould the Law for the better; because in Genesis *vengeance* was assigned "seven times" in the case of Cain, but in that of Lamech "seventy-seven times."

Chapter VIII. ----The Seventh or Final Clause.

[1] For the completeness of so brief a prayer He added----in order that we should supplicate not touching the remitting merely, but touching the entire averting, of acts of guilt, "Lead us not into

temptation:" that is, suffer us not to be led into it, by him (of course) who tempts; [2] but far be the thought that the Lord should seem to tempt,<sup>57</sup> as if He either were ignorant of the faith of any, or else were eager to overthrow it. [3] Infirmity and malice are characteristics of the devil. For *God* had commanded even Abraham to make a sacrifice of his son, for the sake not of tempting, but proving, his faith; in order through him to make an example for that precept of His, whereby He was, by and by, to enjoin that he should hold no pledges of affection dearer than God.<sup>60</sup> [4] He Himself, when tempted by the devil, demonstrated who it is that presides over and is the originator of temptation. [5] This passage He confirms by subsequent ones, saying, "Pray that ye be not tempted; " yet they *were* tempted, (as they showed) by deserting their Lord, because they had given way rather to sleep than prayer. [6] The final clause, therefore, is consonant, and interprets the sense of "Lead us not into temptation;" for this *sense* is, "But convey us away from the Evil One."

Chapter IX. ---  
Recapitulation.

[1] In summaries of so few words, how many utterances of the prophets, the Gospels, the apostles---how many discourses, examples, parables of the Lord, are touched on! How many duties are simultaneously discharged! [2] The honour of God in the "Father;" the testimony of faith in the "Name;" the offering of obedience in the "Will;" the commemoration of

hope in the "Kingdom; "the petition for life in the "Bread;" the full acknowledgment of debts in the prayer for their "Forgiveness;" the anxious dread of temptation in the request for "Protection."

[3] What wonder? God alone could teach how he wished Himself prayed to. The religious rite of prayer therefore, ordained by Himself, and animated, even at the moment when it was issuing out of the Divine mouth, by His own Spirit, ascends, by its own prerogative, into heaven, commending to the Father what the Son has taught.

Chapter X. ---We May Superadd Prayers of Our Own to the Lord's Prayer.

[1] Since, however, the Lord, the Foreseer of human necessities, said separately, after delivering His Rule of Prayer, "Ask, and ye shall receive; " and *since* there are petitions which are made according to the circumstances of each individual; our additional wants have the right---after beginning with the legitimate and customary prayers as a foundation, as it were---of rearing an outer superstructure of petitions, yet with remembrance of *the Master's* precepts.

Chapter XI. ---When Praying the Father, You are Not to Be Angry with a Brother.

[1] That we may not be as far from the ears of God as we are from His precepts, the memory of His precepts paves for our prayers a way unto heaven; of which *precepts* the chief is, that we go not up unto God's altar before we compose whatever of discord or offence we have contracted

with our brethren. For what sort of deed is it to approach the peace of God without peace? the remission of debts while you retain them? How will he appease his *Father* who is angry with his *brother*, when from the beginning "all anger" is forbidden us? [2] For even Joseph, when dismissing his brethren for the purpose of fetching their father, said, "And be not angry in the way." He warned *us*, to be sure, at that time (for elsewhere our Discipline is called "the Way" ), that when, set in "the way" of prayer, we go not unto "the Father" with anger. [3] After that, the Lord, "amplifying the Law," openly adds *the prohibition of anger* against a brother to *that of murder*. Not even by an evil word does He permit it to be vented. Ever if we *must* be angry, our anger must not be maintained beyond sunset, as the apostle admonishes. But how rash is it either to pass a day without prayer, while you refuse to make satisfaction to your brother; or else, by perseverance in anger, to lose your prayer?

Chapter XII. ----We Must Be Free Likewise from All Mental Perturbation.

[1] Nor merely from anger, but altogether from *all* perturbation of mind, ought the exercise of prayer to be free, uttered from a spirit such as the Spirit unto whom it is sent. For a defiled spirit cannot be acknowledged by a holy Spirit, nor a sad by a joyful, nor a lettered by a free. No one grants reception to his adversary: no one grants admittance except to his compeer.

Chapter XIII. ----Of Washing



the Hands.

[1] But what reason is there in going to prayer with hands indeed washed, but the spirit foul?---inasmuch as to our hands themselves spiritual purities are necessary, that they may be "lifted up pure" from falsehood, from murder, from cruelty, from poisonings, from idolatry, and all the other blemishes which, conceived by the spirit, are effected by the operation of the hands. These are the true purities; not those which most are superstitiously careful about, taking water at every prayer, even when they are coming from a bath of the whole body. [2] When I was scrupulously making a thorough investigation of this practice, and searching into the reason of it, I ascertained it to be a commemorative act, bearing on the surrender of our Lord. We, *however, pray* to the Lord: we do not *surrender* Him; nay, we ought even to set ourselves in opposition to the example of His surrenderer, and not, on that account, wash our hands. Unless any defilement contracted in human intercourse be a conscientious cause *for washing them*, they are otherwise clean enough, which together with our whole body we once washed in Christ.

Chapter XIV. ---Apostrophe.

[1] Albeit Israel washed daily all his limbs over, yet is he never clean. His *hands*, at all events, are ever unclean, eternally dyed with the blood of the prophets, and of the Lord Himself; and on that account, as being hereditary culprits from their privity to their fathers' crimes, they do

not dare even to raise them unto the Lord, for fear some Isaiah should cry out, for fear Christ should utterly shudder. We, however, not only raise, but even expand them; and, taking our model from the Lord's passion even in prayer we confess to Christ.

Chapter XV. ----Of Putting Off Cloaks.

[1] But since we have touched on one special point of empty observance, it will not be irksome to set our brand likewise on the other points against which the reproach of vanity may deservedly be laid; if, that is, they are observed without the authority of any precept either of the Lord, or else of the apostles. For matters of this kind belong not to religion, but to superstition, being studied, and forced, and of curious rather than rational ceremony; deserving of restraint, at all events, even on this ground, that they put us on a level with Gentiles. As, *e.g.*, it is the custom of some to make prayer with cloaks doffed, for so do the nations approach their idols; [2] which practice, of course, were its observance becoming, the apostles, who teach concerning the garb of prayer. would have comprehended *in their instructions*, unless any think that it was in prayer that Paul had left his cloak with Carpus! God, forsooth, would not hear cloaked suppliants, who plainly heard the three saints in the Babylonian king's furnace praying in their trousers and turbans.

Chapter XVI. ----Of Sitting After Prayer.

[1] Again, for the custom which some have of sitting when prayer is ended, I

perceive no reason, except that which children give. For what if that Hermas, whose writing is generally inscribed with the title *The Shepherd*, had, after finishing his prayer, not sat down on his bed, but done some other thing: should we maintain that also as a matter for observance? [2] Of course not. Why, even as it is the sentence, "When I had prayed, and had sat down on my bed," is simply put with a view to the order of the narration, not as a model of discipline. [3] Else we shall have to pray nowhere except where there is a bed! [4] Nay, whoever sits in a *chair* or on a *bench*, will act contrary to that writing. [5] Further: inasmuch as the nations do the like, in sitting down after adoring their petty images; even on this account the practice deserves to be censured in us, because it is observed in the worship of idols. [6] To this is further added the charge of *irreverence*,---intelligible even to the nations themselves, if they had any sense. If, on the one hand, it is irreverent to sit under the eye, and over against the eye, of him whom you most of all revere and venerate; how much more, on the other hand, is that deed *most* irreligious under the eye of the living God, while the angel Of prayer is still *standing by* unless we are upbraiding God that prayer has wearied us!

Chapter XVII. ---Of Elevated Hands.

[1] But we more commend our prayers to God when we pray with modesty and humility, with not even our hands too loftily elevated, but elevated temperately and becomingly;

and not even our countenance over-boldly uplifted. [2] For that publican who prayed with humility and dejection not merely in his supplication, but in his countenance too, went his way "more justified" than the shameless Pharisee. [3] The sounds of our voice, likewise, should be subdued; else, if we are to be heard for our noise, how large windpipes should we need! But God is the hearer not of the voice, but of the heart, just as He is its inspector. [4] The demon of the Pythian oracle says:

"And I do understand the mute, and plainly hear the speechless one."

Do the ears of God wait for sound? How, then, could Jonah's prayer find way out unto heaven from the depth of the whale's belly, through the entrails of so huge a beast; from the very abysses, through so huge a mass of sea? [5] What superior advantage will they who pray too loudly gain, except that they annoy their neighbours? Nay, by making their petitions audible, what less error do they commit than if they were to pray in public?

Chapter XVIII. ----Of the Kiss of Peace.

[1] Another custom has now become prevalent. Such as are fasting withhold the kiss of peace, which is the seal of prayer, after prayer made with brethren. [2] But when is peace more to be concluded with brethren than when, at the time of some religious observance, our prayer ascends with more acceptability; that they may themselves participate in our observance, and thereby be

mollified for transacting with their brother touching. their own peace? [3] What prayer is complete if divorced from the "holy kiss? "[4] Whom does peace impede when rendering service to his Lord? [5] What kind of sacrifice is that from which men depart without peace? [6] Whatever our prayer be, it will not be better than the observance of the precept by which we are bidden to conceal our fasts; for *now*, by abstinence from the kiss, we are known to be fasting. But even if there be some reason *for this practice*, still, lest you offend against this precept, you may perhaps defer your "peace" *at home*, where it is not possible for your fast to be entirely kept secret. But wherever else you can conceal your observance, you ought to remember the precept: thus you may satisfy the requirements of discipline abroad and of custom at home. [7] So, too, on the day of the passover, when the religious observance of a fast is general, and as it were public, we justly forego the kiss, caring nothing to conceal anything which we do in common with all.

Chapter XIX. ---Of Stations.

[1] Similarly, too, touching the days of Stations, most think that they must not be present at the sacrificial prayers, on the ground that the Station must be dissolved by reception of the Lord's Body.

[2] Does, then, the Eucharist cancel a service devoted to God, or bind it more to God?

[3] Will not your *Station* be more solemn if you have withal *stood* at God's *altar*?

[4] When the Lord's Body has been received and reserved

each point is secured, both the participation of the sacrifice and the discharge of duty. [5] If the "Station" has received its name from the example of military life---for we withal are God's military ---of course no gladness or sadness chanting to the camp abolishes the "stations" of the soldiers: for gladness will carry out discipline more willingly, sadness more carefully.

Chapter XX. ---Of Women's Dress.

[1] So far, however, as regards the dress of women, the variety of observance compels us---men of no consideration whatever---to treat, presumptuously indeed, after the most holy apostle, except in so far as it will not be presumptuously if we treat the subject in accordance with the apostle. [2] Touching modesty of dress and ornamentation, indeed, the prescription of Peter likewise is plain, checking as he does with the same mouth, because with the same Spirit, as Paul, the glory of garments, and the pride of gold, and the meretricious elaboration of the hair.

Chapter XXI. ---Of Virgins.

[1] But that point which is promiscuously observed throughout the churches, whether virgins ought to be veiled or no, must be treated of. [2] For they who allow to virgins immunity from head-covering, appear to rest on this; that the apostle has not defined "virgins" by name, but "women," as "to be veiled; "nor the sex generally, so as to say "females," but a class of the sex, by saying "women:" [3] for if he had named the sex by saying "females," he would

have made his limit absolute for every woman; but while he names one class of the sex, he separates another class by being silent. [4] For, they say, he might either have named "virgins" specially; or generally, by a compendious term, "females."

Chapter XXII. ---Answer to the Foregoing Arguments.

[1] They who make this concession<sup>115</sup> ought to reflect on the nature of the word itself---what is the meaning of "woman" from the very first records of the sacred writings. Here they find it to be the *name of the sex*, not a *class of the sex*: if, that is, God gave to Eve, when she had not yet known a man, the surname "woman" and "female" --- ("female," whereby the sex generally; "woman," hereby a class of the sex, is marked). So, since at that time the as yet unwedded Eve was called by the word "woman," that word has been made common even to a virgin. Nor is it wonderful that the apostle---guided, of course, by the same Spirit by whom, as all the divine Scripture, so that book Genesis, was drawn up---has used the selfsame word in writing "women," which, by the example of Eve unwedded, is applicable too to a "virgin."

[2] In fact, all the other passages are in consonance herewith. For even by this very fact, that he has not *named* "virgins" (as he does in another place where he is teaching touching marrying), he sufficiently predicates that his remark is made touching *every* woman, and touching *the whole* sex; and that there is no distinction made between a "virgin" *and any other*, while

he does not name her at all. For he who elsewhere---namely, where the difference requires---remembers to make the distinction, (moreover, he makes it by designating each species by their appropriate names, ) wishes, where he makes *no* distinction (while he does not name each), *no* difference to be understood. [3] What of the fact that in the Greek speech, in which the apostle wrote his letters, it is usual to say, "women" rather than "females; "that is, gunai=kaj (gunaikas) rather than qhlei/aj (theleias)? Therefore if that word, which by interpretation represents what "female" (*femina*) represents, is frequently used *instead* of the name of the sex he has named the *sex* in saying gunai=ka; but in the *sex* even the *virgin* is embraced. [4] But, withal, the declaration is plain: "Every woman," saith he, "praying and prophesying with head uncovered, dishonoureth her own head." What is "every woman, but *woman* of every age, of every rank, of every condition? By saying" every" he excepts nought of womanhood, just as he excepts nought of manhood either from not being covered; for just so he says, "Every *man*." As, then, in the masculine sex, under the name of" man" even the" youth" is *forbidden* to be veiled; so, too, in the feminine, under the name of "woman," even the "virgin" is *bidden* to be veiled. Equally in each sex let the younger age follow the discipline of the elder; or else let the male "virgins," too, be *veiled*, if the female virgins withal are *not* veiled, because



*they* are not mentioned by *name*. Let "man" and "youth" be different, if "woman" and "virgin" are different. [5] For indeed it is "on account of the angels" that he saith women must be veiled, because on account of "the daughters of men" angels revolted from God. Who then, would contend that "*women alone*---that is, such as were already wedded and had lost their virginity---were the objects of angelic concupiscence, unless "*virgins*" are incapable of excelling in beauty and finding lovers? Nay, let us see whether it were not *virgins alone* whom they lusted after; since Scriptures saith "*the daughters of men*;" inasmuch as it might have named "*wives of men*," or "*females*," indifferently. [6] Likewise, in that it saith, "And they took them to themselves for wives," it does so on this ground, that, of course, such are "*received for wives*" as are devoid of that title. But it would have expressed itself differently concerning such as were *not* thus devoid. And so (they who are named) are devoid as much of *widowhood* as of *virginity*. So completely has *Paul* by naming the sex generally, mingled "*daughters*" and species together in the genus. [7] Again, while he says that "*nature herself*," which has assigned hair as a tegument and ornament to women, "*teaches that veiling is the duty of females*," has not the same tegument and the same honour of the head been assigned also to virgins? If "*it is shameful*" for a woman to be shorn it is similarly so to a

virgin too. [8] From them, then, to whom is assigned one and the same *law* of the head, one and the same *discipline* of the head is exacted,----(which extends) even unto those virgins whom their childhood defends, for from the first *a virgin* was named "female." This custom, in short, even Israel observes; but if *Israel* did *not* observe it, *our* Law, amplified and supplemented, would vindicate the addition for itself; let it be excused for imposing the veil on virgins also. Under *our* dispensation, let that age which is ignorant of its sex retain the privilege of simplicity. For both Eve and Adam, when it befell them to be "wise," forthwith veiled what they had learnt to know? At all events, with regard to those in whom girlhood has changed (into maturity), their age ought to remember its duties as to nature, so also, to discipline; for they are being transferred to the rank of "women" both in their persons and in their functions. No one is a "virgin" from the time when she is capable of marriage; seeing that, in her, age has by that time been wedded to its own husband, that is, to time. [9] "But some particular *virgin* has devoted herself to God. From that very moment she both changes the fashion of her hair, and converts all her garb into that of a 'woman.'" Let her, then, maintain the character wholly, and perform the whole function of a "virgin: "what she conceals for the sake of God, let her cover quite over. It is our business to entrust to the knowledge of God alone that which the grace of God

effects in us, test we receive from man the reward we hope for from God. Why do you denude before God what you cover before men?<sup>148</sup> Will you be more modest in public than in the church? If *your self-devotion* is a grace of God, and you have received it, "why do you boast," saith he, "as if you have not received it? " Why, by your ostentation of yourself, do you judge others? Is it that, by your boasting, you invite others unto good? Nay, but even you yourself run the risk of losing, if you boast; and you drive others unto the same perils. What is assumed from love of boasting is easily destroyed. Be veiled, virgin, if virgin you are; for you ought to blush. If you are a virgin, shrink from (the gaze of) many eyes. Let no one wonder at your face; let no one perceive your falsehood. You do well in falsely assuming the married character, if you veil your head; nay, you do not seem to assume it *falsely*, for you *are* wedded to Christ: to Him you have surrendered your body; act as becomes your Husband's discipline. If He bids the brides of others to be veiled, His own, of course, much more. [10] "But each individual man is not to think that the institution of his predecessor is to be overturned." Many yield up their own judgment, and its consistency, to the custom of others. Granted that *virgins* be not *compelled* to be veiled, at all events such as *voluntarily are* so should not be prohibited; who, likewise, cannot deny themselves to be virgins, content, in the security of a good conscience

before God, to damage their own fame. Touching such, however, as are betrothed, I can with constancy "above my small measure" pronounce and attest that they are to be veiled from that day forth on which they shuddered at the first bodily touch of a man by kiss and hand. For in them everything has been forewedded: their age, through maturity; their flesh, through age; their spirit, through consciousness; their modesty, through the experience of the kiss their hope, through expectation; their mind through volition. And Rebecca is example enough for us, who, when her betrothed had been pointed out, veiled herself for marriage merely on recognition of him.

Chapter XXIII. ---Of Kneeling.

[1] In the matter of *kneeling* also prayer is subject to diversity of observance, through the act of some few who abstain from kneeling on the Sabbath; and since this dissension is particularly on its trial before the churches, [2] the Lord will give His grace that the dissentients may either yield, or else indulge their opinion without offence to others. We, however (just as we have received), only on the day of the Lord's Resurrection ought to guard not only against kneeling, but every posture and office of solicitude; deferring even our businesses lest we give any place to the devil. Similarly, too, in the period of Pentecost; which period we distinguish by the same solemnity of exultation.[3] But who would hesitate *every* day to prostrate

himself before God, at least in the first prayer with which we enter on the daylight? [4] At fasts, moreover, and Stations, no prayer should be made without kneeling, and the remaining customary marks of humility; for (then) we are not only *praying*, but *deprecating*, and making satisfaction to God our Lord. Touching *times* of prayer nothing at all has been prescribed, except clearly "to pray at every time and every place."

Chapter XXIV. ----Of Place for Prayer.

[1] But how "in every place," since we are prohibited (from praying) in public? In every place, he means, which opportunity or even necessity, may have rendered suitable: for that which was done by the apostles (who, in gaol, in the audience of the prisoners, "began praying and singing to God") is not considered to have been done contrary to the precept; nor yet that which was done by Paul, who in the ship, in presence of all, "made thanksgiving to God."

Chapter XXV. ----Of Time for Prayer.

[1] Touching the *time*, however, the extrinsic observance of certain hours will not be unprofitable--- those common hours, I mean, which mark the intervals of the day---the third, the sixth, the ninth---which we may find in the Scriptures to have been more solemn than the rest. [2] The first infusion of the Holy Spirit into the congregated disciples took place at "the third hour." [3] Peter, on the day on which he experienced the vision of Universal Community, (exhibited) in that small

vessel, had ascended into the more lofty parts *of the house*, for prayer's sake "at the sixth hour." [4] The same (apostle) was going into the temple, with John, at the ninth *hour*," when he restored the paralytic to his health. [5] Albeit these *practices* stand simply without any *precept* for their observance, still it may be granted a good thing to establish some definite presumption, which may both add stringency to the admonition to, pray, and may, as it were by a law, tear us out from our businesses unto such a duty; so that----what we read to have been observed by Daniel also, in accordance (of course) with Israel's discipline----we pray at least not less than thrice in the day, debtors as we are to Three---- Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: of course, in addition to our regular prayers which are due, without any admonition, on the entrance of light and of night. [6] But, withal, it becomes believers not to take food, and not to go to the bath, before interposing a prayer; for the refreshments and nourishments of the spirit are to be held prior to those of the flesh, and things heavenly prior to things earthly.

Chapter XXVI. ----Of the Parting of Brethren.

[1] You will not dismiss a brother who has entered your house without prayer.----" Have you seen," says *Scripture*, "a brother? you have seen your Lord; " ----especially "a stranger," lest perhaps he be "an angel." [2] But again, when received yourself by brethren, you will not make earthly refreshments prior to heavenly, for your

faith will forthwith be judged. Or else how will you--- according to the precept ---say, "Peace to this *house*," unless you exchange mutual peace with them who are *in* the house?

Chapter XXVII. ---Of Subjoining a Psalm.

[1] The more diligent in prayer are wont to subjoin in their prayers the "Hallelujah," and such kind of psalms, in the closes of which the company respond. And, of course, every institution is excellent which, for the extolling and honouring of God, aims unitedly to bring Him enriched prayer as a choice victim.

Chapter XXVIII. ---Of the Spiritual Victim, Which Prayer is.

[1] For this is the spiritual victim which has abolished the pristine sacrifices. "To what purpose," saith He, "(bring ye) me the multitude of your sacrifices? I am full of holocausts of rams, and I desire not the fat of rams, and the blood of bulls and of goats. For who hath required these from your hands?"

[2] What, then, God *has* required the Gospel teaches. "An hour will come," saith He, "when the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and truth. For God is a Spirit, and accordingly requires His adorers to be such." [3] We are the true adorers and the true priests, who, praying in spirit, sacrifice, in spirit, prayer,---a victim proper and acceptable to God, which assuredly He has required, which He has looked forward to for Himself! [4] This *victim*, devoted from the whole heart, fed on faith,

tended by truth, entire in innocence, pure in chastity, garlanded with love, we ought to escort with the pomp of good works, amid psalms and hymns, unto God's altar, to obtain for us all things from God.

Chapter XXIX. ----Of the Power of Prayer.

[1] For what has God, who exacts it *ever* denied to prayer coming from "spirit and truth?" "How mighty specimens of its efficacy do we read, and hear, and believe! *Old-world* prayer, indeed, used to free from fires, and from beasts, and from famine; and yet it had not (then) received its form from Christ. But how far more amply operative is *Christian* prayer! It does not station the angel of dew in mid-fires, nor muzzle lions, nor transfer to the hungry the rustics' bread; it has no delegated grace to avert any sense of suffering; but it supplies the suffering, and the feeling, and the grieving, with endurance: it amplifies grace by virtue, that faith may know what she obtains from the Lord, understanding what---- for God's name's sake----she suffers. [2] But in days gone by, withal prayer used to call down plagues, scatter the armies of foes, withhold the wholesome influences of the showers. Now, however, the prayer of righteousness avers all God's anger, keeps bivouac on behalf of personal enemies, makes supplication on behalf of persecutors. Is it wonder if *it* knows how to extort the *rains* of heaven ----(prayer) which was *once* able to procure its *fires*? Prayer is alone that which vanquishes God. But Christ has willed



that it be operative for no evil: He had conferred on it all its virtue in the cause of good. And so it knows nothing save how to recall the souls of the departed from the very path of death, to transform the weak, to restore the sick, to purge the possessed, to open prison-bars, to loose the bonds of the innocent. Likewise it washes away faults, repels temptations, extinguishes persecutions, consoles the faint-spirited, cheers the high-spirited, escorts travellers, appeases waves, makes robbers stand aghast, nourishes the poor, governs the rich, upraises the fallen, arrests the falling, confirms the standing. [3] Prayer is the wall of faith: her arms and missiles against the foe who keeps watch over us on all sides. And, so never walk we unarmed. By day, be we mindful of Station; by night, of vigil. Under the arms of prayer guard we the standard of our General; await we in prayer the angel's trump. [4] The angels, likewise, all pray; every creature prays; cattle and wild beasts pray and bend their knees; and when they issue from their layers and lairs, they look up heavenward with no idle mouth, making their breath vibrate after their own manner. Nay, the birds too, rising out of the nest, upraise themselves heavenward, and, instead of hands, expand the cross of their wings, and say somewhat to seem like prayer. What more then, touching the office of prayer? Even the Lord Himself prayed; to whom be honour and virtue unto the ages of the ages!

1: 2 utrumque *AB* utriusque *x*, quem sequuntur *Reiff.*, *Diercks*, male, quantum mihi videtur, intellecto scriptoris sensu: si quid tamen mutandum foret, utrimque mallet scripsisse.

3 novis *Pam.* nobis *AB*.

12 quo (*tertia vice*) *AB* qua *edd. post Lat.* intervenit scripsi venit *AB* (*mendum latere suspicantur edd.*) instituta *x* constituta *AB* (*utraque vice*).

14 quo reconciliat scripsi ex ratione qua docetur supplevit *Pam.*: pro docetur maluit *Rig.* suscipitur.

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|4

25 in abditis *Gel.* (*contra consuetudinem scriptoris*).

26 modestiam *A* modestum. *B*.

27 sequente *AB* sequens *Jun.* omisit *Diercks*.

28 proinde *AB edd.* perinde *Reiff.*, sicut alibi saepius.

34 vel *del. Gel. Reiff.*: tuentur *Hoppe, Diercks*.

2:4 crediderunt *A* crediderint *B*.

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|6

3: 3 iam enim filius novum *Gel.* I. quis enim filius non *A*, unde *Reiff.* extraxit iam quis enim filius? novum etc. iam enim filius non *B* (*quod scriptoris sententiae manifeste adversatur*) prius enim quam filius non patris nomen est *Diercks*.

4, 5 Ego veni...nomen tuum om. *B*.

13 cessant *A Diercks* cessat *B Reiff.*

14 meruerimus *AB* meminimus *Gel.* (*perperam*).

20 orandi *x* orando *AB Reiff. Diercks.* quaero an legendum et hic praeecepto . . . orando.

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|8

4: 19 secus *AB* sequius *Scal.* (*perperam*).

21 substantia *AB Oeh.* sub instantiam *Urs. Reiff. Diercks*.

5: 1 quod et *AB* quo et *Leopoldus, Oeh. Reiff. Diercks* quod est *Semler Codd.* tamen *MSS. lectio restituatur, si quidem scribere possis aut eo pertinet quo aut ad id pertinet quod, locutiones vero contaminare vix liceat.*

6 protractum *A* pertractum *B* per tractum *Scal. Reiff.* (*quod quid sibi velit nescio*).

7 saeculo *A* in saeculo *B edd.* paene omnes.

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|10

5:10 protulisse *Rig.* postulisse *A* postulassemus *B*.

12 invidia *AB* ad domini iudicia *Hartelius: alii alia citra necessitatem tentaverunt: cf. quae adnot. Oeh.*

6: 3 petitioni *AB* petitionis *Gomperz*.

4 edixerat *Gel.* ei dixerat *AB*.

7 vita panis *AB Diercks* vitae panis *Semler Reiff.* (*perperam*).

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### 3. Boethius. De Syllogismo Categorico

#### LIBER PRIMUS

Multa Graeci ueteres posteris suis in consultissimis reliquere tractatibus, in quibus priusquam ad res densa caligantes obscuritate uenirent, quasi quadam intelligentia luctatione praeludunt: hinc per introductionem est facilius discibuliorque doctrina, hinc per ea quae illi \*prolegomena\* uocant, nos praedicta uel praedicenda possumus dicere, ad intelligentiam promptior uia munitur. Hanc igitur prouidentiam non exosus, statui ego quoque in res obscurissimas aliquem quodammodo pontem ponere, mediocriter quidque delibans ita ut si quid breuius dictum sit, id nos dilatione ad intelligentiam porrigamus; si quid suo more Aristoteles nominum uerborumque mutatione turbauit, nos intelligentiae seruietes ad consuetum uocabulum reducamus; si quid uero ut ad doctos scribens summa tantum tangens designatione monstrauit, nos id introductionis modo aliqua in eas res tractatione disposita perquiramus.

Sed si qui ad hoc opus legendum accenserint, ab his petendum sit ne in his quae nunquam attigerint statim audeant iudicare; ne si quid in puerilibus disciplinis acceperint, id sacrosanctum iudicent, quandoquidem res teneris auribus accommodatas saepe philosophiae seuerior tractatus eliminat. Si quid uero in his non uidebitur, ne statim obstrepant sed, ratione consulta, quid ipsi opinentur, quidue, nos ponimus, uerius mentis acumine et subtiliore pertractata ratione diiudicent. Et hi quidem sic. Nos enim, ut arbitror, suffecimus eos commentarios, de quibus haec nos protulimus, degustent blando fortasse sapore subtilitatis elicti, quamuis infrenis et indomiti creatores sint, tamen ueterum uirorum inexpugnabilibus auctoritatibus acquiescent; si quis uero Graecae orationis expertus est, in his, uel si qua aliorum sunt similia, desudabit. Itaque haec huius prooemii lex erit, ut forum nostrum nemo non intellecturus, et ob id culpaturus inspiciat. Sed ne prooemiis nihil afferentibus tempus teratur, inchoandum nobis est illo prius depulso periculo, ne a quoquam sterilis culpetur oratio. Non enim eloquentiae compositiones sed planitiam consecramur: qua in re si hoc effecimus, quamlibet incompte loquentes, intentio quoque nostra nobis perfecta est.

Sed quoniam syllogismorum structura nobis est hoc opere explicanda, syllogismis autem prior est propositio, de propositionibus hoc libello tractatus habebitur.

Et quoniam propositionis partes sunt nomen et uerbum, pars autem ab eo cuius pars est prior est, de nomine, et uerbo, ~~quae prima sunt, disputatio prima ponatur.~~

Nomen est uox designatiua ad placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla  
pars extra designatiua est.

VOX autem dictum est, quia uox nominum genus est. Omnis autem definitio a genere trahitur, ut si definias hominem, animal dicitur, id est genus; post uero rationale, id est differentia.

~~DESIGNATIUA uero dicta est, quia sunt uoces quaedam~~ quae nihil significant, ut sunt syllabis.

NOMEN uero, designat id cuius est nomen.

AD PLACITUM uero, quia nullum nomen aliquid per se significat sed ad ponentis placitum. Illud enim unaquaeque res dicitur quod ei placuit qui primus rei nomen illud impressit. Sunt enim uoces naturaliter significantes, ut canum latratus iras canum significat, et alia eius quaedam uox blandimenta; sed non sunt nomina non sunt ad placitum significantes sed natura.

SINE TEMPORE uero, quod uerba quidem uoces sunt designatiuae et secundum placitum sed distant, quod nomina ~~sine tempore sunt, uerba cum tempore.~~

CUIUS NULLA PARS EXTRA DESIGNATIVA EST: nomen ab oratione disiungit, quod oratio et ipsa uox est, et designatiua, et secundum placitum, aliquoties sine tempore est sed orationis partes significant, nominum uero minime. In Ciceronis enim nomine nulla extra pars designatiua est, neque 'ci' neque 'ce' neque 'ro'. Neque si ex duobus integris nomina sint. Quod enim in uno consignificat, id extra non significat. In nomine enim 'magister', 'magis' et 'ter' consignificauit, quia est magister. Sublatum uero 'ter' et 'magis' non erit alicuius significatio, nisi tibi hoc alii nomen dare placuerit. Omnia enim nomina non naturaliter sunt, sed ad placitum ponuntur. Sed de hoc in commentario libri \*Peri hermeneias\* Aristotelis dictum est et maior eius rei tractatus est, quam ut nunc queat expediri.

Reuertamur igitur ad nomen. Sed quoniam sunt quaedam uoces quae et designatiuae sunt, et secundum placitum et sine tempore, quarum dubia sit natura, ut est 'non-homo', hoc enim significat quiddam et secundum placitum, impositum est enim sed dubium est cui subdi possit, nomini enim non potest, omne enim nomen significat aliquid definitum, 'non-homo' autem quod definitum est perimit, oratio uero dici non potest, omnis enim oratio ex nominibus et uerbis constat, 'non-homo' autem, neque ex nominibus constat neque ex uerbis sed multo magis esse non potest uerbum, omne enim uerbum cum tempore est, 'non-homo' uero sine tempore est: quid sit ergo ita uidendum est: et quoniam 'non-homo' uox significat quiddam, quid autem significet in homine ipso non continetur (potest enim 'non-homo' et equus esse et lapis et domus, et quidquid homo non fuerit, quoniam ea qui re significare potest infinita sunt, infinitum nomen uocatur); et quoniam sunt quaedam uoces et designatiuae et ad placitum, et definitae, et quarum partes extra nihil significant, ut sunt casus nominum, ut 'Ciceronis' et 'Cicerone' et caetera, haec nomina non erunt. Omne enim nomen iunctum cum est uerbo, aut uerum aut falsum demonstrat. Ut si dicas:

Dies est

hoc uero aut uerum aut falsum est. Si uero casum iungas, neque uerum neque falsum efficias. Si enim dicas:

Diei est

nihil quod sit aut non sit demonstrasti. Itaque nihil ex hoc neque [796A] uerum neque falsum efficias. Et merito dictum uidetur. Quod enim primo uocabulum nomina rebus imponentes dixerunt, id solum numen uocabitur merito. Qui enim primus circo circum nomen imposuit, ita dixisse uidetur:

Dicatur hoc circus!

Atque ideo primus hic casus nominatiuus uocatur, quod nomen sit. Aliis uero nominibus non nominis caeteros casus appellauere.

Ergo a capite reuoluendum est, uocem dictum quod uox nominum genus sit; designatiuam uero, quod sunt quaedam uoces quae nihil designant, ut ad his uocibus separetur quae nihil significant; ad placitum, ut ab his uocibus separetur quae naturaliter significant, ut sunt pecudum. Sine tempore uero dictum est, ad diuisionem uerbi quod cum tempore est; cuius nulla pars extra significat, ut diuideretur ab oratione, cuius partes nomina sunt et uerba, quae significant; finita uero, ut ab infinitis separetur; recta, ut a casibus distingueretur.

Et in uerbo eadem omnia fere conueniunt.

Est enim uerbum uox significatiua ad placitum cum tempore, cuius

nulla pars extra significatiua est.

Et quia est quaedam uox significatiua et ad placitum cum tempore, cuius pars nihil significat, ut 'non albet' (Albet enim, quod cum non iunctum consignificat, solum non significat), et quia nihil definitum monstrat (quod enim non

albet, potest et rubere, potest et nigrescere, potest et pallere, et quidquid non albet), ideo "infinitum uerbum" uocatum est. 'Faciebat' autem et 'facturus', ut superius in nomine, non uerba sed casus uerborum sunt.

Repetendum est igitur ab initio uerbum esse uocem dictum, a genere; significatiuam, ut a non significatiuis uocibus diuidatur; ad placitum, ut ab illis quae natura sunt significatiuae uocibus separetur: cum tempore, ut a nomine diuideretur; praesens aliquid significare, ut a uerbi casibus disiungeretur; finita, ut ab infinitis disterneretur.

Restat ergo nunc quid sit oratio dicere. Haec enim ex nomine et uerbo componi uidetur: sed prius utrum nomen et uerbum solae partes orationis sint consideremus, an etiam aliae sex, ut grammaticorum opinio fert, an aliquae ex his in uerbi et nominis iura uertantur; quod nisi prius constitutum sit, tota propositionum ac deinceps ea ipsa quae ex propositionibus componitur syllogismorum ratio titubabit. Nam si ex quo sint genere termini nesciatur, totum ignorabitur. Nomen et uerbum, duae solae partes sunt putandae, caeterae enim non partes sed orationis supplementa sunt: ut enim quadrigarum frena uel lora non partes sed quaedam quodammodo ligaturae sunt et, ut dictum est, supplementa non etiam partes, sic coniunctiones et praepositiones et alia huiusmodi non partes orationis sunt sed quaedam colligamenta. Participium uero quod uocatur, uerbi loco ponetur, quoniam temporis demonstratiuum est. Aduerbiu uero nomen est, cuiusdam enim definitae significationis est sine tempore, quod si per casus non flectitur, nihil impedit. Non enim est proprium nominis flecti per casus. Sunt enim quaedam nomina quae flecti non possunt, quae a grammaticis \*monoptata\* nominantur -- sed hoc grammaticae magis quam huius considerationis est.

Oratio est uox designatiua ad placitum, cuius partes aliquid

extra significant, ut dictio, non ut affirmatio.

Et est orationi commune cum nomine et uerbo quod VOX est, et DESIGNATIVA, et AD PLACITUM. Cuius enim partes ad placitum sunt, ea quoque ipsa ad placitum est; orationis autem partes sunt nomen et uerbum; sed haec ad placitum; oratio igitur ad placitum est. Termini uero orationis a dialecticis nominantur nomina et uerba. Termini uero dicti sunt, quod usque ad uerbum et nomen resolutio partium orationis fiat, ne quis orationem usque ad syllabas nominum uel uerborum tentet resolvere, quae iam designatiuae non sunt.

Distat autem a nomine uel uerbo oratio quod illis partes extra significant, uerbi et nominis partes nihil extra designant. Est autem dictio unius simplex uocabuli nuncupatio, uel simplex affirmatio. Atque ideo dictum est orationis partes significare ut dictionem id est ut simplicis uocabuli nuncupationem. In oratione enim:

Socrates ambulat

utraque extra significat tantum quantum simplex uocabuli nuncupatio designare queat. Quomodo autem ut affirmatio simplex non significet in commentario Perihermeneias explicui. (Quid autem sit affirmatio et negatio paulo post explicabimus.)

Sunt uero species orationis in angustissima diuisione quinque. Interrogatiua, ut:

Putasne anima immortalis est?

Imperatiua, ut:

Accipe codicem!

Optatiua uel deprecatiua, ut:

Faciat Deus.

Vocatiua, ut:

Adesto Deus.

Enuntiatiua, ut:

Socrates ambulat

sed in illis quatuor nulla neque ueritas est, neque falsitas Enuntiatiua uero sola aut uerum aut falsum continet. Atque hinc propositiones oriuntur.

Enuntiatio autem in duas partes secabitur, in affirmationem et negationem. Affirmatio est enuntiatio alicuius ad aliquid. Negatio est enuntiatio alicuius ab aliquo. Et est affirmatio, ut puta:

Plato philosophus est.

Negatio:

Plato philosophus non est.

Affirmatio enim ad Platonem philosophiam enuntiat aliquam, id est Platonem esse philosophum. Negatio uero ab aliquo Platone aliquam philosophiam enuntiando tollit, id est enuntiat Platonem non esse philosophum.

Enuntiatiuarum igitur orationum aliae sunt simplices, aliae non simplices. Simples ut si dicas:

Dies est.

Lux est.

Non simplices ut:

Si dies est lux est.

Affirmationes uero simplices et negationes, aliae sunt uniuersales, aliae sunt particulares, aliae indefinitae. Uniuersales sunt quae aut omne affirmant ut:

Omnis homo animal est

aut omne negant, ut:

Nullus homo animal est

Particulares uero quae aliquem affirmant uel aliquem negant, ut:

Aliquis homo animal est

Aliquis homo animal non est

indefinitae uero quae neque uniuersaliter affirmant aut negant, neque particulariter, ut:

Homo animal est

Homo animal non est

Diuiditur autem simplex propositio in duas partes: in subiectum et praedicatum, ut:

Homo animal est

'homo' subiectum est, 'animal' uero de homine praedicatur. Hae autem partes termini nominantur. Quos definimus sic: Termini sunt partes simplicis propositionis in quibus diuiditur principaliter propositio. Est enim simplicis propositionis uniuersalis secunda diuisio, ut sit in propositione:

Omnis homo animal est

'omnis homo' unus terminus, alius uero 'animal est'. Sed hoc secundo loco, illud uero principaliter. Nam primi termini sunt subiectum et praedicatum. 'Est' enim et 'non est', non magis termini sunt quam affirmationis uel negationis designatiua sunt, et 'omnis' uel 'nullus' uel 'aliquis' non magis sunt termini quam definitionum, utrum particulariter an uniuersaliter dictum sit, designatiua sunt.

Diuiditur ergo, ut dictum est, propositio in id quod subiectum est, et in id quod praedicatur. Dico autem subiectum, ut in:

Omnis homo animal est

propositione hominem, id uero quod praedicatur dico animal, et semper quod praedicatur, aut abundat et superest subiecto, aut aequatur. Minus autem praedicatum a subiecto nunquam reperietur. Sed id quod diximus diuersis demonstramus exemplis. Subiecto praedicatum abundat quoties genus aliquod de aliquo praedicatur, ut si dicas:

Omnis homo animal est

Non enim potes conuertere, ut dicas:

Omne animal homo est

quia animal ab homine plus est et abundat. Aequatur autem praedicatum subiecto quoties proprium quoddam cuiusdam praedicatur, ut:

Omnis homo risibile est

potes conuertere:

Omne risibile homo est

ut autem minus sit id quod praedicatur, fieri nequit. Dicitur etiam praecedere praedicatum, sequi quod subiectum est. Idonior est enim praedicatio constituere propositionem, quam id quod subiectum est.

Simplicium autem propositionum aliae sunt in nullo sibi participantibus ut sunt:

Omnis homo animal est

et:

Virtus bona est

et aliae huiusmodi propositiones, aliae uero quae participant. Participantium aliae sunt quae in utroque termino participant, aliae quae in altero, et quae altero termino participant tribus modis, utroque uero duobus.

Ostendamus ergo exemplis quomodo altero tribus modis participant. Communis enim terminus est, cum in una subiectus sit, in altera praedicatus, ut est:



Omnis homo animal est

et:

Omne animal animatum.

In priore enim propositione animal praedicatur ad hominem, in posteriore praedicatur ad animal animatum, et fit animal subiectum. Et est hic primus modus de eis qua altero termino participant.

Secundus uero modus est in quo in utrisque communis terminus praedicatur, ut si quis dicat:

Omnis nix <est> candida

et:

Omnis margarita <est> candida.

Etenim in prima et secunda propositione candida praedicatur, in prima ad niuem, in secunda ad margaritam. Et est hic secundus modus altero termino participantium.

Tertius uero modus est, quoties in utrisque propositionibus communis terminus subiectus est, ut si dices:

Virtus bonum est

Virtus iustum est

In utrisque enim ad iustum et ad bonum uirtus subiectum est.

Sunt igitur participantem alterum terminum his tribus modis, aut cum in una communis terminus praedicatur, in illa subiectus est; aut cum in utrisque praedicatur; aut cum in utrisque subiectus est.

Earum uero quae ad utrosque participant terminos duo sunt modi. Aliae enim ad eundem ordinem, aliae ad ordinis commutationem. Ad eundem sunt quae de eodem idem demonstrant, uel affirmatiue uel negatiue, uel <uniuersaliter> [/aliter uel particulariter]:

Omnis uoluptas bonum est

Nulla uoluptas bonum est

et rursus particulariter:

Quaedam uoluptas bonum est

Quaedam uoluptas bonum non est.

Ad ordinis uero commutationem sunt quoties qui in altera subiectus est terminus, in alia praedicatur ut:

Omne bonum iustum est

et:

Omne iustum <est> bonum.

Nam in priore bonum subiectum est, iustum praedicatum, in secunda iustum subiectum est, bonum praedicatum.

Nunc ergo quoniam aliae ad eundem ordinem, aliae ad ordinis commutationem sunt, prius dicemus de his quae ad eundem ordinem utroque termino participant. Et quoniam sunt propositiones, aliae affirmatiuae aliae negatiuae; aliae uniuersales aliae particulares aliae indefinitae: -- duae sunt ex his quae qualitate differunt, tres quae quantitate. Et sunt quae qualitate differunt affirmatiua et negatiua; ad quantitatem quae uero differunt, sunt uniuersalis, particularis, et indefinita.

In affirmatiuis enim et negatiuis quale quid sit aut non sit ostenditur. In uniuersali particulari et indefinita de omnium uel nullorum uel nonnullorum quantitate monstratur. Ex his ergo quinque differentiis, id est uniuersali, particulari, indefinita, affirmatiua, negatiua, sex coniunctiones fiunt, ita ut tribus quae ad quantitatem dicuntur duae quae ad qualitatem dicuntur aptentur, et fit uniuersalis affirmatiua, et uniuersalis negatiua, ut:

Omnis homo iustus est

Nullus homo iustus est

et particularis affirmatiua, et particularis negatiua, ut:

Quidam homo iustus est

Quidam homo iustus non est

et indefinita affirmatiua et negatiua, ut:

Homo iustus est

Homo iustus non est

fiunt ergo ex duabus quae sunt ad qualitatem, tribus quae sunt ad quantitatem iunctis, sex coniunctiones, de quibus indefinitas, affirmatiuas et negatiuas separemus, et de solis uniuersalibus et particularibus tractatus habeatur.

Subscribantur etiam earum participantium quae ad eundem ordinem utroque termino participant, duae uniuersales propositiones, una affirmatiua, et altera negatiua, et sit affirmatiua uniuersalis:

Omnis homo iustus est

et contra ipsam uniuersalis negatiua:

Nullus homo iustus est.

Item sub his ponantur particularis affirmatio et particularis negatio, ita ut sub uniuersali affirmatiua ponatur particularis affirmatiua, et sub uniuersali negatiua ponatur particularis negatiua, et sit particularis affirmatiua:

Quidam homo iustus est

et contra ipsam particularis negatiua:

Quidam homo iustus non est

quod demonstrat sequens descriptio.

In superiori igitur descriptione uniuersalis affirmatiua et uniuersalis negatiua contrariae sunt, subcontrariae uero particularis affirmatiua et particularis negatiua, subalternae uero dicuntur uniuersalis affirmatiua et particularis affirmatiua, et item uniuersalis negatiua et particularis negatiua. Contraiacentes sunt angulares, id est uniuersalis affirmatiua et particularis negatiua. Et item uniuersalis negatiua et particularis affirmatiua, ut:

Omnis homo iustus est

Quidam homo iustus non est

Nullus homo iustus est

Quidam homo iustus est

et sunt ut hoc modo definiri possint. Contrariae sunt quae uniuersaliter eidem idem haec affirmat, haec negat. Subcontrariae sunt

quae particulariter eidem idem haec affirmat, haec negat.

Subalternae sunt quae eidem idem affirmant uel negant, haec particulariter, illa uniuersaliter. Contraiacentes sunt quando eidem eadem rem haec affirmat, haec negat, uel haec negat, haec affirmat, illa generaliter, haec particulariter, et uocantur contrariae, quis quod affirmatio uniuersaliter ponit negatio uniuersaliter tollit. Subalternae uero, quoniam quod illa uniuersaliter ponit, etiam haec particulariter ponit. Subcontrariae uero dictae sunt, uel quod naturaliter sub ipsis contrariis positae sunt, ut descriptio docet, uel quod a contrariis diuersae sunt, et ipsis contrariis quodammodo contrariae. Nam contraria, ut utraeque simul fieri non potest, ut utraeque omnino non sint fieri potest, contrariam uim obtinebunt subcontrariae. Nam ut utraeque omnino non sint fieri non potest, ut utraeque simul fieri potest, quod in sequentibus melius explicabitur. Contraiacentes dicuntur, quoniam uniuersalis affirmatio uel negatio, particularem affirmationem uel negationem angulariter respiciunt.

Cum autem singulae propositiones habeant duas differentias, unam ad qualitatem, alteram ad quantitatem, ut quae uniuersalis, affirmatiua est, habeat differentiam ad quantitatem quod uniuersalis est, et aliam ad qualitatem quod affirmatiua est; eodem modo caeterae propositiones binas habeant differentias, unam secundum qualitatem, alteram secundum quantitatem.

Subalternae quae sunt, una tantum differentia distant quantitatis, quod haec particularis, illa uniuersalia est. Nam qualitatis differentiam nullam retinent. Utraeque enim affirmatiuae sunt. Hae uero aliae, id est contrariae et subcontrariae ad qualitatem, quod illa affirmatiua, illa negatiua est, nam ad quantitatem nihil differunt. Utraeque enim contrariae uniuersales, utraeque subcontrariae particulares sunt, illae autem quae contraiacentes dicuntur utrisque differentiis differunt. Nam et illa uniuersalis affirmatio est, haec particularis negatio, et illa uniuersalis negatio, est, haec particularis affirmatio.

Nunc quoniam quae secundum qualitatem uel secundum quantitatem et quomodo differant dictum est, earum proprietates, quae secundum uerum falsumque sunt, explicemus.

Igitur earum quae subalternae sunt, si fuerit uera uniuersalis affirmatio uera erit particularis affirmatio. [801B] Si enim:

Omnis homo iustus est

uera est, uera erit etiam quae dicit:

Aliquis homo iustus est.

Nam si omnis homo iustus est, et quidam. Eodem modo negatiuae subalternae nam si uniuersalis negatiua uera fuerit, erit etiam uera negatiua particularis, ut si:

Nullus homo iustus est

uera fuerit, etiam erit uera:

Quidam homo iustus non est.

Nam si nullus homo iustus est, nec quidam. Conuerti autem non potest, nam si particularis uera fuerit, non necesse erit ueram esse etiam uniuersalem. Ut si:

Quidam homo iustus est

uera fuerit, non necesse erit ueram esse:

Omnis homo iustus est.

Possunt enim esse non omnes. Et eodem modo de negatiua. Nam si particularis negatiua uera fuerit, ut est:

Quidam homo non est iustus

non necesse erit uniuersalem:

Nullus homo iustus [801C] est

ueram esse. Potest enim fieri ut quidam iusti sint. Ergo dicamus in subalternis propositionibus si uniuersales uerae sint, ueras esse necesse est particulares sed non conuertitur. Nam si particulares uerae fuerint non necesse est ueras etiam uniuersales esse.

Particulares uero ad uniuersales contrariam conuersionem habent. Nam ut superius si uniuersales uerae essent, etiam particulares uerae essent; et si particulares uerae essent, non omnino uere essent etiam uniuersales in particularibus; si particulares falsae fuerint, falsae erunt etiam uniuersales. Nam si particularis:

Quidam homo iustus est

falsa fuerit, uniuersalis etiam:

Omnis homo iustus est

falsa erit. Nam si quidam homo iustus est falsa est, uera est nullus homo iustus est. Si uera est:

Nullus [801D] homo iustus est

falsa est:

Omnis homo iustus est.

Falsa igitur particulari, falsa erit uniuersalis.

Item si negatiua particularis falsa fuerit, quae est:

Quidam homo iustus non est

falsa erit etiam:

Nullus homo iustus est.

Nam si falsum est quia quidam homo iustus non est, uera est quia omnis homo iustus est. Si uera est haec, falsa est:

Nullus homo iustus est

falsa igitur particulari, falsa erit etiam uniuersalis. Sed non conuertitur, ut si uniuersales falsae sint, falsas necesse sit esse particulares: nam si uniuersalis:

Omnis homo iustus est

falsa fuerit, non necesse est particularem:

Quidam homo iustus est

falsam esse. Potest enim fieri ut si omnis homo iustus non fuerit, sit quidam iustus. Et item si uniuersalis negatiua:

Nullus homo iustus est

falsa fuerit, non necesse erit:

Quidam homo non est iustus

falsam esse. Nam si falsa est nullus homo iustus est, uerum est esse aliquos iustos, uera est etiam quae dicit:

Quidam homo iustus non est

quod sint quidam etiam non iusti.

Repetens igitur a capite dicat quod in subalternis. Si uniuersales uerae fuerint, uerae erunt etiam particulares. Sed non conuertitur. Item si particularia falsae fuerint, falsae erunt etiam uniuersales; sed non conuertitur, contrariae uero simul esse uerae nunquam possunt. Potest autem fieri ut alias utraeque falsae sint, alias una uera, altera falsa. Utraeque falsae sunt, ut si quis dicat:

Omnis homo grammaticus est

falsa est, nam non omnis; et:

Nullus homo grammaticus est

falsa est, nam non nullus; est autem una uera, altera [802B] falsa, ut si quis dicat:

Omnis homo bipes est

haec affirmatiua uera est;

Nullus homo bipes est

haec negatiua falsa est. Et item:

Omnis homo quadrupes est

haec affirmatiua falsa est;

Nullus homo quadrupes est

haec negatiua uera est. Sunt ergo contrariae aliquoties utraeque falsae, aliquoties inter se uerum falsumque diuidentes; ut utraeque autem uerae sint fieri nunquam potest, subcontrariae uero contraria patiuntur. Nam falsae nunquam reperiri queunt. Sed alias uerae utraeque sunt, ut est:

Quidam homo grammaticus est

uera est, et:

Quidam homo grammaticus non est

etiam haec uera est. Potest enim alius esse grammaticus et alius non esse. Alias una uera est, altera falsa. Vera est enim affirmatio:

Quidam homo bipes est

falsa est autem negatio:

Quidam homo bipes non est.

Item falsa est affirmatio:

Quidam homo quadrupes est

uera est negatio:

Quidam homo quadrupes non est

ut uero utraeque falsae sint fieri nunquam potest.

Restat igitur ut de contrarietibus dicamus, quae neque falsae simul aliquando esse possunt neque uerae sed semper una uera est, altera falsa, quod facilius liquet, si quis sibi quaecumque fingat exempla.

Res admonet ut quaedam de indefinitis propositionibus consideremus. Indefinitae etenim propositiones aequam uim retinent particularibus propositionibus. Dictum est enim quod si uniuersales uel affirmatiuae uel negatiuae in subalternis propositionibus essent uerae, essent quoque uerae particulares. Nunc uero dicimus quod si uniuersalis propositiones uerae fuerint, uerae erunt etiam indefinitas. Nam si uera est:

Omnis homo bipes est

uera est etiam:

Quidam homo bipes est

uera erit etiam indefinita quae dicit:

Homo bipes est.

Item dictum est quod si particulares falsae essent, falsae essent etiam uniuersales, nunc uero dicendum est quod si indefinita falsa fuerit, falsa erit etiam uniuersalis. Nam si falsa est quae dicit:

Homo quadrupes est

falsa erit etiam quae dicit:

Quidam homo quadrupes est

et:

Omnis homo quadrupes est.

Atque idem hoc etiam in negatiuis conuenire uidetur. Unde constat quod omnes indefinitae particularibus propositionibus aequam uim continent.

Rursus dictum est quod subcontrariae, quae particulares affirmatiuae et negatiuae sunt, simul uerae esse possunt, diuidere etiam uerum falsumque [803A] ualent, simul uero falsae esse non posse. Hoc idem in indefinitis propositionibus exspectandum est. Nam diuidunt inter se uerum falsumque, ut si quis dicat:

Homo bipes est

uera est;

Homo bipes non est

falsa est, et item:

Homo quadrupes est

falsa est;

Homo quadrupes non est

uera est; uerae autem simul inueniri possunt, ut si quis dicat:

Homo grammaticus est

si quis hoc dicat de Donato, uerum est. Item:

Homo grammaticus non est

si quis hoc dicat de Catone, uerum est, ut simul falsae sint nunquam reperiemus. Hinc quoque ostenditur indefinitas cum particularibus aequali esse potentia.

Amplius quod dictum est, contraiacentes, id est uniuersalem affirmatiuam et particularem negatiuam, et item uniuersalem negatiuam et particularem affirmatiuam neque ueras simul esse neque falsas sed inter se diuidere uerum falsumque, hoc idem euenit in indefinitis. Nam uniuersalis affirmatiua et indefinita negatiua, uel uniuersalis negatiua et indefinita affirmatiua, neque uerae simul esse possunt, neque simul falsae. Diuiduntur autem inter se uerum falsumque: nam si dixeris:

Omnis homo bipes est

uera est; et si dicas:

Homo bipes non est

falsa est. Item si dixeris:

Homo quadrupes est

falsa est, si dixeris,

Nullus homo quadrupes est

uera est: unde hinc quoque colligere licet omnes indefinitas potestate et ui aequales esse particularibus.

Sunt etiam quaedam propositiones quae diuidunt quidem et ipsae uerum et falsum, ut:

Deus fulminat

Deus non fulminat.

Sed istae tunc diuidunt inter se uerum et falsum, cum idem tempus, [803C] idem subiectum, idem praedicatum sit. Quod autem dico tale est, si aequiuocum subiectum fuerit, non diuidunt uerum et falsum. Si quis enim dicat:

Cato se Uticae occidit

et respondeatur:

Cato se Uticae non occidit

utraeque uerae sunt. Nam et Cato Minor se peremit, et Cato Censorius se Uticae non occidit. Sed hoc idcirco euenit, quod Catonis nomen aequiuoce dicitur, dicitur enim et Maior Cato Censorius, et Minor Uticensis. Item si aequiuoca fuerit in propositione praedicatio, uerum inter se affirmatio negatioque non diuidunt. Si quis enim sic dicat:

In nocte lucet

et respondeatur:

In nocte non lucet

fieri potest ut utraeque uerae sint. Nam in nocte lucerna lucere potest, et sol lucere non potest: hoc ideo euenit quia lucere aequiuoce et ad lucernae lumen [803D] et ad solis dicitur.

Amplius si aliud est aliud in subiectis et praedicatis tempus fuerit, uerum falsumque inter se affirmatio negatioque non diuidunt. Nam si quis dicat:

Socrates ambulat

et respondeatur:

Socrates non ambulat

possunt utraeque uerae esse, potest enim fieri ut Socrates alio tempore ambulet, alio tempore non ambulet; sed aut stet aut sedeat, aut quodlibet aliud: in talibus ergo propositionibus quales sunt:

Socrate ambulat

Socrates non ambulat



illae inter se uerum falsumque diuidunt quae ad idem subiectum, ad idem praedicatum, ad idem tempus dicuntur.

Sunt etiam aliae quae contradictoriae uocantur, quae sunt huiusmodi, quoties affirmationem uniuersalem tollit negatio particularis:

Omnis homo iustus est

Non omnis homo iustus est

et rursus:

Nullus homo iustus est

et:

Quidam homo iustus est

in his enim uniuersalis determinatio tollitur. Sed de his alias.

Et quoniam dictum est de his quae eodem ordine participant, dicamus nunc de his quae ordinis commutatione participant. Harum quoque propositionum quae ad commutationem ordinis participant duplex modus est. Est enim per contrapositionem conuersio, ut si dicas:

Omnis homo animal est

Omne non animal non homo est

simplex conuersio est, ut si dicas:

Omnis homo <est> risibile

et conuertat:

Omne risibile <est> homo

sed in illis terminorum tantum commutatio conuersionem facit, in quibus neque praedictum subiecto, neque subiectum praedicato abundat. In hac enim propositione quae dicit:

Omnis homo <est> risibile

homo subiectum, risibile praedicatum, aequam uim habet, et ideo conuerti potest ut si risibile subiectum et homo praedicatum, et dicatur omne risibile homo. In quibus uero unus terminus alio abundauerit, conuerti propositio non potest. Nam si dicas:

Omnis homo animal est

uera est; non tamen potest ueri ut conuersa haec propositio terminis commutatis uera sit: falsum est enim dicere:

Omne animal homo est.

Sed hoc cur euenit? Quia homine animal abundat.

Illa uero conuersio, quae per contrapositionem fit hoc modo fit quoties in affirmatiua subiectum fuerit, idem mutatum et factum praedicatum ad negatiuam particulam ponitur, ut est:

Omnis homo animal est.

Hic homo subiectum est et ad hoc animal praedicatur. Si uero quis per contrapositionem conuertat, et faciat animal subiectum hominem praedicatum, et ad hominem particulam negatiuam ponat, hoc modo faciet:

Omne non animal non homo est

et erit ista conuersio:

Omnis homo animal est

Omne non animal non homo est.

Sed de his posterius tractabimus.

Nunc ad simplices reuertamur. Cum sint igitur quatuor propositiones quarum quae uniuersales sunt, id est affirmatiua et negatiua, duae uero particulares, id est affirmatiua et negatiua, particularis affirmatiua, et uniuersalis negatiua commutatis terminis sibi ipsa conuertitur. Conuertuntur autem illae (ut dictum est) quoties, commutatis terminis, uel simul uerae sunt, uel simul falsae. Nam si quis dicat:

Quidam homo animal est

uera est. Conuersio uero eius:

Quoddam animal homo est

uera est. Item:

Quidam homo lapis est

falsa est, quemadmodum et eius conuersio:

Quidam lapis homo est

nam et ista falsa est. Est igitur particularis affirmatiua quae commutatis terminis sibi ipsa conuertitur. Idem uere patitur uniuersalis negatio. Si quis enim dicat:

Nullus homo lapis est

uera est, et potest conuerti:

Nullus lapis homo est

nam et ista uera est. Item:

Nullus homo rhetor est

falsa est, et eius conuersio:

Nullus rhetor homo est

falsa est. In quatuor igitur his propositionibus quae tantum contraiacentes sibi ipsae conuertuntur, id est particularis affirmatio et uniuersalis negatio. Aliae uero duae sibi ipsis non conuertuntur. Nam neque uniuersalis affirmatio, neque particul&ris negatio sibi ipsa conuertitur. Si quis enim dicat:

Omnis homo animal est

uera est. Si quis uero conuertat:

Omne animal homo est

falsum est. Non igitur sibi ipsi conuerti potest, quoniam conuersa prioris ueritatem non recipit. Neque uero particularis negatio sibi conuertitur. Nam si quis dicat:

Quidam homo grammaticus non est

uera est; si uero conuertat:

Quidam grammaticus homo non est

falsa est: omnis enim grammaticus homo est.

Repetendum est igitur a capite quod cum quatuor propositiones sint, affirmatio uniuersalis, negatio uniuersalis, affirmatio particularis, negatio particularis, particularis affirmatio et uniuersalis, negatio quae contraiacentes sunt, sibi ipsis conuerti possunt. Uniuersalis uero affirmatio et particularis negatio, quae ipsae contraiacentes sunt, nunquam possunt sibi ipsis conuerti. Nec hoc nos turbet quod quaedam affirmationes uniuersales et quaedam particulares negationes conuerti possunt. Potest enim dici:

Omnis homo risibilis est

Omne risibile homo est

et utraeque uerae sunt. Et item:

Omnis homo hinnibilis est

falsa est; et:

Omne hinnibile homo est

et haec quoque falsa est. Item in particulari negatione:

Quidam homo non est lapis

uera est; et:

Quidam lapis non est homo

uera est. Item:

Quidam homo non est risibile

falsa est;

Quoddam risibile homo non est

et haec quoque falsa est. Ergo uidentur posse uniuersales affirmationes et particulares negationes conuerti, et conuertuntur quidem sed non uniuersaliter.

Generaliter autem dico propositiones posse conuerti, quoties uniuersaliter, id est in omnibus conuertuntur. Ista autem in duabus solis materiebus conuerti possunt. Si quis enim proprium cuiuslibet speciei ad ipsam speciem cuius est proprium uelut ad subiectum praedicet, potest conuertere. Nam quia risibile proprium est homini, si praedices risibile, et subiicias hominem, ut est:

Omnis homo risibile est

potes iterum subiicere risibile et hominem praedicare, ut si dicas:

Omne risibile est homo.

In illis uero simul falsae sunt generalium affirmationum conuersiones, in quibus id quod praedicatur ad subiectum nullo tempore uere dici potest, ut si quis dicat:

Omnis homo lapis est

falsa est. Et iterum:

Omnis lapis homo est

falsa est haec, quoniam nullo tempore neque homo lapis est, neque lapis homo uere praedicabitur. In particularibus negatiuis contrarium est; nam aut falsae sunt, cum proprium subiectum est aut praedicatum, ut si quis dicat:

Quidam homo risibile non est

falsum est. Item:

Quoddam risibile homo non est

et haec quoque falsa est. In illis uerae sunt, quando id quod affirmando nullo tempore uere praedicari potest ad subiectum praedicant, ut si dicas:

Quidam homo lapis non est

uera est. Iterum:

Quidam lapis homo non est

uera est. Ergo uniuersales affirmationes tum sibi conuertuntur ut uerae sint cum proprium praedicant, tum sibi conuertuntur ut falsae sint cum id quod nullo tempore ad subiectum uere dici poterit praedicatur. Item in particularibus negatiuis, tum falsae sunt, cum proprium praedicant, tum uerae, cum id quod nullo tempore uere dici poterit praedicant.

In his ergo solae conuerti possunt. In aliis uero conuerti non possunt. Atque ideo uniuersaliter non conuertuntur; remanet ergo ut in aliis rebus omnibus, ut superius dictum est, non conuertantur.

Hoc uero percipiendum est, quod particularis affirmatioque sibi ipsi conuertitur, uniuersali affirmationi, quae sibi non conuertitur, per accidens conuerti potest. Et item contraiacens uniuersali affirmationi particularis negatio, quae sibi ipsi non conuertitur, conuerti potest per accidens negationi uniuersali, quae sibi ipsi conuertitur. Sed quomodo particularis affirmatio et uniuersalis negatio sibi ipsis conuertantur ostendimus.

Nunc uero quomodo particularis affirmatio uniuersali affirmationi per accidens, uel quomodo particularis negatio uniuersali negationi per accidens conuertantur, demonstrandum est. Dictum est superius quod si uera est uniuersalis affirmatio, uera est etiam particularis, et sequeretur particularis uniuersalem. Nam si uera est:

Omnis homo animal est

uera est etiam:

Quidam homo animal est.

Si enim omnis, et quidam; sed particularis affirmatio sibi ipsi conuertitur, conuertitur etiam uniuersali affirmationi. Nam si omnis homo animal est, et quidam homo animal est. Sed ista sibi conuertitur hoc modo, si dicas:

Quidam homo animal est

potest igitur conuerti ad:

Omnis homo animal est

uniuersalem affirmationem particularis affirmatio, quae est:

Quidam homo animal est

et conuertitur, ut si dicas:

Quoddam animal homo est

utraeque enim uerae sunt -- et quae dicit:

Omnis homo animal est

et quae dicit:

Quoddam animal homo est

per accidens autem conuerti dicitur particularis affirmatio uniuersali affirmationi, qui particularis affirmatio sibi ipsi principaliter conuertitur, secundo uero loco uniuersali affirmationi conuertitur.

Restat igitur ut hoc monstremus: quomodo particularis negatio quae sibi non conuertitur uniuersali negationi quae sibi conuertitur per accidens conuertatur, et hic eadem ratio est. Nam quoniam uniuersalis negatio si uera est, uera est etiam particularis, uniuersalis uero negatio sibi ipsa conuertitur potest uniuersali negationi conuersae particularis conuerti negatio. Age enim uniuersalem negationem, id est:

Nullus homo hinnibilis est

conuertamus, ut sit:

Nullum hinnibile homo est.

Sed istam propositionem, id est uniuersalem negatiuam quae est:

Nullus homo hinnibilis est

sequitur particularis negatio quae est:

Quidam homo non est hinnibilis.

Conuerte igitur uniuersalem quae est:

Nullus homo hinnibilis est

et fac:

Nullum hinnibile homo est

conuerte huic particularem negationem quae est:

Quidam homo non est hinnibilis

et fac:

Quoddam hinnibile non est homo

utraeque uerae sunt. Nam et:

Nullum hinnibile homo est

quae est uniuersalis conuersio negationis, uera est, et:

Quoddam hinnibile non est homo

quae conuersio particularis negationis est. Cur autem per accidens conuerti dicatur, superius dictum est. Liquet ergo talis per accidens conuersio: quod igitur habet uniuersalis affirmatio, hoc habet etiam contraiacens particularis negatio, utraeque enim sibi conuerti non possunt; quod autem habet uniuersalis negatio, hoc habet et ei contraiacens affirmatio particularis, utraeque enim sibi conuerti possunt. Iunctae ergo quae sibi conuerti possunt, et quae sibi conuerti non possunt, ut quae sibi conuerti potest iungatur ei quae sibi conuerti non potest, et quae sibi conuerti non potest iungatur ei quae sibi conuerti potest, faciunt per accidens conuersiones quae superius demonstratae sunt.

Restat ut de his conuersionibus dicamus quae per contrapositionem fiunt, et primum earum sit dispositio in descriptione subiecta, generalis enim affirmationis quae dicit:

Omnis homo animal est

conuersio per contrapositionem est quae dicit:

Omne non animal non homo est.

Item generalis negationis quae dicit:

Nullus homo animal est

conuersio per contrapositionem est:

Nullum non animal non homo est.

Item particularis affirmationis quae dicit:

Quidam homo animal est

conuersio per contrapositionem est quae dicit:

Quoddam non animal non homo est.

Item particularis negationis quae dicit:

Quidam homo animal non est

conuersio per contrapositionem est quae dicit:

Quoddam non animal non homo est

quod demonstrat subiecta descriptio:

Omnis homo animal est      Omne non animal non homo est

Nullus homo animal est      Nullum non animal non homo est

Quidam homo animal est      Quoddam non animal non homo est

Quidam homo animal non est      Quoddam non animal non homo non est

His ergo ita positus, quomodo dictum est superius in simplici terminorum conuersione, quod particularis affirmatio et generalis negatio sibi ipsis conuerterentur, generalis uero affirmatio et particularis negatio sibi ipsis non conuerterentur, hic in per contrapositionem conuersionibus contra est. Nam generalis affirmatio per contrapositionem sibi ipsa conuertitur, et particularis negatio sibi ipsi conuertitur. Generalis uero negatio et particularis affirmatio per contrapositionem sibi non conuertuntur.

Quod ita esse his exemplis probabimus. Si enim uera sit affirmatio generalis quae dicit:

Omnis homo animal est

uera erit eius per contrapositionem conuersio quae dicit:

Omne non animal non homo est.

Quod enim animal non fuerit, id homo non erit. Et si falsa fuerit generalis affirmatio quae dicit:

Omne animal homo est

falsa erit etiam eius per contrapositionem conuersio quae dicit:

Omnis non homo non animal est

potest enim fieri ut quod homo non est, animal sit. Illa enim negat esse animal quod homo non fuerit. Quod si cum uera est generalis affirmatiua, uera est eius per contrapositionem conuersio, et si cum falsa est generalis affirmatio, falsa est eius per contrapositionem conuersio, non est dubium quin generalis affirmatio possit sibi ipsa conuerti.

Item nunc ostendendum est quomodo particularis negatio sibi ipsi per contrapositionem conuertitur. Nam si falsa est quae dicit:

Quidam homo animal non est

falsa eius erit etiam per contrapositionem conuersio quae dicit:

Quoddam non animal non homo est.

Hoc enim uidetur haec propositio dicere, ac si diceret: Quaedam res quae animal non est homo est, qui enim dicit:

Non homo non est

hominem esse significat quod animal non sit. Hoc uero aperte falsum est, omnis enim homo animal est, et si uera fuerit particularis negatio quae dicit:

Quoddam animal homo non est

uera erit et eius per contrapositionem conuersio quae dicit:

Quidam non homo non animal non est.

Aequale est enim ac si diceret: Res quae homo non est non est non animal sed est animal, ut equus et bos homo non est, et non est non animal. Ergo si cum particularis negatio falsa est, falsa est etiam eius per compositionem conuersio, et si cum particularis negatio uera est, uera est eius per contrapositionem conuersio, non est dubium quin particularis negatio possit per contrapositionem sibi ipsa conuerti.

Nunc quoniam ostensum generalem affirmatiuam et particularem negatiuam, per contrapositionem sibi posse conuerti, ostendamus generalem negatiuam et particularem affirmatiuam per contrapositionem sibi non posse conuerti.

Et prius de generali negatione dicendum est. Nam si generalis negatio uera est, non necesse erit per contrapositionem sibi conuersam ueram esse. Sed si falsa fuerit et per contrapositionem sibi conuersam falsam esse necesse est. Nam si falsa est quae dicit:

Nullus homo animal est

falsa erit fortasse eius per contrapositionem conuersio, quae dicit:

Nullum non animal non homo est.

Aequale est enim ac si dicat: Nulla res est quae non sit animal et sit non homo, quod est omnis res quae animam non habet homo est, quod aperte falsum est. Item si uera fuerit generalis negatio, falsa erit eius per contrapositionem conuersio. Nam si uera est quae dicit:

Nullus homo est lapis

falsa erit eius per contrapositionem conuersio quae dicit:

Nullus non lapis non homo est.

Aequale est enim ac si dicat: Nulla res est quae cum non sit lapis non homo sit, quod est omnis res quaecumque lapis non fuerit homo est, quod falsum est. Innumerabilia enim inuenies quae non sunt lapides, et non homines non sunt; ergo quoniam si generalis negatio falsa fuerit, Falsa est eius per contrapositionem conuersio, uel si eadem uera fuerit, falsa erit eius per contrapositionem conuersio, non est dubium generalem negationem sibi non posse conuerti, quod enim in aliquo fallit, generaliter colligi non potest.

Restat igitur ut id quod reliquum est monstremus, particularem affirmationem per contrapositionem sibi non posse conuerti. Cum enim fuerit particularis affirmatio uera, uera erit eius etiam per contrapositionem conuersio. Nam si uera est quae dicit:



Quidam homo animal est

uera est eius per contrapositionem conuersio:

Quoddam non animal non homo est.

Aequale est enim ac si dicat: Quaedam res quae animam non habet homo non est, quod uerum est. Lapis enim animam non habet, et tamen homo non est. Item si particularis affirmatio quae dicit:

Quidam lapis homo est

falsa est, uera erit eius per contrapositionem conuersio quae dicit:

Quidam non homo non lapis est.

Aequale est enim ac si diceret: Quaedam res quae homo non fuerit lapis non est, quod uerum est. Equus enim homo non est, et tamen lapis non est. Ergo si cum in quibusdam particularis affirmatio uera fuerit, uera erit eius per contrapositionem conuersio, et si cum in quibusdam falsa fuerit particularis affirmatio, uera erit eius per contrapositionem conuersio, non est dubium particulares affirmationes per contrapositionem sibi non posse conuerti. Generalis enim negatio et particularis affirmatio, quae contraiacentes sunt, in per contrapositionem conuersionibus contraria patiuntur. Nam in generalibus negatiuis siue generales negatiuae uerae fuerint siue falsae per contrapositionem conuersiones semper falsae sunt; in particularibus autem affirmatiuis, siue particularis affirmatio uera fuerit siue falsa, siue per contrapositionem conuersio uera est.

Repetendum est igitur a superioribus et confirmandum quod in simplicibus terminorum conuersionibus particularis affirmatio et generalis negatio sibi conuerti possunt. Generales uero affirmatio et particularis negatio sibi conuerti uon possunt. In his uero conuersionibus quae per contrapositionem fiunt, contra est; nam generalis affirmatio et particularis negatio per contrapositionem sibi ipsis conuerti possunt, generalis uero negatio, et particularis affirmatio per contrapositionem sibi ipsis conuerti non possunt, et generalis negatio et particularis affirmatio quae sunt contraiacentes in ueri falsique distantia (ut demonstratum est), sibi ipsis inuicem contraria patiuntur.

Haec de categoricorum syllogismorum categoricis propositionibus dicta sufficiant. Si qua uero in his praetermissa sunt, in Perihermenias Aristotelis commentario diligentius subtiliusque tractata sunt.

#### 4. Isidorus

De Rhetorica et Dialectica

1 De Rhetorica eiusque nomine. Rhetorica est bene dicendi scientia in civilibus quaestionibus, eloquentia copia ad persuadendum iusta et bona. Dicta autem Rhetorica Graeca appellatione ἀπὸ τοῦ ῥητορίζειν, id est a copia locutionis. Ῥῆσις enim apud Graecos locutio dicitur, ῥήτωρ orator. 2 Coniuncta est autem Grammaticae arti Rhetorica. In Grammatica enim scientiam recte loquendi discimus; in Rhetorica vero percipimus qualiter ea, quae didicimus, proferamus.

2 De inventoribus Rhetoricae artis. Haec autem disciplina a Graecis inventa est, a Gorgia, Aristotele, Hermagora, et translata in Latinum a Tullio videlicet et Quintiliano et Titiano, sed ita copiose, ita varie, ut eam lectori admirari in promptu sit, comprehendere impossibile. 2 Nam membranarum retentis quasi adhaerescit memoriae series dictionis, ac mox repositis recordatio omnis elabatur. Huius disciplinae perfecta cognitio oratorem facit.

3 De nomine oratoris et partibus Rhetoricae. Orator est igitur vir bonus, dicendi peritus. Vir bonus consistit natura, moribus, artibus. Dicendi peritus consistit artificiosa eloquentia, quae constat partibus quinque: inventione, dispositione, elocutione, memoria, pronuntiatione, et fine officii, quod est aliquid persuadere. 2 Ipsa autem peritia dicendi in tribus rebus consistit: natura, doctrina, usu. Natura ingenio, doctrina scientia, usus assiduitate. Haec sunt enim quae non solum in oratore, sed in unoquoque homine artifice expectantur, ut aliquid efficiat.

4 De tribus generibus causarum. Genera causarum tria sunt, deliberativum, demonstrativum, iudiciale. Deliberativum genus est, in quo de quibuslibet utilitatibus vitae, quid aut debeat aut non debeat fieri, tractatur. Demonstrativum, in quo laudabilis persona aut reprehensibilis ostenditur. 2 Iudiciale, in quo de ipsius personae facto aut poenae aut praemii sententia datur. Dictum autem iudiciale eo, quod iudicet hominem, et sententia sua ostendat utrum laudabilis praemio dignus sit, aut certe reus condemnari liberarique supplicio. 3 Deliberativum genus vocatur eo, quod de unaquaque re in eo deliberatur. Huius genus duplex est, suasio et dissuasio, id est de expetendo et fugiendo, id est de faciendo et non faciendo. 4 Suasoria autem in tribus locis dividitur: honesto, utili, et possibili. Haec differt aliquid a deliberativa, quia suasoria eget alteram personam, deliberativa interdum et apud se agit. In suasoria autem duae sunt quae plus valent: spes et metus. 5 Demonstrativum dictum, quod unamquamque rem aut laudando aut vituperando demonstrat. Quod genus duas habet species: laudem et vituperationem. Laudis ordo tribus temporibus distinguitur: ante ipsum, in ipsum, post ipsum. 6 Ante ipsum, ut (Virg. Aen. 1, 605):

Quae te tam laeta tulerunt

saecula?

In ipsum, ut (Virg. Aen. 1, 597):

O sola infandos Troiae miserata labores.

Post ipsum, ut (Virg. Aen. 1, 607):

In freta dum fluvii current, dum montibus umbrae lustrabunt,

semper honos nomenque tuum laudesque manebunt.

7 Pari ordine e contrario et in vituperatione hominis haec forma servanda est, ante hominem, in hominem, post hominem. Locus communis ad demonstrativum vituperationis genus pertinet. Quod tamen ab eo in aliquo differt. Nam vituperatio, quae contraria est laudis, specialiter in certam facientis personam adhibetur. 8 Communis vero locus generaliter in facti crimen praepositur. Unde et communis locus dicitur, quia absente persona non tam in hominem, quantum in ipsum crimen exponitur. Omne enim vitium non in uno tantum, sed etiam commune in plurimis invenitur.

5 De gemino statu causarum. Status apud Rhetores dicitur ea res, in qua causa consistit, id est constitutio. Graeci autem statum a contentione στάσις dicunt. Latini autem non solum a pugna, per quam expugnent propositionem

adversarii, sed quod in eo pars utraque consistat. Fit autem ex intentione et depulsione. 2 Status autem causarum sunt duo: rationalis et legalis. De rationali oriuntur coniectura, finis, qualitas, translatio. De fine iudicialis et negotialis. De iudiciali absoluta et adsumptiva. De adsumptiva concessio, remotio criminis, relatio criminis, compensatio. De concessione purgatio et deprecatio. 3 Coniecturalis status est cum factum, quod alio obicitur, ab alio pernegatur. Definitivus status est, cum id, quod obicitur, non hoc esse contenditur, sed quid illud sit adhibitis definitionibus adprobatur. Qualitas est, dum qualis res sit quaeritur: et quia de vi et genere negotii controversia agitur, constitutio generalis appellatur. 4 Translatio est cum causa ex eo pendet, quod non aut is agere videtur, quem oportet, aut non apud quos, quo tempore, qua lege, quo crimine, qua poena oporteat. Translativa constitutio, quod actio translationis et commutationis indigere videtur. 5 Iudicialis est, in qua aequi et recti natura et praemia aut poenae ratio quaeritur. Negotialis est, in qua quid iuris ex civili more et aequitate sit consideratur. Adsumptiva est, quae ipsa ex se nihil dat firmi ad recusationem, foris autem aliquid defensionis adsumit. 6 Concessio est, cum reus non ad id, quod factum est, defendit, sed ut ignoscatur postulat. Quod nos ad poenitentes probavimus pertinere. Remotio criminis est cum id crimen, quod infertur ab se et ab sua culpa, vi et potestate in alium reus demovere conatur. 7 Relatio criminis est, cum ideo iure factum dicitur, quod aliquis ante iniuria lacesitus sit. Comparatio est, cum aliud aliquod alterius factum honestum aut utile contenditur, quod ut fieret, illud, quod arguitur, dicitur esse commissum. 8 Purgatio est, cum factum quidem conceditur, sed culpa removetur. Haec partes habet tres: imprudentiam, casum, necessitatem. Deprecatio est, cum et peccasse et consultu peccasse reus confitetur, et tamen ut ignoscatur postulat. Quod genus perraro potest accidere. 9 Item ex legali statu haec oriuntur, id est scriptum et voluntas, leges contrariae, ambiguitas, collectio sive ratiocinatio et definitio legalis. Scriptum et voluntas est, quando verba ipsa videntur cum sententia scriptoris dissidere. Legis contrariae status est, quando inter se duae leges aut plures discrepare noscuntur. Ambiguitas est, cum id, quod scriptum est, duas aut plures res significare videtur. Collectio vel ratiocinatio est, quando ex eo, quod scriptum est, aliud quoque, quod non scriptum est, invenitur. Definitio legalis est, cum vis quasi in definitiva constitutione, in quo posita sit, quaeritur. 10 Status ergo tam rationales quam legales a quibusdam certius decem et octo connumerati sunt. Ceterum secundum Rhetoricos Tullii decem et novem reperiuntur propterea, quia translationem inter rationales principaliter adfixit status. Inde se ipse etiam Cicero reprehendens translationem legalibus statibus adplicavit.

6 De tripartita controversia. Tripartita controversia iuxta Ciceronem aut simplex est, aut iuncta. Et si iuncta erit, considerandum est utrum ex pluribus quaestionibus iuncta sit, an ex aliqua comparatione. Controversia simplex est, quae absolutam continet unam quaestionem hoc modo: Corinthiis bellum indicamus, an non? 2 Iuncta est ex pluribus quaestionibus, in qua plura quaeruntur hoc pacto: Utrum Carthago diruatur, an Carthaginensibus reddatur, an eo colonia deducatur? Ex comparatione, utrum potius, aut quid potissimum quaeritur, ad hunc modum: Utrum exercitus in Macedoniam contra Philippum mittatur, qui sociis sit auxilio, an teneatur in Italia, ut quam maximae contra Hannibalem copiae sint?

7 De quattuor partibus orationis. Partes orationis in Rhetorica arte quattuor sunt: exordium, narratio, argumentatio, conclusio. Harum prima auditoris animum provocat, secunda res gestas explicat, tertia fidem adsertionibus facit, quarta finem totius orationis complectitur. 2 Inchoandum est itaque taliter, ut benivolum, docilem, vel adtentum auditorem faciamus: benivolum precando, docilem instruendo, adtentum excitando. Narrandum est ita, ut breviter atque aperte loquamur; argumentandum est ita, ut primum nostra firmemus, dehinc adversa confringamus; concludendum ita, ut concitemus animos audientis implere quae dicimus.

8 De quinque modis causarum. Species causarum sunt quinque: id est honestum, admirabile, humile, anceps, obscurum. Honestum causae genus est, cui statim sine oratione nostra favet animus auditoris. Admirabile, a quo est alienatus animus eorum, qui audituri sunt. Humile est, quod neclegitur ab auditore. 2 Anceps est, in quo aut iudicatio dubia est, aut causa honestatis et turpitudinis particeps, ut benivolentiam pariat et offensam. Obscurum, in quo aut tardi auditores sunt, aut difficilioribus ad cognoscendum negotiis causa cernitur implicata.

9 De Syllogismis. Syllogismus Graece, Latine argumentatio appellatur. Argumentatio autem dicta est, quasi argutae mentis oratio, qua inventum probabile exequimur. Syllogismus igitur est propositionis et adsumptionis confirmationisque extrema conclusio aut ex ambigentis incerto, aut ex fiducia conprobantis. 2 Constat enim tribus partibus: propositione, adsumptione, conclusionem. Propositione, ut puta, quod bonum est, turpem usum habere non potest. Consensit audiens; adsumpsit ille 'pecunia turpem usum habet'. Concluditur, 'ergo pecunia bonum non est'. 3 Syllogismis autem non solum rhetores, sed maxime dialectici utuntur, licet Apostolus saepe proponat, adsumat,

confirmet atque concludat: quae, ut diximus, propriae artis Dialecticae et Rhetoricae sunt. 4 Syllogismorum apud rhetores principalia genera duo sunt: inductio et ratiocinatio. Inductionis membra sunt tria: prima propositio, secunda inlatio, quae et adsumptio dicitur, tertia conclusio. 5 Inductio est, quae rebus non dubiis captat adhesionem eius, cum instituta est, sive inter philosophos, sive inter rhetores, sive inter sermocinantes. Propositio inductionis est, quae similitudines concedendae rei necessario unius inducit aut plurium. 6 Inlatio inductionis est, quae et adsumptio dicitur, quae rem, de qua contenditur, et cuius causa similitudines habitae sunt, introducit. Conclusio inductionis est, quae aut concessionem inlationis confirmat, aut quid ex ea conficiatur declarat. Ratiocinatio est oratio, qua id, de quo est quaestio, comprobatur. 7 Ratiocinationis modi sunt duo. Primus enthymema, qui est imperfectus syllogismus atque rhetoricus. Secundus epichirema, qui est inrhetoricus et latior syllogismus. 8 Enthymema igitur Latine interpretatur mentis conceptio, quem imperfectum syllogismum solent artigraphi nuncupare. Nam in duabus partibus eius argumenti forma consistit, quando id, quod ad fidem pertinet faciendam, utitur, syllogismorum lege praeterita, ut est illud: 'Si tempestas vitanda est, non est igitur navigandum'. Ex sola enim propositione et conclusione constat esse perfectum, unde magis rhetoribus quam dialecticis convenire iudicatum est. 9 Enthymematis membra sunt quinque: primum convincibile, secundum ostentabile, tertium sententiale, quartum exemplabile, quintum collectivum. 10 Convincibile est, quod evidenti ratione convincitur, sicut fecit Cicero pro Milone (79): 'Eius igitur mortis sedetis ultores, cuius vitam si putetis per vos restitui posse, nolitis'. Ostentabile est, quod certa rei demonstratione constringit, sicut Cicero in Catilina (1, 2): 'Hic tamen vivit, immo etiam in senatum venit'. Sententiale est, quod sententia generalis adducit, ut apud Terentium (Andr. 68):

Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

12 Exemplabile est, quod alicuius exempli conparatione eventum simile conminatur, sicut Cicero in Philippicis (2, 1): 'Te miror, Antoni, quorum exempla imitaris, eorum exitus non pertimescere'. 13 Collectivum est, cum in unum quae argumentata sunt colliguntur, sicut ait Cicero pro Milone (41): 'Quem igitur cum gratia noluit, hunc voluit cum aliquorum querella. Quem iure, quem loco, quem tempore non est ausus: hunc iniuria, alieno tempore, cum periculo capitis non dubitavit occidere'. 14 Praeterea secundum Victorinum enthymematis est altera definitio ex sola propositione, sicut iam dictum est, quae ita constat: Si tempestas vitanda est, non est navigatio requirenda. 15 Ex sola adsumptione, ut est illud: Si inimicus est, occidit; inimicus autem est. Et quia illi deest conclusio, enthymema vocatur. 16 Sequitur epichirema, descendens de ratiocinatione latior et executior rhetoricis syllogismis, latitudine distans et productione sermonis a dialecticis syllogismis, propter quod rhetoribus datur. Hic autem constat modis tribus. Primus modus tripertitus est, secundus quadripertitus, tertius quinquepertitus. 17 Tripertitus epichirematicus syllogismus est, qui constat membris tribus, id est propositione, adsumptione, conclusione. Quadripertitus est, qui constat ex membris quattuor: prima propositione, secunda adsumptione et una propositionis sive adsumptionis coniuncta, tertia probatione et conclusione. 18 Quinquepartitus itaque est, qui constat ex membris quinque, id est prima propositione, secunda eius probatione, tertia adsumptione, quarta eius probatione, quinta conclusione. Hunc Cicero ita facit in arte Rhetorica (de Inv. 1, 12): 'Si deliberatio et demonstratio genera sunt causarum, non possunt recte partes alicuius generis causae putari. Eadem enim res alii genus, alii pars esse potest; eidem genus et pars non potest, vel cetera, quousque syllogismi huius membra claudantur.

10 De lege. Lex est constitutio populi, quam maiores natu cum plebibus sancierunt. Nam quod Rex vel Imperator edicit, constitutio vel edictum vocatur. Institutio aequitatis duplex est, nunc in legibus, nunc in moribus. Inter legem autem et mores hoc interest, quod lex scripta est, mos vero est vetustate probata consuetudo, sive lex non scripta. Nam lex a legendo vocata, quia scripta est. 2 Mos autem longa consuetudo est, de moribus tracta tantundem. Consuetudo autem est ius quoddam moribus institutum, quod pro lege suscipitur, cum deficit lex; nec differt scriptura an ratione consistat, quando et legem ratio commendat. 3 Porro si ratione lex constat, lex erit omne iam quod ratione constiterit, dumtaxat quod religioni congruat, quod disciplinae conveniat, quod saluti proficiat. Vocata autem consuetudo, quia in communi est usu. 4 Omnis autem lex aut permittit aliquid, ut 'vir fortis petat praemium':<sup>o</sup> aut vetat, ut 'sacrarum virginum nuptias nulli petere liceat': aut punit, ut 'qui caedem fecerit, capite plectatur'. 5 Factae sunt autem leges, ut earum metu humana coherceatur audacia, tutaque sit inter improbos innocentia, et in ipsis improbis formidato supplicio refrenetur nocendi facultas. Legis enim praemio aut poena vita moderatur humana. 6 Erit autem lex honesta, iusta, possibilis, secundum naturam, secundum consuetudinem patriae, loco temporisque conveniens, necessaria, utilis, manifesta quoque, ne aliquid per obscuritatem in captionem contineat, nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi civium utilitate conscripta.

11 De sententia. Sententia est dictum impersonale, ut (Ter. Andr. 68):

Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

Huic si persona fuerit adiecta, chria erit, ita: 'offendit Achilles Agamemnonem vera dicendo', 'Metrophanes promeruit gratiam Mithridatis obsequendo'. 2 Nam inter chrian et sententiam hoc interest, quod sententia sine persona profertur; chria sine persona numquam dicitur. Unde si sententiae persona adiciatur, fit chria; si detrahatur, fit sententia.

12 De Catasceua et Anasceua. Catasceua est confirmatio propositae rei. Anasceua autem contraria superiori est. Revincit enim non fuisse, aut non esse, quod natum, aut factum, aut dictum esse proponitur; ut si quis Chimaeram neget fuisse, aut fuisse confirmet. 2 Inter haec et thesin hoc interesse, quod thesis, quamvis et ipsa habeat disputationem in utramque partem, tamen incertae rei quasi quaedam deliberatio vel cohortatio est. Catasceua autem et anasceua in his rebus, quae verisimiles non sunt, sed pro veris proponuntur, plerumque versantur. 3 Anasceuae prima divisio est inconveniens et mendacium. Inconvenientis species sunt, quod inhonestum est et quod inutile. Item inhonestum tractatur aut in dictis aut in factis. In dictis, ut si qui indecora et non respondentia auctoritati dixisse dicatur; velut si aliqui infamet Catonem illum Censorium, iuventutem illum ad nequitiam et luxuriam cohortatum. 4 In factis, ut si qui abhorrens aliquid a sanctimonia et nomine suo fecisse dicatur; ut est fabula de adulterio Martis et Veneris. Mendacium tres habet species: incredibile, quod factum non esse credatur, ut adolescentem, qui de Siculo litore ingredienti Africam classes viderit. 5 Impossibile est ut Clodius insidias Miloni fecerit et idem occisus sit a Milone. Contrarium est; nam si insidias fecit, occidit. Occisus est; non fecit insidias. Haec distributio in contrarium reformata catasceua proderit. Ut gradus omnes constituamus, honestum, utile, verisimile, possibile, consentaneum, vel ex diverso inhonestum, inutile, parum verisimile, impossibile, contrarium. Oportebit tamen principia sic ordinare, ut aut credendum esse veterum auctoritati, aut fabulis fidem non habendam esse dicamus. 6 Et ad id postremum in anasceua requiramus, ne quid aliud significare voluerint, qui ista finxerunt: ut Scyllam non marinam, sed maritimam feminam, nec succinctam canibus, sed rapacem aliquam et inhospitalem venientibus extitisse.

13 De Prosopoeia. Prosopoeia est, cum inanimalium et persona et sermo fingitur. Cicero in Catilina (1, 27): 'Etenim si mecum patria mea, quae mihi vita mea multo est carior, loqueretur, dicens,' et cetera. 2 Sic et montes et flumina vel arbores loquentes inducimus, personam inponentes rei quae non habet naturam loquendi; quod et tragoedis usitatum et in orationibus frequentissime invenitur.

14 De Ethopoeia. Ethopoeiam vero illam vocamus, in qua hominis personam fingimus pro exprimendis affectibus aetatis, studii, fortunae, laetitiae, sexus, maeroris, audaciae. Nam cum piratae persona suscipitur, audax, abrupta, temeraria erit oratio: cum feminae sermo simulatur, sexui convenire debet oratio: iam vero adolescentis et senis, et militis et imperatoris, et parasi et rustici et philosophi diversa oratio dicenda est. 2 Aliter enim loquitur gaudio affectus, aliter vulneratus. In quo genere dictionis illa sunt maxime cogitanda, quis loquatur et apud quem, de quo et ubi et quo tempore: quid egerit, quid acturus sit, aut quid pati possit, si haec consulta neclexerit.

15 De generibus quaestionum. Genera quaestionum duo sunt, quorum unum est finitum, alterum infinitum. Finitum ὑπόθεσις Graece, Latine causa dicitur, ubi cum certa persona controversia est. 2 Infinitum, quod Graece θέσις, Latine propositum nominatur. Hoc personam non habet certam, nec inest in aliqua certa circumstantia, id est, nec locus, nec tempus. In causa vero certa omnia sunt, unde quasi pars causae est propositum.

16 De elocutione. Iam vero in elocutionibus illud uti oportebit, ut res, locus, tempus, persona audientis efflagitat, ne profana religiosus, ne inverecunda castis, ne levia gravibus, ne lasciva seriis, ne ridicula tristibus misceantur. Latine autem et perspicue loquendum. 2 Latine autem loquitur, qui verba rerum vera et naturalia persequitur, nec a sermone atque cultu praesentis temporis discrepat. Huic non sit satis videre quid dicat, nisi id quoque aperte et suaviter dicere; ne id quidem tantum, nisi id quod dicat et facere.

17 De trimodo dicendi genere. Dicenda sunt quoque summissa leniter, incitata graviter, inflexa moderate. Hoc est enim illud trimodum genus dicendi: humile, medium, grandiloquum. Cum enim magna dicimus, granditer proferenda sunt; cum parva dicimus, subtiliter; cum mediocria, temperate. 2 Nam in parvis causis nihil grande, nihil sublime dicendum est, sed leni ac pedestri more loquendum. In causis autem maioribus, ubi de Deo vel hominum salute referimus, plus magnificentiae et fulgoris est exhibendum. 3 In temperatis vero causis, ubi nihil agitur ut agat,

sed tantummodo ut delectetur auditor, inter utrumque moderate dicendum est: sed et quamvis de magnis rebus quisque dicat, non tamen semper granditer docere debet, sed summis, cum docet; temperate, cum aliquid laudat vel vituperat; granditer, cum ad conversionem aversos animos provocat. Utenda tamen verba in summis genere sufficientia, in temperato splendentia, in grandi vehementia.

18 De colo, commate, et periodis. Conponitur autem instruiturque omnis oratio verbis, comma et colo et periodo. Comma particula est sententiae. Colon membrum. Periodos ambitus vel circuitus. Fit autem ex coniunctione verborum comma, ex commate colon, ex colo periodos. 2 Comma est iuncturae finitio, utputa (Cic. Mil. 1): 'Etsi vereor, iudices,' ecce unum comma; sequitur et aliud comma: 'ne turpe sit pro fortissimo viro dicere,' et factum est colon, id est membrum, quod intellectum sensui praestat; sed adhuc pendet oratio, sicque deinde ex pluribus membris fit periodos, id est extrema sententiae clausula: 'ita veterem iudiciorum morem requirunt.' Periodos autem longior esse non debet quam ut uno spiritu proferatur.

19 De vitiis litterarum et verborum et sententiarum cavendis. Praeterea purum et honestum oratoris eloquium carere debet omnibus vitiis tam in litteris, quam in verbis, quam etiam in sententiis. 2 In litteris, ut iunctura apta et conveniens sit; et sic observandum, ne praecedentis verbi extrema vocalis in eandem vocalem primam incidat verbi sequentis, ut 'feminae Aegyptiae'. Quae structura melior fit, si consonantes vocalibus adplicentur. Trium quoque consonantium, quae in se incidentes stridere et quasi rixare videntur, vitanda iunctura est, id est, R, S, X, ut: 'ars studiorum,, 'rex Xerxes, 'error Romuli'. Fugienda est et consonans M inlisa vocalibus, ut 'verum enim'.

20 De iuncturis verborum. In verbis quoque cavenda sunt vitia, ut non inpropria verba ponantur, quae Graeci Acyrologian vocant. Amanda est ergo proprietates, sic tamen ut aliquando propter humilitatem sordidi aut spurci vocabuli translatis nominibus sit utendum, non tamen longe accitis, sed ut veris proxima et cognata videantur. 2 Fugienda etiam Hyperbata longiora, quae fieri sine aliorum sensuum confusione non possunt. Ambiguitas quoque et vitium illud cavendum, cum quidam iactatione eloquentiae ducti, quod uno aut duobus verbis significare poterant, interpositis inanibus vocibus longa et circumflexa ambage concludunt: quod vitium Perissologian vocatur. 3 Cui contrarium criminis vitium est et brevitatis studio etiam necessaria verba furari. Fugienda sunt quoque, sicut in litteris et verbis, ita et in sententiis vitia, quae inter prima Grammaticorum studia cognoscuntur. 4 Sunt autem Cacemphaton, Tautologia, Ellipsis, Acyrologia, Macrologia, Perissologia, Pleonasmus et his similia. At contra orationem extollit et exornat †energia tum† Emphasis, quae plus quiddam quam dixerit intellegi facit; ut si dicas: 'Ad gloriam Scipionis ascendit', et Vergilius (Aen. 2, 262):

Demissum lapsi per funem.

Cum enim dicit lapsi, altitudinis imaginem suggerit. Huic contraria virtus est, verbis minuere quae natura sua magna sunt.

21 De figuris verborum et sententiarum. Augetur et ornatur oratio etiam figuris verborum ac sententiarum. Nam quia directa et perpetua oratio fatigationem atque fastidium tam dicendi quam audiendi creat, flectenda est et in alias versanda formas, ut et dicentem reficiat, et ornatior fiat, et iudicem diverso vultu audituque deflectat. E quibus plurimae superius a Donato in schematibus artis Grammaticae adnotatae sunt. 2 Unde tantum illa hic interponi oportuit, quae in poemate aut numquam aut difficulter fiunt, in oratione autem libere. 3 Anadiplosis est congeminatione verborum, ut (Cic. Catil. 1, 2): 'hic tamen vivit, vivit, etiam in senatum venit'. 4 Climax est gradatio, cum ab eo, quo sensus superior terminatur, inferior incipit, ac dehinc quasi per gradus dicendi ordo servatur, ut est illud Africani: 'ex innocentia nascitur dignitas, ex dignitate honor, ex honore imperium, ex imperio libertas'. Hanc figuram nonnulli catenam appellant, propter quod aliud in alio quasi nectitur nomine, atque ita res plures in geminatione verborum trahuntur. Fit autem hoc schema non solum in singulis verbis, sed etiam in contexione verborum, ut apud Gracchum: 'pueritia tua adolescentiae tuae inhonestamentum fuit, adolescentia senectuti dedecoramentum, senectus reipublicae flagitium'. Sic et apud Scipionem: 'vi atque ingratis coactus cum illo sponsonem feci, facta sponsonem ad iudicem adduxi, adductum primo coetu damnavi, damnatum ex voluntate dimisi'. 5 Antitheta, quae Latine contrapositione appellantur: quae, dum ex adverso ponuntur, sententiae pulchritudinem faciunt, et in ornamento locutionis decentissima existunt, ut Cicero (Catil. 2, 25): 'ex hac parte pudor pugnat, illinc

petulantia; hinc pudicitia, illinc stuprum; hinc fides, illinc fraudatio; hinc pietas, illinc scelus; hinc constantia, illinc furor; hinc honestas, illinc turpitudine; hinc continentia, illinc libido; hinc denique aequitas, temperantia, fortitudo, prudentia, virtutes omnes certant cum iniquitate, luxuria, ignavia, temeritate, cum vitiis omnibus; postremo copia cum egestate; bona ratio cum perdita; mens sana cum amentia; bona denique spes cum omnium rerum desperatione confligit'. In huiusmodi certamine ac praelio, huiusmodi locutionis ornamento liber Ecclesiasticus usus est, dicens (33, 15): 'contra malum bonum, et contra mortem vita: sic contra pium peccator: et sic intueri in omnia opera altissimi, bina et bina, unum contra unum'. 6 Synonymia est, quotiens in conexa oratione pluribus verbis unam rem significamus, ut ait Cicero (Catil. 1, 8): nihil agis, nihil moliris, nihil cogitas'. Et item (Catil. 1, 10): 'non feram, non patiar, non sinam'. 7 Epanodos, quam regressionem nostri vocant (Cic. Ligar. 19): 'principium dignitas erat pene par; non par fortasse eorum, quae sequebantur'. 8 Antapodosis, quotiens media primis et ultimis conveniunt ut est (Cic. c. cont. Metell. frag. 5): 'vestrum iam hoc factum reprehendo, patres conscripti, non meum, ac pulcherrimum quidem factum: verum, ut dixi, non meum, sed vestrum'. 9 Paradiastole est, quotiens id, quod dicimus, interpretatione discernimus (cf. Rutil. Lup. 1, 4): 'cum te pro astuto sapientem appellas, pro inconsiderato fortem, pro inliberali diligentem'. 10 Antanaclasis est, quae eodem verbo contrarium exprimit sensum. Querebatur quidam de filio, cum mortem suam expectaret, respondente: 'non expecto, immo peto, inquit, ut expectes'. 11 Antimetabole est conversio verborum, quae ordine mutato contrarium efficit sensum: 'non ut edam vivo, sed ut vivam edo'. Et illud (Cic. Phil. 4, 8): 'si consul Antonius, Brutus hostis: si conservator reipublicae Brutus, hostis Antonius'. 12 Exoche (Cic. Mil. 59): Quis eos appellavit? Appius. Quis produxit? Appius'. 13 Nunc figuras sententiarum, quas operae pretium sit cognoscere, persequamur. 14 Sententia est dictum impersonale, ut (Ter. Andr. 68):

Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

Huic si persona fuerit adiecta, Chria erit, ita: 'offendit Achilles Agamemnonem vera dicendo'. 'Metrophanes promeruit gratiam Mithridatis obsequendo'. Nam inter chriam et sententiam hoc interest, quod sententia sine persona profertur, chria sine persona numquam dicitur. Unde si sententiae persona adiciatur, fit chria; si detrahatur, fit sententia. 15 Sententiarum species multae. Aliae enim sunt indicativae, aliae sunt pronuntiativae, ut (Virg. Aen. 4, 373):

Nusquam tuta fides;

aliae imperativae, ut (Virg. Aen. 4, 223):

Vade, age, nate, voca Zephyros, et labere pinnis.

Aliae admirativae (Virg. Aen. 1, 11):

Tantaene animis caelestibus irae?

16 Aliae comparativae (Lucil. iv. frag.?):

Si vinco et pereor, quid ibi me vincere praestat?

Aliae superlativae, quae cum aliquo motu animi et indignatione promuntur (Virg. Aen. 3, 57):

Quid non mortalia pectora coges,

auri sacra fames!

17 Aliae interrogativae ut (Virg. Aen. 8, 113):

Iuvenes, quae causa subegit

ignotas temptare vias?

Quid genus, unde domum? Pacemne huc fertis, an arma?

18 Aliae responsivae, ut 'illinc', 'istinc'. Aliae deprecativae, ut (Virg. Aen. 6, 365):

Eripe me his, invicte, malis!

Aliae promissivae, ut (Virg. Aen. 1, 257):

Parce metu, manent inmota tuorum.

Aliae concessivae quae impulsione prohibeant, ut (Virg. Aen. 4, 381):

I, sequere Italiam ventis, pete regna per undas.

Quae tamen ne non intellecta sit persuasio, permixta sunt aliqua quae vetent latenter, ut 'ventis', 'per undas'.

Aliae demonstrativae, ut 'en', 'ecce'. Aliae optativae, ut (Virg. Aen. 8, 560):

O mihi praeteritos referat si Iuppiter annos.

19 Aliae derogativae, ut 'nequaquam'. Aliae, quae cum exclamatione proferuntur, ut (Petron. 68):

Quis furor, o cives, pacem convertit in arma?

Et Cicero (Cat. 1, 9): 'O dii immortales, ubinam gentium sumus?' 20 Aliae exhortativae, cum ad sententiam provocamus, ut (Virg. Aen. 8, 364):

Aude, hospes, contemnere opes.

21 Aliae dehortativae, cum a contrario vitio peccatoque reducimus. Sunt et adfirmativae, ut: 'quidni', 'quippe'. 22 Praeceptivae, ut (cf. Virg. Georg. 1, 299):

Nudus ara, sere nudus, et habebis frigore messes.

23 Vetativae, ut (Virg. Georg. 2, 299):

Neve inter vites corylum sere, neve flagella

summa pete.

24 Negativae, ut: 'non', 'minime'. Sunt et mirativae, ut (Hieronym. epist. ad Rust. 4, 6) 'Papae! vivere non licet, et fornicare libet?' 25 Dolentis, ut (cf. Ovid. Heroid. 5, 149):

Ei mihi, quod nullus amor est sanabilis herbis.

Flentis ut. Similitudinis, sic (Virg. Aen. 5, 588):

Ut quondam Creta fertur Labyrinthus in alta.

Admonentis ut. Inidentis ut. Gementis ut. Exhortativae ut. Consolativae ut. Conmiserantis ut. Quorum quot sunt figurae, tot et in pronuntiando voces. 26 Sunt et Amphidoxae, quarum pars honesta est, pars inhonesta, ut (Ovid, Met. 2, 53):

Non est tua tuta voluntas:

magna petis, Phaëthon.



27 Sunt et aliae, procatalempsis, cum id, quod nobis obici puterat, ante praesumimus ad diluendum, ut (Cic. Div. in Caec. 1): 'Si quis vestrum iudices, aut eorum, qui adsunt, forte mirantur'. Sunt et aporiae, dubitatio simulantis nescire se quae scit, aut quomodo dicatur. 28 Koenonosis autem dicitur communicatio consilii cum iudicibus aut adversariis, ut si dicas: 'Vos consulo, iudices, aut vos adversarii, quid me facere convenerit, aut quid vos facturi fuissetis'. 29 Paradoxon est, cum dicimus inopinatum aliquid accidisse, ut Flacco Cicero (cf. Flacc. 1): 'Cuius laudis praedicator esse debuerit, eius periculi deprecatores esse factum'. 30 Epitele, id est permissio, cum aliqua ipsis iudicibus aut adversariis permittimus aestimanda, ut Calvus in Vaticinio: 'Perfrica frontem, et dic te digniorem qui praetor fieres quam Catonem'. 31 Parrhesia est oratio libertatis et fiducia plena (Cic. Mil. 72): 'occidi non Spurium Maelium', et cetera. Qua figura caute utendum est, ut Cicero: praemisit enim factionem. 32 Ethopoeia est, cum sermonem ex aliena persona inducimus, ut pro Caelio Tullius facit Appium Caecum cum Clodia loquentem. 33 Energia est rerum gestarum aut quasi gestarum sub oculis inductio, de qua locuti iam sumus. 34 Metathesis est, quae mittit animos iudicum in res praeteritas aut futuras, hoc modo: 'Revocate mentis ad spectaculum expugnatae miserae civitatis, et videre vos credite incendia, caedes, rapinas, direptiones, liberorum corporum iniurias, captivitates matronarum, trucidationes senum'. In futurum autem anticipatio eorum, quae dicturus est adversarius, ut Tullio pro Milone, cum mittit animos iudicum in eum reipublicae statum, qui futurus est, etiamsi occiso Milone Clodius viveret. 35 Aposiopesis est, cum id, quod dicturi videbamur, silentio intercipimus (Virg. Aen. 1, 135):

Quos ego, sed motos praestat componere fluctus.

36 Epanalempsis est digressio: 'Tulit calor me dicendi et dignitas rerum paulo longius quam volebam, sed redeo ad causam'. 37 Anamnesis est commemoratio eius rei, quod oblitos fuisse nos fingimus. 38 †Aparisis† est, cum id, quod in animos iudicum quasi deposueramus, opportune repossimus. 39 Aetiologia est, cum proponimus aliquid, eiusque causam et rationem reddimus. 40 Characterismus, descriptio figurae alicuius expressa, ut (Virg. Aen. 4, 558):

Omnia Mercurio similis, vocemque coloremque

et crines flavos et membra decora iuventa.

Ἀθροισμός, cum plures sensus breviter expeditos in unum locum coacervant, et cum quadam festinatione decurrit, ut Cicero (Cic. Catil. 3, 1): 'Reipublicam, Quirites, vitamque omnium vestrorum, bona, fortunas, coniuges, liberosque vestros', et cetera. 41 Ironia est, cum per simulationem diversum quam dicit intellegi cupit. Fit autem aut cum laudamus eum quem vituperare volumus, aut vituperamus quem laudare volumus. Utriusque exemplum erit, si dicas amatorem reipublicae Catilinam, hostem reipublicae Scipionem. 42 Diasyrmus ea, quae magna sunt, verbis minuit, aut minima extollit. 43 †Efon† est, quotiens in eodem sensu diutius immoramur: 'Cui tandem pepercit? cuius amicitiae fidem custodivit? cui bono inimicus non fuit? quando non aut accusavit aliquem, aut verberavit, aut prodidit?' 44 Epangelia est promissio, qua iudicem adtentum facimus, pollicentes nos aliqua magna aut minima dicturos. 45 Prosopopoeia est, cum inanimalium et persona et sermo fingitur. Cicero in Catilina (1, 27): 'etenim si mecum patria mea, quae mihi vita mea multo est carior,' loqueretur dicens, et cetera. 46 Parathesis est, cum quasi deponimus aliquid imperfectum apud memoriam iudicum, repetituros nos dicentes, cum opportunum fuerit. 47 Peusis, id est soliloquium, cum ad interrogata ipsi nobis respondemus. 48 Synaeresis est, cum differimus aliquid, petentes ut aliud interim nos permittant dicere.

22 De Dialectica. Dialectica est disciplina ad disserendas rerum causas inventa. Ipsa est philosophiae species, quae Logica dicitur, id est rationalis definiendi, quaerendi et disserendi potens. Docet enim in pluribus generibus quaestionum quemadmodum disputando vera et falsa diiudicentur. 2 Hanc quidam primi philosophi in suis dictionibus habuerunt; non tamen ad artis redegere peritiam. Post hos Aristoteles ad regulas quasdam huius doctrinae argumenta perduxit, et Dialecticam nuncupavit, pro eo quod in ea de dictis disputatur. Nam λεκτόν dictio dicitur. Ideo autem post Rhetoricam disciplinam Dialectica sequitur, quia in multis utraque communia existunt.

23 De differentia Dialecticae et Rhetoricae artis. Dialecticam et Rhetoricam Varro in novem disciplinarum libris tali similitudine definivit: 'Dialectica et Rhetorica est quod in manu hominis pugnus adstrictus et palma distensa: illa verba contrahens, ista distendens'. 2 Dialectica siquidem ad disserendas res acutior: Rhetorica ad illa quae nititur docenda facundior. Illa ad scholas nonnumquam venit: ista iugiter procedit in forum. Illa requirit rarissimos

studiosos: haec frequenter et populos. 3 Solent autem Philosophi antequam ad isagogen veniant exponendam, definitionem Philosophiae ostendere, quo facilius ea, quae ad eam pertinent, demonstrantur.

24 De definitione Philosophiae. Philosophia est rerum humanarum divinarumque cognitio cum studio bene vivendi coniuncta. Haec duabus ex rebus constare videtur, scientia et opinatione. 2 Scientia est, cum res aliqua certa ratione percipitur; opinatio autem, cum adhuc incerta res latet et nulla ratione firma videtur, utputa sol utrumne tantus quantus videtur, an maior sit quam omnis terra: item luna globosa sit an concava, et stellae utrumne adhaereant caelo, an per aerem libero cursu ferantur: caelum ipsum qua magnitudine, qua materia constat: utrum quietum sit et immobile, an incredibili celeritate volvatur: quanta sit terrae crassitudo, aut quibus fundamentis librata et suspensa permaneat. 3 Ipsud autem nomen Latine interpretatum amorem sapientiae profitetur. Nam Graeci φιλο- amorem, σοφίαν sapientiam dicunt. Philosophiae species tripartita est: una naturalis, quae Graece Physica appellatur, in qua de naturae inquisitione disseritur: altera moralis, quae Graece Ethica dicitur, in qua de moribus agitur: tertia rationalis, quae Graeco vocabulo Logica appellatur, in qua disputatur quemadmodum in rerum causis vel vitae moribus veritas ipsa quaeratur. 4 In Physica igitur causa quaerendi, in Ethica ordo vivendi, in Logica ratio intellegendi versatur. Physicam apud Graecos primus perscrutatus est Thales Milesius, unus ex septem illis sapientibus. Hic enim ante alios caeli causas atque vim rerum naturalium contemplata ratione suspexit, quam postmodum Plato in quattuor definitiones distribuit, id est Arithmetica, Geometrica, Musica, Astronomia. 5 Ethicam Socrates primus ad corrigendos componendosque mores instituit, atque omne studium eius ad bene vivendi disputationem perduxit, dividens eam in quattuor virtutibus animae, id est prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam. 6 Prudentia est in rebus, qua discernuntur a bonis mala. Fortitudo, qua adversa aequanimiter tolerantur. Temperantia, qua libido concupiscentiaque rerum frenatur. Iustitia, qua recte iudicando sua cuique distribuunt. 7 Logicam, quae rationalis vocatur, Plato subiunxit, per quam, discussis rerum morumque causis, vim earum rationabiliter perscrutatus est, dividens eam in Dialecticam et Rhetoricam. Dicta autem Logica, id est rationalis. Λόγος enim apud Graecos et sermonem significat et rationem. 8 In his quippe tribus generibus Philosophiae etiam eloquia divina consistunt. Nam aut de natura disputare solent, ut in Genesi et in Ecclesiaste: aut de moribus, ut in Proverbiis et in omnibus sparsim libris: aut de Logica, pro qua nostri Theoreticam sibi vindicant, ut in Cantico canticorum, et Evangeliiis. 9 Item aliqui doctorum Philosophiam in nomine et partibus suis ita definierunt: Philosophia est divinarum humanarumque rerum, in quantum homini possibile est, probabilis scientia. Aliter: Philosophia est ars artium et disciplina disciplinarum. Rursus: Philosophia est meditatio mortis, quod magis convenit Christianis qui, saeculi ambitione calcata, conversatione disciplinabili, similitudine futurae patriae vivunt. Philosophia dividitur in duas partes: prima inspectiva; secunda actualis. 10 Alii definierunt Philosophiae rationem in duabus consistere partibus, quarum prima inspectiva est, secunda actualis. Inspectiva dividitur in tribus modis, id est prima in naturalem; secunda in doctrinalem; tertia in divinam. Doctrinalis dividitur in quattuor, id est, prima in Arithmetica, secunda Musica, tertia Geometria, quarta Astronomia. 11 Actualis dividitur in tribus, id est, prima in moralem, secunda dispensativam, tertia civilem. Inspectiva dicitur, qua supergressi visibilia, de divinis aliquid et caelestibus contemplamur, eaque mente solummodo inspicimus, quoniam corporeum supergrediuntur obtutum. 12 Naturalis dicitur, ubi uniuscuiusque rei natura discutitur, quia nihil generatur in vita: sed unumquodque his usibus deputatur, in quibus a creatore definitum est, nisi forte cum voluntate Dei aliquod miraculum provenire monstratur. 13 Divinalis dicitur, quando aut ineffabilem naturam Dei, aut spirituales creaturas ex aliqua parte, profundissima qualitate disserimus. 14 Doctrinalis dicitur scientia, quae abstractam considerat quantitatem. Abstracta enim quantitas dicitur, quam intellectu a materia separantes, vel ab aliis accidentibus, ut est par, impar, vel ab huiusmodi, in sola ratiocinatione tractamus. Cuius species sunt quattuor: Arithmetica, Geometrica, Musica, Astronomia. 15 Arithmetica est disciplina quantitatis numerabilis secundum se. Geometrica est disciplina magnitudinis immobilis et formarum. Musica est disciplina quae de numeris loquitur qui ad aliquid sunt, his qui inveniuntur in sonis. Astronomia est disciplina, quae cursus caelestium siderumque figuras contemplatur omnes, et habitudines stellarum circa se et circa terram indagabili ratione percurrit. 16 Porro actualis dicitur, quae res propositas operationibus suis explicat. Cuius partes sunt tres, moralis, dispensativa et civilis. Moralis dicitur, per quam mos vivendi honestus adpetitur, et instituta ad virtutem tendentia praeparantur. Dispensativa dicitur, cum domesticarum rerum sapienter ordo disponitur. Civilis dicitur, per quam totius civitatis utilitas administratur.

25 De isagogis porphyrii. Post Philosophiae definitiones, in quibus generaliter omnia continentur, nunc Isagogas Porphyrii expediemus. Isagoga quippe Graece, Latine introductio dicitur, eorum scilicet qui Philosophiam incipiunt: continens in se demonstrationem primarum rationum de qualibet re quid sit, suaque certa ac substantiali definitione declaretur. 2 Nam posito primo genere, deinde species et alia, quae vicina esse possunt, subiungimus ac discretis

communione separamus, tamdiu interponentes differentias, quousque ad proprium eius de quo quaerimus signata eius expressione perveniamus, ut puta: Homo est animal rationale, mortale, terrenum, bipes, risu capax. 3 Genus animal cum dictum est, substantia hominis declarata est. Est enim ad hominem genus animal, sed quia late patebat, adiecta est species, terrenum: iam exclusum est id quod aut aethereum aut humidum suspicabatur. Differentia vero, ut bipes, quae propter animalia posita est quae multis pedibus innituntur. Item rationale, propter illa quae ratione egeant: mortale autem propter id quod angelus non est. 4 Postea discretis atque seclusis adiectum est proprium in parte postrema risu capax: est enim solum hominis, quod ridet. Sic perfecta est omni ex parte definitio ad hominem declarandum. Cuius disciplinae definitionem plenam existimaverunt Aristoteles et Tullius ex genere et differentiis consistere. 5 Quidam postea pleniore in docendo eius perfectam substantialem definitionem in quinque partibus, veluti membris suis, dividerunt. Quarum prima est de genere, secunda de specie, tertia de differentia, quarta de proprio, quinta de accidenti. 6 Genus, ut animal. Est enim vocabulum generale et commune omnium animam habentium. Species, ut homo. Est enim specialitas, qua separatur a ceteris animantibus. Differentia, ut rationale, mortale. His enim duobus differt homo a ceteris. 7 Cum enim dicitur rationale, discernitur ab irrationalibus mutis, quae non habent rationem. Cum dicitur mortale, discernitur ab angelis, qui nesciunt mortem. Proprium, ut risibile. Homo est enim quod ridet, et hoc praeter hominem nullius animalis est. Accidens, ut color in corpore, doctrina in animo. 8 Haec enim temporum varietate et accidunt et mutantur: et est ex omnibus his quinque partibus oratio plenae sententiae, ita: Homo est animal rationale, mortale, risibile, boni malique capax. Sic etiam in omni oratione substantiali tamdiu interponere debemus species et differentias, quam diu seclusis omnibus, quae hoc idem esse possunt, ad id perveniatur, ut proprietas iam certa teneatur. 9 Isagogas autem ex Graeco in Latinum transtulit Victorinus orator, commentumque eius quinque libris Boetius edidit.

26 De categoriis aristotelis. Sequuntur Aristotelis categoriae, quae Latine praedicamenta dicuntur: quibus per varias significationes omnis sermo conclusus est. 2 Instrumenta categoriarum sunt tria, id est prima aequivoca; secunda univoca; tertia denominativa. Aequivoca sunt, quando multarum rerum nomen unum est, sed non eadem definitio, ut leo. Nam quantum ad nomen pertinet, et verus et pictus et caelestis leo dicitur; quantum ad definitionem pertinet, aliter verus definitur, aliter pictus, aliter caelestis. 3 Univoca sunt, quando duarum aut plurimarum rerum unum nomen est et definitio, ut vestis. Nam et birrus et tunica et nomen vestis possunt accipere et eius definitionem. Ergo hoc univocum in generibus esse intellegitur, quia et nomen et definitionem dat formis suis. 4 Denominativa, id est derivativa, dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo solo differentiae casu secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a bonitate bonus, et a malitia malus. 5 Categoriarum autem species decem sunt, id est substantia, quantitas, qualitas, relatio, situs, locus, tempus, habitus, agere et pati. 6 Substantia est, quae proprie et principaliter dicitur, quae neque de subiecto praedicatur, neque in subiecto est, ut aliqui homo vel aliqui equus. Secundae autem substantiae dicuntur, in quibus speciebus illae, quae principaliter substantiae primo dictae sunt, insunt atque clauduntur, ut in homine Cicero. 7 Quantitas est mensura, per quam aliquid vel magnum vel minus ostenditur, ut longus, brevis. Qualitas est, ut qualis sit, orator an rusticus, niger aut candidus. Relatio est, quae refertur ad aliquid. Cum enim dicitur filius, demonstratur et pater. Haec relativa simul incipiunt. Namque servus ac dominus uno tempore exordium nominis sumunt, nec aliquando invenitur dominus prior servo, nec servus domino. Alterum enim alteri praeesse non potest. 8 Locus est ubi sit, in foro, in platea. Loci autem motus partes sex habet, dextram et sinistram, ante et retro, sursum atque deorsum. Partes quoque istae sex duo habent id est, situm et tempus. Situm, ut longe et prope. Tempus, ut: heri, hodie. Porro situs a positione dictus, ut quis aut stet, aut sedeat, aut iaceat. 9 Habitus ab habendo aliquid dictus, ut habere scientiam in mente, virtutem in corpore, circa corpus vestimentum, et cetera, quae ad habendi modum, designato a doctoribus numero, comprehenditur. 10 Iam vero agere et pati ab agentis et patientis significatione consistunt. Nam scribo vocis actum habet, quoniam facientis rem indicat. Scribor patientis est, quoniam pati se ostendit. In his enim novem generibus, quorum exempli gratia quaedam posita sunt, vel in ipso substantiae genere, quod est οὐσία, innumerabilia reperiuntur. Nam et ea quae intellectu capimus, id ad alterutrum horum decem praedicamentorum sermone vulgamus. 11 Plena enim sententia de his ita est: Augustinus, magnus orator, filius illius, stans in templo, hodie, infulatus, disputando fatigatur. Usia autem substantia est, id est proprium, quae ceteris subiacet; reliqua novem accidentia sunt. Substantia autem dicitur ab eo, quod omnis res ad se ipsam subsistit. Corpus enim subsistit, et ideo substantia est. 12 Illa vero accidentia, quae in subsistente atque subiecto sunt, substantiae non sunt, quia non subsistunt, sed mutantur; sicut color vel forma. 13 De subiecto autem et in subiecto quasi de ipso et in ipso. Ubi enim dicitur de subiecto, substantia est, quasi dicatur de substantia. Ubi autem dicitur in subiecto, accidentia sunt, id est, quae accidunt in substantia; ut quantitas, qualitas, vel figura. De subiecto igitur genera et species, in subiecto accidentia sunt. Ex his novem accidentibus tria intra usiam sunt, quantitas et, qualitas

et situs. Haec enim sine usia esse non possunt. Extra usiam vero sunt locus, tempus et habitus; intra et extra usiam sunt relatio, facere et pati. 14 Appellatas autem categorias constat, quia non possunt nisi ex subiectis agnosci. Quis enim quid sit homo possit agnoscere, nisi aliquem hominem sibi ponat ante oculos, quasi subiectum nomini? 15 Hoc opus Aristotelis intellegendum est, quando, sicut dictum est, quidquid homo loquitur, inter decem ista praedicamenta habentur. Proficiet etiam ad libros intellegendos, qui sive Rhetoribus sive Dialecticis adplicantur.

27 De perihermeniiis. Sequitur dehinc liber Perihermenias subtilissimus nimis, et per varias formas iterationesque cautissimus, de quo dicitur: Aristoteles, quando Perihermenias scriptitabat, calamum in mente tinguebat. 2 Praefatio Perihermeniarum. Omnis quippe res, quae una est et uno significatur sermone, aut per nomen significatur, aut per verbum: quae duae partes orationis interpretantur totum, quidquid conceperit mens ad loquendum. Omnis enim elocutio conceptae rei mentis interpretis est. 3 Hanc Aristoteles, vir in rerum expressione et faciendis sermonibus peritissimus, Perihermeniam nominat, quam interpretationem nos appellamus; scilicet quod res mente conceptas prolatis sermonibus interpretetur per cataphasin et apophasin, id est adfirmationem et negationem. Per adfirmationem, ut homo currit; per negationem, ut homo non currit. 4 In his itaque Perihermeniiis supra dictus philosophus de septem speciebus tractat, id est de nomine, de verbo, de oratione, de enuntiatione, de adfirmatione, de negatione, de contradictione. 5 Nomen est vox significativa secundum placitum, sine tempore, cuius nulla pars est significativa separata, ut Socrates. Verbum est, quod significat tempus, cuius pars nihil extra significat, sed semper eorum, quae de altero dicuntur, notat, ut cogitat, disputat. Oratio est vox significativa, cuius partium aliquid separatum significativum est, ut Socrates disputat. Enuntiativa oratio est vox significativa de eo quod est aliquid vel non est, ut Socrates est, Socrates non est. 6 Adfirmatio est enuntiatio alicuius de aliquo, ut Socrates est. Negatio est alicuius ab aliquo, ut Socrates non est. Contradictio est adfirmationis et negationis oppositio, ut Socrates disputat, Socrates non disputat. 7 Haec omnia in libro Perihermeniarum minutissime divisa et subdivisa tractantur, quarum rerum definitiones hic breviter sufficiat intimasse, quando in ipso competens explanatio reperitur. Utilitas Perihermeniarum haec est, quod ex his interpretamentis syllogismi fiunt. Unde et analytica pertractantur.

28 De syllogismis dialecticis. Sequuntur dehinc Dialectici syllogismi, ubi totius eius artis utilitas et virtus ostenditur; quorum conclusio plurimum lectorem adiuvat ad veritatem investigandam tantum, ut absit ille error decipiendi adversarium per sophismata falsarum conclusionum. 2 Formulae categoricorum, id est praedicativorum syllogismorum, sunt tres. 3 Primae formulae modi sunt novem. Primus modus est, qui conducit, id est, qui colligit ex universalibus dedicativis dedicativum universale directim, ut: 'Omne iustum honestum: omne honestum bonum: omne igitur iustum bonum'. 4 Secundus modus est, qui conducit ex universalibus dedicativis et abdicativis abdicativum universale directim, ut: 'Omne iustum honestum: nullum honestum turpe: nullum igitur iustum turpe.' 5 Tertius modus est, qui conducit ex dedicativis particulari et universali dedicativum particulare directim, ut: 'Quoddam iustum honestum: omne honestum utile: quoddam igitur iustum utile'. 6 Quartus modus est, qui conducit ex particulari dedicativa et universali abdicativa abdicativum particulare directim, ut: 'Quoddam iustum honestum: nullum honestum turpe: quoddam igitur iustum non est turpe'. 7 Quintus modus est, qui conducit ex universalibus dedicativis particulare dedicativum per reflexionem, ut: 'Omne iustum honestum: omne honestum bonum: quoddam igitur bonum iustum'. 8 Sextus modus est, qui conducit ex universali dedicativa et universali abdicativa abdicativum universale per reflexionem, ut: 'Omne iustum honestum: nullum honestum turpe: nullum igitur turpe iustum'. 9 Septimus modus est, qui conducit ex particulari et universali dedicativo dedicativum particulare per reflexionem, ut: 'Quoddam iustum honestum: omne honestum utile: quoddam igitur utile iustum'. 10 Octavus modus est, qui conducit ex universalibus abdicativa et dedicativa particulare abdicativum per reflexionem, ut: 'Nullum turpe honestum: omne honestum iustum: quoddam igitur turpe non est iustum'. 11 Nonus modus est, qui conducit ex universali abdicativa et particulari dedicativa abdicativum particulare per reflexionem, ut: 'Nullum turpe honestum: quoddam honestum iustum: quoddam igitur iustum non est turpe'. 12 Formulae secundae modi sunt quattuor: Primus modus est, qui conducit ex universalibus dedicativa et abdicativa abdicativum universale directim, ut: 'Omne iustum honestum: nullum turpe honestum: nullum igitur turpe iustum'. 13 Secundus modus est, qui conducit ex universalibus abdicativa et dedicativa abdicativum universale directim, ut: 'Nullum turpe honestum: omne iustum honestum: nullum igitur turpe iustum'. 14 Tertius modus est, qui conducit ex particulari dedicativa et universali abdicativa abdicativum particulare directim, ut: 'Quoddam iustum honestum: nullum turpe honestum: quoddam igitur iustum non est turpe'. 15 Quartus modus est, qui conducit ex particulari abdicativa et universali dedicativa abdicativum particulare directim, ut: 'Quoddam iustum non est turpe: omne malum turpe; quoddam igitur iustum non est malum'. 16 Formulae tertiae modi sunt sex. Primus modus est, qui conducit ex dedicativis universalibus dedicativum particulare tam directim quam reflexim, ut: 'Omne iustum honestum: omne honestum iustum: omne iustum bonum:

quoddam igitur honestum bonum, quoddam bonum honestum'. 17 Secundus modus est, qui conducit ex dedicativis particulari et universali dedicativum ex particulari directim, ut: 'Quoddam iustum honestum: omne iustum bonum: quoddam igitur honestum bonum'. 18 Tertius modus est, qui conducit ex dedicativis universali et particulari dedicativum particulare directim, ut: 'Omne iustum honestum: quoddam iustum bonum: quoddam igitur honestum bonum'. 19 Quartus modus est, qui conducit ex universali dedicativa et particulari abdicativa abdicativum particulare directim, ut: 'Omne iustum honestum: nullum iustum malum: quoddam igitur honestum non est malum'. 20 Quintus modus est, qui conducit ex dedicativa particulari et abdicativa universali abdicativum particulare directim, ut: 'Quoddam iustum honestum: nullum iustum malum: quoddam igitur honestum non est malum'. 21 Sextus modus est, qui conducit ex dedicativa universali et abdicativa particulari abdicativum particulare directim, ut: 'Omne iustum honestum: quoddam iustum non est malum: quoddam igitur honestum non est malum'. 22 Has formulas categoricorum syllogismorum qui plene nosse desiderat, librum legat qui inscribitur Perihermenias Apulei, et quae subtilius sunt tractata cognoscet. Distincta enim atque considerata ad magnas intellegentiae vias lectorem, praestante Domino, utiliter introducunt. Nunc ad Hypotheticos syllogismos ordine sequenti veniamus. 23 Modi syllogismorum Hypotheticorum, qui fiunt cum aliqua conclusione, sunt septem. Primus modus est: 'Si dies est, lucet: est autem dies: lucet igitur'. Secundus modus est: 'Si dies est, lucet: non lucet: non est igitur dies'. Tertius modus est ita: 'Non et dies est et non lucet: atqui dies est: lucet igitur'. 24 Quartus modus est ita: 'Aut dies est, aut nox: atqui dies est: nox igitur non est'. Quintus modus est ita: 'Aut dies est, aut nox: atqui nox non est: dies igitur est'. Sextus modus est ita: 'Non et dies est et non lucet: dies autem est: nox igitur non est'. 25 Septimus modus est ita: 'Non dies et nox: atqui nox non est: dies igitur est'. Modos autem Hypotheticorum syllogismorum si quis plenius nosse desiderat, librum legat Marii Victorini qui inscribitur de Syllogismis Hypotheticis. 26 Hinc ad Dialecticas definitionum species accedamus, quae tanta dignitate praecellunt ut possint indiciorum aperte manifestationes et quaedam indicia dictionum ostendere.

29 De divisione definitionum ex Marii Victorini libro abbreviata. Definitio est Philosophorum, quae in rebus exprimentis explicat quid res ipsa sit, qualis sit, et quemadmodum membris suis constare debeat. Est enim oratio brevis uniuscuiusque rei naturam a communione divisam propria significatione concludens. Divisio definitionum in partes quindecim habetur. 2 Prima species definitionis est οὐσιώδης, id est substantialis, quae proprie et vere dicitur definitio, ut est: 'Homo animal rationale, mortale, sensus disciplinaeque capax'. Haec enim definitio per species et differentias descendens venit ad proprium, et designat plenissime quid sit homo. 3 Secunda species definitionis est, quae Graece ἐννοηματική dicitur, Latine notio nuncupatur, quam notionem communi, non proprio nomine possumus dicere. Haec isto modo semper efficitur: 'Homo est, quod rationali conceptione et exercitio praeest animalibus cunctis'. Non enim dixit quid est homo, sed quid agat, quasi quodam signo in notitiam devocato. In ista enim et in reliquis notitia rei profertur, non substantialis explicatio declaratur; et quia illa substantialis est, definitionum omnium obtinet principatum. 4 Tertia species definitionis est, quae Graece ποιότης dicitur, Latine qualitativa vocatur: quia ex qualitate nomen accepit pro eo quod quid, quale sit id, quod sit, evidenter ostendit. Cuius exemplum tale est: 'Homo est, qui ingenio valet, artibus pollet et cognitione rerum, aut quod agere debet eligit, aut animadversione quod inutile sit contemnit'. His enim qualitativis expressus ac definitus homo est. 5 Quarta species definitionis est, quae Graece ὑπογραφική, Latine a Tullio descriptio nominatur, quae adhibita circuitione dictorum factorumque rem, quae sit, descriptione declarat. Quaeritur enim quid avarus sit, quid crudelis, quid luxuriosus, et universa luxuriosi, avari, crudelis natura describitur; ut, si luxuriosum volumus definire, dicimus: Luxuriosus est victus non necessarii, sed sumptuosi et onerosi appetens, in deliciis adfluens, in libidine promptus. Haec et alia definiunt luxuriosum, sed per descriptionem definiunt. Quae species definitionis oratoribus magis apta est quam Dialecticis, quia latitudines habet, quae similitudo in bonis rebus ponitur et in malis. 6 Quinta species definitionis est, quam Graece κατὰ ἀντίληξιν, Latine adverbium dicimus. Haec vocem illam, de cuius re quaeritur, alio sermone designat, uno ac singulari; et quodammodo quid illud sit in uno verbo positum, uno verbo alio declarat, ut: 'Conticescere est tacere'. Item cum terminum dicimus finem, aut populas interpretatur esse vastatas. 7 Sexta species definitionis est, quam Graeci κατὰ διαφοράν, nos per differentiam dicimus. Scriptores vero artium de eodem et de altero nominant, ut cum quaeritur quid intersit inter regem et tyrannum, adiecta differentia, quid uterque sit definitur; id est, rex est modestus et temperans, tyrannus vero inpius et inmitis. 8 Septima species definitionis est, quam Graeci κατὰ μεταφοράν, Latini per translationem dicunt, ut Cicero in Topicis (32): 'Litus est, qua fluctus eludit'. Hoc varie tractari potest. Modo enim ut moneat, modo ut designet, modo ut vituperet aut laudet. Ut moneat: 'Nobilitas est virtutis maiorum apud posteros sarcina'. Ut designet: 'Apex est arx corporis'. Ut laudet: 'Adulescentia est flos aetatis'. Ut vituperet: 'Divitiae sunt brevis vitae longum viaticum'. 9 Octava species definitionis est, quam Graeci κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν τοῦ ἐναντίου, Latini per privantiam contrarii eius, quod definitur, dicunt: 'Bonum est, quod

malum non est. Iustum est, quod iniustum non est,' et his similia. Hoc autem genere definitionis uti debemus, cum contrarium notum est, ut: 'Si bonum est quod prodest cum honestate, id quod tale non est malum est'. 10 Nona species definitionis est, quam Graeci κατὰ ὑποτύπωσιν, Latini per quandam imaginationem dicunt, ut: 'Aeneas est Veneris et Anchisae filius'. Haec semper in individuis versatur, quae Graeci ἄτομα appellant. 11 Decima species definitionis est, quam Graeci κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, Latini iuxta rationem dicunt; ut si quaeratur quid sit animal, respondeatur: 'Ut homo'. Rem enim quaesitam praedictum declarabit exemplum. Hoc est autem proprium definitionis, quid sit illud quod quaeritur declarare. 12 Undecima species definitionis est, quam Graeci κατ' ἔλλειπές ὀλοκλήρου ὁμοίου γένους, Latini per indigentiam pleni ex eodem genere dicunt. Ut si quaeratur quid sit triens, respondeaturque: 'Cui bessis deest ut sit assis'. 13 Duodecima species definitionis est, quam Graeci κατὰ ἔπαινον, id est, per laudem; ut Tullius pro Cluentio (146): 'Lex est mens et animus et consilium et sententia civitatis'. Et aliter (Cic. Phil. 2, 113): 'Pax est tranquilla libertas'. Fit et per vituperationem, quam Graeci ψόγον vocant, ut (ibid.): 'Servitus est postremum malorum omnium, non modo bello, sed morte quoque repellenda'. 14 Tertiadecima species definitionis est, quam Graeci κατὰ τὸ πρός τι, Latini ad aliquid vocant, ut est illud: 'Pater est, cui est filius'. 'Dominus est, cui est servus'. 15 Quartadecima species definitionis est κατὰ τὸν ὄρον, ut Cicero in Rhetoricis (Inv. 1, 42): 'Genus est, quod plures amplectitur partes'. Item 'Pars est, quae subest generi'. 16 Quintadecima species definitionis est, quam Graeci κατὰ αἰτιολογίαν, Latini secundum rei rationem vocant, ut: 'Dies est sol supra terras, nox est sol sub terris'. Scire autem debemus praedictas species definitionum Topicis merito esse sociatas, quoniam inter quaedam argumenta sunt positae, et nonnullis locis commemorantur in Topicis. Nunc ad Topica veniamus, quae sunt argumentorum sedes, fontes sensuum et origines dictionum.

30 De topicis. Topica est disciplina inveniendorum argumentorum. Divisio Topicorum, sive locorum ex quibus argumenta dicuntur, triplex est. Nam alia in eo ipso, de quo agitur, haerent; alia, quae dicuntur effecta, quae quodammodo ex rebus aliis tracta noscuntur; alia, quae adsumuntur extrinsecus. Argumenta, quae in eo ipso, de quo agitur, haerent, in tribus divisa sunt. Prima, a toto; secunda, a parte; tertia, a nota. 2 Argumentum a toto, cum definitio adhibetur ad id, quod quaeritur, sicut ait Cicero (Marcell. 26): 'Gloria est laus recte factorum magnorumque in republica fama meritorum'. 3 A partibus est argumentum, cum is, qui se defendit, aut negat factum, aut factum esse iure defendit. 4 A nota est argumentum, cum ex vi nominis argumentum aliquod eligatur, ut Cicero (Pis. 19): 'Consulem, inquam, quaerebam, quem in isto maiali invenire non poteram'. 5 Effecta argumenta sunt, quae quodammodo ex rebus aliis tracta noscuntur. Sunt autem numero quattuordecim; id est, primum a coniugatis argumentum est, cum declinatur a nomine et fit verbum, ut Cicero Verrem dicit everrisse provinciam; vel nomen a verbo, cum latrocinari dicitur latro. Nomen est a nomine; Terentius (Andr. 218):

Interceptio est amentium, haud amantium;

dummodo distet unius appellationis postremitas, in alia vocis declinatione formata. 6 Secundum argumentum a genere est, cum de eodem genere sententia dicitur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 4, 569):

Varium et mutabile genus.

7 Tertium ab specie argumentum est, cum generali quaestioni fidem species facit, ut (Virg. Aen. 7, 363):

Non sic Phrygius penetrat Lacedaemona pastor.

A simili argumentum est, quando rebus aliquibus similia proferuntur (Virg. Aen. 10, 333):

Suggere tela mihi: non ullum dextera frustra

torsit in Rutulos, steterunt quae in corpore Graium

Iliacis campis.

8 A differentia argumentum est, quando per differentiam aliqua separantur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 10, 581):

Non Diomedis equos, nec currum cernis Achillis.

A contrariis argumentum dicitur, quando res discrepantes sibimet opponuntur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 9, 95):

Mortaline manu factae immortale carinae

fas habeant, certusque incerta pericula lustres,

Aeneas?

9 A consequentibus argumentum dicitur, quando positam rem aliquid inevitabiliter consequitur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 1, 529):

Non ea vis animo, nec tanta superbia victis.

Ab antecedentibus argumentum est, quando aliqua ex his, quae prius gesta sunt, conprobantur, ut Cicero pro Milone (44): 'Cum non dubitaverit aperire quid cogitaverit, vos potestis dubitare quid fecerit?' 10 A repugnantibus argumentum est, quando illud, quod obicitur, aliqua contrarietate destruitur, ut Cicero (Deiot. 15): 'Is igitur non modo de tali periculo liberatus, sed honore amplissimo ditatus, domi te interficere voluisset'. 11 A coniugatis argumentum est, cum contra probabiliter ostenditur quid sit ex re quaque venturum, ut Vergilius (Aen. 8, 147):

Nos si pellant, nihil adfore credunt,

quis omnem Hesperiam penitus sua sub iuga mittant.

12 A causis argumentum est, quando consuetudine communi res quaeque tractatur, ut Terentius (Andr. 582):

Ego nonnihil veritus sum dudum abs te cavere, ne faceres

quod vulgus servorum solet, dolis ut me deluderet.

Ab effectis argumentum est, cum ex his, quae facta sunt, aliquid adprobatur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 4, 13):

Degeneres animos timor arguit.

13 A comparatione argumentum est, quando per conlationem personarum sive causarum sententiae ratio sub inputatione formatur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 10, 81):

Tu potes Aenean manibus subducere Graium,

nos aliquid contra Rutulos iuvisse nefandum est?

14 Item argumenta quae ducuntur extrinsecus, quae Graece ἄτέχνους, id est artis expertes vocant, ut est testimonium. Testimonium vero constat re. 15 Haec dividitur in quinque modis: id est, primo ex persona, secundo ex naturae auctoritate, tertio ex temporibus auctoritatum, quarto ex dictis factisque maiorum, quinto ex tormentis. Tertius ergo superior modus, qui est ex temporibus, in octo species derivatur. Prima ingenio, secunda opibus, tertia aetate, quarta fortuna, quinta arte, sexta usu, septima necessitate, octava concursione fortuitorum. Testimonium omne est, quod ab aliqua externa re sumitur ad faciendam fidem. Persona non qualiscumque est quae testimonii pondus habet ad faciendam fidem, sed morum probitate debet esse laudabilis. 16 Naturae auctoritas est quae maxime virtute consistit. Testimonia multa sunt quae adferant auctoritatem: id est, ingenium, opes, aetas, fortuna, ars, usus, necessitas et concursio rerum fortuitarum. A dictis factisque maiorum petitur fides, cum priscorum dicta factaque memorantur. A tormentis fides praebetur, post quae nemo creditur velle mentiri. 17 Ea vero quae tractantur in tempore, quia suis nominibus plana sunt, definitionem non indigent. Memoriae quoque condendum est Topica oratoribus, Dialecticis, poetis et iurisperitis communiter quidem argumenta praestare; sed quando aliquid specialiter probant, ad Rhetores, poetas, iurisperitosque pertinent; quando vero generaliter disputant, ad philosophos attinere manifestum est. 18 Mirabile plane genus operis, in unum potuisse colligi, quidquid mobilitas ac varietas humanae mentis in sensibus exquirendis per diversas causas poterat invenire, conclusum liberum ac voluntarium intellectum.

Nam quocumque se verterit, quascumque cogitationes intraverit, in aliquid eorum, quae praedicta sunt, necesse est cadat ingenium.

31 De oppositis. Contrariorum genera quattuor sunt, quae Aristoteles ἀντικείμενα, id est opposita vocat, propter quod sibi velut ex adverso videntur obsistere, ut contraria; nec tamen omnia quae opponuntur sibi contraria sunt, sed omnia a contrario opposita sunt. Primum genus est contrariorum, quod iuxta Ciceronem diversum vocatur, pro eo quod tantum contrarie sibi opponuntur, ut non eorum sint quibus opponuntur, ut sapientia stultitia. 2 Quod genus in tres species dividitur. Nam sunt quaedam eius quae medium habent; et sunt quaedam quae sine medio sunt; et quaedam sunt quae habent medium et tamen sine nomine sunt, nisi utrumque ei vocabulum creet. Candidum et nigrum medium habent, quia inter eos saepe color pallidus vel fuscus invenitur. 3 Sine medio sunt, quotiens unum de duobus accidit, ut sanitas vel infirmitas. Horum nihil est medium. Ea autem quorum media sine nomine sunt, ut felix infelix, medium habent non felix. Secundum genus est relativorum, quae ita sibi opponuntur ut ad se conferantur, sicut duplum simplum. 4 Hoc solum oppositorum genus ad se refertur. Non est enim maius, nisi ad minus referatur; et simplum, nisi ad duplum. Nam relativum relativo ita opponitur ut hoc ipsum, quod opponitur, aut eius sit, cui opponitur, aut ad id quocumque modo referatur. Dimidium enim opponitur duplo, eiusque dupli medium est, sed ita illi opponitur ut eius sit, cui opponitur. 5 Sic et parvum opponitur magno, ita ut ipsud parvum ad magnum, cui opponitur, sit parvum. Nam superiora quae dicuntur contraria ita sibi opponuntur ut eorum non sint, quibus opponuntur, nec ad ea quocumque modo referantur; siquidem iniquitas iustitiae ita contraria est ut non eiusdem iustitiae iniquitas sit, aut ad illam sit iniquitas. 6 Tertium genus est oppositorum habitus vel orbatio. Quod genus Cicero privationem vocat, qua ostendit aliquid quempiam habuisse, unde privatus est. Cuius species sunt tres: quarum prima est in re, secunda in loco, tertia in tempore congruo. In re, ut caecitas visio. In loco, ut caecitatis et visionis in oculis locus est. In tempore congruo, ut infantem non dicere sine dentibus eum, cui dentes adhuc aetas parva negavit. Non enim est privatus dentibus, quos nondum habuit. 7 Quartum vero genus ex confirmatione et negatione opponitur, ut Socrates disputat, Socrates non disputat. Haec a superioribus ideo differt, quod illa singillatim dici possunt, haec nisi conexe dici non possunt. Quod genus quartum apud Dialecticos multum habet conflictum, et appellatur ab eis valde oppositum, siquidem et tertium non recipit. 8 Nam ex illis quaedam habere tertium possunt, ut in contrariis candidum et nigrum. Tertium eius nec candidum nec nigrum, sed fuscum vel pallidum. In relativis quoque, ut multa et pauca. Tertium eius nec multa nec pauca, sed mediocria. In habitu vel orbatione, ut visio et caecitas. Tertium eius, nec caecitas nec visio, sed lippitudo. Hic ergo legit, non legit: tertium nihil habet.



## Chapter 3

### 1. Dante. *De vulgari eloquentia*

#### *Dante, De vulgari eloquentia*

##### *De vulgari eloquentia*

Liber Primus

#### I

Cum neminem ante nos de vulgaris eloquentie doctrina quicquam inveniamus tractasse, atque talem scilicet eloquentiam penitus omnibus necessariam videamus, cum ad eam non tantum viri, sed etiam mulieres et parvulinitantur, in quantum natura permittit; volentes discretionem aliquantulum lucidare illorum qui tanquam ceci ambulantes per plateas, plerumque anteriora posteriora putantes, Verbo aspirante de celis, locutioni vulgarium gentium prodesse temptabimus, non solum aquam nostri ingenii ad tantum poculum haurientes sed, accipiendo vel compilando ab aliis, potiora miscentes, ut exinde potatione possimus dulcissimum ydromellum. Sed quia unamquamque doctrinam oportet non probare, sed suum aperire subiectum, ut sciatur quid sit super quod illa versatur, dicimus, celeriter actendentes, quod vulgarem locutionem appellamus eam qua infantes assuefiunt ab assistentibus, cum primitus distinguere voces incipiunt; vel, quod breviter dici potest, vulgarem locutionem asserimus, quam sine omni regula nutrice imitantes accipimus. Est et inde alia locutio secundaria nobis, quam Romani gramaticam vocaverunt Hanc quidem secundariam Greci habent et alii, sed non omnes; ad habitum vero huius pauci perveniunt, quia non nisi per spatium temporis et studii assiduitatem regulamur et doctrinamur in illa. Harum quoque duarum nobilior est vulgaris: tum quia prima fuit humano generi usitata; tum quia totus orbis ipsa perfruitur, licet in diversas prolationes et vocabula sit divisa, tum quia naturalis est nobis, cum illa potius artificialis existat. Et de hac nobiliori nostra est intentio pertractare.

#### II

Hec est nostra vera prima locutio. Non dico autem "nostra", ut et aliam sit esse locutionem quam hominis; nam eorum que sunt omnium soli homini datum est loqui, cum solum sibi necessarium fuerit. Non angelis, non inferioribus animalibus necessarium fuit loqui: sed nequicquam datum fuisset eis; quod nempe facere natura abhorret. Si etenim perspicaciter consideramus quid cum loquimur intendamus, patet quod nichil aliud quam nostre mentis enucleare aliis conceptum. Cum igitur angeli ad pandendas gloriosas eorum conceptiones habeant promptissimam atque ineffabilem sufficientiam intellectus, qua vel alter alteri totaliter innotescit per se, vel saltem per illud fulgentissimum speculum, in quo cuncti representantur pulcherrimi atque avidissimi speculantur, nullo signo locutionis indiguissent videntur. Et si obiciatur de hiis qui corruerunt spiritibus, dupliciter responderi potest: primo, quod cum de hiis que necessaria sunt ad bene esse tractemus eos preterire debemus, cum divinam curam perversi expectare noluerunt; vel, secundo et melius, quod ipsi demones ad manifestandam inter se perfidiam suam non indigent nisi ut sciat quilibet de quolibet quia est et quantus est: quod quidem sciunt; cognoverunt enim se invicem ante ruinam suam. Inferioribus quoque animalibus, cum solo nature instinctu ducantur, de locutione non oportuit provideri; nam omnibus eiusdem speciei sunt iidem actus et passiones, et sic possunt per proprios alienos cognoscere; inter ea vero que diversarum sunt specierum, non solum non necessaria fuit locutio, sed prorsus dampnosa fuisset, cum nullum amicabile commercium fuisset in illis. Et si obiciatur, de serpente loquente ad primam mulierem vel de asina Balaam quod locuti sint, ad hoc respondemus, quod angelus in illa et dyabolus in illo taliter operati sunt, quod ipsa animalia moverunt organa sua, sic ut vox inde resultav[er]it distincta tanquam vera locutio; non quod aliud esset asine illud quam rudere, nec quam sibilare serpenti. Si vero contra argumentetur quis de eo quod ovidius dicit in quinto Metamorphoseos de picis loquentibus, dicimus quod hoc figurate dicit, aliud intelligens. Et si dicatur quod pice adhuc et alie aves locuntur, dicimus quod falsum est, quia talis actus locutio non est, sed quedam imitatio soni nostre vocis; videlicet quod nituntur imitari nos in quantum sonamus, sed non in quantum loquimur. Unde si expresse dicenti "Pica" resonaret etiam "Pica", non esset hoc nisi representatio vel imitatio soni illius qui prius dixisset. Et sic patet soli homini datum fuisse loqui. Sed quare necessarium sibi foret, breviter pertractare conemur.

### III

Cum igitur homo, non nature instinctu, sed ratione moveatur; et ipsa ratio vel circa discretionem vel circa iudicium vel circa electionem diversificetur in singulis adeo ut fere quilibet sua propria specie videatur gaudere, per proprios actus vel passiones, ut brutum animal, neminem alium intelligere opinamur. Nec per spiritualem speculationem ut angelum alterum alterum introire contingit, cum grossitie atque opacitate mortalis corporis humanus spiritus sit obtentus. Oportuit ergo genus humanum ad comunicandas inter se conceptiones suas aliquod rationale signum et sensuale habere; quia, cum de ratione accipere habeat et in rationem portare, rationale esse oportuit; cumque de una ratione in aliam nichil deferri possit nisi per medium sensuale, sensuale esse oportuit. Quare, si tantum rationale esset, pertransire non posset; si tantum sensuale, nec a ratione accipere nec in rationem deponere potuisset. Hoc equidem signum est ipsum subiectum nobile de quo loquimur: nam sensuale quid est, in quantum sonus est; rationale vero, in quantum aliquid significare videtur ad placitum.

### IV

Soli homini datum fuit ut loqueretur, ut ex premissis manifestum est. Nunc quoque investigandum esse existimo, cui hominum primum locutio data sit, et quid primitus locutus fuerit, et ad quem, et ubi, et quando, nec non et sub quo ydiomate primiloquium emanavit. Secundum quidem quod in principio loquitur Genesis, ubi de primordio mundi sacratissima Scriptura pertractat, mulierem invenitur ante omnes fuisse locutam, scilicet presumptuosissimam Evam, cum dyabolo seiscitanti respondit: "De fructu lignorum que sunt in paradiso vescimur; de fructu vero ligni quod est in medio paradisi, precepit nobis Deus ne comederemus nec tangeremus, ne forte moriamur". Sed quamquam mulier in Script[ur]is prius inveniatur locuta, rationabilius tamen est ut hominem prius locutum fuisse credamus; et inconvenienter putatur tam egregium humani generis actum non prius a viro quam a femina proflu[x]isse. Rationabiliter ergo credimus ipsi Ade prius datum fuisse loqui ab eo qui statim ipsum plasmaverat. Quid autem prius vox primi loquentis sonaverit, viro sane mentis in promptu esse non titubo ipsum fuisse quod Deus est, scilicet EI, vel per modum interrogationis, vel per modum responsionis. Absurdum atque rationi videtur orrificum ante Deum ab homine quicquam nominatum fuisse, cum ab ipso et in ipsum factus fuisset homo. Nam sicut post prevaricationem humani generis quilibet exordium sue locutionis incepit ab "heu", rationabile est quod ante qui fuit inciperet a gaudio; et cum nullum gaudium sit extra Deum, sed totum in Deo, et ipse Deus totus sit gaudium, consequens est quod primus loquens primo et ante omnia dixisset "Deus". Oritur et hinc ista questio, cum dicimus superius per viam responsionis hominem primum fuisse locutum: si responsio fuit ad Deum; nam si ad Deum fuit, iam videretur quod Deus locutus extitisset, quod contra superius prelibata videtur insurgere. Ad quod quidem dicimus quod bene potuit respondisse Deo interrogante, nec propter hoc Deus locutus est ipsa quam dicimus locutionem. Quis enim dubitat quicquid est ad Dei nutum esse flexibile, quo quidem facta, quo conservata, quo etiam gubernata sunt omnia? Igitur cum ad tantas alterationes moveatur aer imperio nature inferioris, que ministra et factura Dei est, ut tonitrua personet, ignem fulgoret, aquam gemat, spargat nivem, grandines lancinet, nonne imperio Dei movebitur ad quedam sonare verba, ipso distinguente qui maiora distinxit? Quid ni? Quare ad hoc et ad quedam alia hec sufficere credimus.

### V

Opinantes autem non sine ratione, tam ex superioribus quam inferioribus sumpta, ad ipsum Deum primitus primum hominem direxisse locutionem, rationabiliter dicimus ipsum loquentem primum, mox postquam afflatus est ab animante Virtute, incunctanter fuisse locutum. Nam in homine sentiri humanius credimus quam sentire, dummodo sentiatur et sentiat tanquam homo. Si ergo faber ille atque perfectionis principium et amator afflando primum nostrum omni perfectione complevit, rationabile nobis apparet nobilissimum animal non ante sentire quam sentiri cepisse. Si quis vero fatetur contra obiciens quod non oportebat illum loqui, cum solus adhuc homo existeret, et Deus omnia sine verbis archana nostra discernat etiam ante quam nos, cum illa reverentia dicimus, qua uti oportet, cum de eterna Voluntate aliquid iudicamus, quod, licet Deus sciret, immo presciret (quod idem est quantum ad Deum) absque locutione conceptum primi loquentis, voluit tamen et ipsum loqui, ut in explicatione tante dotis gloriaretur ipse qui gratis dotaverat. Et ideo divinitus in nobis esse credendum est, quod in actu nostrorum effectuum ordinato letamur. Et hinc penitus elicere possumus locum illum ubi effutita est prima locutio; quoniam, si extra paradisum afflatus est homo, extra, si vero intra, intra fuisse locum prime locutionis convicimus.

## VI

Quoniam permultis ac diversis ydiomatibus negotium exercitatur humanum, ita quod multi multis non aliter intelligantur verbis quam sine verbis, de ydiomate illo venari nos decet, quo vir sine matre, vir sine lacte qui nec pupillarem etatem nec vidit adultam, creditur usus. In hoc, sicut etiam in multis aliis, Petramala civitas amplissima est et patria maiori parti filiorum Adam. Nam, quicumque tam obscene rationis est ut locum sue nationis delitiosissimum credat esse sub sole, hic etiam pre cunctis proprium vulgare licetur, idest maternam locutionem, et per consequens credit ipsum fuisse illud quod fuit Ade. Nos autem, cui mundus est patria velut piscibus equor, quanquam Sarnum biberimus ante dentes et Florentiam adeo diligamus ut, quia dileximus, exilium patiamur iniuste, rationi magis quam sensui spatulas nostri iudicii podiamus. Et quamvis ad voluptatem nostram sive nostre sensualitatis quietem in terris amenior locus quam Florentia non existas, revolventes et poetarum et aliorum scriptorum volumina, quibus mundus universaliter et membratim describitur, ratiocinantesque in nobis situationes varias mundi locorum et eorum habitudinem ad utrunque polum et circulum equatorem, multas esse perpendimus firmiterque censemus et magis nobiles et magis delitiosas et regiones et urbes quam Tusciam et Florentiam, unde sumus oriundus et civis, et plerasque nationes et gentes delectabiliore atque utiliori sermone uti quam Latinos. Redeuntes igitur ad propositum, dicimus certam formam locutionis a Deo cum anima prima concreatam fuisse. Dico autem "formam" et quantum ad rerum vocabula et quantum ad vocabulorum constructionem et quantum ad constructionis prolationem; qua quidem forma omnis lingua loquentium uteretur, nisi culpa presumptionis humane dissipata fuisset, ut inferius ostendetur. Hac forma locutionis locutus est Adam; hac forma locutionis locuti sunt omnes posteri eius usque ad edificationem turris Babel, que turris confusionis interpretatur hanc formam locutionis hereditati sunt filii Heber, qui ab eo dicti sunt Hebrei. Hiis solis post confusionem remansit, ut Redemptor noster, qui ex illis oriturus erat secundum humanitatem, non lingua confusionis, sed gratie fueretur. Fuit ergo hebraicum ydioma illud quod primi loquentis labia fabricarunt.

## VII

Disputet, heu, nunc humani generis ignominiam renovare! Sed quia preterire non possumus quin transeamus per illam, quanquam rubor in ora consurgat animusque refugiat, percurremus. O semper nostra natura prona peccatis, o ab initio et nunquam desinens nequitatrix! Num fuerat satis ad tui correptionem, quod per primam prevaricationem eluminata, deliciarum exulabas a patria? Num satis, quod per universalem familie tue luxuriam et trucitatem, unica reservata domo, quicquid tui iuris erat cataclismo perierat, et [que] commiseras tu, animalia celi que terre iam luerant? Quippe satis extiterat. Sed sicut proverbialiter dici solet, "Non ante tertium equitabis", misera miserum venire maluisti ad equum. Ecce, Iector, quod vel oblitus homo vel vilipendens disciplinas priores et avertens oculos a vibicibus que remanserant, tertio insurrexit ad verbera, per superbam stultitiam presumendo. Presumpsit ergo in corde suo incurabilis homo sub persuasione gigantis Nembroth, arte sua non solum superare naturam, sed etiam ipsum naturantem, qui Deus est; et cepit edificare turrim in Sennaar, que postea dicta est Babel, hoc est confusio, per quam celum sperabat ascendere, intendens inscius non equare, sed suum superare Factorem. o sine mensura clementia celestis imperii! Quis patrum tot sustineret insultus a filio? Sed exurgens non hostili scutica, sed paterna et alias verberibus assueta, rebellantem filium pia correctione necnon memorabili castigavit. Siquidem pene totum humanum genus ad opus iniquitatis coierat, pars imperabant, pars architectabantur, pars muros moliebantur, pars amussibus regulabant, pars trullis linebant, pars scindere rupes, pars mari, pars terra vehere intendebant partesque diverse diversis aliis operibus indulgebant, cum celitus tanta confusione percussi sunt, ut qui omnes una eademque loquela deserviebant ad opus ab opere multis diversificati loquelis desinerent et nunquam ad idem commercium convenirent. Solis etenim in uno convenientibus actu eadem loquela remansit: puta cunctis architectoribus una, cunctis saxa volventibus una, cunctis ea parantibus una, et sic de singulis operantibus accidit. Quot quot autem exercitii varietates tendebant ad opus, tot tot ydiomatibus tunc genus humanum disiungitur; et quanto excellentius exercebant, tanto rudius nunc barbariusque locuntur. Quibus autem sacratum ydioma remansit, nec aderant, nec exercitium commendabant; sed graviter detestantes, stoliditatem operantium deridebant. Sed hec minima pars, quantum ad numerum, fuit de semine Sem, sicut conicio qui fuit tertius filius Noe; de qua quidem ortus est populus Israel, qui antiquissima locutione sunt usi usque ad suam dispersionem.

## VIII

Ex precedenter memorata confusione linguarum non leviter opinamur per universa mundi climata climatumque plagas incolendas et angulos tunc primum homines fuisse dispersos. Et cum radix humane propaginis principalis in oris orientalibus sit plantata, nec non ab inde ad utrunque latus per diffusos multipliciter palmites nostra sit extensa propago, demumque ad fines occidentales protracta, forte primitus tunc vel totius Europe flumina, vel saltim quedam, rationalia guctura potaverunt. Sed sive advene tunc primitus advenissent, sive ad Europam indigene repedassent, ydioma secum tripharium homines actulerunt. et afferentium hoc alii meridionalem, alii septentrionalem regionem in Europa sibi sortiti sunt; et tertii, quos nunc Grecos vocamus, partim Europe, partim Asye occuparunt. Ab uno, postea, eodemque ydiomate in vindice confusione recepto diversa vulgaria traxerunt originem, sicut inferius ostendemus. Nam totum quod ab hostiis Danubii sive Meotidis paludibus, usque ad fines occidentales Anglie, Ytalorum Francorumque finibus et oceano limitatur, solum unum obtinuit ydioma; licet postea per Sclavones, Ungaros, Teutonicos, Saxones, Anglicos, et alias nationes quamplures fuerit per diversa vulgaria dirivatum; hoc solo fere omnibus in signum eiusdem principii remanente, quod quasi predicti omnes iò affirmando respondent. Ab isto incipiens ydiomate, videlicet a finibus Ungarorum, versus orientem aliud occupavit totum, quod ab inde vocatur Europa, nec non ulterius est protractum. Totum vero quod in Europa restat ab istis, tertium tenuit ydioma, licet nunc tripharium videatur; nam alii oc, alii oïl, alii si affirmando locuntur, ut puta Yspani, Franci et Latini. Signum autem quod ab uno eodemque ydiomate istorum trium gentium progrediantur vulgaria, in promptu est, quia multa per eadem vocabula nominare videntur, ut Deum, celum, amorem, mare, terram, est, vivit, moritur, amat, alia fere omnia Istorum vero proferentes oc meridionalis Europe tenent partem occidentalem, a Januensium finibus incipientes. Qui autem si dicunt a predictis finibus orientalem tenent, videlicet usque ad promontiorum illud Ytalie, qua sinus Adriatici maris incipit, et Siciliam. Sed loquentes oïl quodam modo septentrionales sunt respectu istorum. Nam ab oriente Alamannos habent et a "septentrione et occidente an[glico sive] gallico mari vallati sunt, et montibus Aragonie terminati, a meridie quoque Provincialibus et Apenini devexione clauduntur.

## IX

Nos autem oportet quam nunc habemus rationem periclitari, cum inquirere intendamus de hiis in quibus nullius auctoritate fulcimur, hoc est de unius eiusdemque a principio ydiomatis variatione secuta. Et quia per notiora itinera salubrius breviusque transitur, per illud tantum quod nobis est ydioma pergamus, alia desinentes: nam quod in uno est, rational[i] videtur [et] in aliis esse causa. Est igitur super quod gradimur ydioma tractando tripharium, ut superius dictum est; nam alii oc, alii si, alii vero dicunt oïl. Et quod unum fuerit a principio confusionis (quod prius proba[t]um est) apparet, quia convenimus in vocabulis multis, velut eloquentes doctores ostendunt; que quidem convenientia ipsi confusio repugnat, que ruit celitus in edificatione Babel. Trilingues ergo doctores in multis conveniunt, et maxime in hoc vocabulo quod est amor. Gerardus de Brunel: Sim sentis fezels amics, per ver encusera amor. Rex Navarre: De fin 'amor si vient sen et bonté. Dominus Guido Guinizelli: Nè fe 'amor prima che gentil core, nè gentil [cor], prima che amor, natura. Quare autem tripharie principali[ter] variatum sit, investigemus, et quare quelibet istarum variationum in se ipsa varietur, puta dextre Ytalie locutio ab ea que est sinistre, nam aliter Paduani, et aliter Pisani locuntur; et quare vicinius habitantes adhuc discrepant in loquendo, ut Mediolanenses et Veronenses, Romani et Florentini, nec non convenientes in eodem genere gentis, ut Neapolitani et Caetani, Ravennates et Faventini; et quod mirabilius est, sub eadem civilitate morantes, ut Bononienses Burgi sancti Felicis et Bononienses Strate Maioris. Hee omnes differentie atque sermonum varietates quid accidant, una eademque ratione patebit. Dicimus ergo quod nullus effectus superat suam causam, in quantum effectus est quia nichil potest efficere quod non est. Cum igitur omnis nostra loquela (preter illam homini primo concreatam a Deo) sit a nostro beneplacito reparata post confusionem illam, que nil fuit aliud quam prioris oblivio, et homo sit instabilissimum atque variabilissimum animal, nec durabilis nec continua esse potest, sed sicut alia que nostra sunt, puta mores et habitus, per locorum temporumque distantias variari oportet. Nec dubitandum reor modo in eo quod diximus "temporum", sed potius opinamur tenendum; nam si alia nostra opera perscrutemur, multo magis discrepare videmur: a vetustissimis concivibus nostris quam u coetaneis perlonginquis. Quapropter audacter testamur quod, si vetustissimi Papienses nunc resurgerent, sermone vario vel diverso cum modernis Papiensibus loquerentur. Nec aliter mirum videatur quod dicimus, quam percipere juvenem exoletum quem exolescere non videmus; nam que

paulatim moventur, minime perpenduntur a nobis; et quanto longiora tempora variatio rei ad perpendi requirit, tanto rem illam stabiliorem putamus. Non etenim ammiramus, si extimationes hominum qui parum distant a brutis, putant eandem civitatem sub invariabili semper civicasse sermone, cum sermonis variatio civitatis eiusdem non sine longissima temporum successione paulatim contingat, et hominum vita sit etiam ipsa sua natura brevissima. Si ergo per eandem gentem sermo variatur, ut dictum est, successive per tempora, nec stare ullo modo potest, necesse est ut disiunctim abmotimque morantibus varie varietur, ceu varie variantur mores et habitus, qui nec natura nec consortio confirmantur, sed humanis beneplacitis localique congruitate nascuntur. Hinc moti sunt inventores gramaticae facultatis; que quidem gramatica nichil aliud est quam quedam inalterabilis locutionis idempinitas diversis temporibus atque locis. Hec cum de comuni consensu multarum gentium fuerit regulata, nulli singulari arbitrio videtur obnoxia, et per consequens nec variabilis esse potest. Adinvenerunt ergo illam, ne propter variationem sermonis arbitrio singularium fluitantis vel nullo modo vel saltem imperfecte antiquorum actingeremus auctoritates et gesta sive illorum quos a nobis locorum diversitas facit esse diversos.

## X

Triphario nunc existente nostro ydiomate, ut superius dictum est, in comparatione sui ipsius secundum quod trisonum factum est, cum tanta timiditate cunctamur librantes, quod hanc vel istam vel illam partem in comparando preponere non audemus, nisi eo quo gramaticae positores inveniuntur accepisse sic adverbium affirmandi; quod quandam anterioritatem erogare videtur Ytalis, qui si dicunt. Quelibet enim partium largo testimonio se tuetur. Allegat ergo pro se lingua oil quod propter sui faciliorem ac delectabiliorem vulgaritatem quicquid redactum sive inventum est ad vulgare prosaicum, suum est: videlicet Biblia cum Troianorum Romanorumque gestibus compilata et Arturi regis ambages pulcerrime et quamplures alie ystorie ac doctrine. Pro se vero argumentatur alia, scilicet oc, quod vulgares eloquentes in ea primitus poetati sunt, tanquam in perfectiori dulciorique loquela ut puta Petrus de Alvernia et alii antiquiores doctores. Tertia quoque, [que] Latinorum est, se duobus privilegiis actestatur preesse: primo quidem quod quid dulcius subtiliusque poetati vulgariter sunt hii familiares et domestici sui sunt, puta Cynus Pistoriensis et amicus eius; secundo quia magis videtur inniti gramaticae que comunis est, quod rationabiliter insipientibus videtur gravissimum argumentum. Nos vero iudicium relinquentes in hoc et tractatum nostrum ad vulgare latium retrahentes, et receptas in se variationes dicere nec non illas invicem comparare conemur. Dicimus ergo primo Latium bipartitum esse in dextrum et sinistrum. Si quis autem querat de linea dividente, breviter respondemus esse iugum Apenini, quod, ceu fi[cti]le culmen hinc inde ad diversa stillicidia grundat aquas, ad altera hinc inde litora per ymbria longa distillat, ut Lucanus in secundo describit: dextrum quoque latus Tyrenum mare grundatorium habet; levum vero in Adriaticum cadit. Et dextri regiones sunt Apulia, sed non tota, Roma, Ducatus, Tuscia et Januensis Marchia; sinistri autem pars Apulie, Marchia Anconitana, Romandiola, Lombardia Marchia Trivisiana cum Venetiis. Forum Iulii vero et Ystria non nisi leve Ytalie esse possunt. nec insule Tyreni maris, videlicet Sicilia et Sardinia, non nisi dextre Ytalie sunt, vel ad dextram Ytaliam sociande. In utroque quidem duorum laterum, et hiis que secuntur ad ea, lingue hominum variantur, ut lingua Sicularum cum Apulis, Apulorum cum Romanis, Romanorum cum Spoletanis, horum cum Tuscis, Tuscorum cum Januensibus, Januensium cum Sardis, nec non Calabrorum cum Anconitanis, horum cum Romandiolis, Romandiolorum cum Lombardis, Lombardorum cum Trivisianis et Venetis, horum cum Aquilegiensibus, et istorum cum Ystrianis. De quo Latinorum neminem nobiscum dissentire putamus. Quare ad minus xiiii vulgaribus sola videtur Ytalia variari. Que adhuc omnia vulgaria in sese variantur, ut puta in Tuscia Senenses et Aretini, in Lombardia Ferrarenses et Placentini; nec non in eadem civitate aliqualem variationem perpendimus, ut superius in capitulo immediato posuimus. Quapropter si primas et secundarias et subsecundarias vulgaris Ytalie variationes calculare velimus, et in hoc minimo mundi angulo non solum ad millenam loquela variationem venire contigerit, sed etiam ad magis ultra.

## XI

Quam multis varietatibus latio dissonante vulgari, decentiorem atque illustrem Ytalie venemur loquelam, et ut nostre venationi pervium callem habere possimus, perplexos frutices atque sentes prius eiciamus de silva. Sicut ergo Romani se cunctis preponendos existimant, in hac eradicatione sive discriptione non inmerito eos alii preponamus, protestantes eosdem in nulla vulgaris eloquentie ratione fore tangendos. Dicimus igitur Romanorum-non vulgare, sed potius tristiloquium ytalorum vulgarium omnium esse turpissimum: nec mirum, cum etiam morum habituumque

deformitate pre cunctis videantur fetere. Dicunt enim: Messure, quinto dici? Post hos incolas anconitane marchie decerpamus, qui Chignamente scate, sc-tate? locuntur; cum quibus et Spoletanos abicimus. Nec pretereundum est quod in improprium istarum trium gentium cantiones quamplures invente sunt; inter quas unam vidimus recte atque perfecte ligatam, quam quidam Florentinus nomine Castra posuerat; incipiebat etenim: Una fermata scopai da Casciòlim cita cita sen giù grande aina. Post quos Mediolanenses atque Pergameos eorumque finitimos eruncemus, in quorum etiam improprium quendam cecinisse recolimus: Enter l'ora del vesper, ciò fu del mes d'occhiover. Post hos Aquilegienses et Ystrianos cribremus, qui Ces fastu? crudeliter accentuando eructuant. Cumque hiis montaninas omnes et rusticanas loquelas eicimus, que semper mediastinis civibus accentus enormitate dissonare videntur, ut Casentinenses et Fractenses. Sardos etiam, qui non latii sunt, sed latiis associandi videntur, eicimus, quoniam soli sine proprio vulgari esse videntur, gramaticam, tanquam simie homines, imitantes; nam dominus nova et dominus meus locuntur.

## XII

Exaceratis quodam modo vulgaribus ytalis, inter ea que remanserunt in cribro comparisonem facientes, honorabilius atque honorificentius breviter seligamus. Et primo de siciliano examinemus ingenium; nam videtur sicilianum vulgare sibi famam pre aliis asciscere, eo quod quicquid poetantur Ytali sicilianum vocatur, et eo quod perplures doctores indigenas invenimus graviter cecinisse; puta in cantionibus illis: Anchor che l'aigua per lo foco lassi et Amor, che lungiamente m'ai menato. Sed hec fama trinacrie terre, si recte signum ad quod tendit inspiciamus, videtur tantum in obprobrium ytalorum principum remansisse, qui non heroico more, sed plebeio secuntur superbiam. Siquidem illustres heroes, Fredericus cesar et bene genitus eius Manfredus, nobilitatem ac rectitudinem sue forme pandentes, donec fortuna permisit, humana secuti sunt, brutalia dedignantes. Propter quod corde nobiles atque gratiarum dotati inherere tantorum principum maiestati conati sunt, ita quod eorum tempore quicquid excellentes animi Latinorum enitebantur, primitus in tantorum coronatorum aula prodibat; et quia regale solium erat Sicilia, factum est ut quicquid nostri predecessores vulgariter protulerunt, sicilianum voc[ar]etur; quod quidem retinemus et nos, nec posterius nostri permutare valebunt. Racha, racha. Quid nunc personat tuba novissimi Frederici, quid tintinabulum secundi Karoli, quid cornua Iohannis et Azzonis marchionum potentum, quid aliorum magnatum tibie, nisi "Venite, carnifices; venite, altriplices; venite, avaritie sectatores?". Sed prestat ad propositum repedare quam frustra loqui. Et dicimus quod, si vulgare sicilianum accipere volumus, secundum quod prodit a terrigenis mediocribus, ex ore quorum iudicium eliciendum videtur, prelationis honore minime dignum est, quia non sine quodam tempore profertur, ut puta ibi: Tragemi d'este focora, se t'este a boluntate. Si autem ipsum accipere volumus, secundum quod ab ore primorum Siculorum emanat, ut in preallegatis cantionibus perpendi potest, nichil differt ab illo quod laudabilissimum est, sicut inferius ostendemus. Apuli quoque vel a sui acerbitate vel finitimorum suorum contiguitate, qui Romani et Marchiani sunt, turpiter barbarizant; dicunt enim: Volzera che chiangesse lo quatraro. Sed quamvis terrigene Apuli loquantur obscene comuniter, prefulgentes eorum quidam polite locuti sunt, vocabula curialiora in suis cantionibus compilantes, ut manifeste apparet eorum dicta perspicientibus, ut puta Madonna dir vi voglio, et Per fino amore vo si letamente. Quapropter superiora notantibus innotescere debet nec siculum nec apulum esse illud quod in Ytalia pulcherrimum est vulgare, cum eloquentes indigenas ostenderimus a proprio divertisse.

## XIII

Post hec veniamus ad Tuscos, qui, propter amentiam suam infroniti, titulum sibi vulgaris illustris arrogare videntur. Et in hoc non solum plebe[i]a dementat intentio, sed famosos quamplures viros hoc te nuisse comperimus: puta Guictonem Aretinum, qui nunquam se ad curiale vulgare direxit, Bonagiuntam Lucensem, Gallum Pisanum, Minum Mocatam Senensem, Brunectum Florentinum, quorum dicta si rimari vacaverit, non curialia, sed municipalia tantum invenientur. Et quoniam Tusci pre aliis in hac ebrietate baccantur, dignum utileque videtur municipalia vulgaris Tuscanorum singillatim in aliquo depompare. Locuntur Florentini et dicunt: Manichiamo introque, | che noi non facciamo altro. Pisani: Bene andonno li fanti | de Fiorenza per Pisa. Lucenses: Fo voto a dio, ke in grassarra lo comuno de Lucca. Senenses: Onche renegata avesse io Siena. Ch'ee chesto? Aretini: Vuo' tu venire ovelle? De Perusio, Urbe Veteri, Viterbio, nec non de Civitate Castellana, propter affinitatem quam habent cum Romanis et

Spoletanis, nihil tractare intendimus. Sed quanquam fere omnes Tusci in suo turpiloquio sint obtusi, nonnullos vulgaris ex cellentiam cognovisse sentimus, scilicet Guidonem, Lapum et unum alium, Florentinos, et Cynum Pistoriensem, quem nunc indigne postponimus, non indigne coacti. Itaque si tuscanas examinemus loquelas et pensemus, qualiter viri prehonorati a propria diverterunt, non restat in dubio quin aliud sit vulgare quod querimus quam quod actingit populus Tuscanorum. Si quis autem quod de Tuscis asserimus de Ianuensibus asserendum non putet, hoc solum in mente premat, quod si per oblivionem Ianuenses ammitterent z licteram, vel mutire totaliter eos, vel novam reparare oporteret loquelam. Est enim z maxima pars eorum locutionis; que quidem lictera non sine multa rigiditate profertur.

#### XIV

Transeuntes nunc humeros Apenini frondiferos, levam Ytaliam contatim venemur, ceu solemus orientaliter ineuntes. Romandiolam igitur ingredientes, dicimus nos duo in Latio invenisse vulgaria, quibusdam convenientiis contrariis alternata. Quorum unum in tantum muliebre videtur propter vocabulorum et prolotionis mollitiem, quod virum, etiam si viriliter sonet, feminam tamen facit esse credendum. Hoc Romandiolos omnes habet, et presertim Forlivienses; quorum civitas, licet novissima sit, meditullium tamen esse vide tur totius provincie: hii deusci affirmando locuntur, et oculo meo et corada mea proferunt blandientes. Horum aliquos a proprio poetando divertisse audivimus, Thomam videlicet et Ugolinum Bucciolam Faventinos. Est et aliud, sicut dictum est, adeo vocabulis accentibusque yrsutum et yspidum, quod propter sui rudem asperitatem mulierem loquentem non solum disternit, sed esse virum dubitare[s, le]ctor. Hoc omnes qui magara dicunt, Brixianos videlicet, Veronenses et Vigentinos habet; nec non Paduanos, turpiter sincopantes omnia in -tus participia et denominativa in -tas, ut mercò et bonté. Cum quibus et Trivisianos adducimus, qui more Brixianorum et finitimorum suorum, u consonantem per f apocopando proferunt: puta nof pro novem et vif pro vivo; quod quidem barbarissimum reprobamus. Veneti quoque nec sese investigati vulgaris honore dignantur; et si quis eorum, errore confossus, vanitaret in hoc, recordetur si unquam dixit: Per le plaghe de Dio tu no verras. Inter quos omnes unum audivimus nitentem divertere a materno et ad curiale vulgare intendere, videlicet Ildebrandinum Paduanum. Quare, omnibus presentis capituli ad iudicium comparentibus, arbitramur nec romandiolum nec suum oppositum, ut dictum est, nec venetianum esse illud quod querimus vulgare illustre.

#### XV

Illud autem quod de ytala silva residet, percontari conemur expedientes. Dicimus ergo quod forte non male opinantur qui Bononienses asserunt pulciori locutione loquentes, cum ab Ymolensibus Ferrarensibus et Mutinensibus circumstantibus aliquid proprio vulgari asciscunt, sicut facere quoslibet a finitimis suis conicimus, ut Sordellus de Mantua sua ostendit, Cremone, Brixie atque Verone con fini: qui, tantus eloquentie vir existens non solum in poetando, sed quomodocunque loquendo patrium vulgare deseruit. Accipiunt enim prefati cives ab Ymolensibus lenitatem atque mollitiem, a Ferrarensibus vero et Mutinensibus aliqualem garrulitatem, que proprie Lombardorum est: hanc ex commixtione advenarum Longobardorum terrigenis credimus remansisse. Et hec est causa quare Ferrarensium, Mutinensium vel Regianorum nullum invenimus poetasse; nam proprie garrulitati assuefacti nullo modo possunt ad vulgare aulicum sine quadam acerbitate venire. Quod multo magis de Parmensibus est putandum, qui monto pro multo dicunt. Si ergo Bononienses utrinque accipiunt, ut dictum est, rationabile videtur esse quod eorum locutio per commixtionem oppositorum, ut dictum est, ad laudabilem suavitatem remaneat temperata: quod procul dubio nostro iudicio sic esse censemus. Itaque si preponentes eos in vulgari sermone sola municipalia Latinorum vulgaria comparando considerant, allubescentes concordamus cum illis; si vero simpliciter vulgare bononiense preferendum existimant, dissentientes discordamus ab eis. Non etenim est quod aulicum et illustre vocamus; quoniam si fuisset, maximus Guido Guinizelli, Guido Ghisilerius, Fabrutius et Honestus et alii poetantes Bononie nunquam a proprio divertissent: qui doctores fuerunt illustres et vulgarium discretione repleti. Maximus Guido: Madonna, lo fino amor ch'a vui porto; Guido Ghisilerius: Donna, lo fermo core; Fabrutius: Lo meo lontano gire; Honestus: Più non actendo il tuo secorso, Amore: que quidem verba prorsus a mediastinis Bononie sunt diversa. Cumque de residuis in extremis Ytalie civitatibus neminem dubitare pendamus (et si quis dubitat, illum nulla nostra solutione dignamur), parum restat in nostra discussione dicendum. Quare cribellum cupientes deponere,

ut residentiam cito visamus, dicimus Tridentum atque Taurinum nec non Alexandriam civitates metis Ytalie in tantum sedere propinquas, quod puras nequeunt habere loquelas; in tantum quod, si etiam quod turpissimum habent vulgare, haberent pulcherrimum, propter aliorum commixtionem esse vere latium negaremus. Quare si latium illustre venamur, quod venamur in illis inveniri non potest.

## XVI

Postquam venati saltus et pascua sumus Ytalie, nec pantheram quam sequimur adinvenimus, ut ipsam reperire possimus, rationabilius investigemus de illa, ut solerti studio redolentem ubique et necubi apparentem nostris penitus irretiamus tenticulis. Resumentes igitur venabula nostra, dicimus quod in omni genere rerum unum esse oportet quo generis illius omnia comparentur et ponderentur, et a quo omnium aliorum mensuram accipiamus; sicut in numero cuncta mesurantur uno, et plura vel pauciora dicuntur, secundum quod distant ab uno vel ei propinquant; et sicut in coloribus omnes albo mesurantur, nam visibiles magis dicuntur et minus, secundum quod accedunt vel recedunt ab albo. Et quemadmodum de hiis dicimus que quantitatem et qualitatem ostendunt, de predicamentorum quolibet, etiam de substantia, posse dici putamus: scilicet ut unumquodque mensurabile sit, secundum quod in genere est, illo quod simplicissimum est in ipso genere. Quapropter in actionibus nostris, quantumcunque dividantur in species, hoc signum inveniri oportet quo et ipse mesurentur. Nam, in quantum simpliciter ut homines agimus, virtutem habemus (ut generaliter illam intelligamus), nam secundum ipsam bonum et malum hominem iudicamus; in quantum ut homines cives agimus, habemus legem, secundum quam dicitur civis bonus et malus; in quantum ut homines latini agimus, quedam habemus simplicissima signa et morum et habituum et locutionis, quibus latine actiones ponderantur et mesurantur. Que quidem nobilissima sunt earum que Latinorum sunt actiones, hec nullius civitatis Ytalie propria sunt, et in omnibus comunia sunt: inter que nunc potest illud discerni vulgare quod superius venabamur, quod in qualibet redolet civitate, nec cubat in ulla. Potest tamen magis in una quam in alia redolere, sicut simplicissima substantiarum, que Deus est, in homine magis redolet quam in bruto animali: [in bruto animali] quam in planta, in hac quam in minera; in hac quam in elemento, in igne quam in terra: et simplicissima quantitas, quod est unum, in impari numero redolet magis quam in pari; et simplicissimus color, qui albus est, magis in citrino quam in viride redolet. Itaque adepti quod querebamus, dicimus illustre, cardinale, aulicum et curiale vulgare in Latio, quod omnis latie civitatis est et nullius esse videtur, et quo municipalia vulgaria omnia Latinorum mesurantur et ponderantur et comparantur.

## XVII

Quare autem hoc quod repertum est il lustre, cardinale, aulicum et curiale adicientes vocemus, nunc disponendum est; per quod clarius ipsum quod ipsum est faciamus patere. Primum igitur quid intendimus cum illustre adicimus, et quare illustre dicimus, denudemus. Per hoc quidem quod illustre dicimus, intelligimus quid illuminans et illuminatum prefulgens: et hoc modo viros appellamus illustres, vel quia potestate illuminati alios et iustitia et caritate illuminant, vel quia excellenter magistrati excellenter magistrant, ut Seneca et Numa Pompilius. Et vulgare de quo loquimur, et sublimatum est magistratu et potestate, et suos honore sublimat et gloria. Magistratu quidem sublimatum videtur, cum de tot rudibus Latinorum vocabulis, de tot perplexis constructionibus, de tot defectivis prolationibus, de tot rusticanis accentibus, tam egregium, tam extricatum, tam perfectum et tam urbanum videamus electum, ut Cynus Pistoriensis et amicus eius ostendunt in cantionibus suis. Quod autem exaltatum sit potestate, videtur. Et quid maioris potestatis est quam quod humana corda versare potest, ita ut nolentem volentem et volentem nolentem faciat, velut ipsum et fecit et facit? Quod autem honore sublimet, in promptu est. Nonne domestici sui reges, marchiones, comites et magnates quoslibet fama vincunt? Minime hoc probatione indiget. Quantum vero suos familiares gloriosos efficiat, nos ipsi novimus, qui huius dulcedine glorie nostrum exilium postergamus. Quare ipsum illustre merito profiteri debemus.

## XVIII

Neque sine ratione ipsum vulgare illustre decusamus adiectione secunda, vide licet ut id cardinale vocemus. Nam



sicut totum hostium cardinem sequitur, ut, quo cardo vertitur, versetur et ipsum seu introrsum seu extrorsum flectatur, sic et universus municipalium grex vulgarium vertitur et revertitur, movetur et pausat secundum quod istud, quod quidem vere pater familias esse videtur. Nonne cotidie extirpat sentosos frutices de ytala silva? Nonne cotidie vel plantas inserit vel plantaria plantat? Quid aliud agricolae sui satagunt, nisi ut amoveant et admoveant, ut dictum est? Quare prorsus tanto decusari vocabulo promeretur. Quia vero aulicum nominamus, illud causa est, quod, si aulam nos Ytali haberemus, palatinum foret. Nam si aula totius regni comunis est domus et omnium regni partium gubernatrix augusta, quicquid tale est ut omnibus sit comune nec proprium ulli, conveniens est ut in ea conversetur et habitet; nec aliquod aliud habitaculum tanto dignum est habitante: hoc nempe videtur esse id de quo loquimur vulgare. Et hinc est quod in regni omnibus conversantes semper illustri vulgari locuntur hinc etiam est quod nostrum illustre velut accola peregrinatur et in humilibus hospitatur asilis, cum aula vacemus. Est etiam merito curiale dicendum, quia curialitas nil aliud est quam librata regula eorum que peragenda sunt; et quia statera huiusmodi librationis tantum in excellentissimis curiis esse solet, hinc est quod quicquid in actibus nostris bene libratum est, curiale dicatur. Unde cum istud in excellentissima Ytalorum curia sit libratum, dici curiale meretur. Sed dicere quod in excellentissima Ytalorum curia sit libratum, videtur nugatio, cum curia careamus. Ad quod facile respondetur. Nam licet curia, secundum quod unita accipitur, ut curia, regis Alamanie, ih Ytalia non sit, membra tamen eius non desunt; et sicut membra illius uno Principe uniuntur, sic membra huius gratioso lumine rationis unita sunt. Quare falsum esset dicere curia carere Ytalos, quanquam Principe careamus, quoniam curiam habemus, licet corporaliter sit dispersa.

## XIX

Hoc autem vulgare, quod illustre, cardinale, aulicum esse et curiale ostensum est, dicimus esse illud quod vulgare latium appellatur. Nam sicut quoddam vulgare est invenire quod proprium est Cremone, sic quoddam est invenire quod proprium est Lombardie; et sicut invenire aliquod quod sit proprium Lombardie, [sic] est invenire aliquod quod sit totius sinistre Ytalie proprium; et sicut omnia hec est invenire, sic et illud quod totius Ytalie est. Et sicut illud cremonense, ac illud lombardum et tertium semilatium dicitur, sic istud quod totius Ytalie est, latium vulgare vocatur. Hoc enim usi sunt doctores illustres qui lingua vulgari poetati sunt in Ytalia, ut Siculi, Apuli, Tusci, Romandioli, Lombardi et utriusque Marchie viri. Et quia intentio nostra, ut polliciti sumus in principio huius operis, est doctrinam de vulgari eloquentia tradere, ab ipso tanquam ab excellentissimo incipientes, quos putamus ipso dignos uti, et propter quid, et quo modo, nec non ubi, et quando, et ad quos ipsum dirigendum sit, in immediatis libris tractabimus. Quibus illuminatis, inferiora vulgaria illuminare curabimus, gradatim descendentes ad illud quod unius solius familie proprium est.

## Liber Secundus

### I

Sollicitantes iterum celeritatem ingenii nostri et ad calamum frugi operis redeuntes, ante omnia confitemur latium vulgare illustre tam prosayce quam metricae decere proferri. Sed quia ipsum prosaycantes ab avientibus magis accipiunt, et quia quod avietum est prosaycantibus permanere videtur exemplar, et non e converso (que quendam videntur prebere primatum), primo secundum quod metricum est ipsum carminemus, ordine pertractantes illo quem in fine primi libri polluximus. Queramus igitur prius, utrum omnes versificantes vulgariter debeant illud uti. Et superficiteus videtur quod sic, quia omnis qui versificatur suos versus exornare debet in quantum potest; quare cum nullum sit tam grandis exornationis quam vulgare illustre, videtur quod quisquis versificator debeat ipsum uti. Preterea: quod optimum est in genere suo, si suis inferioribus misceatur, non solum nil derogare videtur eis, sed ea meliorare videtur quare si quis versificator, quanquam rude versificetur, ipsum sue ruditati admisceat, non solum bene facit, sed ipsum sic facere oportere videtur: multo magis opus est adiutorio illis qui pauca, quam qui multa possunt. Et sic apparet quod omnibus versificantibus liceat ipsum uti. Sed hoc falsissimum est; quia nec semper excellentissime poetantes debent illud induere, sicut per inferius pertractata perpendi poterit. Exigit ergo istud sibi consimiles viros, quemadmodum alii nostri mores et habitus; exigit enim magnificentia magna potentes, purpura viros nobiles: sic et hoc excellentes ingenio et scientia querit, et alios aspernatur, ut per inferiora patebit. Nam

quicquid nobis convenit, vel gratia generis, vel speciei, vel individui convenit, ut sentire, ridere, militare. Sed hoc non convenit nobis gratia generis, quia etiam brutis conveniret; nec gratia speciei, quia cunctis hominibus esset conveniens, de quo nulla questio est nemo enim montaninis rusticana tractantibus hoc dicit esse conveniens convenit ergo individui gratia. Sed nichil individuo convenit nisi per proprias dignitates, puta mercari, militare ac regere; quare si convenientia respiciunt dignitates, hoc est dignos, et quidam digni, quidam digniores, quidam dignissimi esse possunt, manifestum est quod bona dignis, meliora dignioribus, optima dignissimis convenient. Et cum loquela non aliter sit necessarium instrumentum nostre conceptionis quam equus militis, et optimis militibus optimi convenient equi, ut dictum est, optimis conceptionibus optima loquela conveniet. Sed optime conceptiones non possunt esse nisi ubi scientia et ingenium est; ergo optima loquela non convenit nisi illis in quibus ingenium et scientia est. Et sic non omnibus versificantibus optima loquela conveniet, cum plerique sine scientia et ingenio versificentur, et per consequens nec optimum vulgare. Quapropter si non omnibus competit, non omnes ipsum debent uti, quia inconvenienter agere nullus debet. Et ubi dicitur, quod quilibet suos versus exornare debet in quantum potest, verum esse testamur; sed nec bovem epiphyatum nec balteatum suem dicemus ornatum, immo potius deturpatum ridemus illum; est enim exornatio alicuius convenientis additio. Ad illud ubi dicitur, quod superiora inferioribus admixta profectum adducunt, dicimus verum esse quando cesset discretio: puta si aurum cum argento conflamus; sed si discretio remanet, inferiora vilescunt: puta cum formose mulieres deformibus admiscentur. Unde cum sententia versificantium semper verbis discretive mixta remaneat, si non fuerit optima, optimo sociata vulgari non melior sed deterior apparebit, quemadmodum turpis mulier si auro vel serico vestiatur.

## II

Postquam non omnes versificantes, sed tantum excellentissimos illustre uti vulgare debere astruximus, consequens est astruere, utrum omnia ipso tractanda sint aut non; et si non omnia, que ipso digna sunt segregatim ostendere. Circa quod primo reperiendum est id quod intelligimus per illud quod dicimus dignum. Et dicimus dignum esse quod dignitatem habet, sicut nobile quod nobilitatem; et si cognito habituante habituatum cognoscitur in quantum huiusmodi, cognita dignitate cognoscemus et dignum. Est etenim dignitas meritotum effectus sive terminus: ut, cum quis bene meruit ad boni dignitatem profectum esse dicimus cum male vero, ad mali; puta bene militantem ad victoriae dignitatem, bene autem regentem ad regni, nec non mendacem ad ruboris dignitatem, et latronem ad eam que est mortis. Sed cum in bene merentibus fiant comparationes, et in aliis etiam, ut quidam bene quidam melius quidam optime, quidam male quidam peius quidam pessime mereantur, et huiusmodi comparationes non fiant nisi per respectum ad terminum meritorum, quem dignitatem dicimus (ut dictum est), manifestum est ut dignitates inter se comparentur secundum magis et minus, ut quedam magne, quedam maiores, quedam maxime sint; et per consequens aliquid dignum, aliquid dignius, aliquid dignissimum esse constat. Et cum comparatio dignitatum non fiat circa idem obiectum, sed circa diversa, ut dignius dicamus quod maioribus, dignissimum quod maximis dignum est (quia nichil eodem dignius esse potest), manifestum est quod optima optimis secundum rerum exigentiam digna sunt. Unde cum hoc quod dicimus illustre sit optimum aliorum vulgarium, consequens est ut sola optima digna sint ipso tractari, que quidem tractandorum dignissima nuncupamus. Nunc autem que sint ipsa venemur. Ad quorum evidentiam sciendum est, quod sicut homo tripliciter spirituatus est, videlicet vegetabili, animali et rationali, triplex iter perambulat. Nam secundum quod vegetabile quid est, utile querit, in quo cum plantis comunicat; secundum quod animale, delectabile, in quo cum brutis; secundum quod rationale, honestum querit, in quo solus est, vel angelice sociatur [nature]. Propter hec tria quicquid agimus, agere videmur. Et quia in quolibet istorum quedam sunt maiora, quedam maxima, secundum quod talia, que maxima sunt maxime pertractanda videntur, et per consequens maximo vulgari. Sed disserendum est que maxima sint. Et primo in eo quod est utile: in quo, si callide consideremus intentum omnium querentium utilitatem, nil aliud quam salutem inveniemus. Secundo in eo quod est delectabile: in quo dicimus illud esse maxime delectabile quod per pretiosissimum obiectum appetitus delectat; hoc autem venus est. Tertio in eo quod est honestum: in quo nemo dubitat esse virtutem. Quare hec tria, salus videlicet, venus et virtus, apparent esse illa magnalia que sint maxime pertractanda, hoc est ea que maxime sunt ad ista, ut armorum probitas, amoris accensio et directio voluntatis. Circa que sola, si bene recolimus, illustres viros invenimus vulgariter poetasse, scilicet Bertramum de Bornio arma, Arnaldum Danielem amorem, Gerardum de Bornello rectitudinem; Cynum Pistoriensem amorem, amicum eius rectitudinem. Bertramus etenim ait: Non posc mudar c'un cantar non exparja. Arnaldus: L'aura amara fa l bruol brancuz clarzir. Gerardus: Per solaz reveillar che s'es trop endormitz.

Cynus: Digno sono eo de morte. Amicus eius: Doglia mi reca ne lo core ardire. Arma vero nullum latium adhuc invenio poetasse. Hiis proinde visis, que canenda sint vulgari altissimo innotescunt.

### III

Nunc autem quo modo ea coartare debemus, que tanto sunt digna vulgari, sollicite vestigare conemur. Volentes igitur modum tradere quo ligari hec digna existant, primo dicimus esse ad memoriam reducendum, quod vulgariter poetantes sua poemata multimode protulerunt, quidam per cantiones, quidam per ballatas, quidam per sonitus, quidam per alios illegitimos et irregulares modos, ut inferius ostendetur. Horum autem modorum cantionum modum excellentissimum esse pensamus; quare si excellentissima excellentissimis digna sunt, ut superius est probatum, illa que excellentissimo sunt digna vulgari, modo excellentissimo digna sunt, et per consequens in cantionibus pertractanda. Quod autem modus cantionum sit talis ut dictum est, pluribus potest rationibus indagari. Prima quidem quia, cum quicquid versificamur sit cantio, sole cantiones hoc vocabulum sibi sortite sunt; quod nunquam sine vetusta provisione processit. Adhuc: quicquid per se ipsum efficit illud ad quod factum est, nobilius esse videtur quam quod extrinseco indiget: sed cantiones per se totum quod debent efficiunt, quod ballate non faciunt: indigent enim plausoribus, ad quod edite sunt; ergo cantiones nobiliores ballatis esse sequitur extimandas, et per consequens nobilissimum aliorum esse modum illarum, cum nemo dubitet quin ballate sonitus nobilitate excellant. Preterea: illa videntur nobiliora esse que conditori suo magis honoris afferunt: sed cantiones magis deferunt suis conditoribus quam ballate, igitur nobiliores sunt, et per consequens modus earum nobilissimus aliorum. Preterea: que nobilissima sunt carissime conservantur: sed inter ea que cantata sunt cantiones carissime conservantur, ut constat visitantibus libros; ergo cantiones nobilissime sunt, et per consequens modus earum nobilissimus est. Ad hec: in artificiatas illud est nobilissimum quod totam comprehendit artem: cum igitur ea que cantantur artificiatas existant, et in solis cantionibus ars tota comprehendatur, cantiones nobilissime sunt, et sic modus earum nobilissimus aliorum. Quod autem tota comprehendatur in cantionibus arc cantandi poetice, in hoc palatur, quod quicquid artis reperitur in omnibus aliis, et in cantionibus reperitur; sed non convertitur hoc. Signum autem horum que dicimus promptum in conspectu habetur; nam quicquid de cacuminibus illustrium capitum poetantium profluxit ad labia, in solis cantionibus invenitur. Quare ad propositum patet quod ea que digna sunt vulgari altissimo in cantionibus tractanda sunt.

### IV

Quando quidem aporiavimus extricantes qui sint aulico digni vulgari et que, nec non modum quem tanto dignamur honore ut solus altissimo vulgari conveniat, antequam migremus ad alia, modum cantionum, quem casu magis quam arte multi usurpare videntur, enucleemus; et qui hucusque casualiter est assumptus, illius artis ergasterium reseremus, modum ballatarum et sonituum ommictentes, quia illum elucidare intendimus in quarto huius operis cum de mediocri vulgari tractabimus. Revisentes igitur ea que dicta sunt, recolimus nos eos qui vulgariter versificantur prelunque vocasse poetas; quod procul dubio rationabiliter eructare presumpsimus, quia prorsus poete sunt, si poesim recte consideremus; que nichil aliud est quam fictio rethorica \*musicaque posita\*. Differunt tamen a magnis poetis, hoc est regularibus, quia magni sermone et arte regulari poetati sunt, hii vero casu, ut dictum est. Idcirco accidit ut, quantum illos proximius imitemur, tantum rectius poetemur. Unde nos doctrine operi intendentes, doctrinatas eorum poetrias emulari oportet. Ante omnia ergo dicimus unumquemque debere materie pondus propriis humeris coequare, ne forte humerorum nimio gravata virtute in cenam cespitare necesse sit. Hoc est quod magister noster Oratius precipit, cum in principio poetrie "Sumite materiam..." dicit. Deinde in hiis que dicenda occurrunt debemus discretionem potiri, utrum tragice, sive comice, sive elegiace sint canenda. Per tragediam superiorem stilum inducimus per comediam inferiorem, per elegiam stilum intelligimus miserorum. Si tragice canenda videntur, tunc assumendum est vulgare illustre, et per consequens cantionem [oportet] ligare. Si vero comice, tunc quandoque mediocre, quandoque humile vulgare sumatur; et huius discretionem in quarto huius reservamus ostendere. Si autem elegiace, solum humile oportet nos sumere. Sed ommittamus alios, et nunc, ut conveniens est, de stilo tragico pertractemus. Stilo equidem tragico tunc uti videmur, quando cum gravitate sententie tam superbia carminum quam constructionis elatio et excellentia vocabulorum concordat. Qua[re], si bene recolimus summa summis esse digna iam fuisse probatum, et iste quem tragicum appellamus summus videtur esse stilorum, et illa que summe canenda

distinximus isto solo sunt stilo canenda: videlicet salus, amor et virtus, et que propter ea concipimus, dum nullo accidente vilescant. Caveat ergo quilibet et discernat ea que dicimus; et quando hec tria pure cantare intendit, vel que ad ea directe ac pure secuntur, prius Elicone potatus, tensis fidibus ad supremum, secure plectrum tum movere incipiat. Sed cautionem atque discretionem hanc accipere, sicut decet, hoc opus et labor est, quoniam nunquam sine strenuitate ingenii et artis assiduitate scientiarumque habitu fieri potest. Et hii sunt quos poeta Eneidorum sexto Dei dilectos et ab ardente virtute sublimatos ad ethera deorumque filios vocat, quanquam figurate loquatur. Et ideo confutetur illorum stultitia, qui arte scientiaque immunes, de solo ingenio confidentes, ad summa summe canenda prorumpunt; et a tanta presumptuositate desistant, et si anseres natura vel desidia sunt, nolint astripetam aquilam imitari.

## V

De gravitate sententiarum vel satis dixisse videmur vel saltim totum quod operis est nostri; quapropter ad superbiam carminum festinemus. Circa quod sciendum est quod predecessores nostri diversis carminibus usi sunt in cantionibus suis, quod et moderni faciunt; sed nullum adhuc invenimus in carmen sillabando endecadem trascendisse, nec a trisillabo descendisse. Et licet trisillabo carmine atque endecasillabo et omnibus intermediis cantores Latii usi sint, pentasillabum, eptasillabum et endecasillabum in usu frequentiori habentur; et post hec trisillabum ante alia. Quorum omnium endecasillabum videtur esse superbium, tam temporis occupatione, quam capacitate sententie, constructionis et vocabulorum; quorum omnium specimen magis multiplicatur in illo, ut manifeste apparet; nam ubicunque ponderosa multiplicatum, [multiplicatur] et pondus. Et hoc omnes doctores perpensis videntur, cantiones illustres principiantes ab illo, ut Gerardus de Bornello: Ara ausirez encabalitz cantars. (Quod carmen licet decasillabum videatur, secundum rei veritatem endecasillabum est nam due consonantes extreme non sunt de sillaba precedente; et licet propriam vocalem non habeant, virtutem sillabe non tamen amittunt: signum autem est quod rithimus ibi una vocali perficitur, quod esse non posset nisi virtute alterius ibi subintellecte). Rex Nauarre: De fin'amor si vient sen et bonté; ubi, si consideretur accentus et eius causa, endecasillabum esse constabit. Guido Guinizelli: Al cor gentile repara sempre amore. Iudex de Columpnis de Messana: Amor, che lungiamente m'ài menato. Renaldus de Aquino: Per fino amore vo si letamente. Cynus Pistoriensis: Non spero che gia mai per mia salute. Amicus eius: Amor, che movi tua virtù da cielo. Et licet hoc quod dictum est celeberrimum carmen, ut dignum est videatur omnium aliorum, si eptasillabi aliqualem societatem assumat, dummodo principatum obtineat, clarius magisque sursum superbire videtur. Sed hoc ulterius elucidandum remaneat. Et dicimus eptasillabum sequi illud quod maximum est in celebritate. Post hoc pentasillabum et deinde trisillabum ordinamus. Neasillabum vero, quia triplicatum trisillabum videbatur, vel nunquam in honore fuit, vel propter fastidium abolevit. Parisillaba vero propter sui ruditatem non utimur nisi raro; retinent enim naturam suorum numerorum, qui numeris imparibus, quemadmodum materia forme, subsistunt. Et sic recolligentes predicta endecasillabum videtur esse superbissimum carmen; et hoc est quod querebamus. Nunc autem restat investigandum de constructionibus elatis et fastigiosis vocabulis; et demum, fustibus torquibusque paratis, promissum fascem, hoc est cantionem, quo modo viere quis debeat, instruemus.

## VI

Quia circa vulgare illustre nostra versatur intentio, quod nobilissimum est aliorum, et ea que digna sunt illo cantari discevimus, que tria nobilissima sunt, ut superius est astructum, et modum cantionarium selegimus illis, tanquam aliorum modorum summum, et ut ipsum perfectius edocere possimus, quedam iam preparavimus, stilum videlicet atque carmen, nunc de constructione agamus. Est enim sciendum, quod constructionem vocamus regulatam compaginem dictionum, ut Aristotiles phylosophatus est tempore Alexandri. Sunt enim quinque hic dictiones compacte regulariter, et unam faciunt constructionem. Circa hanc quidem prius considerandum est, quod constructionum alia congrua est, alia vero incongrua. Et quia si primordium bene disgressionis nostre recolimus sola suprema venamur, nullum in nostra venatione locum habet incongrua, quia nec inferiorem gradum bonitatis promeruit. Pudeat ergo, pudeat ydiotas tantum audere deinceps, ut ad cantiones prorumpant. Quos non aliter deridemus quam cecum de coloribus distinguentem. Est ut videtur congrua quam sectamur. Sed non minoris difficultatis accedit discretio, priusquam quam querimus actingamus, videlicet urbanitate plenissimam. Sunt etenim gradus constructionum quamplures: videlicet insipidus, qui est rudium, ut Petrus amat multum dominam Bertam. Est

et pure sapidus, qui est rigidorum scolarium vel magistrorum, ut Piget me cunctis pietate maiorem, quicumque in exilio tabescentes patriam tantum somnians revisunt. Est et sapidus et venustus, qui est quorundam superficetenus rethoricam auriensium, ut Laudabilis discretio marchionis Estensis, et sua magnificentia preparata, cunctis illum facit esse dilectum. Est et sapidus et venustus etiam et excelsus, qui est dictatorum illustrium ut Eiecta maxima parte florum de sinu tuo, Florentia, nequicquam Trinacriam Totila secundus adivit. Hunc gradum constructionis excellentissimum nominamus, et hic est quem querimus, cum suprema venemur, ut dictum est. Hoc solum illustres cantiones inveniuntur contexte, ut Gerardus: Si per mon Sobretots non fos. Folquetus da Marsilia: Tan m'abellis l'amoros pensamen. Arnaldus Danielis: Sols sui che sai lo sobraffan chem sorz. Namericus de Belnui: Nuls hom non pot complir adrechamen. Namericus de Peculiano: Si com l'arbres che per sobrecarcar. Rex Navarre: Ire d'amor qui en mon cor repaire. Iudex de Messana: Anchor che l'aigua per lo foco lassi. Guido Guinizelli: Tegno de folle 'mpresa a lo ver dire. Guido Cavalcantis: Poi che de doglia cor conven ch'io porti. Cynus de Pistorio: Avegna che io aggia più per tempo. Amicus eius: Amor che ne la mente mi ragiona. Nec mireris, lector, de tot reductis autoribus ad memoriam; non enim hanc quam supremam vocamus constructionem nisi per huiusmodi exempla possumus indicare. Et fortassis utilissimum foret ad illam habituandam regulatos vidisse poetas, Virgilium videlicet, Ovidium Metamorphoseos, Statium atque Lucanum, nec non alios qui usi sunt altissimas prosas, ut Titum Livium, Plinium, Frontinum, Paulum Orosium, et multos alios, quos amica sollicitudo nos visitare invitat. Subsistant igitur ignorantie sectatores Guictonem Aretinum et quosdam alios extollentes, nunquam in vocabulis atque constructione plebescere desuetos.

## VII

Grandiosa modo vocabula sub prelato stilo digna consistere, successiva nostre progressionis presentia lucidari expostulat. Testamur proinde incipientes non minimum opus esse rationis discretionem vocabulorum habere, quoniam per plures eorum maneries inveniri posse videmus. Nam vocabulorum quedam puerilia, quedam muliebria, quedam virilia; et horum quedam silvestria, quedam urbana, et eorum que urbana vocamus, quedam pexa et lubrica, quedam yrsuta et reburra sentimus. Inter que quidem pexa atque yrsuta sunt illa que vocamus grandiosa, lubrica vero et reburra vocamus illa que in superfluum sonant; quemadmodum in magnis operibus quedam magnanimitatis sunt opera, quedam fumi; ubi, licet in superficie quidam consideretur ascensus, ex quo limitata virtutis linea prevaricatur, bone rationi non ascensus, sed per altera declivia ruina constabit. Intuearis ergo, lector, actente, quantum ad exaceranda egregia verba te cribrare oportet; nam si vulgare illustre consideres, quo tragice debent uti poete vulgares, ut superius dictum est, quos informare intendimus, sola vocabula nobilissima in cribro tuo residere curabis. In quorum numero neque puerilia propter sui simplicitatem, ut mamma et babbo, mate et pate, neque muliebria propter sui mollitiem, ut dolciada et placevole, neque silvestria propter austeritatem, ut greggia et cetra neque urbana lubrica et reburra, ut femina et corpo, ullo modo poteris collocare. Sola etenim pexa yrsutaque urbana tibi restare videbis, que nobilissima sunt et membra vulgaris illustris. Et pexa vocamus illa, que trisyllaba vel vicinissima trisyllabitati, sine aspiratione, sine accentu acuto vel circumflexo, sine z vel x duplicibus, sine duarum liquidarum geminatione vel positione immediate post mutam, dolata quasi, loquentem cum quadam suavitate relinquunt, ut amore, donna, disio, vertute, donare, letitia, salute, securtate, defesa. Yrsuta quoque dicimus omnia preter hec, que vel necessaria vel ornativa videntur vulgaris illustris. Et necessaria quidem appellamus que campare non possumus, ut quedam monosyllaba, ut sì, no, me, te, sé, à, è, i', ò, u', interiectiones, et alia multa. Ornativa vero dicimus omnia polysyllaba, que, mixta cum pexis, pulcrum faciunt armoniam compaginis, quamvis asperitatem habeant aspirationis et accentus et duplicium et liquidarum et prolixitatis, ut terra, honore, speranza, gravitate, alleviato, impossibilità, impossibilitate benaventuratissimo, inanimatissimamente disaventuratissimamente, sovramagnificentissimamente, quod endecasillabum est. Posset adhuc inveniri plurium sillabarum vocabulum sive verbum; sed quia capacitatem omnium nostrorum carminum superexcedit, rationi presenti non videtur obnoxium, sicut est illud honorificabilitudinitate, quod duodena perficitur sillaba in vulgari, et in gramatica tredena perficitur in duobus obliquis. Quomodo autem pexis yrsuta huiusmodi sint armonizanda per metra, inferius instruendum relinquimus. Et que iam dicta sunt de fastigiositate vocabulorum, ingenue discretioni sufficiant.

## VIII

Preparatis fustibus torquibusque ad fascem, nunc fasciandi tempus incumbit. Sed quia cuiuslibet operis cognitio

precedere debet operationem, velut signum ante ammissionem sagiete vel iaculi, primo et principaliter qui sit iste fascis quem fasciare intendimus, videamus. Fascis igitur iste, si bene comminiscimur omnia prelibata, cantio est. Quapropter quid sit cantio videamus, et quid intelligimus, cum dicimus cantionem. Est enim cantio secundum verum nominis significatum ipse canendi actus vel passio, sicut lectio passio vel actus legendi. Sed divaricemus quod dictum est, utrum videlicet hec sit cantio prout est actus, vel prout est passio. Et circa hoc considerandum est quod cantio dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod fabricatur ab auctore suo, et sic est actio et secundum istum modum Virgilius primo Eneidorum dicit, Arma virumque cano; alio modo secundum quod fabricata profertur vel ab auctore, vel ab alio quicumque sit, sive cum soni modulatione proferatur, sive non; et sic est passio. Nam tunc agitur; modo vero agere videtur in alium, et sic, tunc alicuius actio, modo quoque passio alicuius videtur. Et quia prius agitur ipsa quam agat, magis, immo prorsus denominari videtur ab eo quod agitur, et est actio alicuius, quam ab eo quod agit in alios. Signum autem huius est quod nunquam dicimus, "Hec est cantio Petri" eo quod ipsam proferat, sed eo quod fabricaverit illam. Preterea disserendum est utrum cantio dicatur fabricatio verborum armonizatorum, vel ipsa modulatio. Ad quod dicimus, quod nunquam modulatio dicitur cantio, sed sonus, vel tonus, vel nota, vel melos. Nullus enim tibicen, vel organista, vel citharedus melodiam suam cantionem vocat, nisi in quantum nupta est alicui cantioni, sed armonizantes verba opera sua cantiones vocant; et etiam talia verba in cartulis absque prolatore iacentia cantiones vocamus. Et ideo cantio nichil aliud esse videtur quam actio completa dictantis verba modulationi armonizata: quapropter tam cantiones quas nunc tractamus, quam ballatas et sonitus, et omnia cuiuscunque modi verba sunt armonizata vulgariter et regulariter, cantiones esse dicemus. Sed quia sola vulgaria ventilamus, regulata linquentes, dicimus vulgarium poematum unum esse suppreum, quod per superexcellenciam cantionem vocamus; quod autem suppreum quid sit cantio, in tertio huius libri capitulo est probatum. Et quoniam quod diffinitum est pluribus generale videtur, resumentes diffinitum iam generale vocabulum, per quasdam differentias solum quod petimus distinguamus. Dicimus ergo quod cantio, in quantum per supe rexcellentiam dicitur, ut et nos querimus est equalium stantiarum sine responsorio ad unam sententiam tragica coniugatio, ut nos ostendimus cum dicimus, Donne, che avete intelletto d'amore. Quod autem dicimus "tragica coniugatio", est quia cum comice fiat hec coniugatio, cantilenam vocamus per diminutionem; de qua in quarto huius tractare intendimus. Et sic patet quid cantio sit, et prout accipitur generaliter, et prout per superexcellenciam vocamus eam. Satis etiam patere videtur quid intelligimus cum cantionem vocamus, et per consequens quid sit ille fascis quem ligare molimur.

## IX

Quia, ut dictum est, cantio est coniugatio stantiarum, ignorato quid sit stantia, necesse est cantionem ignorare; nam ex diffinientium cognitione diffiniti resultat cognitio; et ideo consequenter de stantia est agendum, ut scilicet vestigemus quid ipsa sit, et quid per eam intelligere volumus. Et circa hoc sciendum est quod hoc vocabulum per solius artis respectum inventum est, videlicet ut in quo tota cantionis ars esset contenta, illud diceretur stantia hoc est mansio capax sive receptaculum totius artis. Nam quemadmodum cantio est gremium totius sententie, sic stantia totam artem ingremiat; nec licet aliquid artis sequentibus arrogare, sed solam artem antecedentis induere. Per quod patet quod ipsa de qua loquimur erit congruatio sive compages omnium eorum que cantio sumit ab arte; quibus divaricatis, quam querimus descriptio innotescet. Tota igitur, scilicet ars cantionis, circa tria videtur consistere: primo circa cantus divisionem, secundo circa partium habitudinem, tertio circa numerum carminum et sillabarum. De rithimo vero mentionem non facimus, quia de propria cantionis arte non est. Licet enim in qualibet stantia rithimos innovare et eosdem reiterare ad libitum; quod, si de propria cantionis arte rithimus esset, minime liceret: quod dictum est. Si quid autem rithimi servare interest huius quod est ars, illud comprehenditur ibi cum dicimus "partium habitudinem". Quare sic colligere possumus ex predictis diffinientes, et dicere stantiam esse sub certo cantu et habitudine limitatam carminum et sillabarum compagem.

## X

Scientes quia rationale animal homo est et quia sensibilis anima et corpus est animal, et ignorantibus de hac anima quid ea sit, vel de ipso corpore, perfectam hominis cognitionem habere non possumus; quia cognitionis perfectio uniuscuiusque terminatur ad ultima elementa, sicut magister sapientum in principio Physicorum testatur. Igitur ad habendam cantionis cognitionem quam inhiamus, nunc diffinientia suam diffiniens sub compendio ventilemus; et primo de cantu, deinde de habitudine, et postmodum de carminibus et sillabis percontemur. Dicimus ergo quod

omnis stantia ad quandam odam recipiendam armonizata est. Sed in modis diversificari videntur; quia quedam sunt sub una oda continua usque ad ultimum progressive, hoc est sine iteratione modulationis cuiusquam et sine diesim dicimus deductionem vergentem de una oda in aliam; hanc voltam vocamus, cum vulgus alloquimur; et huiusmodi stantia usus est fere in omnibus cantionibus suis Arnaldus Danielis, et nos eum secuti sumus cum diximus: Al poco giorno e al gran cerchio d'ombra. Quedam vero sunt diesim patientes; et diesim esse non potest, secundum quod eam appellamus, nisi reiteratio unius ode fiat, vel ante diesim, vel post, vel undique. Si ante diesim repetitio fiat, stantiam dicimus habere pedes; et duos habere decet, licet quandoque tres fiant, rarissime tamen. Si repetitio fiat post diesim, tunc dicimus stantiam habere versus. Si ante non fiat repetitio, stantiam dicimus habere frontem; si post non fiat, dicimus habere sirmam, sive caudam. Vide igitur, lector, quanta licentia data sit cantiones poetantibus, et considera cuius rei causa tam largum arbitrium sibi usus asciverit; et si recto calle ratio te direxerit, videbis auctoritatis dignitate sola quod dicimus esse concessum. Satis hinc innotescere potest, quomodo cantionis ars circa cantus divisionem consistat; et ideo ad habitudinem procedamus.

## XI

Videtur nobis hec quam habitudinem dicimus maxima pars eius quod artis est; hec etenim circa cantus divisionem atque contextum carminum et rithimorum relationem consistit; quapropter dililgentissime videtur esse tractanda. Incipientes igitur dicimus quod frons cum versibus, pedes cum cauda vel sirmate nec non pedes cum versibus, in stantia se habere diversimode possunt. Nam, quandoque frons versus excedit in sillabis et carminibus, vel excedere potest; et dicimus "potest", quoniam habitudinem hanc adhuc non vidimus. Quandoque in carminibus excedere et in sillabis superari potest, ut si frons esset pentametra et quilibet versus esset dimeter, et metra frontis eptasillaba et versus endecasillaba essent. Quandoque versus frontem superant sillabis et carminibus, ut in illa quam dicimus, Tragemi de la mente Amor la stiva. Fuit hec tetrametra frons, tribus endecasillabis et uno eptasillabo contexta; non etenim potuit in pedes dividi, cum equalitas carminum et sillabarum requiratur in pedibus inter se et etiam in versibus inter se. Et quemadmodum dicimus de fronte, dicimus et de versibus. Possent etenim versus frontem superare carminibus, et sillabis superari, puta si versus duo essent et uterque trimeter, et eptasillaba metra, et frons esset pentametra, duobus endecasillabis et tribus eptasillabis contexta. Quandoque vero pedes caudam superant carminibus et sillabis, ut in illa quam diximus, Amor, che movi tua virtù da cielo. Quandoque pedes a sirmate superantur in toto, ut in illa quam diximus, Donna pietosa e di novella etate. Et quemadmodum diximus frontem posse superare carminibus, sillabis superatam, et e conversio, sic de sirmate dicimus. Pedes quoque versus in numero superant et superantur ab hiis; possunt enim esse in stantia tres pedes et duo versus, et tres versus et duo pedes; nec hoc numero limitamur, quin liceat plures et pedes et versus simul contexere. Et quemadmodum de victoria carminum et sillabarum diximus inter alia, nunc etiam inter pedes et versus dicimus; nam eodem modo vinci et vincere possunt. Nec pretermittendum est quod nos e contrario regulatis poetis pedes accipimus, quia illi carmen ex pedibus, nos vero ex carminibus pedem constare dicimus, ut satis evidentem apparet. Nec etiam pretermittendum est quin iterum asseramus pedes ab invicem necessario carminum et sillabarum equalitatem et habitudinem accipere, quia non aliter cantus repetitio fieri posset. Hoc idem in versibus esse servandum astruimus.

## XII

Est etiam, ut superius dictum est, habitudo quedam quam carmina contexendo considerare debemus; et ideo rationem faciamus de illa, repetentes proinde que superius de carminibus diximus. In usu nostro maxime tria carmina frequentandi prerogativam habere videntur endecasillabum scilicet, eptasillabum et pentasillabum; que trisillabum ante alia sequi astruximus. Horum prorsus, cum tragice poetari conamur, endecasillabum propter quandam excellentiam in contextu vincendi privilegium promeretur. Nam quedam stantia est que solis endecasillabis gaudet esse contexta, ut illa Guidonis de Florentia, Donna me prega, perch'io volgl[i]o dire. Et etiam nos dicimus, Donne ch'avete intellecto d'amore. Hoc etiam Yspani usi sunt; et dico Yspanos qui poetati sunt in vulgari oc. Name ricus de Belnui, Nuls hom non pot complir adrechamen. Quedam est in qua tantum eptasillabum intexitur unum; et hoc esse non potest nisi ubi frons est vel cauda, quoniam, ut dictum est, in pedibus atque versibus actenditur equalitas carminum et sillabarum. Propter quod etiam nec numerus impar carminum potest esse ubi frons vel cauda non est; sed ubi hee sunt vel altera sola, pari et impari numero in carminibus licet uti ad libitum. Et sicut quedam

stantia est uno solo eptasillabo conformata, sic duobus, tribus, quatuor, quinque videtur posse contexi, dummodo in tragico vincat endecasillabum et principiet. Verumtamen quosdam ab eptasillabo tragice principiasse invenimus, videlicet [Guidonem Guinizelli] Guidonem de Ghisilerii et Fabrutium, Bononienses: De fermo sofferire, et Donna, lo fermo core, et Lo meo lontano gire, et quosdam alios. Sed si ad eorum sensum subtiliter intrare velimus, non sine quodam elegie umbraculo hec tragedia processisse videbitur. De pentasillabo quoque non sic concedimus; in dictamine magno sufficit enim unicum pentasillabum in tota stantia conseri, vel duo ab plus [in pedibus]; et dico "pedibus" propter necessitatem qua pedibus versibusque cantatur Minime autem trisillabum in tragico videtur esse sumendum per se subsistens; et dico "per se subsistens", quia per quadam rithimorum repercussionem frequenter videtur assumptum, sicut inveniri potest in illa Guidonis Florentini, Donna me prega, et in illa quam diximus, Poscia ch'Amor del tutto m'à lasciato. Nec per se ibi carmen est omnino, sed pars endecasillabi tantum, ad rithimum precedentis carminis velut eco respondens. Hoc etiam precipue attendendum est circa carminum habitudinem, quod si eptasillabum interseratur in primo pede, quem situm accipit ibi, eundem resumat in altero: puta si pes trimeter primum et ultimum carmen endecasillabum habet et medium, hoc est secundum, eptasillabum [et pes alter habeat secundum eptasillabum] et extrema endecasillaba; non aliter ingeminatio cantus fieri posset, ad quam pedes fiunt, ut dictum est; et per consequens pedes esse non possent. Et quemadmodum de pedibus, dicimus et de versibus; in nullo enim pedes et versus differre videmus nisi in situ, quia hii ante, hii post diesim stantie nominantur. Et etiam quemadmodum de trimetro pede, et de omnibus aliis servandum esse asserimus; et sicut de uno eptasillabo, sic de pluribus et de pentasillabo et omni alio dicimus. Satis hinc, lector, elicere potes [qua] qualit[ate] tibi carminum habituanda sit stantia habitudinem[que] circa carmina consideranda[m] videre.

### XIII

Rithirnorutn quoque relationi vacemus, nichil de rithimo secundum se modo tractantes; proprium enim eorum tractatum in posterum prorogamus, cum de mediocri poemate intendemus. In principio igitur huius capituli quedam resecanda videntur. Unum est stantia sine rithimo, in qua nulla rithimorum habitudo attenditur; et huiusmodi stantiis usus est Arnaldus Danielis frequentissime, velut ibi, Sem fos Amor de joi donar; et nos dicimus, Al poco iorno. Aliud est stantia cuius omnia carmina eundem rithimum reddunt, in qua superfluum esse constat habitudinem querere. Sic proinde restat circa rithimos mixtos tantum debere insisti. Et primo sciendum est quod in hoc amplissimam sibi licentiam fere omnes assumunt, et ex hoc maxime totius armonie dulcedo intenditur. Sunt etenim quidam qui non omnes quandoque desinentias carminum rithimantur in eadem stantia, sed easdem repetunt, sive rithimantur in aliis, sicut fuit Gottus Mantuanus, qui suas multas et bonas cantiones nobis oretenus intimavit. Hic semper in stantia unum carmen incomitatum texebat, quod clavem vocabat; et sicut de uno licet, licet etiam de duobus, et forte de pluribus. Quidam alii sunt, et fere omnes cantionum inventores, qui nullum in stantia carmen incomitatum relinquunt quin sibi rithimi concrepantiam reddant, vel unius vel plurium. Et quidam diversos faciunt esse rithimos eorum que post diesim carmina sunt a rithimis eorum que sunt ante; quidam vero non sic, sed desinentias anterioris stantie inter postera carmina referentes intexunt. Sepissime amen hoc fit in desinentia primi posteriorum, quam plerique rithimantur ei que est priorum posterioris; quod non aliud esse videtur quam quedam ipsius stantie concatenatio pulcra. De rithimorum quoque habitudine, prout sunt in fronte vel in cauda, videtur omnis optata licentia concedenda; pulcerrime tamen se habent ultimorum carminum desinentie, si cum rithimo in silentium cadant. In pedibus vero cavendum est; et habitudinem quandam servatam esse invenimus. Et, discretionem facientes, dicimus quod pes vel pari vel impari metro completur; et utrobique comitata et incomitata desinentia esse potest: nam in pari metro nemo dubitat; in alio vero, si quis dubius est, recordetur ea que diximus in preinmediato capitulo de trisillabo, quando pars existens endecasillabi velut eco respondet. Et si in altero pedum exsortem rithimi desinentiam esse contingat, omnimode in altero sibi instauratio fiat. Si vero quelibet desinentia in altero pede rithimi consortium habeat, in altero prout libet referre vel innovare desinentias licet, vel totaliter vel in parte, [dum] dumtaxat precedentium ordo servetur in totum; puta si extreme desinentie trimetri, hoc est prima et ultima, concrepabunt in primo pede, sic secundi extremas desinentias convenit concrepare, et qualem se in primo media videt, comitatam quidem vel incomitatam, talis in secundo resurgat; et sic de aliis pedibus est servandum. In versibus quoque fere semper hac lege prefruiamus; et "fere" dicimus quia propter concatenationem prenotatam et combinationem desinentiarum ultimarum quandoque ordinem iam dictum perverti contingit. Preterea nobis bene convenire videtur ut que cavenda sunt circa rithimos, huic appendamus capitulo, cum in isto libro nichil ulterius de rithimorum doctrina tangere intendamus. Tria ergo sunt que circa rithimorum positionem potiri dedecet aulice poetantem: nimia scilicet eiusdem rithimi repercussio, nisi forte novum aliquid atque intentatum artis hoc sibi



preroget; ut nascentis militie dies, qui cum nulla prerogativa suam indignatur preterire dietam; hoc etenim nos facere nisi sumus ibi, Amor, tu vedi ben che questa donna; secundum vero est ipsa inutilis equivocatio, que semper sententie quicquam derogare videtur; at tertium est rithimorum asperitas, nisi forte sit lenitati permixta; nam lenium asperorumque rithimorum mixtura ipsa tragedia nitescit. Et hec de arte, prout habitudinem respicit, tanta sufficiant.

#### XIV

Ex quo duo que sunt artis in cantione satis sufficienter tractavimus, nunc de tertio videtur esse tractandum, videlicet de numero carminum et sillabarum. Ea primo secundum totam stantiam videre oportet aliquid; deinde secundum partes eius videbimus. Nostra igitur primo refert discretionem facere inter ea que canenda occurrunt, quia quedam stantie prolixitatem videntur appetere, quedam non. Nam cum ea que dicimus cuncta vel circa dextrum aliquid vel sinistrum canamus ut quandoque persuasorie quandoque dissuasorie, quandoque gratulanter quandoque yronice, quandoque laudabiliter quandoque contemptive canere contingit, que circa sinistrum sunt verba semper ad extremum festinent, et alia decenti prolixitate passim veniant ad extremum...

## 2. Leonard Cox: *The Art or Crafte of Rhetoryke*

1532

[A.ii.r]

To the reuerende father in god & his singuler good lorde / the lorde Hugh Faryngton Abbot of Redynge / his pore client and perpetuall seruaunt Leonarde Cockes desyreth longe & prosperouse lyfe with encrease of honour. Onsiderynge my spe[-] ciall good lorde how great[-] ly and how many ways I am bounden to your lord- shyp / and among all other that in so great a nombre of counynge men whiche are now within this region it hath pleased your goodnes to accepte me as worthy for to haue the charge of the instruction & bryngynge vp of suche youth as resorteth to your gra- mer schole / fōūded by your antecessours in this your towne of Redynge / I studied a longe space what thyng I myght do next the busy & diligent occupieng of my selfe in your sayd seruyce / to the whiche bothe conscience and your stipende doth straytly bynde me / that myght be a significacion of my faithfull and seruyisable hart which I owe to your lordeshyp / & agayne a long memory bothe of your singuler and bene-[A.ii.v] ficiall fauour towarde me: and of myn in- dustry and diligence employed in your ser- uyce to some profite: or at the leest way to some delectacion of the inhabitauntes of this noble realme now flouryshynge vn- der the most excellent & victorious prynce our souerain Lorde kyng Henry the .viii. And whan I had thus long prepensed in my mynde what thyng I myght best chose out: non offred it selfe more conue- nyent to the profyte of yonge studentes (which your good lordshyp hath alwayes tenderly fauoured) and also meter to my p[ro]fession: than to make som proper werke of the right pleasaunt and persuadible art of Rhetorique / whiche as it is very neces- sary to all suche as wyll either be Aduoca[-] tes and Proctours in the law: or els apte to be sent in theyr Prynces Ambassades / or to be techers of goddes worde in suche maner as may be moost sensible & accepte to theyr audience / and finally to all them hauynge any thyng to purpose or to speke afore any companye (what someuer they be) So contrarily I se no science that is lesse taught & declared to Scolers / which ought chiefly after the knowlege of Gra- mer ones had to be instructe in this facul[-] tie / without the whiche oftentymes the[A.iii.r] rude vtterance of the Aduocate greatly hindereth and apeyreth his cliētes cause. Likewise the vnapt disposicion of the pre- cher (in orderyng his mater) confoundeth the memory of his herers / and briefly in declarynge of maters: for lacke of inuen- cion and order with due elocucion: great tediousnes is engendred to the multitude beyng present / by occasion wherof the spe[-] ker is many tymes ere he haue ended his tale: either left almost aloon to his no li- tle confusiō: or els (which is a lyke rebuke to hym) the audience falleth for werynes of his ineloquent language fast on slepe. Wyllynge therefore for my parte to help suche as are desirouse of this Arte (as all surely ought to be which entende to be re- garded in any comynaltie) I haue parte- ly translated out a werke of Rhetorique wryten in the Latin tongue: and partely compyled of myn owne: and so made a ly- tle treatyse in maner of an Introductyon into this aforesayd Science: and that in our Englysshe tongue. Remembrynge that euery good thyng (after the sayeng[e]s of the Philosopher) the more comon it is: the more better it is. And furthermore tru[-] styng therby to do som pleasure and ease to suche as haue by negligence or els fals[A.iii.v] persuacions be put to the lernyng of other sciences or euer they haue attayned any meane knowlege of the Latin tongue. whiche my sayd labour I humbly offre to your good Lordeshyp / as to the chyefe maintener & nouryssher of my study / be- sechynge you / thoughe it be ferre within your merites done to me / to accepte it as the fyrst assay of my pore and simple wyt / which yf it may fyrst please your Lord- shyp / and nexte the reders / I trust by the ayde of almyghty god to endyte other werkes bothe in this facul- ty and other to the laude of the hygh godhed / of whome all goodnes doth procede / and to your Lordshyps plea- sure / and to profyte and delectacion of the Reder. [A.iii.r] Ho someuer desyreth to be a good Oratour or to dys- pute and commune of any maner thyng / hym beho- ueth to haue foure thynges. The fyrst is called In- uencion / for he must fyrst of all imagin or Inuent in his mynde what he shall say. The seconde is named Iugement. For he must haue wyt to deserue & iuge whe- ther tho thynges that he hath founde in his mynde be conuenient to the purpose or nat. For oftētymes yf a man lacke this property / he may aswell tell that that is against hym as with hym / as experience doth dayly shew. The thyrde is Dispo- sicion / wherby he may know how to order and set euery thyng in his due place / leest thoughe his inuencion and iugement be neuer so good / he may happen to be coun- ted (as the comon prouerbe sayth) to put the carte afore the horse. The fourth & last is suche thynges as he hath inuen- ted: and by Iugement knowen apte to his purpose whan they are set in theyr order so to speke them that it may be pleasaunt and delectable to the audience / so that it may be sayd of hym that hystories make mencion that an olde woman sayd ones[A.iii.v] by Demosthenes / & syns hath ben a comō prouerbe amonge the Grekes οὐτος ἐστὶ which is as moche to say as (This is he) And this last p[ro]perty is called among ler- ned men ( Eloquence. Of these foure the moost difficile or harde

is to inuent what thou must say / wherfore of this parte the Rethoriciens whiche be maisters of this Arte: haue written very moche & diligētly. Inuencion is comprehended in certayn places / as the Rethoriciens call them / out of whom he that knoweth ye faculty may fetche easely suche thynges as be mete for the mater that he shall speke of / which ma[-]ter the Oratours calleth the Theme / and in our vulgare tongue it is called impro- perly the Anthethem. The theme pur- posed: we must after the rules of Rheto- rique go to our places that shall anō shew vnto vs what shall be to our purpose.

Example.

IN olde tyme there was greate enuy betwene two noble men of Rome / of whō the one was called Milo / & the other Clodius / which malice grew so ferre that Clodius layd wayte for Milo on a season when he sholde ryde out of the Citie / and in his iourney set vpon hym / and there as[A.v.r] it chaunced: Clodius was slayne / where vpon this Clodius frendes accused Milo to the Cenate of murder. Tully whiche in tho days was a great Aduocate in Rome sholde plede Miloes cause. Now it was open that Milo had slayne Clodius / but whether he had slayn hym lauffully or nat was the doubt. So than the Theme of Tullies oraciō or plee for Milo was this / that he had slayne Clodius lauffully / and therefore he ought nat to be punisshed / for the confirmacion wherof (as dothe appere in Tullies oracion) he dyd brynge out of places of Rhetoryque argumentes to p[ro]ue his sayd Theme or purpose. And likewyse must we do when we haue any mater to speke or comun of. As if I sholde make an oracion to the laude & prayse of the Kyn- ges highnes: I must for the Inuencyon of suche thynges as be for my purpose go to places of Rhetorique / where I shall easely finde (after I know the rules) that that I desyre. Here is to be noted that there is no Theme but it is conteyned vn[-]der one of the foure causes / or for the more playnnes foure kyndes of Oracions. The fyrste is called Logycall / whyche kinde we call properly disputaciō. The seconde is called Demonstratiue. The[A.v.v] thyrd Deliberatiue. The fourth Iudi- ciall / and these thre last be properly called spices or kyndes of oracions / whose natu- res shall be declared seperately hereafter with the crafte that is required in euery of them. All themes that pertain to Logike either they be simple or compoude. As yf a man desyre to know of me what Iustice is. This onely thīg Iustice is my theme. Or if disputacion be had in company vpon religion / and I wolde declare the very na- ture of religion / my theme shulde be this simple or one thyng religion. But yf it be doubted whether Iustyce be a vertue or nat / and I wolde proue the parte affyrma[-]tyue / my theme were now compoūde / that is to say / Iustice is a vertue / for it is made of two thynges knyght and vnied together / Iustice and vertue. Here must be noted that Logike is a playn & a sure way to in- struct a mā of the trouth of euery thyng / & that in it the natures / causes / partes / & effectes of thynges are by certayne rules discussed & serched out / so that nothing can be p[er]fectly & p[ro]perly knowē but by rules of Logike / which is nothing but an obserua[-]cion / or a dylygent markyng of nature. whereby in euery thyng mannes reason dothe consyder what is fyrste / what last / [A.vi.r] what proper / what improper. The places or instrumentes of a simple theme are. The diffinicion of the thyng.

The causes.

The partes.

The effectes.

Exāple. If thou inquire what thīg Iu[-]stice is / whereof it cometh / what partes it hath / & what is the office or effect of euery parte / than hast thou diligētly serched out the hole nature of Iustice / & handed thy simple theme accordyng to the precept[e]s of Logicians / to whom our auctour leueth suche mat[er]s to be discussed of thē / howbeit somewhat ye Rhetoriciās haue to do with ye simple theme / & asmoche as shall be for theyr entent he wyll shew hereafter. For many tymes the oratour must vse bothe diffinicions & diuisions. But as they be in Logike playne and compendiose / so are they in Rhetorike extēded & paynted with many figures & ornament[e]s belongyng to the science. Neuertheles to satisfie the re- ders mynde / & to alleuiate the tediousnes of serchyng these places / I wyll open the maner and facion of the handelyng of the theme aforsayd as playnly as I can / after the preceptes of Logike. [A.vi.v] First to serche out the perfite knowlege of Iustice: I go to my fyrst place diffinici[-]on / & fetch from Aristotle in his Ethik[e]s the Diffinicion of Iustice / which is this. Iustice is a morall vertue / wherby men be the workers of rightfull thynges (that is to saye) whereby they bothe loue & also do suche thynges as be iust. This done: I serche the causes of Iustice (that is to say) from whens it toke the fyrst begynnnyng / and by cause that it is a morall vertue: and Plato in the ende of his Dialogue Menō concludeth that all vertue cometh of god: I am assured that god is the chief cause of Iustice: declaryng it to the worlde by his Instrument mānes wyt / whiche the same Plato

affyrmeth in the begynnyng of his lawes. The Diffinicion and cause had: I come to the thyrd place called partes to knowe whether there be but one kynde of Iustice or els many. And for this purpose I fynde that Arystotle in the fyfte of his Ethikes deuideth Iustice in two spesces or kyndes. One yt he calleth Iustice legiti- me or legal / an other that he called Equi- te. Iustice legall is that that consysteth in the superiours whiche haue power for to make or statute lawes to the iferiours. And the office or ende of this Iustice is to[A.vii.r] make suche lawes as be bothe good and accordyng to right and conscience / & thā to declare them / & whan they are made & publisshed as they ought to be / to se that they be put in vre / for what auaieth it to make neuer so good lawes: yf they be nat obserued and kept. And finally that the maker of the lawe applye his hole studie & mynde to the welthe of his subiectes and to the comon profyte of them. The other kynde of Iustice whiche men call Equitie is whereby a man neyther taketh nor gy- ueth lesse nor more than he ought / but in gyyunge taketh good hede that euery mā haue accordyng as he deserueth. This Equitie is agayne deuyded into Equitie distributyue of comon thynges & Equitie Commutatiue. By Equitie distributyue is distributyd and giuen of comon goodes to euery mā accordyng to his deseruyng[e]s and as he is worthy to haue. As to deuide amonge suche as longe to the Chyrche of the Chyrche goodes after the qualitie of theyr merytes: and to them beyng Ciuil persones of the comon treasour of the Ci- tie accordyng as they are worthy. In this parte is comprehended the pu- nyshment of mysdoers and trangressours of the lawe / to whome correccion must be[A.vii.v] distributed for the comon welth according to theyr demerites / after the prescripcions of the lawes of the contrey / made & deter- mined for the punisshment of any maner of transgressour. Equity cōmutatiue is a iust maner in the chaungyng of thyng[e]s from one to another / whose offyce or effect is to kepe iust dealyng in equytie / as by- enge / sellyng / & all other bargaynes law- full. And so are herewith the spices of Iu- stice declared theyr offices / which was the fourth & last place. Our auctour also in a great worke that he hath made vpon Rhetorike / declareth the handelyng of a theme symple by the same example of Iustice / addyng two pla[-] ces mo / whiche are called affines and con- traries on this maner.

What is Iustice? A vertue whereby to euery thyng is gyuen that that to it be- longeth.

What is the cause thereof? Mannes wyll consentyng with lawes & maners.

How many kyndes? Two.

Whiche? Commutatiue & Distributiue / for in two maners is our medlyng with other men / eyther in thynges of our sub- stance & wares / or in gentyll and cyuyle conuersacion.

[A.viii.r]

what thyng is Iustice commutatiue? Right and equitie in all contractes.

what is Iustice distributiue? Iustice of ciuile lyuynge.

How manyfolde is Iustyce dystrybu- tyue? Either it is comon or priuate. The comon is called in latin Pietas / but in en- glysshe it may be moost properly named good order / which is the crowne of all ver[-]

tues conceruynge honest and ciuile conuersacyon of men together / as the hedes with the meane comonalty in good vnity and concorde. Pryuate or seuerall Iustice dystributyue is honest and amyable frendeshyp & conuersacion of neighbours.

What are the offyces? To do for euery man / ryche or pore / of what estate so euer he be / and for our contrey / for our wyues / chyldren / and frendes / that that ought to be done for euery of them.

Affynes or vertues nigh to Iustice are constancy / lyberalytie / temperaunce.

Thynges contrary are fere / couetyse / prodigalytie.

And this is the maner of handelynge of a symple Theme dialectycall. But yet let nat the reder deceyue hym selfe / and thynke that the very perfyte knowlege is shewyd hym all here. And that whiche[A.viii.v] hath bē shewed now: is somewhat general and briefe. More sure and exact knowlege is contained in Logike / to whome I wyll aduise thē that be studiouse to resorte & to fetche euery thyng in his owne proper facultie.

Of a Theme compoude.

Uery Theme compoude: ey- ther it is proued trewe or fals. Now whether thou wylt p[ro]ue or improue any thyng: it must be done by argument. And yf any Theme compoude: be it Logicall or Rhetorycall / it must be referred to the rules of Logike by thē to be proued trew or fals. For this is the dyfference that is betwene these two sciences / that the Logician in dysputyng obserueth certayne rules for the settinge of his wordes being solicitous that there be spokē no more nor no lesse than the thyng requyeth / & that it be euin as plaīly spokē as it is thought. But the Rhetorician seketh about & borroweth where he can asmoche as he may for to make the symple and playne Logicall argumentes gaye & delectable to the eare. So than the sure iugement of argu-[B.i.r] mentes or reasons must be lerned of the logician / but the crafte to set thē out with pleasaunt figures and to delate the mater belongeth to the Rhetorician. As in Miloes cause / of whome was made mencion afore. A logician wolde briefly argue / who so euer violently wyll slee an other / may lawfully of the other be slayne in his defence. Clodius wolde vyolently haue slain Milo / wherfore Clodius might lawfully be slayne of Milo in Miloes owne defence. And this argument the logicians call a Sillogisme in Darii / whiche Tully in his oracion extendeth that in foure or fyue leues it is scant made an ende of / nor no man can haue knowlege whether Tullyes argument that he maketh in his oracyon for Milo / be a good argumente or nat / and howe it holdeth / excepte he can by Logyke reduce it to the perfecte and briefe forme

of a Sillogisme / takyng in the meane season of the Rhetorycyans what ornamentes haue ben cast to for to lyght and augment the oracyon / and to gyue it a maiestie.

The places out of whome are founde argumentes for the prouynge or improuyng of compounde Themes / are these folowyng.

[B.i.v]

Diffinicion

Cause

Partes lyke

contrary

F the places of argumentes shall be spoken hereafter. For as touchyng the in all thynges the Rhetorician & Logician do agre. But as concernyng the crafte to fourme argumentes whan thou hast foude them in theyr places / that must be lerned of the Logician / where he treateth of the fourme of sillogismes / enthime[-]mes and inductions.

Of an oracion demonstratiue.

The vse of an oracion demonstratiue is ī praise or dispraise / whiche kynde or maner of oracion was greatly vsed somtyme in comon accions / as dothe declare the oracions of Demosthenes / and also many of Thucydides oracions. And there ben thre maners of oracions demonstratiue.

The fyrst conteyneth the prayse or dys-[B.ii.r] prayse of persones. As yf a man wolde prayse the kynges hyghnes / or dysprayse some yll persone / it must be done by an ora[-]cion demonstratiue. The seconde kynde of an oracion demonstratiue is: where in is praysed or dysprayed / nat the persone but the dede. As if a thefe put hym selfe in iop[ar]dy for the safegarde of a true mā / against other theues and murderers / the p[er]son can nat be praysed for his vicious lyuyng / but yet the dede is worthy to be commended. Or if one shulde speake of Peters denyng of Christ / he hath nothyng to dispraise ye person saue onely for this dede. The thyrd kynde is: wherin is lauded or blamed nother person nor dede / but some other thing as vertue / vice / iustice / iniurie / charite / en- uie / pacience / wrathe / and suche lyke.

Partes of an Oracion.

The partes of an oracion prescribed of Rhetoriciens are these.

The Preamble or exorden.  
The tale or narracion.  
The prouynge of the matter or conten-  
cion.  
The conclusion.

[B.ii.v]

Of the whiche partes mencyon shall be  
made hereafter in euery kynde of oracions /  
for they are nat founde generally in euery  
oracion / but some haue moo partes / and  
some lesse.

Of the Preamble.

GENERALLY the Preamble nat alonly in an oracion demonstratiue / but al- so in the other two is conteyned and must be fetched out of thre places / that is to say of beneuolence / attencion / & to make the mater easy to be knowen / whiche the Rhetoricians call Docilite. Beneuolence is the place whereby the herer is made willyng to here vs / and it is conteyned in the thyng that we speke of / in them whom we speke to / & in our owne persone. The easyest and moost vsed place of beneuolence consysteth in the offyce or duety of the person / whan we shew that it is our duety to do that we be about. Out of this place is fet ye p[re]āble of saīt Gregory Nazazene / made to the praise of saynt Basyll / where he saith that it is his his duety to prayse saynt Basyll for thre causes. For the great loue and frendeshyp that hath ben always betwene them / and agayne for the remembraūce of the moost[B.iii.r] fayre and excellent vertues that were in hym / and thyrdely that the chyrch myght haue an example of a good and holy Bysshop. Trewly by our authours lycence me thynketh that in the preamble Naza- zen doth nat only take beneuolence out of the place of his owne persone / but also out of the other two / whā he sheweth the cause of his duetye / for in praysynge his frende he dyd but his duetye. In praysynge his vertues / he cam to the place of beneuolēce of hym that he spake of / as touchyng the example that the chyrche shulde haue / it was for theyr profite / and concernyng the place of beneuolence / taken of them that he spake to. But our authour regarded chiefly the principall proposicion / whiche was that saynt Gregory Nazazene was bounde to praise saint Basyll. A lyke example of beneuolence taken out of the place of office or dutie / is in the oracyon that Tully made for the Poete Archias / whiche begynneth thus. MY lordes that be here iuges / yf there be in me any wyt / whiche I knowe is but small / or yf I haue any crafty vse of makynge an oracion / wherein I denie nat but yt I haue metely excercysed my selfe / or yf any helpe to that science cometh out[B.iii.v] of other lyberall artes / in whome I haue occupied al my lyfe / surely I am boūde to no man more for them than to Archias / whiche may lawfully if I may do any mā any profite by them / chalenge a chiefe por[-]cion for hym therin. Out of this place dyd this same Tully fetche the begynnyng of his fyrste epistle / in whome he wrytethe to one Lentule on this maner: I do so my deutie in al poyn- tes towarde you / and so great is the loue and reuerence that I bere vnto you that all other men say that I can do no more / and yet me semeth that I haue neuer don that that I am bounde to do / eyther to you or in your cause. We may also get beneuolence by reason of them / whome we make our oracion of: As yf we saye that we can neuer prayse hym to hyghly / but yt he is worthy moch more laude and prayse. And so taketh saīt Nazianzene beneuolence in his sayd ora- cion for saint Basile. Also of them afore whome we speke / as if we say / it is for theyr profyte to laude or prayse the p[er]son. And that we knowe very wel howe moche they haue alwayes loued[B.iiii.r] hym / and that he ought therefore to be prai[-]sed the more for theyr sakes. The maner is also to get vs beneuolence in the preface of our oracion / by pynchyng and blamyng of our aduersarie. As doth Tullie in the o- racion that he made for one Aulus Cecinna / wherin he begynneth his proeme thus If temerite and lake of shame coulde as moche preuayle in plees afore the iustices / as doth audacite and temerarious bolde- nesse in the feldes and deserte places / there were no remedie but euen so muste Aulus Cecinna be ouercome in this matter by Sextus Ebucius impudence / as he was in the felde ouercome by his insidious au- dacite. And these be the cōmune formes of beneuolence. A man may also fetche his proeme out of the nature of the place wher he speketh / as Tullie dothe in the oracion made for Pompeius for the

sendyng of hym into Asie agaynst kynge Mithridates of Pon- tus / and kynge Tigraues of Armenie on this maner: howe be it my lordes and mai[-] sters of this noble citie of Rome / I haue al tymes thought it a synguler reioyse to me if I myght ones se you gadred to gyther in a cōpany / to here some publique oracion[B.iiii.v] of myne / and agayne I iuged no place to be so ample and so honourable to speke in as this is. &c[etera]. Or he may begyn at the nature of the tyme that is than / or at som other cyrcum[-] stance of his mater / as Tully taketh the begynnyng of his oracion for Celius at the tyme / this wise. If so be it my lordes iuges any mā be now present here that is ignorāt of your lawes / of your processe in iugement[e]s / and of your customes / surely he may well mar[-] uell what so heynous a mater this shulde be / that it onely shulde be syt vpon in an hygh feest daye / whan all the comonaltye after theyr olde custome are gyuen to the sight of playes / ordeined after a perpetual vsage for the nones for them / all maters of the law laid for the tyme vtterly a part. He began also an other oracion for one Sext[us] Roscius / out of the daunger of the season that he spake in. One may besyde these vse other maner of prohemes / whiche by cause they are nat set out of the very mater it selfe / or els the circumstaunces / as in these aforesayd they are called peregrine or straūge prohemes. And they be taken out of sētes / solēpne petitions / maners or customes / lawes / sta[-][B.v.r] tutes of nacyns & contreys. And on this maner dothe Aristides begyn his oracion made to the praise of Rome. Demosthenes in his oracyon made a- gainst Eschines / toke his preface out of a solempne petition / besechyng the goddes that he might haue as good fauour in yt cause / as he had foūde in all other maters yt he had done afore for the comon welth. In like maner beginneth Tully the ora[-] cion that he made for one Murena / & also the oracyon that he made vnto the Ro- maynes after his retourne from exyle. He begynneth also an other oracyon / whiche he made as touchyng a lawe de- creed for the diuision of feldes amonge the comunes out of a custome amonge them / on this wyse. The maner and custome of our olde fa- ders of Rome hath ben. &c. And this is the maner of prefaces in any oracion / whiche is also obserued in the making of epistles / howbeit there is farre lesse crafte in them than is in an oracyon. There is yet an other fourme & maner to begyn by insinuacion / wherfore it beho[-] ueth to know that insinuacion is / whā in the begynnyng / yf the mater seme nat lau[-] dable or honest / we find an excuse therefore. [B.v.v]

#### Example

/ Homere in his Iliade des- cribeth one Thersites / that he was moost foule and euyll fauored of all the Grekes that came to the batayle of Troye / for he was both gogle eyed / and lame on the one legge / with croked and pynched shulders / and a longe pyked hede / balde in very ma- ny places. And besyde these fautes he was a great folysshe babler / and ryght foule mouthed / and ful of debate and stryfe / car- ryng always agaynste the heddes and wyse men of the armye. Nowe if one wolde take vpon hym to make an oraciō to the prayse of this losel / whiche mater is of litle honesty in it selfe / he must vse in stede of a preface an insinu- acion. That what thyng poetes or com- mune fame doth eyther prayse or dispraise ought nat to be gyuen credence to / but ra- ther to be suspecte. For ones it is the na- ture of poetes to fayne and lye / as bothe Homere and Virgile / which are the prin- ces and heddes of al poetes to witnesse thē selfe. Of whome Homere sayth / that poe- tes make many lies / and Virgile he saith: The moost part of the sene is but deceyte.[B.vi.r] Poetes haue sene blake soules vnder the erthe / poetes haue fayned and made many lyes of the pale kyngdome of Plato / and of the water of Stigie / and of dogges in hell. And agayne cōmune rumours howe often they ben vayne / it is so open that it nede nat to be declared. Wherfore his trust is that the hearers wyll more regarde his sayng than fayned fables of poetes / and fleyng tales of lyght folkes / whiche ar for the more parte the grounders of fame & rumours. An example may be fet out of the decla- macion that Erasmus made to the prayse of folysshenes. An other example hath the same Eras- mus in his second booke of Copia / which is this: Plato in the fyfte dialogue of his comunaltie wyllethe that no man shall haue no wyfe of his owne / but that euery woman shalbe commune to euery man. If any man than wolde eyther prayse or de- fende this mynde of Plato / which is both contrarie to Christes religion and to the commune luyng of mē / he myght as E- rasmus teacheth / begynne thus. [B.vi.v] I knowe very well that this mater whiche I haue determyned to speke of / wyll seme vnto you at the fyrste heryng / nat onely very straunge / but also right ab- hominable. But that nat withstandyng / yf it wyll please you a litle while to deferre you iugement tyll ye haue herde the sūme of suche reasons as I wyll bryng forthe in the cause / I doubt nothyng but that I shall make the trouthe so euident that you all will with one assent approue it / & knowlege that ye haue ben hitherto mar- uelously deceyued in your oppynyon / and somdele to alleuiate your myndes / ye shall vnderstande that I am nat my selfe au- thour of the thyng / but it is the mynde & sayng of the excellent & moost highly na- med philosopher Plato / whiche was vn- doubted so famouse a clerke / so discrete a man / and soo vertuose in all his dedes / that ye may be sure he wold speke nothīg but it were on a right perfyte ground / and that the thyng were of it selfe very expe- dient / thoughe



peradventure it shewe ferre otherwise at the fyrst herynge. In all prefaces of preambles must be good heed taken that they be nat to ferre fet / nor to longe. These affectuouse wordes / I reioyce / I[B.vii.r] am sorye / I meruaile / I am glad for your sake / I desire / I fere / I pray god / and such other lyke / be very apte for a preface. Of the seconde place of a preface / called Attencion. He herers shall be made attent or diligent to giue audience / yf the oratour make promyse yt he will shew them new thynges / or els necessary or profita[-] ble / or yf he say yt it is an harde mater that he hath in handelynge / or els obscure & nat easy to be vnderstād / except they gyue right good attendaunce. wherfore it is expedyent that yf they wyll haue the percepcion of it / that they gyue a good eare. But as concernyng the newnesse or profyte of the mater / it ma- keth nat all onely ye herer to gyue a good ere (which thyng is called attencion) but also maketh hym well wyllynge for to be present / whiche is beneuolence. Docilite. Ocilite whereby we make the mater playne & easy to be per- ceuyed / is nat greatly required in this kynde of oracion / for it is belonging properly to derke[B.vii.v] and obscure causes / in whiche we must p[ro]- myse that we wyl nat vse great ambages / or to go (as mē say) roūde about the bussh / but to be short and playne. Of narracion whiche is the se- conde p[ar]te of an oracion. The Narracion or tale wherin p[er]sones are prayed / is the declaryng of theyr lyfe & doynge after the fasshion of an historie. The places out of the whiche it is sought are: The persones byrthe. His chyldhode. His adolescencie. His mannes state. His old age. His dethe and what foloweth after. N his byrthe is consydered of what stocke he came / what chaū[-] sed at the tyme of his natiuite or nighe vpon / as in the natiuite of Christe shepherdes hard angelles synge. In his chyldhode are marked his bryngyng vp and tokens of wysdome cō- mynge: As Horace in his fourthe Satire sheweth / how in his chyldhode his father taught hym by examples of suche as were than lyuyng to flee from vice and to gyue hym selfe to vertue. In adolescencie is considered where to[B.viii.r] he than gyueth hym selfe; As in the fyrst comedie of Terēce one Simo telleth his seruaut Sosia / that though all yonge men for the more parte gyue them selfe to some peculiare thyng / wherin they sette their chiefe delyght / as some to haue goo- dely horses / some to cherysshe houndes for huntyng / & some are gyuen onely to theyr bookes / his sone Pāphilus loued none of these more one thā an other / and yet in al these he exercised hym selfe mesurably. In mannes state and olde age is noted what office or rule he bare among his citi- sens / or in his cōtrey / what actes he dyd / how he gouerned suche as were vnd[er] him / howe he p[ro]spered / & what fortune he had in suche thyng[e]s as he went about. Example here of is in Saluste / whiche cōpareth to[-] gether Cato and Cesar / sayng that both theyr stocke / age & eloquēce / were almost lyke & egall / theyr excellēcie & greatnes of spirite & wytte was also lyke & egal / & lyke fame & worshyppe had they both attayned howe be it nat by a lyke waye. Cesar was had ī great estimacion for his benefites & liberalite. Cato had gottē hī a name for his p[er]fīght & vpriht lyuyng. Cesar was prayed for his gentilnes and pitie. Cato was honored for his earnestnes and surete. [B.viii.v] The tother wanne moche bruyt by gy[-] uyng large gyftes / by helpyng suche as were in dystresse / and by forgyuyng of tres[-] passes done agaynste hym. Catons fame dyd sprede because he wold neither be for- gyuen of none offence / neither forgiue non other / but as any man had deserued / so to cause him to be delt with. In the one was great refuge to suche as were in mysery: In the other was sore punisshment & per- nicion to mysdoers & euyll transgressours of the law. Briefly to conclude it was all Ceazars mynde and pleasure to labour di- ligently night and day in his frendes cau[-] ses / to care lesse for his owne busynes thā for theirs / to deny nothing that was wor[-] thy to be asked / his desyre was euermore to be in warre / to haue a great hoost of mē vnder his gouernaunce / that by his noble and hardy faictes his valyantnes myght be the more knowen and spred abroad. Cōtraryly all Catons study was on tem[-] peraūce / and to do in no maner otherwyse than was conuenient & fyttyng for suche a man as he was / and chiefly he sette his mynde to seuerity / he neuer made no com[-] parison with the riche man in richesse / nor with the myghty man in power. But yf nede required / with the hardy mā in bold-[C.i.r] nes / with the temperate in moderacion / with the good man in innocency & iust dea[-] ling. He cared not for the name / it was suf- ficiēt to hym to haue the dede / & so / the lesse he cared for glorye / the more alwayes he opteyned. Many suche comparisons ve- ry profitable for this intēt / are also in Plu[-] tarche in his boke of noble mennes lyues. A goodly ensāple of this place is in the oracion that Hermola[us] Barbarus made to the emperour Frederike and Maximi- lian his son / which for bicause it is so long I let it passe. A like ensample is in Tul- lies oracion / that he made to the people of Rome for Pompeyus / to be sente agaynst Mithridates. Some there be that deuide the landes of persones into thre kindes of goodes / be- gynnyng the narracion at them / whiche thyng our author doth nat greatly com- mende / but rather in rehersyng of any per[-] sones dedes / yf there can nat be kept an or- der of historie / and many thynges must be spoken. It were after his mynde best to touche fyrst his actes done by prudence / & next by iustice / thirdely by fortitude of the mynde / and last by temperaunce / and so to gather the narracion out of this foure car- dinall vertues. As if one shuld praise saint[C.i.v] Austen / after that he hath spoken of his pa[-] rentele and bryngyng vp in youthe / and is come to the rehersale of his actes / they may be conueniently distributed into the places of vertues.

On this maner did Tul[-] ly prayse Pompey. I suppose (sayeth he) that in hym that shulde be a hed capitayne ouer a great army / ought to be foure thynges. Knowledge of werre / valiantnes / auctoritie / & felicitie. Here is to be noted that in rehersynge any persons actes / we may haue our chief respecte to some peculiare and principall vertue in hym / enlargynge and exaltinge it by amplificaciō in maner of a digressiō. Our author in this worke maketh no mencyon of the last place that is dethe and suche thynges as folowe after / but in an other greater work he declareth it thus briefly. The dethe of the persone hathe also his praises / as of suche whiche haue ben slayne for the defence of theyr contrey or prince. A very goodly ensample for the handlinge of this place is in an epistle that An[-] gele Policiane writeth in his fourth boke of epistels to Iames Antiquarie of Laurence Medices / howe wysely and deuoutly he dysposed hym selfe in his dethe bed / [C.ii.r] and of his departyng / and what chann[-] ced at that tyme. And so to conclude an oracion Demonstratiue / wherein persones are lauded / is an historycall exposition of all his lyfe in order. And there is no difference betwene this kynde and an history / saue that in histories we be more briefe and vse lesse curiositie. Here all thynges be augmēted and coloured with as moche ornamentes of eloquence as can be had. Confirmacion of our purpose / and confutyng or reprouyng of the contrarye / whiche are the partes of contencion / are nat requisite in this kynde of oracion / for here are nat treated any doubtfull matters / to whome contencion pertaineth. Neuer the lesse / somtyme it happeneth (howbeit it is seldome) that a doubt may come / which must be either defended / or at the leest excused.

Example.

The frenche men in olde tyme  
made myghty warre agaynste  
the Romaynes / and so sore besieged  
theym that they were by compulsion  
constrayned to fall to composition [C.ii.v]  
with the frenche men for an huge summe  
of golde / to be payed to theym for the  
brekyng of the siege / but beyng in this  
extreme misery / they sent for one  
Camillus / whome nat very longe afore  
they had banished out of the citie /  
and in his absence made hym dictatour  
/ which was the chiefest dignitie  
amonge the Romaynes / and of so  
greate auctoritie / that for the space  
of thre monethes / for so long dured  
the office moost cōueniently / he might  
do all thyng at his pleasure / whether  
it concerned deth or no / nor no mā  
so hardy ones to say nay against any  
thyng that he dyd / so that for the  
space he was as a kynge / hauyng all  
in his owne mere power. Now it  
chaūced that while this summe was  
in payenge / & nat fully wayed /  
Camillus of whome I said afore /  
that being in exile he was made  
dictatour / came with an army / and  
anone bad cease of the payment / &  
that eche party shulde make redy to  
bataile / and so he vainquished  
the frenche men.

Now yf one shulde praise hym of his noble faites / it shuld seme that this was done contrary to the law of armes / to defaite the frenche men of the raumsom due to them / syns the compacte was made afore / wherfore it is necessary for the oratour to defēde [C.iii.r] this dede / & to proue that he did nothyng contrary to equitie. For the whiche purpose he hathe two places. One apparent / whiche is a comon sayenge vsurped of the poete. Dolus au

virtus quis in hoste requirat. That is to say / who will serche whether ye dede of enemy against enemy be either gile or pure valiantnes? But for that in warre law is as well to be kept as in other thin- ges. This sayeng is but of a feble groūde. The other is of a more stronge assuraūce / whiche Titus Liuius writeth in his fyfte boke from the buildyng of Rome / where he reherceth this history now mencioned / and that answeere is this / that the cōpacte was made to paye the foresayd raunsome after that Camillus was created dicta- tour / at what time it was nat lawfull that they whiche were of ferre lesse auctoritie / ye & had put them selfe holy in his hande / shuld entermedle them with any maner of treatise without his licence / & that he was nat bounde to stande to theyr bargayne. The whiche argumente is deducte out of two circumstaunces / whereof one is the tyme of the makynge of the compacte / and the other / the persons that made it / which two circumstaunces may briefly be called whan / and who. Likewise yf an oracion[C.iii.v] shulde be made to the laude of saint Pe- ter / it behoueth to excuse his denyenge of christe / that it was rather of diuine power and wyll: than otherwise / for a comfortable example to synners of grace yf they repēt. This is the maner of handelynge of an oracion demonstratiue / in whiche the per- son is praised. The author in his greater worke decla[-] reth the facion by this example. If one wolde praise kynge Charles / he shulde kepe in his oracion this order. Fyrst in declarynge his parentele / that he was kynge Pipines sone / whiche was the fyrste of all kynges of Franncce named the moost christen kynge / and by whom all af- ter hym had the same name / and Nephien to Martell / the moost valiauntest prynce that euer was. Nexte / his bryngynge vp vnder one Peter Pisane / of whom he was instructe bothe in Greke and Latin. Thā his adollescencie / whiche he passed in excer- cise of armes vnder in his fader in ye war- res of Aquitaine / where he lerned also the Sarazynes tongue. Beynge come to mannes state / & now kyuge of Fraunce / he subdued Aquitayn / Italye / Swauelande / and the Saxones. And these warres were so fortunate / that[C.iiii.r] he ouercam his aduersaries more by aucto[-] ritie and wisdom than by effusion of blode. Also many other notable examples of vertue were in hym in that age / specially that he edified the vniuersitie of Paris. Here may by digressiō be declared how goodly a thyng lernynge is in Prynces. Chiefly suche condicion apperteyneth to vertue and good luyng. Here may be also made comparison of his vertues in warre / and of other agre- ynge with peace / in the whiche (as his hi- story maketh mencyon) he was more ex- cellent. For his chiefe delyte was to haue peace / and agayne he was so gentyll and so mercyfull / that he wolde rather saue euyn suche as had don hym great offence: and had deserued very well for to dye / thā to dystroye theym / thoughte he might do it conueniently. Besyde this / he was so greatly enfla- med in the loue of god and his holy chirch / that one Alcuine a noble clerk of England was continually with hym / in whose prea[-] chyng and other gostely comunicacion he had a chiefe pleasure. His olde age he passed in rest and quyetenes fortunately / saue for one thyng / that his sonnes agreed euyll betwene them. [C.iiii.v] After his decease reigned his son / holy saint Lewes / and so the folowynges of his dethe were suche that they could be no bet- ter / and a very great token of his good and vertuouse luyng. For yf an yll tree can bryng furthe no good fruite / what shall we suppose of this noble kynge Charles / of whome cam so vertuouse and so holy a son? Truely me thynketh that hither may be nat incōueniently applied the sayenges of the gospels / by theyr frutes you shall know them. Of an oracion Demonstratiue / wherein an acte is praysed. WHan we wyll prayse any maner of dede / the moost apte preamble for that purpose shall be to say that the mater perteyneth to the commodities of them whiche here vs.

Example.

WHan the Romaynes had expelled  
 theyr kynge / whome the historiciens  
 call Tarquine the proude / out of the  
 citie / and fully enacted that they wolde ne[-]  
 uer haue kynge to reigne more ouer them.  
 This Tarquin[us] went for aide and socour  
 to the kynge of Tuscaye / whiche whan he[C.v.r]  
 could by no menes entreat the Romains  
 to receiue agayn theyr kyng / he cam with  
 all his puissaunce against the citie / & there  
 long space besieged the Romaynes / by rea[-]  
 son wherof / great penury of whete was in  
 the citie / & the kynge of Tuscay had great  
 trust / that continuyng the siege / he shulde

within a litle lenger space compell the Ro[-]  
maynes through famine to yelde thēselfe.

In the meane season a yong man of the  
citie named Gaius Mucius / came to the  
Senatours and shewed them that he was  
purposed yf they wolde gyue hym licence  
to go furthe of the citie to do an acte that  
shuld be for theyr great profite and welth /  
whereupon when he had obtained licence /  
priuely / with weapō hyd vnder his vesture  
he cam to the Tuscans campe / & gate hym  
among the thickest / nigh to the tent where  
as the kyng sat with his chaunceller / pay-  
enge the sowdiers the wages. And bicause  
that they were almoost of lyke apparell / &  
also the chaunceler spake many thynges  
as a man beyng in auctoritie / he coulde  
nat tell whether of theym was the kynge /  
nor he durst nat aske / leest his demaunde  
wolde haue bewrayed hym / for as for lan-  
guage they had one / & nothyng was diffe-  
rent / for bothe Tuscains & Romains were[C.v.v]  
all of Italye / as in tymes past / Englande  
hathe had many kynges / though the lan-  
guage & people were on. And thus beyng  
in doubt whether of them he myght steppe  
vnto / by chaunce he strake the chaunceller  
in stede of the kynge / and slew hym / wher-  
fore when he was taken and brought be-  
fore the kynge / for to punyssh his hande  
that had failed in takyng one for an other /  
and agayn to shew the kynge how litle he  
cared for his menaces / he thrast his hande  
into the fire / which at that time was there  
prepared for sacrifice / & there in the flame  
let it brenne / nat ones mouynge it. The  
kynge greatly marueylynge at his audaci[-]  
tie & hardy nature / cōmended hym greatly  
thereof / and bad hym go his way free: For  
the whiche (as though he wolde make the  
kyng a great amendes) he fayned that .iii.  
C. of the noblest yonge men of Rome had  
conspyred to gyther in lyke maner euery  
one after another vnwar[e]s to slee hym / and  
all to put theyr bodies and liues in hasard  
tyll tyme shulde chaunce that one myght  
acheue theyr entent. For fere whereof the  
kynge furthwith fell at a pointement with  
the Romaines / and departed. The yonge  
man afterwarde was named Sceuola /  
whiche is as moche to say in Englyssh as[C.vi.r]

lefte hāded. For as I haue reherced afore /  
he brente his right hande / so that he had  
lost the vse therof.

IF any oratour wolde in an oracyon commende this dede / he myght conueni- ently make the preface on this facion. There is no doubt my lordes & maysters of Rome: but that the remēbraunce of Sceuolaes name is very pleasant vnto your audiēce / whiche with one act that he dyd / endewed your citie with many and greate commo- dytees. &c[etera]. This maner of preface is moost conue[-] nyent and best annexyd to suche maner of oracyons demonstratiues. Neuer the lesse it is lawfull for vs to take our preface (yf it be our pleasure) oute of some circumstaunce / as out of the place that our oracion is made in / or out of the tyme that we speke in / or els otherwyse / accordyng as we shall haue occasyon / As Tullie / in the oracyon that he made for the restitucion of Marcus Marcel- lus / in the whiche he praiseth Cezare for the callyng home of the sayd Marc[us] mar- cellus out of exyle / he taketh his pream- ble out of the tyme and Cezares persone / begynnyng thus. [C.vi.v] THis daye my lordes Senatoures hath made an ende of the longe sci- lence that I haue kepte a great while / nat for any fere that I had / but part for great sorow that was in me / & partly for shame / this day as I sayd hath taken away that longe scilence / ye / and besyde that of newe brought to me lust & mynde to speke what I wolde / and what I thought moost expe[-] dient / like as I was afore wont to do. For I can nat in no maner of wyse refrayne / but I must nedes speke of the great meke- nes of Cezare / of the graciousnes that is in hym / so habūdant and so great withall / that neuer afore any suche hath ben wont to be sene or herde of / and also of the excel- lent good moderaciō of all thynges which is in hym that hathe all in his owne mere power. Nor I can nat let passe his excellēt incredible / and diuine wisdomē vnspoken of / afore you at this tyme.

Of the Narracion.

IN this kynde we vse but seldom hole narracions / oneles we make our ora[-] cion afore them that know nat the history of the acte or dede whiche we be aboute to prayse. But in stede of a narracion we vse a[C.vii.r] proposicion / on this maner.

AMonge all the noble deedes Cezare that ye haue done / there is non that is more worthy to be prayed than this re[-] stitucion of Marke Marcell.

Of Confirmacion / whiche is the fyrst parte of Contencion.

THE places of confirmacion are honesty / p[er]fite / lightnes / or har- dines of the dede. For after the prohome of the oracion and the narracion / than go we to the prouyng of our mater. Fyrst shewyng that it was a very honest dede. And next / that it was nat all only ho[-] nesty: but also profitable. Thirdely as con[-] cernyng the easines or difficulty / the praise therof must be considered / parte in the do- er / part in the dede. An easy dede deserueth no great praise / but an harde and a ieoper[-] douse thyng / the soner and the lightlier it is acheued / the more it is to be lauded. The honesty of the cause is fet from the nature of the thyng yt is spoken of / which place lieth in the wytte of the oratour / and may also be fet out of the philosophers bo[-] kes. It is also copiosely declared of Rhe- toriciens / and very compēdiouly handled[C.vii.v] of Erasmus in his boke / entituled of the maner and crafte to make epistels / in the chapitre of a persuadyng epistle. The pro- fyte of the dede / or the commoditie may be fet at the circumstaunce of it. Circumstaū[-] ces are these / what was done / who dyd it / whan / where it was done / among whom / by whose helpe. As if one wolde praise Sceuolaes acte / of the whiche mencion was made afore / he may. Whan he cometh

to the places of contention / shew fyrst how honest a dede it is for any man to put his lyfe in ieopardy for the defence of his countrey / whiche is so moche the more to be commended that it cam of his owne minde / and nat by the instigation of any other / and how profitable it was to the citie to remoue so strong and puissaunt an enemy by so good and crafty policy / what tyme the citie was nat well assured of all mennes myndes that were within the walles / considerynge that but a lytle afore many noble yonge men were detecte of treason in the same busines. And than also the citie was almost destitute of vitales / & all other commodities necessary for the defence.

### 3. Indian Rhetoric. Aitareya Upanishad

#### Aitareya Upanishad

##### *Invocation*

*May my speech be fixed in my mind, may my mind be fixed in my speech! O self—luminous Brahman, be manifested to me. O mind and speech, may you bring me the meaning of the Vedas! May what I study from the Vedas not leave me! I shall unite day and night through this study. I shall think of the right; I shall speak the right. May Brahman protect me, may Brahman protect the teacher! May Brahman protect me, may Brahman protect the teacher! Om. Peace! Peace! Peace!*

##### *Part One*

##### *Chapter I—The Creation of Virat*

*1 In the beginning all this verily was Atman only, one and without a second. There was nothing else that winked. He bethought Himself: "Let Me now create the worlds."*

*2 He created these worlds: Ambhah, the world of water—bearing clouds, Marichi, the world of the solar rays, Mara, the world of mortals and Ap, the world of waters. Yon is Ambhah, above heaven; heaven is its support. The Marichis are the interspace. Mara is the earth. What is underneath is Ap.*

*3 He bethought Himself: "Here now are the worlds. Let Me now create world—guardians." Right from the waters He drew forth the Person in the form of a lump and gave Him a shape.*

*4 He brooded over Him. From Him, so brooded over, the mouth was separated out, as with an egg; from the mouth, the organ of speech; from speech, fire, the controlling deity of the organ. Then the nostrils were separated out; from the nostrils, the organ of breath; from breath, air, the controlling deity of the organ. Then the eyes were separated out; from the eyes, the organ of sight; from sight, the sun, the controlling deity of the organ. Then the ears were separated out; from the ears, the organ of hearing; from hearing, the quarters of space, the controlling deity of the organ. Then the skin was separated out; from the skin, hairs, the organ of touch; from the hairs, plants and trees, air the controlling deity of the organs. Then the heart was separated out; from the heart, the organ of the mind; from the mind, the moon, the controlling deity of the organ. Then the navel was separated out; from the navel, the organ of the apana; from the apana, Death, Varuna, the controlling deity of the organ.*

*Then the virile member was separated out; from the virile member, semen, the organ of generation; from the semen, the waters, the controlling deity of the organ.*

##### *Chapter II—Cosmic Powers in the Human Body*

*1 These deities, thus created, fell into this great ocean. He subjected the Person to hunger and thirst. They said to Him: "Find out for us an abode wherein being established we may eat food."*

*2—3 He brought them a cow. They said: "But this is not enough for us." He brought them a horse. They said: "This, too, is not enough for us." He brought them a person. The deities said: "Ah, this is well done, indeed." Therefore a person is verily something well done. He said to the deities: "Now enter your respective abodes."*

*4 The deity fire became the organ of speech and entered the mouth. Air became breath and entered the nostrils. The sun became sight and entered the eyes; the quarters of space became hearing and entered the ears. Plants and trees, the deity of air, became hairs and entered the skin. The moon became the mind and entered the heart. Death became the apana and entered the navel. The waters became semen and entered the virile member.*

*5 Hunger and thirst said to the Creator: "For the two of us find an abode also." He said to them: "I assign the two of you to these deities; I make you co—sharers with them." Therefore to whatsoever deity an oblation is made, hunger and thirst became sharers in it.*

##### *Chapter III—The Embodiment of the Supreme Self*

*1 He bethought Himself: "Here now are the worlds and the world—guardians. Let Me create food for them."*

*2 He brooded over the waters. From the waters, thus brooded over, there emerged a condensed form. The form that so emerged is indeed food.*

*3 The food so created wished to flee away. He sought to grasp it with speech. But He was not able to grasp it with speech. If, indeed, He has grasped it with speech, one would then have been satisfied by merely uttering the word food*

*4—10 The Creator sought to grasp it with the breath. But He was not able to grasp it with the breath. If, indeed, He had grasped it with the breath, one would then have been satisfied by merely smelling food. He sought to grasp it*

with the eye. But He was not able to grasp it with the eye. If, indeed, He had grasped it with the eye, one would then have been satisfied by merely seeing food. He sought to grasp it with the ear. But He was not able to grasp it with the ear. If, indeed, He had grasped it with the ear, one would then have been satisfied by merely hearing of food. He sought to grasp it with the skin. But He was not able to grasp it with the skin. If, indeed, He had grasped it with the skin, one would then have been satisfied by merely touching food. He sought to grasp it with the mind. But He was not able to grasp it with the mind. If, indeed, He had grasped it with the mind, one would then have been satisfied by merely thinking of food. He sought to grasp it with the virile member. But He was not able to grasp it with the virile member. If, indeed, He had grasped it with the virile member, one would then have been satisfied by merely emitting food. He sought to grasp it with the apana and He grasped it. This grasper of food is what vayu, air or prana is. This vayu is what lives on food.

11 He bethought Himself: "How could this exist without Me?" Then He said to Himself: "Which way shall I enter it?" he said to Himself further: "If speech is uttered by the organ of speech, if smelling is done by the breath, seeing by the eyes, hearing by the ears, touching by the skin, thinking by the mind, eating by the apana and the emission of semen by the virile member, then who am I?"

12 So, piercing the end, the Lord entered through that door. That door is known as the vidriti, the cleft. This is the place of bliss. Atman, thus embodied, has three abodes, three conditions of sleep. This is one abode, this is another, this is the third.

13 Having been born as the jiva, He realised the elements as one with Himself. What else here would one desire to speak about? He perceived this very person as the all—pervading Brahman. He said: "Ah, I have seen It." (Idandra - This (I) saw)

14 Therefore He is called Idandra. Idandra, indeed is His name. Him who is Idandra they call indirectly Indra. For the gods appear to be fond of cryptic epithets; yea, the gods appear to be fond of cryptic epithets (paroksha priyaahi iva devah).

Part Two

Chapter I—The Three Births of the Self

1 This person is, at first, the germ in a man. That which is the semen is here called the germ. This semen is the vigour drawn from all the limbs. The man bears the self in the self. When he pours the semen into a woman, he gives it a birth. This, indeed, is the first birth of the embodied soul.

2 That semen becomes one with the woman—just like a limb of her own. That is why it does not hurt her. She nourishes this self of his that has come into her.

3 She, being the nourisher, should be nourished. The woman nourishes the embryo. Immediately after its birth he nourishes the child, which in the beginning was already born. Nourishing the child from birth onward, he thus nourishes himself for the continuation of these worlds. For thus alone are these worlds perpetuated. This is one's second birth.

4 He who is the one self of his, is made his substitute for virtuous deeds. Then the other self of his, having accomplished his duties and reached his age departs. So departing hence, he is born again. This is the third birth.

5 About this a rishi has said: "While still lying in the womb, I came to know all the births of the gods. A hundred strongholds, as if made of iron, confined me, yet I burst through them all swiftly, like a hawk." Vamadeva spoke, in this wise, even while lying in the womb.

6 Thus endowed with Knowledge, he, becoming one with the Supreme Self and soaring aloft on the dissolution of the body, obtained all desires in the heavenly world and became immortal—yea, became immortal.

Part Three

Chapter I—Concerning the Self

1 Who is He whom we worship, thinking: "This is the Self"? Which one is the Self? Is it He by whom one sees form, by whom one hears sound and by whom one tastes the sweet and the unsweet?

2 Is it the heart and the mind. It is consciousness, lordship, knowledge, wisdom, retentive power of mind, sense knowledge, steadfastness, though, thoughtfulness, sorrow, memory, concepts, purpose, life, desire, longing: all these are but various names of Consciousness (Prajnanam).

3 He is Brahman, He is Indra, He is Prajapati; He is all these gods; He is the five great elements—earth, air, akasa, water, light; He is all these small creatures and the others which are mixed; He is the origin—those born of an egg, of a womb, of sweat and of a sprout; He is horses, cows, human beings, elephants—whatever breathes here, whether moving on legs or flying in the air or unmoving. All this is guided by Consciousness, is supported by Consciousness. The basis is Consciousness. Consciousness is Brahman (Prajnanam Brahma).



4 He, having realised oneness with Pure Consciousness, soared from this world and having obtained all desires in yonder heavenly world, became immortal—yea, became immortal.

End of Aitareya Upanishad

The Peace Chant

May my speech be fixed in my mind, may my mind be fixed in my speech! O self—luminous Brahman, be manifest to me. O mind and speech, may you bring me the meaning of the Vedas! May what I study from the Vedas not leave me! I shall unite day and night through this study. I shall think of the right; I shall speak the right. May Brahman protect me, may Brahman protect the teacher! May Brahman protect me, may Brahman protect the teacher!

Om. Peace! Peace! Peace!

KHĀNDOGYA-UPANISHAD.

FIRST PRAPĀTHAKA.

FIRST KHANDA 1.

1. LET a man meditate on the syllable 2 Om, called the udgîtha; for the udgîtha (a portion of the Sâma-veda) is sung, beginning with Om.

The full account, however, of Om is this:--

2. The essence 3 of all beings is the earth, the essence of the earth is water, the essence of water

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the plants, the essence of plants man, the essence of man speech, the essence of speech the Rig-veda, the essence of the Rig-veda the Sâma-veda 1, the essence of the Sâma-veda the udgîtha (which is Om).

3. That udgîtha (Om) is the best of all essences, the highest, deserving the highest place 2, the eighth.

4. What then is the Rik? What is the Sâman? What is the udgîtha? 'This is the question.

5. The Rik indeed is speech, Sâman is breath, the udgîtha is the syllable Om. Now speech and breath, or Rik and Sâman, form one couple.

6. And that couple is joined together in the syllable Om. When two people come together, they fulfil each other's desire.

7. Thus he who knowing this, meditates on the syllable (Om), the udgîtha, becomes indeed a fulfiller of desires.

8. That syllable is a syllable of permission, for whenever we permit anything, we say Om, yes. Now permission is gratification. He who knowing this meditates on the syllable (Om), the udgîtha, becomes indeed a gratifier of desires.

9. By that syllable does the threefold knowledge (the sacrifice, more particularly the Soma-sacrifice, as founded on the three Vedas) proceed. When the Adhvaryu priest gives an order, he says Om. When the Hotri priest recites, he says Om. When the Udgâtri priest sings, he says Om,

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[paragraph continues] --all for the glory of that syllable. The threefold knowledge (the sacrifice) proceeds by the greatness of that syllable (the vital breaths), and by its essence (the oblations) 1.

10. Now therefore it would seem to follow, that both he who knows this (the true meaning of the syllable Om), and he who does not, perform the same sacrifice 2. But this is not so, for knowledge and ignorance are different. The sacrifice which a man performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad 3 is more powerful. This is the full account of the syllable Om.

#### 4. Chinese Rhetoric. *I Ching*

##### Gen (Ken)

1 艮: 艮其背，不獲其身，行其庭，不見其人，無咎。

Gen: When one's resting is like that of the back, and he loses all consciousness of self; when he walks in his courtyard, and does not see any (of the persons) in it,—there will be no error.

彖傳: 艮，止也。時止則止，時行則行，動靜不失其時，其道光明。艮其止，止其所也。上下敵應，不相與也。是以不獲其身，行其庭不見其人，無咎也。

Tuan Zhuan: Gen denotes stopping or resting; - resting when it is the time to rest, and acting when it is the time to act. When one's movements and restings all take place at the proper time for them, his way (of proceeding) is brilliant and intelligent. Resting in one's resting-point is resting in one's proper place. The upper and lower (lines of the hexagram) exactly correspond to each other, but are without any interaction; hence it is said that '(the subject of the hexagram) has no consciousness of self; that when he walks in his courtyard, he does not see (any of) the persons in it; and that there will be no error.'

象傳: 兼山，艮；君子以思不出其位。

Xiang Zhuan: (Two trigrams representing) a mountain, one over the other, form Gen. The superior man, in accordance with this, does not go in his thoughts beyond the (duties of the) position in which he is.

2 艮: 初六: 艮其趾，無咎，利永貞。

Gen: The first SIX, divided, shows its subject keeping his toes at rest. There will be no error; but it will be advantageous for him to be persistently firm and correct.

象傳: 艮其趾，未失正也。

Xiang Zhuan: 'He keeps his toes at rest:' - he does not fail in what is correct (according to the idea of the figure).

3 艮: 六二: 艮其腓，不拯其隨，其心不快。

Gen: The second SIX, divided, shows its subject keeping the calves of his legs at rest. He cannot help (the subject of the line above) whom he follows, and is dissatisfied in his mind.

象傳: 不拯其隨，未退聽也。

Xiang Zhuan: 'He cannot help him whom he follows:' (he whom he follows) will not retreat to listen to him.

4 艮: 九三: 艮其限，列其夤，厲薰心。

Gen: The third NINE, undivided, shows its subject keeping his loins at rest, and separating the ribs (from the body below). The situation is perilous, and the heart glows with suppressed excitement.

象傳: 艮其限，危薰心也。

Xiang Zhuan: 'He keeps the loins at rest:' - the danger (from his doing so) produces a glowing, heat in the heart.

5 艮: 六四: 艮其身，無咎。

Gen: The fourth SIX, divided, shows its subject keeping his trunk at rest. There will be no error.

象傳: 艮其身，止諸躬也。

Xiang Zhuan: 'He keeps the trunk of his body at rest:' - he keeps himself free (from agitation).

6 艮: 六五: 艮其輔，言有序，悔亡。

Gen: S. The fifth SIX, divided, shows its subject keeping his jawbones at rest, so that his words are (all) orderly. Occasion for repentance will disappear.

象傳: 艮其輔，以中正也。

Xiang Zhuan: 'He keeps his cheek bones at rest:' - in harmony with his central position he acts correctly.

7 艮: 上九: 敦艮，吉。

Gen: The sixth NINE, undivided, shows its subject devotedly maintaining his restfulness. There will be good fortune.

象傳: 敦艮之吉，以厚終也。

Xiang Zhuan: 'There is good fortune through his devotedly maintaining his restfulness:' - to the end he shows himself generous and good.

## 52. Kên / Keeping Still, Mountain

The image of this hexagram is the mountain, the youngest son of heaven and earth. The male principle is at the top because it strives upward by nature; the female principle is below, since the direction of its movement has come to its normal end.

In its application to man, the hexagram turns upon the problem of achieving a quiet heart. It is very difficult to bring quiet to the heart. While Buddhism strives for rest through an ebbing away of all movement in nirvana, the Book of Changes holds that rest is merely a state of polarity that always posits movement as its complement. Possibly the words of the text embody directions for the practice of yoga.

### THE JUDGMENT

KEEPING STILL. Keeping his back still  
So that he no longer feels his body.  
He goes into his courtyard  
And does not see his people.  
No blame.

True quiet means keeping still when the time has come to keep still, and going forward when the time has come to go forward. In this way rest and movement are in agreement with the demands of the time, and thus there is light in life.

The hexagram signifies the end and the beginning of all movement. The back is named because in the back are located all the nerve fibers that mediate movement. If the movement of these spinal nerves is brought to a standstill, the ego, with its restlessness, disappears as it were. When a man has thus become calm, he may turn to the outside world. He no longer sees in it the struggle and tumult of individual beings, and therefore he has that true peace of mind which is needed for understanding the great laws of the universe and for acting in harmony with them. Whoever acts from these deep levels makes no mistakes.

### THE IMAGE

Mountains standing close together:  
The image of KEEPING STILL.  
Thus the superior man  
Does not permit his thoughts  
To go beyond his situation.

The heart thinks constantly. This cannot be changed, but the movements of the heart-that is, a man's thoughts-should restrict themselves to the immediate situation. All thinking that goes beyond this only makes the heart sore.

No moving lines for the current hexagram.  
The following commentary does not apply.

## THE LINES

Six at the beginning means:  
Keeping his toes still.  
No blame.  
Continued perseverance furthers.

Keeping the toes still means halting before one has even begun to move. The beginning is the time of few mistakes. At that time one is still in harmony with primal innocence. Not yet influenced by obscuring interests and desires, one sees things intuitively as they really are. A man who halts at the beginning, so long as he has not yet abandoned the truth, finds the right way. But persisting firmness is needed to keep one from drifting irresolutely.

Six in the second place means:  
Keeping his calves still.  
He cannot rescue him whom he follows.  
His heart is not glad.

The leg cannot move independently; it depends on the movement of the body. If a leg is suddenly stopped while the whole body is in vigorous motion, the continuing body movement will make one fall.

The same is true of a man who serves a master stronger than himself. He is swept along, and even though he may himself halt on the path of wrongdoing, he can no longer check the other in his powerful movement. Where the master presses forward, the servant, no matter how good his intentions, cannot save him.

Nine in the third place means:  
Keeping his hips still.  
Making his sacrum stiff.  
Dangerous. The heart suffocates.

This refers to enforced quiet. The restless heart is to be subdued by forcible means. But fire when it is smothered changes into acrid smoke that suffocates as it spreads.

Therefore, in exercises in meditation and concentration, one ought not to try to force results. Rather, calmness must develop naturally out of a state of inner composure. If one tries to induce calmness by means of artificial rigidity, meditation will lead to very unwholesome results.

Six in the fourth place means:  
Keeping his trunk still.  
No blame.

As has been pointed out above in the comment on the Judgment, keeping the back at rest means forgetting the ego. This is the highest stage of rest. Here this stage has not yet been reached: the individual in this instance, though able to keep the ego, with its thoughts and impulses, in a state of rest, is not yet quite liberated from its dominance. Nonetheless, keeping the heart at rest is an important function, leading in the end to the complete elimination of egotistic drives. Even though at this point one does not yet remain free from all the dangers of doubt and unrest, this frame of mind is not a mistake, as it leads ultimately to that other, higher level.

Six in the fifth place means:  
Keeping his jaws still.  
The words have order.  
Remorse disappears.

A man in a dangerous situation, especially when he is not adequate to it, is inclined to be very free with talk and presumptuous jokes. But injudicious speech easily leads to situations that subsequently give much cause for regret. However, if a man is reserved in speech, his words take ever more definite form, and every occasion for regret vanishes.

Nine at the top means:  
Noblehearted keeping still.  
Good fortune.

This marks the consummation of the effort to attain tranquillity. One is at rest, not merely in a small, circumscribed way in regard to matters of detail, but one has also a general resignation in regard to life as a whole, and this confers peace and good fortune in relation to every individual matter.

When one's resting is like that of the back, and he loses all consciousness of self; when he walks in his courtyard, and does not see any (of the persons) in it,--there will be no error.

1. The first SIX, divided, shows its subject keeping his toes at rest. There will be no error; but it will be advantageous for him to be persistently firm and correct.

2. The second SIX, divided, shows its subject keeping the calves of his legs at rest. He cannot help (the subject of the line above) whom he follows, and is dissatisfied in his mind.

3. The third NINE, undivided, shows its subject keeping his loins at rest, and separating the ribs (from the body below). The situation is perilous, and the heart glows with suppressed excitement.

4. The fourth SIX, divided, shows its subject keeping his trunk at rest. There will be no error.

5. The fifth SIX, divided, shows its subject keeping his jawbones at rest, so that his words are (all) orderly. Occasion for repentance will disappear.

6. The sixth NINE, undivided, shows its subject devotedly maintaining his restfulness. There will be good fortune.

#### Footnotes

177:LII The trigram Kǎn represents a mountain. Mountains rise up grandly from the surface of the earth, and their masses rest on it in quiet and solemn majesty; and they serve also to arrest the onward progress of the traveller. Hence the attribute ascribed to Kǎn is twofold; it is both active and passive-resting and arresting. The character is used in this hexagram with both of those significations. As the name of the figure, it denotes the mental characteristic of resting in what is right; especially resting, as it is expressed by Chinese critics, 'in principle,'--that which is light, on the widest scale, and in the absolute conception of the mind; and that which is right in every different position in which a man can be placed. We find this treated of in the Great Learning (Commentary, chapter 3), and in the Doctrine of the Mean, chapter 14, and other places. This is the theme of the hexagram; and the symbolism of it is all taken from different parts of the human body, as in hexagram 31, and the way in which they are dealt with. Several of the paragraphs are certainly not easy to translate and interpret.

The other parts of the body, such as the mouth, eyes, and ears, have their appetencies, which lead them to what is without themselves. The back alone has nothing to do with anything beyond itself--hardly with itself even; all that it has to do is to stand straight and strong. So should it be with, us, resting in principle, free from the intrusion of selfish thoughts and external objects. Amidst society, he who realises the idea of the hexagram is still alone, and does not allow himself to be distracted from the contemplation and following of principle. He is not a recluse, however, who keeps aloof from social life; but his distinction is that he maintains a supreme regard to principle,

when alone, and when mingling with others.

In the symbolism the author rises from one part of the body to the other. The first line at the bottom of the figure fitly suggests 'the toes.' The lesson is that from the first men should rest in, and be anxious to do, what is right in all their affairs. The weakness of the line and its being in an odd place give occasion for the caution, with which the paragraph concludes.

Above the toes are the calves, represented by the second line, weak, but in its proper place. Above this, again, are the loins, represented by 3, strong, and in danger of being violent. Line 2 p. 178 follows 3, and should help it; but is unable to do so; and there results dissatisfaction.

When the calves are kept at rest, advance is stopped, but no other harm ensues. Not so when the loins are kept at rest, and unable to bend, for the connexion between the upper and lower parts of the body is then broken. The dissatisfaction increases to an angry heat. Paragraph 3 is unusually difficult. For 'loins' P. Regis has scapulae, and for ribs renes; Canon McClatchie says:--'Third Nine is stopping at a limit, and separating what is in continued succession (i. e. the backbone); thus the mind,' &c.

Line 4 is a weak line resting in a proper place; hence it gives a good auspice. The Khang-hsi editors, however, call attention to the resting of the trunk as being inferior to the resting of the back in the Thwan.

The place of the weak fifth line is not proper for it; and this accounts for the mention of its subject 'repenting,' for which, however, there is not occasion.

The third line of the trigrams, and the sixth of the hexagram, is what makes Kǎn what it is,--the symbol of a mountain. The subject of it therefore will carry out the resting required by the whole figure in the highest style.

*Fee-Alexandra Haase*

*The 'Characters of the Speaker' and the 'Characters of Speech'.*

*Literary Sources for Chinese Speech and Communication Methods*

**Examples for Comparative Linguistic and Cultural Studies in Rhetorical Terminology of Chinese Culture and Western Terminology for Classic Rhetoric Concepts.**

### **Abstract**

This article describes the use of rhetoric as an element of cultural contexts in a Western and Eastern culture focussing on the terminology and the use of rhetoric in China in the context of its cultural –which means in most cases religious- systems where rhetoric serves as an ethical codex. One example of a similarity is the term 'the superior man' in Chinese, which can be compared with the 'vir bonus' (good man) of Roman rhetoric based upon Greek rhetoric. So this article is a contrastive study between Eastern and Western cultures of speech concepts. In contemporary vocabulary of Chinese the terms of ancient Greek rhetoric exist next to the traditional terminology used for rhetoric. But there is a lack of documents for any transfer between both cultures. We will demonstrate how in general the concepts of philosophy took the topos of 'good speech' as an element within their system in order to integrate their teachings. We will also demonstrate the structural parallels in Western classical and Korean and Japanese formulas of rhetorical writing.

Our method of access to this field is comparative rhetoric. Comparative rhetoric, according to George A. Kennedy, is 'the cross-cultural study of rhetorical traditions as they exist or have existed in different societies around the world'.<sup>1</sup> But we must also consider limits and the fact that certain aspects of rhetoric are universal and so also part of e.g.

<sup>1</sup> Kennedy, George A. (1998) *Comparative Rhetoric: An Historical and Cross-cultural Introduction*. (New York, Oxford UP), 12

Chinese culture. The figures of speech, we will discuss later, are one example for this phenomenon. Regarding the sources we miss in the Chinese culture a consequent tradition of rhetoric and its teachings and an institutional place. Instead we have only certain personal authorities; in their teachings some aspects of rhetoric can be found, but none of them can claim to be exclusively related to rhetoric.<sup>2</sup> George Kennedy's *Comparative Rhetoric* was the first book to offer a cross-cultural overview of rhetoric as a universal feature of expression, composition, and communication. The second part of this book provides an account of rhetoric as understood and practiced in early literate societies in the Near East, China, India, Greece, and Rome, identifying unique or unusual features of Western discourse in comparison to uses elsewhere. Kennedy already evaluated the validity of traditional Western rhetorical concepts in describing non-Western rhetoric. In our first part we will deductively introduce Chinese rhetoric using the figures of speech as one example for this deduction.

If we take Greece as paradigm for the Western rhetoric, the areas of rhetoric are politics, law and public life. Later in Christian culture theology was added. In the Western culture rhetoric traditionally has a close relationship to ethics, criticism, and discourse. Rhetoric is to be found in every use of language. This ancient idea of 'good speaking' is a similarity to ethics, moral or religious precepts that are parts of good speech in Asian systems. In Roman rhetoric the definition as '*ars bene dicendi*' and its three main elements to teach (*docere*), to move (*movere*) and to bring joy (*delectare*) demonstrate the social factors of Western rhetoric tradition coming from Greece and being absorbed by the Roman culture. The categories for a person's value were in Greek culture 'ethos', 'pathos' and 'logos' according to the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle (1.2.2). Greek rhetoric developed the five canons of rhetoric (*invention, heuresis, inventio*), arrangement (*taxis, dispositio*), style (*lexis, elocutio*), delivery (*hypokrisis, actio*), and memory (*mneme, memoria*). This thinking flourished in Western culture to the genre of rhetorical handbooks for all kinds of use as well as for its sister discipline poesy. The term the 'superior man' corresponds to the classical ideal in books of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian mentioning that the orator must be a man of good moral character. From this moral quality speech derives its effectiveness. Like the ideal speaker in the West exhibits or embodies certain characteristics for his moral goodness so also the ideal speaker in the Confucian tradition embodies certain characteristics. In Western culture tradition the system of rhetoric was dominated either by religion or by philosophy, when the renaissance on the *artes liberales* started in the Middle Ages. In Far Asia the advices of speaking were more or less a permanent part of religious or philosophical thinking. As a daily phenomenon of human societies, the practice of communication as well shows its diversity and variations in Chinese societies.

### **The Chinese Terminology of Rhetoric According to Greek Terminology and Chinese Literary Sources**

Contemporary Chinese has a bright variety of rhetorical terms coming from Greek rhetoric. Figures of speech always make our language figurative. When we use words in other than their ordinary or literal sense to lend force to an idea, to heighten effect, or to create suggestive imagery. Forms of figures of speech like simile, metaphor, analogy, personification, hyperbole, understatement, euphemism, metonymy, synecdoche, antonomasia, pun, syllepsis, zeugma, irony, innuendo, sarcasm, paradox, oxymoron, antithesis, epigram, climax, anti-climax / bathos, apostrophe, transferred epithet, alliteration and onomatopoeia have their equivalent in Chinese. When we use words in other than their ordinary or literal sense to lend force to an idea, to heighten effect, or to create suggestive imagery, we are said to be speaking or writing figuratively. Terms used in *rhetoric* (搜狐) and *Chinese rhetoric* (汉语修辞学) are *metaphor* (比喻), *metonymy* (借代), *personification* (拟人), *irony* (反语), *hyperbole* (夸张), *understatement* (低调), *euphemism* (委婉语), *contrast* (对照), *oxymoron* (矛盾修辞法), *transferred epithet* (移就), *pun* (双关), *syllipsis* (异叙), *zeugma* (粘连), *parody* (仿拟), *paradox* (隗语), *repetition* (反复), *catchword repetition* (联珠), *chiasmus* (回文), *parallelism* (平行结构), *antithesis* (反对), *rhetoric question* (设问), *anticlimax* (突降) and *syllogism* (三段论法). In Chinese the terms of rhetoric do exist. *Figures of speech* (修辞) are ways of making our language figurative. Now we are going to talk about some of these common forms of figures of speech. A *simile* (明喻) is a figure of speech, which makes a comparison between two unlike elements having at least one quality or characteristic (特性) in common. When we use words in other than their ordinary or literal sense to lend force to an idea, to heighten effect, or to create suggestive imagery, we are said to be speaking or writing figuratively. Forms of figures of speech like *simile*, *metaphor*, *analogy*,

<sup>2</sup> Mao, Lu Ming (2003) Reflective Encounters: Illustrating Comparative Rhetoric. In: Style. November, 11. 2005.  
<[http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m2342/is\\_4\\_37/ai\\_n6344007](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2342/is_4_37/ai_n6344007)>

*personification, hyperbole, understatement, euphemism, metonymy, synecdoche, antonomasia, pun, syllepsis, zeugma, irony, innuendo, sarcasm, paradox, oxymoron, antithesis, epigram, climax, anti-climax / bathos, apostrophe*, transferred epithet, alliteration and onomatopoeia have their equivalent in Chinese. A *metaphor* (暗喻) is like a simile, also makes a comparison between two unlike elements, but unlike a simile, this comparison is implied rather than stated. For example, the world is a stage. *Analogy* (类比) is also a form of comparison, but unlike simile or metaphor which usually uses comparison on one point of resemblance, analogy draws a parallel between two unlike things that have several common qualities or points of resemblance. *Personification* (拟人) gives human form of feelings to animals, or life and personal attributes (赋予) to inanimate (无生命的) objects, or to ideas and *abstractions* (抽象). A *hyperbole* (夸张) is the deliberate use of overstatement or exaggeration to achieve emphasis. An *understatement* (含蓄陈述) is the opposite of hyperbole, or overstatement. It achieves its effect of emphasizing a fact by deliberately (故意地) understating it, impressing the listener or the reader more by what is merely implied or left unsaid than by bare statement. *Euphemism* (委婉) is the substitution of an agreeable or inoffensive (无冒犯) expression for one that may offend or suggest something unpleasant. *Metonymy* (转喻) is a figure of speech that has to do with the substitution of the name of one thing for that of another. *Synecdoche* (提喻) involves the substitution of the part for the whole, or the whole for the part. *Antonomasia* (换喻) has to do with substitution. *Pun* (双关语) is a play on words, or rather a play on the form and meaning of words. A *syllepsis* (语双叙) has two connotations. *Zeugma* (轭式搭配) is a single word which is made to modify or to govern two or more words in the same sentence, wither properly applying in sense to only one of them, or applying to them in different senses. *Irony* (反语) is a figure of speech that achieves emphasis by saying the opposite of what is meant, the intended meaning of the words being the opposite of their usual sense. *Innuendo* (暗讽) is a mild form of irony, hinting in a rather *roundabout way* (曲折) at something *disparaging* (不一致) or *uncomplimentary* (不赞美) to the person or subject mentioned. *Sarcasm* (讽刺) is a strong form of irony. *Paradox* (似非而是的隽语) is a figure of speech consisting of a statement or proposition which on the face of it seems self-contradictory, absurd or contrary to established fact or practice, but which on further thinking and study may prove to be true, well-founded, and even to contain a succinct point. *Oxymoron* (矛盾修饰) is a compressed paradox, formed by the conjoining (结合) of two contrasting, contradictory or incongruous (不协调) terms as in bitter-sweet memories, orderly chaos (混乱) and proud humility (侮辱). *Antithesis* (对照) is the deliberate arrangement of contrasting words or ideas in balanced structural forms to achieve emphasis. An *epigram* (警句) states a simple *truth pithily* (有利地) and *pungently* (强烈地). It is usually terse and arouses interest and surprise by its deep insight into certain aspects of human behavior or feeling. *Climax* (渐进) is derived from the Greek word for ‘ladder’ implying the progression of thought at a uniform or almost uniform rate of significance or intensity. *Anti-climax* (突降) is the opposite of climax. In an *apostrophe* (顿呼) a thing, place, idea or person (dead or absent) is addressed as if present, listening and understanding what is being said. *Alliteration* (头韵) has to do with the sound rather than the sense of words for effect. It is a device that repeats the same sound at frequent *intervals* (间隔) and since the sound repeated is usually the initial consonant sound. *Onomatopoeia* (拟声) is a device that uses words which imitate the sounds made by an object (animate or inanimate), or which are associated with or *suggestive* (提示的) of some action or movement. We see that the terminology of rhetoric, exemplified here with the figures of speech, is universal as analytic means of texts. But – in opposition to the Western culture- in the East this knowledge was not codified within a distinguished discipline.

We will now discuss the sources of Chinese rhetorical phenomena and teachings. Therefore, we must always be aware of the cultural contexts they are implemented in. We mentioned before the lack of exclusive material related to rhetoric. Lu Ming Mao stated that next to *The Doctrine of the Mean*, one of the treatises on ancient ceremonies and etiquette believed to be written by Confucius's grandson, *Li Ji (Records of Rituals)* and *Shi Jing (Book of Odes)*, the *Analects* are fundamental sources for Chinese rhetoric.<sup>3</sup> Mao also stated that ‘any culturally-based rhetoric is necessarily multidimensional.’ But what shall this mean. In the case of the Greek rhetoric we find a chronologically developed rhetorical system, while the roots of Chinese rhetoric come from different sources and backgrounds. Since the Chinese culture is totally different from the Greek one, we must state that Chinese culture brought cultural aspects, which show similarity or parallels to the Western system, but in terms of their development, theory and teachings and cultural background they can only be called ‘equivalent concepts or elements’ to rhetoric.

<sup>3</sup> Mao, Lu Ming. (2003) Reflective Encounters: Illustrating Comparative Rhetoric. In: Style. November, 11. 2005. <[http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m2342/is\\_4\\_37/ai\\_n6344007](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2342/is_4_37/ai_n6344007)>



Chinese rhetoric does not have a terminology as explicated by the Greek tradition. Chinese rhetoric is called *xiu-ci*. The meaning of *ci* relates to ‘speech, language, and discourse’ overlapping with *yan* and also to explanation and the artistic presentation of language, associations which are not emphasized in *yan*. *Jian* (advising, persuasion) is advising activities that take place in a hierarchical (unequal) relationship with the advisee (the king, lord, ruler). *Shui* (persuasion), *shuo* (explanation) and *jian* are similar in some ways, but where *jian shi* relied primarily upon quotations or citations from the antiquities and classics the *you shui* (traveling persuaders) used an analysis of advantages and disadvantages for the persuadee and his state. While *jian* relied on ethical appeal, *shui* appealed to the persuaded with utilitarian considerations and an analysis of practical benefits. Chinese used the characters *ma* for persuasion and *bian* for ‘to debate’, ‘to argue’. Terms taken from the Greek ones exist in Chinese characters next to the classical ones. We find also a highly differentiated system of classic Chinese speech communication types. Figures of speech are always of making our language figurative. Speaking and behaviour in a rhetorical manner has long been claimed as a Western intellectual property. Chinese rhetoric is characterized by an emphasis on harmony and deprecation of speeches. The origin of rhetoric came with supernatural beliefs. The augurs and *zhu guan* were the elites of society and the first trained ‘rhetoricians’ in China. They were involved in divination and written and oral communication. The *Book of Annals, Shang Shu*, is one of the *Five Classics (wu ching)*. It is the first book in Chinese history recording both speeches and events. Although it was produced during the Zhou dynasty, its pages document various persuasive encounters between the king and ministers of the Shang dynasty.

The formal communication, usually between the emperor and government officials or common people, was conducted through nine common channels in the traditional Chinese society of *zhao*, *chi*, *cheng*, *zou*, *biao*, *yi*, *jian*, *shu* and *xi*. Both *zhao* and *chi* are imperial decree, mandate, or edict by which the emperor conveyed an order, proclamation, or benevolence to government officials or citizens. If the message targets an individual, it would be read openly to the person. If the message aims to reach the public, it would be posted prominently in the town. *Cheng* is an appeal letter written by an official to the emperor. The purpose of *cheng* is to express a subordinate’s appreciation for the reward, grant, or benevolence. *Zou* is an impeach report, issued by lower-rank government officials, to the emperor to report the disloyal of another official. Provocative language usually was used in *zou* to describe the disloyal behaviours of an official and how to impeach him or her.

The two kinds of speeches in *shang shu* are *shi* for taking oath and *gao* for public advising. A *shi* was performed by a ruler in relation to his soldiers before a war expediency in order to encourage morale. A *gao* was performed by the king at mass gatherings such as the celebration of a harvest. *Shi* is more akin to the Greek notion of deliberative speech that aims at political expedience and communal bonding. The term *gao* is similar to the Greek notion of epideictic speech to amplify deeds and celebrate virtue. *Shi* were the educated intellectual elite of the Warring States periods (445-221). Confucius was a *shi*. Various names for *shi*, often used interchangeably in the pre-Qin writings include *bian shi*, the disputer, *mou shi*, the consultant, *cha shi*, the wise men, *wen shi*, the scholar, *shui shi*, the persuader, *jian shi* as adviser, *you shi* being the traveler and *yan zhi shi* as the talker. Eight kinds of *yan* referred to in *Shang Shu* are *jing yan* (clever speech), *chang yan* (beautiful speech), *shi yan* (hypocritical speech), *fu yan* (assertive speech), *hui yan* (remorseful speech), *bian yan* (deceitful speech), *zhen yan* (king's speech), *zhong yan* (mass speech). Keywords to Asian rhetorical considerations are *bian*, the fluid senses about speech and argument using reason and evidence to express opinions, show weaknesses in other's argument, and to achieve correct view and mutual understanding. *Ming* has the meanings logos, logic and order. Authority is the most ubiquitous form of argument in form of an archetype, case, quotation, text and master.

Virtues are the ethic categories to achieve the quality of good speaking both in Western rhetoric tradition and Eastern culture. We find the use of the ancient system in the writings of the Church fathers as well as in later Christian literature and theology, which means also the appearance of the forth ‘genus dicendi’, the homiletic speech. *Bian* emphasizes more wisdom of the rhetor than logical development of arguments, though there was a hidden logical relation in *bian* to the rhetorical situation. When a *bian shi* (messenger) was sent to speak to the king of another country in order to prevent a potential war, he would tell a story that had a moral in it. Although the meaning of communication in the traditional China, which more emphasized verbal exchange or delivery, is not identical with the modern perception of the concept. It is found that the following terminologies were used to represent communication activities. Benevolence (*jen*) is a virtue the speaker wants to achieve similar to the ‘benevolentia’ as aim of the Western rhetorical tradition. In Chinese the terms *shi sen* for ‘line of vision’ and *sjj kako* for ‘vision, sense

of sight' are known. In Chinese the terms 'shi' for 'to inspect', *shi yoku* for 'sight' and *shi kai* for 'field of vision' and *shi satsu* for inspection come from the same root. *Riso* means 'ideal', *ron* and *gaku setsu* are 'theory' and *meian* 'bright idea'. *Tei ken* is 'definite view'. *Ji* has the meaning 'character', 'symbol' and 'letter'. *Goki* is the 'way of speaking', *wahei* a 'topic of conversation' and *sho* is 'to persuade'. In the *Book of Poems, She King*, artful speaking is described:

*Alas that (right words) cannot be spoken,  
Which come not from the tongue (only)!  
The speakers of them are sure to suffer.  
Well is it for the words that can be spoken!  
The artful speech flows like a stream,  
And the speakers dwell at ease in prosperity.<sup>4</sup>*

In another ode the ethic quality of speaking is mentioned:

*Do not speak lightly: - your words are your one: -  
Do not say, 'This is of little importance.'  
No one can hold my tongue for me;  
Words are not to be cast away.  
Every word finds its answer;  
Every good deed has its recompense.  
If you are gracious among your friends,  
And to the people, as if there were your children,  
Your descendants will continue in unbroken line,  
And all the people will surely be obedient to you.<sup>5</sup>*

In addition to formal written channels of the Chinese communication Chinese has long elaborated messages exchanged through oral communication, especially in the practice of informal communication among common people. Prince and philosopher Han Fei, born in around 280 B.C., has pointed out 12 kinds of obstacle and 12 kinds of taboo in the process of oral communication. In informal communication in addition to ways of communication such as *shuo* (to say), *tan* (to talk), *jiang* (to speak), and *lun* (to comment) used for oral interaction and channels such as *song* (to intone), *yin* (to chant), *yong* (to hum), and *chang* (to sing) next to literary exchanges. *Shui fu* (persuasion) was the most common practice, which was used in both formal and informal communication. Chinese not only considered *shui fu* as a skill, but also developed a systematic theory to explain it, one must go through a rigid learning and training process in order to fully acquire the ability of *shui fu*. Although the Confucian tradition

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<sup>4</sup> Legge, James (ed.). *The Chinese Classics with a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes*. Edited and Translated by J. Legge. In Five Volumes. IV. *The She King*. Taipei, SMC Publishing. Book IV. X, 5. P. 328

<sup>5</sup> *She King*. Opus Citatum. III. Ode II. 6. P. 514.

did not put an emphasis on this line of oral communication, writings and anecdotes on persuasion exist in the Chinese literary history. The tradition continues today and scholars have begun to systematically study the Chinese persuasive communication decades ago. So no comprehensive exclusive rhetoric handbook exist from Chinese history.

Chinese rhetoric cannot be discussed as a unified whole deriving from a common tradition, which is one legitimate way of describing the Western practice of rhetoric insofar as it can be said to derive from Aristotle and the classical orators of Greece and Rome. The problem in discussing ethos in any concept of Chinese rhetoric is that there are at least three major strands of religious and ethical precepts and practice that are intertwined with Chinese life and thought. The Buddhist speech concept is implemented in the concept of Buddhist thinking. Therefore, it never developed a separated theory or teaching instruction focusing on rhetoric. Buddhism spread into China and became part of the Chinese culture. The Chinese culture developed

1. Literature of rhetorical issues
2. A communication system of their culture including rhetoric and
3. A terminology of rhetoric for spoken and written words.

Philosophical mainstream concepts

in Asia such as Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism and the *I-Ching*, later Christianity, took recourse to speech as an ethical value in order to develop their teachings in cultural contexts of different countries. When comparing Chinese and Greek rhetoric / rhetorical elements, we must consider the educational and social systems around them. The parallels between the parts 'opening', 'development', 'supplemental deviation', and 'conclusion' (*ki-shou-ten-ketsu*) in Japanese writing, the Korean *ki – sung – chen - kyeol* formula and the arrangement in the classical Western pattern of 'opening' (*initium*), narration (*narration*), argumentation (*argumentatio*), and conclusion (*conclusio*) are obvious.

In Chinese rhetoric is called *xiu ci* or *Xiu ci xue*. The hybridization of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism constitutes the mainstream Chinese philosophy. While Buddhism was imported from India, Confucianism, and Taoism were deeply rooted in China. Taoism is related to a rhetoric emphasizing *wu-wei* as the avoidance of action and *wu-xin* as negation of mind. *De* is the principle of spontaneous functioning. Most of his rhetoric was presented in a political context.<sup>6</sup> *Bian hua* in Daoism is transformation as the underlying principle of change within the world. *Dao* can also mean 'way' or 'speak' as the ultimate cosmic principle in Daoism. *Tong* means 'to communicate' and 'go through'.<sup>7</sup> Since ancient time in China rhetoric is a part of social and religious conceptions.<sup>8</sup> The augurs (*zhu guan*) were the elites of society and the first trained 'rhetoricians' in China according to their involvement in divination and written and oral communication. The *Shang Shu* is the first book in Chinese history to record both speeches and events. Two kinds of speeches in the *Shang Shu* are *shi* for taking oath and *gao* for public advising. Ancient Chinese terms related to rhetoric are 'yan' (language, speech), 'ci' (mode of speech, artistic expressions),

<sup>6</sup> Chou, Tse-Tsung. "Yijing 'Xiu Ci Li Qi Cheng' Bian". In: *Zhongguo Wenzhe Yanjiu Jikan*. (Academia Sinica: Bulletin of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy). Vol. 3 (1993). Pp. 27-53.

Xinyong Gao. "Rhetoric". In: *The Indiana Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature. Communication and Culture. China and the World entering the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. 2<sup>nd</sup> revised edition. Taipei: Southern Materials Center 1988. Pp. 121-137.

Xinyong Gao. "Rhetorical Devices in the Chinese Literary Tradition". In: *Tamkang Review*. Vol. 14. No. 1-4. (1983/84). Pp. 325-337.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Glossary. Designed and edited by James Miller. Queen's University. *Daoiststudies*. June, 12, 2006.

<<http://www.daoiststudies.org/glossary.php>>

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Kennedy, George A. "Rhetoric in Ancient China". In: *Comparative Rhetoric. A Historical and Cross-cultural Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press 1998. Pp. 141-170.

'*jian*' (advising, persuasion), and '*shui*' (persuasion), '*shuo*' (explanation), '*ming*' (naming), and and *bian* (distinction, disputation, argumentation).<sup>9</sup> A keyword to Asian rhetorical considerations is *bian*, the fluid senses about speech and argument using reason and evidence to express opinions. Asian rhetorical theory operates in a hierarchical group-oriented society and depends on Eastern ways of minding.<sup>10</sup> *Bian* is a fluid senses about speech and argument using reason and evidence to express opinions, show weaknesses in other's argument, and to achieve correct view and mutual understanding. *Wen* is all polished literature should have sermonic outcome.<sup>11</sup> *Ming* has the meanings logos, logic, and order. Authority is the most ubiquitous form of argument in form of an archetype, case, quotation, text, and master.<sup>12</sup> *Ming* had different meanings and implications to different people.<sup>13</sup> Confucius viewed *ming* as titles, names attached to one's social status, and one's kinship with others. In an abstract sense *ming* signified cultural code or prescribed behaviours for society and acted as means of social transformation. Laozi referred to *ming* as honor, an indication of success, popularity, and achievement. speaking and behaviour to be found. *Ming* has also the meanings fate, destiny, life, and the physiological element of one's person in complete reality cultivation. *Shi* was performed by a ruler in relation to his soldiers before a war in order to encourage morale. A *gao* was performed by the king at mass gatherings such as the celebration of a harvest. *Shi* were also the educated intellectual elite of the Spring-Autumn/Warring States periods. Confucius was a *shi*. Various names for *shi*, often used interchangeably in the pre-Qin writings include *bian shi*, the disputer, *mou shi*, the consultant, *cha shi*, the wise men, *wen shi*, the scholar, *shui shi*, the persuader, *jian shi* as adviser, *you shi* being the traveler and *yan zhi shi* as the talking person. Eight kinds of *yan* referred to in the *Shang Shu* are *jing yan* (clever speech), *chang yan* (beautiful speech), *shi yan* (hypocritical speech), *fu yan* (assertive speech), *hui yan* (remorseful speech), *bian yan* (deceitful speech), *zhen yan* (king's speech), and *zhong yan* as mass speech and the way how the king refers to commoners' speech. *Jian* (advising, persuasion) is advising activities that take place in a hierarchical (unequal) relationship with the advisee (the king, lord, ruler). *Shui* (persuasion), *shuo* (explanation), and *jian* are similar in some ways. *Jian shi* relied primarily upon quotations or citations from the antiquities and classics. The *you shui* (traveling persuader) used an analysis of advantages and disadvantages for the persuadee and his state. While *jian* relied on ethical appeal, *shui* appealed to the persuadee with utilitarian considerations and an analysis of practical benefits. *Biao* is a formal statement, which states one's situation in order to let the emperor understand, for example, why the subordinate cannot carry out the obligation or accept the order. The message in *biao* is usually highly emotion-laden.

Specific terms indicate ways of communication. In Chinese *zhe you* is a resume or digest of official communication prepared for superior. *Bao gao* is a report, to report, often preceding verbal communication to superior. *Zai an* is the subject of a previous communication. *Shen zhuang* means to send communication or report to superior. *Kou tou* is oral communication. *Kou tou* is flavor, or taste. *Zhao de* is a opening formula in official communication to subordinate. *Zhao hui* is an official communication. *Bo huan* is to reject a petition. *Kai fa* are educated minds. *Guan wen* is a form of official communications between officials of equal rank. *Wen du* is correspondence, official communications, bureau in charge of this, and secretariat. *Jiao tong* is communications and transportation. In Chinese areas Hakka, Cantonese, Mandarin, Wu, and Korean show similarities in terms of the cultural concept they present in their terminology. In Hakka *zih*, in Cantonese *zu*, in Mandarin *zii*, in Wu *zi*, and in Korean *ca* stand for the verbs to inquire, to consult, to confer and an official communication between officers of the same level. In Hakka *kuk*, in Cantonese *guk*, in Mandarin *kwuk*, in Wu *guk*, and in Korean *ko* stand for a mythical emperor and the verb 'to inform quickly' and the noun 'urgent communication'.

<sup>9</sup> Lu, Xing. Rhetoric in Ancient China, Fifth to Third Century B.C.E.: A Comparison with Classical Greek Rhetoric. Studies in Rhetoric/Communication. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press 1998. P. 3-4.

<sup>10</sup> Lamoureux, Ed. Rhetorical Theory Notes. Introduction to African, African American, and Asian Rhetoric. Bradley University. May, 18. 2006.  
<<http://bradley.edu/~ell/aa&arhet.html>>

<sup>11</sup> Lamoureux, Ed. Rhetorical Theory Notes. Introduction to African, African American, and Asian Rhetoric. Bradley University. May, 18. 2006.  
<<http://bradley.edu/~ell/aa&arhet.html>>

<sup>12</sup> Lamoureux, Ed. Rhetorical Theory Notes. Introduction to African, African American, and Asian Rhetoric. Bradley University. May, 18. 2006.  
<<http://bradley.edu/~ell/aa&arhet.html>>

<sup>13</sup> Lu, Xing. Rhetoric in Ancient China, Fifth to Third Century B.C.E.: A Comparison with Classical Greek Rhetoric. Studies in Rhetoric/Communication. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press 1998. P. 60-72.

The formal communication usually between the emperor and government officials or common people was conducted through nine common channels in the traditional Chinese society consisting of *zhao*, *chi*, *cheng*, *zou*, *biao*, *yi*, *jian*, *shu*, and *xi*. Both *zhao* and *chi* are imperial decrees, mandates, or edicts by which the emperor conveyed an order, proclamation, or benevolence to government officials or citizens. *Cheng* is an appeal letter written by an official to the emperor. The purpose of *cheng* is to express a subordinate's appreciation for the reward, grant, or benevolence. *Zou* is an impeach report issued by lower-rank government officials to the emperor to report the disloyalty of another official. Provocative language usually was used in *zou* to describe the disloyal behaviours of an official. *Yi* is an argumentative statement used by government officials to express their disagreement or different opinions to the emperor, when the *jian* (oral admonition) is not available. Although using *yi* or *jian* to admonish the emperor often put the presenters in a risky situation for being executed, it was a common way for Chinese literate elite serving as a government official to try to persuade the emperor for a good deed. The language in *yi* or *jian* tends to be acute and sharpened. *Shu* is a petition letter, in which a suggestion is expressed, used in the upward communication. *Xi* is a summons to arms, which lists the crimes of a tyrant and is usually issued by an emperor or a challenger.<sup>14</sup>

In addition to formal written channels of the Chinese communication, messages exchanged through oral communication have long been elaborated by Chinese. Han Fei, born in around 280 B.C.E., has pointed out 12 kinds of obstacle and 12 kinds of taboo in the process of oral communication. In informal communication channels such as *shuo* (to say), *tan* (to talk), *jiang* (to speak), and *lun* (to comment) were used for the daily oral interaction, and channels such as *song* (to intone), *yin* (to chant), *yong* (to hum), and *chang* (to sing) were used for literary exchanges. *Shui fu* (persuasion) was the most common practice, which was used in both formal and informal communication. Chinese considered *shui fu* as a skill. Although the Confucian tradition did not put an emphasis on this line of oral communication, abundant writings and anecdotes on persuasion exist in the Chinese literary history. The tradition continues today and scholars have begun to systematically study the Chinese persuasive communication decades ago.<sup>15</sup> Terminology of speech in Chinese consists of the sign 語 standing for dialect, language, and tell, the character 讲话 stands for 'to speak'. The character 講 stands for to explain, to speak, to talk, to tell. 話 stands for conversation, dialect, language, spoken words, talk, what someone said, and words. 言語 is talk. 報告 stands for lecture, make known, report, talk, to inform. Speech in Chinese is 話 (chat, conversation, story, talk). In China no tradition of rhetorical theory existed. In Asian cultures generally no difference between philosophy and rhetoric exists.<sup>16</sup> The *Tao-te Ching* is the basic text of the Chinese spiritual system of Taoism and shapes a mentality that is as inherent in poetry as well as in the oratory, dance, painting, architecture, and governmental decision making.<sup>17</sup> Under the influence of Chinese Confucianism East Asians developed complex literate cultures. Ancient Chinese terms related to rhetoric are *yan* (language, speech), *ci* (mode of speech, artistic expressions), *jian* (advising, persuasion), *shui* (persuasion), *shuo* (explanation), *ming* (naming), and *bian* (distinction, disputation, argumentation). The word *zhe* first appeared in the *Shang Shu* with the meanings wisdom and ability. In the *Shuo Wen Jie Zi*, the first Chinese dictionary compiled by Xu Shen (58-147 C.E.), it is defined as 'knowing and understanding.'

### 1<sup>st</sup> Example: Rhetorical Elements in Chinese Buddhism

Speech in the Buddhist conception has the three functions to be true, real and useful. The rhetoric of India, in both its Hindu and its Buddhist forms, has an ethical basis. During the third century B.C. the spread of Buddhism was furthered by Ashoka (270-232), the third of the Mauryan kings who created the first pan-Indian empire. Wisdom

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<sup>14</sup> Lu, Xing. Rhetoric in Ancient China, Fifth to Third Century B.C.E. A Comparison with Classical Greek Rhetoric. Studies in Rhetoric/Communication. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press 1998. P. 60-72.

<sup>15</sup> Lu, Xing. Rhetoric in Ancient China. Fifth to Third Century B.C.E.E. A Comparison with Classical Greek Rhetoric. Studies in Rhetoric/Communication. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press 1998. P. 60-72.

<sup>16</sup> Chang, Hui Ching. "The 'well-defined' is 'ambiguous': Indeterminacy in Chinese Conversation." In: Journal of Pragmatics. 31. (1990). Pp. 535-556.

<sup>17</sup> Li, Wai Yee. "The Rhetoric of Spontaneity in Late-Ming Literature". In: Ming Studies. 35 (1995). Pp. 32-52.

Zhang, Xue Tao. "From Evolution of Chinese Rhetoric to History of Chinese Rhetoric: On Professor Zheng Ziyu's Research into the History of Rhetoric". In: Beijing Daxue Xuebao (Journal of Peking University). 4. (1991). Pp. 112-117.

books of ancient India consist of speaker's invocation of cultural truths while seeking to attain harmony and consensus. The goal of the wise person in India was to gain liberation from worldly goods and desires. Truthful speech was thought to be that which revealed aspects of the greater cosmic and social order of things. The earliest history of Buddhism is largely lost, because some 400 years separate the death of the Buddha from the first documented efforts to commit the Buddhist scriptures to writing. There are five paths, on which a Bodhisattva develops in succession and among the 8-fold path there is the quality of 'perfect speech':

*Sambharamarga* The path of equipment  
*Prayogamarga* The path of training  
*Darshanamarga* The path of seeing  
*Bhavanamarga* The path of intense contemplation  
*Vimuktimarga* The path of freedom

The 8-fold path consists of:

*Perfect view*  
*Perfect resolve*  
*Perfect speech*  
*Perfect conduct*  
*Perfect livelihood*  
*Perfect effort*  
*Perfect mindfulness*  
*Perfect concentration*

The Eightfold path includes perfect understanding, perfect thought, perfect speech, perfect action, perfect livelihood, perfect effort, perfect mindfulness and perfect concentration. Buddha gives in *The Eightfold Path right speech*: as 'absence of lying and useless speech' this definition:

*What, now, is right speech? It is abstaining from lying; abstaining from tale-bearing; abstaining from harsh language; abstaining from vain talk. There, someone avoids lying, and abstains from it. He speaks the truth, is devoted to the truth, reliable, worthy of confidence, is not a deceiver of men.*

Therefore examples follow:

*Being at a meeting, or amongst people, or in the midst of his relatives, or in a society, or in the king's court, and called upon and asked as witness, to tell what he knows, he answers, if he knows nothing: "I know nothing"; and if he knows, he answers: "I know"; if he has seen nothing, he answers: "I have seen nothing," and if he has seen, he answers: "I have seen.", he never knowingly speaks a lie, neither for the sake of his own advantage, nor for the sake of another person's advantage, nor for the sake of any advantage whatsoever. He avoids tale-bearing, and abstains from it.*<sup>18</sup>

Buddha describes with words such as words as *gentle, soothing to the ear, loving, going to the heart, courteous and dear right speech* in *The Eightfold Path*:

*What he has heard here, he does not repeat there, so as to cause dissension there; and what he heard there, he does not repeat here, so as to cause dissension here. He unites those that are divided; and those that are united, he encourages. Concord gladdens him, he delights and rejoices in concord, and it is concord that he spreads by his words. He avoids harsh language, and abstains from it. He speaks such words as are gentle, soothing to the ear, loving, going to the heart, courteous and dear, and agreeable to many.*<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Matathera, Nyanatiloka (ed.). Buddha. The Word Index. Online Version. In: The Pagan Library. May, 5.2006. <[Http://www.paganlibrary.com/etext/buddha-word/third\\_step.php](http://www.paganlibrary.com/etext/buddha-word/third_step.php)>

<sup>19</sup> Matathera, Nyanatiloka (ed.). Buddha. The Word Index. Online Version. In: The Pagan Library. May, 5.2006. <[Http://www.paganlibrary.com/etext/buddha-word/third\\_step.php](http://www.paganlibrary.com/etext/buddha-word/third_step.php)>

Speech in the Buddhist conception has the qualities of being true and useful. So we find here a combination of speech qualities that in the Western categories is divided into rhetoric and philosophy. The transmission of Buddhist texts to China occurred over the course of several centuries. Chinese characters are the direct descendants of Shang pictographs. Chinese is a monosyllabic language particularly suited to pictographs for writing. As Chinese became more complex it evolved by adding tones. Mandarin Chinese has been expanding against the other Chinese languages because of its political, cultural, and demographic dominance and the peculiar relationship of these languages to each other. In India no language has a status comparable to Mandarin in China. The rhetoric of the Far East manifests an emphasis upon certain virtues, which have analogues in Western or Classical rhetoric. There is not a direct parallel or traditional connection. The virtues that make up the ethical appeal are those virtues that one would expect in a rhetoric that aims at conciliation. The word rhetoric doesn't have an exact and equivalent meaning in Chinese nor has a systematic approach like the Greek tradition. In the 3<sup>rd</sup> century B.C. Li Shu, a Chinese emperor's minister, developed script. In China no tradition of rhetorical theory does exist. In Asian cultures no difference between philosophy and rhetoric exists.<sup>20</sup> Any paradigmatic examples of Asian rhetoric that are compact enough to be subjected to a thorough analysis do not exist. The ethics of communication in Asia are more concerned with a mediating function, less with authority. In China, schools used Confucianism and Daoism as religious elements and mix it with Buddhism. These are the three religious ways of Chinese civilization. Philosophy is in both systems of scholarship in East and West the dominant discipline above rhetoric.

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Example: Rhetorical Elements in Chinese Confucianism

We will look at ethos and the notions that inform Confucian ethical rhetoric.<sup>21</sup> The status of Confucianism as the orthodox philosophy in China has its roots in the time about 2000 years ago. Confucianism is not a religion limited to a particular culture, race, or nationality. It is a dynamic force that flows, and has the capacity to interact with other traditions in a pluralistic context. Confucian virtues include *jen* for benevolence, *yi* for righteousness, *hsin* for faithfulness and *li* for propriety. Confucian rhetoric is based mainly on *ren dao* or the way of humans and the moral codes Confucius prescribes in his teachings. Benevolence (*jen*) containing within itself the characteristics of regard for the feelings of others, receptivity, and impartiality manifests itself as the speaker's indifference to his own feelings and his concerns for the rights of others. Within this framework of notions rhetoric was used as a way of communication in different ways according to the social constellation.<sup>22</sup> The way the narrative texts are composed to document Confucius' speeches focuses on the style of these sayings. Confucius taught about the quality of speech of *jen*:

1:3 Confucius said: "*Someone who is a clever speaker and maintains a 'too-smiley' face is seldom considered a person of jen.*"

13:27 Confucius said: "*With firmness, strength, simplicity and caution in speaking, you will be close to jen.*"<sup>23</sup>

Confucian rhetoric has instead of a terminology like in the Greek rhetoric system certain basic characters. So *Jen* is the essence of all kinds of manifestations of virtuosity like wisdom, filial piety, reverence, courtesy, love and sincerity. *Jen*, also 'benevolence, charity, humanity, love', is the fundamental virtue of Confucianism. The Confucian ideal uses the principle of government by example and by 'not doing' (*wu wei*) putting Confucianism closer to Daoism and the idea of *nirvana*. Confucius thought that government by laws and punishments could keep

<sup>20</sup> Cf.: Chang, Hui Ching "The 'Well-Defined' is 'Ambiguous': Indeterminacy in Chinese Conversation". In: Journal of Pragmatics, 31 (1999). Pp. 535-556.

<sup>21</sup> Cf.: Lu, Xing. Rhetoric in Ancient China, Fifth to Third Century, B.C.E. A Comparison with Classical Greek Rhetoric. University of South Carolina Press. 1998. Pp. 107-113.

<sup>22</sup> A basic research work is:

Gong, Wen Xiang. "The Role of Ethics in Persuasive Communication. A Comparative Study of Aristotle's 'Ethos' and the Confucian 'Correctness of Names.'" In: Gong, Wen Xiang (eds.). Communication and Culture. China and the World Entering the 21st Century. Amsterdam 1998. Pp. 14-15.

Kao, Karl S. Y. "Rhetorical Devices in the Chinese Literary Tradition". In: Tamkang Review. Vol. 14. (1983/84). Pp. 325-337.

<sup>23</sup> Confucius. Analects. Translated by Charles Muller. Online Edition. February, 9 2007.

<<http://www.human.toyogakuen-u.ac.jp/~acmuller/conDao/laotzu.htm>>

people in line considering government by example of virtue (*de*) and good manners (*li*) would enable people to control themselves (*Analects* II. 3). During the Tang Dynasty, the canon of Confucian classics became the basis for the great civil service examinations that henceforth provided the magistrates and bureaucrats called Mandarins for the Chinese government. Buddhism became so popular after the fall of the Later Han Dynasty (220 A.D.) that, by the time of the Sui Dynasty (590-618) and Tang Dynasty (618-906), it was accepted as properly Chinese.

The character of the 'superior man', in contrast to the sage, is being taught as a tangible model. In the *Analects* of Confucius is written:

巧言令色, 鮮矣仁

[1:3] Confucius said: "Someone who is a clever speaker and maintains a 'too-smiley' face is seldom considered a humane person."<sup>24</sup>

In the *Analects* Confucius gives an example of humanity and speech:

雍也仁而不子曰：焉用 饒人以口給，屢 憎於人。不知其仁，焉用

[5:5] Someone said: "Yung is a humane man, but he is not sharp enough with his tongue." Confucius said, "Why does he need to be sharp with his tongue? If you deal with people by smooth talk, you will soon be disliked. I don't know if Yung is a humane man, but why should he have to be a clever speaker?"<sup>25</sup>

In the *Analects* Confucius describes himself as a transmitter:

述而不作, 信而好古, 竊比於我老彭

[7:1] Confucius said: "I am a transmitter, rather than an original thinker. I trust and enjoy the teachings of the ancients. In my heart I compare myself to old P'eng."<sup>26</sup>

The term *ming* had different meanings and implications to different people. Confucius viewed *ming* as titles attached to one's social status, and one's kinship with others. In an abstract sense, *ming* signified cultural code or prescribed behaviours for society and acted as means of social transformation. Laozi referred to *ming* as honour, an indication of success, popularity, and achievement. Daoism sponsors a rhetoric emphasizing nirvana (*wu-wei*) as the avoidance of action, *wu-hsin* as negation of mind, and *te* as the principle of spontaneous functioning. Most of his rhetoric was presented in a political context, so its influence on the political thoughts in China has been persistent.<sup>27</sup> Propriety, *li*, emphasizes that the speaker has a due regard for the social relations that exist between him and his audience,

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<sup>24</sup> Confucius. *Analects*. Translated by Charles Muller. Online Edition. February, 9 2007.  
<[Http://www.hm.tyg.jp/~acmuller/conDao/analects.html](http://www.hm.tyg.jp/~acmuller/conDao/analects.html)>

<sup>25</sup> Confucius. *Analects*. Translated by Charles Muller. Online Edition. February, 9 2007  
<[Http://www.hm.tyg.jp/~acmuller/conDao/analects.html](http://www.hm.tyg.jp/~acmuller/conDao/analects.html)>

<sup>26</sup> Confucius. *Analects*. Translated by Charles Muller. Online Edition. February, 9 2007  
<[Http://www.hm.tyg.jp/~acmuller/conDao/analects.html](http://www.hm.tyg.jp/~acmuller/conDao/analects.html)>



whether it is that of the ruler or of the people or some other relationship. Righteousness, *i*, establishes the moral tone or quality of the speaker. The nature of the ethical appeal in Confucian rhetoric is not one that differs in an extreme way from the nature of the ethical appeal in classical rhetoric. Although there is no obvious correspondence between the notions of goodness and *li* or any of the other virtues in the Confucian triad the whole notion of the ideal speaker may be summed up in the idea of the superior man, the *chun-tsu*. *Li*, *yi*, and *jen* lend a person credibility. The nature of a rhetoric that has as its chief virtues propriety, righteousness, and benevolence and which sees these virtues as being the primary virtues will necessarily be different than a rhetoric which sees different virtues as qualities.

### 3<sup>rd</sup> Example: Chinese rhetorical elements following Daoism and the *I-Ching*

In Far Asia the *I-Ching* or *Book of Changes* is an oracle based on geometric forms. The *I Ching* is one of the five Chinese classics. The book was traditionally written by the Chinese Emperor Fu Hsi (2953-2838 B.C.). An Asian genre of statements, which the Western civilization calls aphorisms, is the opposite to the system of logical science Aristotle attempted to establish. The *I Ching* is an ancient Chinese oracular text, which consists of a core work from the Western Zhou dynasty (ca. 825 BCE) called *Zhouyi* and a set of commentaries ('*The Ten Wings*') from later periods. Books were used in superstitious ways in China as methods of fortune telling. The *Dao-te Ching* and the *I Ching* it used this way. The *Dao-te Ching* is the basic text of the Chinese religious system of Daoism and shapes a mentality that is as inherent in certain Chinese poetry as in the oratory, dance, painting, architecture, and government of that ancient culture.<sup>28</sup> According to the *Dao Te Ching* in Stan Rosenthal's translation the *dao* can be reached through speech:

*1. The embodiment of Dao  
Through knowledge, intellectual thought and words,  
the manifestations of the Dao are known,  
but without such intellectual intent  
we might experience the Dao itself.  
Both knowledge and experience are real,  
but reality has many forms,  
which seem to cause complexity.*<sup>29</sup>

A leader acts 'without unnecessary speech':

*17. Leadership by exception  
Man cannot comprehend the infinite;  
only knowing that the best exists,  
the second best is seen and praised,  
and the next, despised and feared.  
The sage does not expect that others  
use his criteria as their own.  
The existence of the leader who is wise  
is barely known to those he leads.  
He acts without unnecessary speech,*

<sup>27</sup> Cf. basic works in this field:

Chou, Tze Tsung. "Yijing 'Xiu Ci Li Qi Cheng' Bian". In: *Zhongguo Wenzhe Yanjiu Jikan* (Academia Sinica: Bulletin of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy). Vol. 3 (1993). Pp. 27-53.

Xinyong, Gao. Rhetoric. In: Nienhauser, W. H. Jr. (ed.): *The Indiana Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature*. (Nachdruck) Taipei: Southern Materials Center (second revised edition) 1988. Pp. 121-137.

Kao, Karl S. Y. "Rhetorical Devices in the Chinese Literary Tradition". In: *Tamkang Review*. Vol. 14. (1983/84). No. 1-4. Pp. 325-337.

<sup>28</sup> Li, Wai Yee. "The Rhetoric of Spontaneity in Late-Ming Literature". In: *Ming Studies*. 35 (1995). Pp. 32-52.

Cheng, Chung Yin. "The I Ching as a Symbolic System of Integrated Communication". In: *Communication Theory. The Asian Perspective*. Singapore: Asia Mass Communication Research and Information Centre 1988. Pp. 79-104

<sup>29</sup> *Dao Te Ching. The Book of Changes*. Translated by Stan Rosenthal. Online Edition. University of Florida. May, 18. 2006.

<<http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/gthursby/Daoism/ttctan3.htm>>

so that the people say,  
"It happened of its own accord".<sup>30</sup>

Daoism is a basically agnostic system, created by cognitive and conceptual differences, which occur in westerners' translations of esoteric texts, which cannot be understood or properly translated apart from a lineage derived *kou jue* tradition.<sup>31</sup> The scholar of Daoism acts as a transmitter of oral evidence, as well as explicator of performance-based liturgical and meditative texts. This tradition of oral teachings called *kou jue* is an essential factor in understanding Chinese Daoism rhetoric based upon oral traditions.

In the *Dao Te Ching* we find sentences about speaking:

23.  
*To speak little is natural.*  
*Therefore a gale does not blow a whole morning.*

27.  
*A good traveller leaves no tracks.*  
*Good speech lacks faultfinding.*  
*A good counter needs no calculator.*

56.  
*One who knows does not speak.*  
*One who speaks does not know.*<sup>32</sup>

The syncretistic use of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism constitutes the main Eastern philosophy. The method of comprehending those words is to immediately grasp by once again presenting in one's own mind concrete instances of the issue, so the meaning of the statement is unambiguously and intuitively understood. In Asia silence was an important vehicle in Chinese rhetoric. The ideal speaker in the Confucian tradition embodies certain characteristics of *li*, *i*, and *jen*, which lend him credibility. The way or *Dao* of the superior man is that which arises from his embodiment of the virtues named above. Since ancient time in China rhetoric is a discipline.<sup>33</sup> Under the influence of Chinese Confucianism, East Asians developed complex literate cultures and cohesive family organizations. Ancient Chinese terms related to rhetoric are *yan* (language, speech), *ci* (mode of speech, artistic expressions), *jian* (advising, persuasion), *shui* (persuasion), *shuo* (explanation), *ming* (naming) and *bian* (distinction, disputation, argumentation). The word *zhe* first appeared in Shang Shu with the meaning wisdom and ability. In *Shuo Wen Jie Zi*, the first Chinese dictionary compiled by Xu Shen (58-147 A.C.) *zhe* is defined as 'knowing and understanding.' The Chinese term for philosophy is *zhe xue*.

#### **Excuse: Korean and Japanese Terminology**

In Korea rhetoric is called *susa hak* (수사학). In ancient Korea before Silla Dynasty education of *hwarang* in Chinese sciences meant learning philosophy, literature, rhetoric, music, the use of weapons, riding horses and fighting from the age of a child. These arts were called *hwarang do*, way of *hwarang*. Like in Japanese style of writing where the parts of a printing are called opening, development, supplemental deviation, and conclusion (*ki-shou-ten-ketsu*) the Korean preferred rhetorical structure in composition of *ki – sung – chen - kyeol* consisting of an introduction that introduces the argument (*ki*), followed by a section that begins to develop that idea (*sung*). The next

<sup>30</sup> Dao Te Ching. The Book of Changes. Translated by Stan Rosenthal. Online Edition. University of Florida. May, 18. 2006.  
<[Http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/gthursby/Daoism/ttctan3.htm](http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/gthursby/Daoism/ttctan3.htm)>

<sup>31</sup> Introductory texts are:

Wang, William S.-Y. The Chinese Language. In: Scientific American. 228 (1973). Pp. 50-60.

<sup>32</sup> Confucius. Analects. Translated by Charles Muller. Online Edition. February, 9 2007.

<[Http://www.human.toyogakuen-u.ac.jp/~acmuller/conDao/laotzu.htm](http://www.human.toyogakuen-u.ac.jp/~acmuller/conDao/laotzu.htm)>

<sup>33</sup> Cf.: Kennedy, George A. Rhetoric in Ancient China. In: Comparative Rhetoric. A Historical and Cross-cultural Introduction. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998. Pp. 141-170.

section of the composition usually turns abruptly away from the main line of development and states the main point (*chen*). The final section then returns to the original idea and acts as a conclusion (*kyeol*). A communication style is achieved during primary socialization is the process whereby people learn the attitudes, values, and actions appropriate to individuals as members of a particular culture. During secondary socialization communication skills are a part of the process of learning what is an appropriate behavior as a member of a smaller group within the larger society. Influential agents are culture, religion, work, place, the state, and media resources. Communication is in Korean *cheon dal* 전달 (transmitting). Talk is in Korean *iaki* (이야기). Speech in Korean is *youn sol* (연설). In Japan the fundamental form of human existence is contextual. Interpersonalism as a perspective transcends the dualism. It is defined by mutual dependence, mutual trust and human relation in itself.<sup>34</sup> Japan has an own tradition of rhetoric according to the Shintoism practices there and the tradition of kingship.<sup>35</sup> In Japanese style of writing the parts of a priting are called opening, development, supplemental deviation, and conclusion (*ki-shou-ten-ketsu*). Japanese writers introduce their main idea at the end of their essays. This four-part organization of Japanese Buddhist traditional rhetoric of beginning, development, main point, supplemental deviation, and conclusion called *ki-shou-ten-ketsu* is based on classical Chinese poetry and consists of a topic structure with organizational markers, connectives, narrative structure, and paragraphing.<sup>36</sup>

## Conclusion

While philosophy and rhetoric are more or less divided in the Western way of education and scholarship by the system of *artes liberales* and theology and philosophy above them, in the main Eastern philosophical teachings elements of rhetoric are included next to works concerning speech and rhetoric. Rhetoric figures are universal categories of rhetoric we can of course find in all cultures. The linguistic disposition of Chinese is of course different than the one of the Western culture. Indeed, the idea of personal self-defense, which caused the establishment of the logographs and rhetoricians, in front of a public assembly is totally unknown in the East. As element of spiritual belief systems the rhetorical elements are bound to a social construction different to the political one in the West. Eastern rhetorical elements stay descriptive, they refer to their social system which a lack of precision, which was archived in the Western culture. Western rhetoric is a pragmatic discipline, while Eastern elements are philosophical.

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<sup>34</sup> Miyahara, Akira. "Toward Theorizing Japanese. Interpersonal Communication Competence from a Non-Western Perspective". In: *Acjournal*. Vol. 3. 2000 [6.6.2006]

<[Http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol3/Iss3/spec1/Miyahara.html](http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol3/Iss3/spec1/Miyahara.html)>

<sup>35</sup> McPhail, Mark Lawrence. "Zen in the Art of Rhetoric. An Inquiry into Coherence". Albany, NY 1996. Pp. 101-108.

<sup>36</sup> Maynard, Senko K. *Principles of Japanese Discourse: A Handbook*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.

## 5. Arabic Rhetoric: Ibn Khaldun. *The Muqaddimah*

### Arabic Rhetoric

In the Arabic language the expression *'ilm al-ma'nan* is used for rhetoric derived from the word *ma'nan* for sense or meaning. Another expression for rhetoric exist, which is called *bala:gha* derived from *bala:gh* meaning communication. The expression *'ilm al-kala:m* is actually the expression literally translated used for the science of words, but in both Christian and Islamic contexts it is an expression meaning theology.

#### 44. The sciences concerned with the Arabic language

The pillars of the Arabic language are four: lexicography, grammar, syntax and style (*bayan*), and literature. Knowledge of them all is necessary for religious scholars, since the source of all religious laws is the Qur'an and the Sunnah, which are in Arabic. Their transmitters, the men around Muhammad and the men of the second generation, were Arabs. Their difficulties are to be explained from the language they used. Thus, those who want to be religious scholars must know the sciences connected with the Arabic language.

These sciences differ in emphasis (as to their importance) according to the different degrees (of usefulness) they possess for conveying the intended meaning of speech, as will become clear when they are discussed one by one. The conclusion will be that the first and most important of them is grammar, since it gives a clear indication of the basic principles (used in expressing) the various intended meanings. Thus, one can distinguish between subject and object, as well as between the subject of a nominal sentence and its predicate. Without grammar, one would not know on what to base giving information (about anything)

Lexicography would deserve to be first, were not most of its data constant (and restricted) to their (conventional) meanings, incapable of changing, in contrast to the case endings (in grammar) which indicate dependence, the (person or thing) that is dependent, and the (person or thing) on which (something else) depends. They always change completely and leave no trace. Thus, grammar is more important than lexicography, since ignorance of (grammar) is very harmful to mutual understanding. This is not the case with lexicography.

And God knows better.

#### Grammar

It should be known that language, as the term is customarily used, is the expression by a speaker of his intention. Such expression is an act of the tongue which originates in an intention to convey the meaning of speech. Therefore, (language) must become an established habit (located) in the part of the body that produces it, namely, the tongue.

In every nation, the (formation of language takes place) according to their own terminology. The linguistic habit that the Arabs obtained in that way is the best there is. It is the one most clearly expressing the intended meaning, since many ideas are indicated in it by something else than words. There are, for instance, vowels to distinguish the subject from object and i-case - that is, the genitive - and (there are) letters to transform actions (verbs) - that is, motions -into essences, without need of other words. These (features) are found in no other language but Arabic. All other languages need special words to indicate a particular idea or situation. Therefore; we find non-Arabs lengthier in their speech than we would consider necessary in Arabic. This is what was meant in the following remark by Muhammad: "I was given the most comprehensive words, and speech was made short for me."

The consonants, vowels, and positions (of letters [sounds]), that is, the forms of the Arabic language, came to indicate the intended meaning in a definite manner. The (Arabs) did not need a craft to teach them their meaning. It was a habit in their tongues that one generation learned from the other, as our children nowadays learn our languages.

Then Islam came. The Arabs left the Hijaz to seek the royal authority that was in the hands of (foreign) nations and dynasties. They came into contact with non-Arabs. As a result, their linguistic habit changed under the influence of the solecisms they heard non-Arab speakers of Arabic make, and it is hearing that begets the linguistic habit. Thus,

the (Arab linguistic habit began to) incline toward adopting forms of speech at variance with it, because (the Arabs) became used to hearing them spoken, and (their linguistic habit) became corrupted. Cultured people feared that the (Arab linguistic) habit would become entirely corrupted and that, if the (process of corruption) went on for a long time, the Qur'an and the traditions would no longer be understood. Therefore, they derived certain norms for the (Arab linguistic) habit from their way of speaking. (These norms are) of general applicability, like universals and basic principles. They checked all the other parts of speech with them and combined like with like. (Among such norms,) for instance, are these:

The agent has the u-ending.

The object has the a-ending.

The subject of a nominal sentence has the u-ending.

Then, they considered (the fact) that the meaning changes with the change of vowel (endings). For this (phenomenon), they used the technical term of i'rab. For the thing that necessitates the change (in meaning), they used the technical term "agent," ('amil), and so on. All these things came to be technical terms peculiar to the (grammarians) who set them down in writing and made a particular craft of them. The technical term they used for that (craft) is "grammar" (nahw).

The first to write on (grammar) was Abul-Aswad ad-Du'ali, of the Banu Kinanah. It is said that he did so upon the advice of 'Ali, who noticed that the (linguistic) habit was changing. Therefore he advised (ad-Du'ali) to protect it, and (ad-Du'ali) anxiously went about the task of fixing it accurately by means of comprehensive, inductively evolved rules.

Later on, scholars wrote books on (grammar). Eventually, in the time of al-Khalil b. Ahmad al-Farahidi, in the days of ar-Rashid, people were more in need of (grammatical rules than ever before), because the (linguistic) habit was disappearing from among the Arabs. (Al-Khalil) improved the craft (of grammar) and perfected its various chapters. Sibawayh learned (grammar) from him. He perfected its details and increased the number of proofs and examples used in connection with it. He wrote on it his famous Book which became the model for everything subsequently written on (grammar). Short books for students were later written by Abu-Ali al-Farisi 1246 and Abul-Qasim az-Zajjaji. In them, they followed the model of (Sibawayh's) Book.

Then, there was much grammatical discussion. Divergent opinions originated among the grammarians of al-Kufah and al-Basrah, the two old cities of the Arabs. They used an increasing number of proofs and arguments. The methods of (grammatical) instruction also became different. There was much difference of opinion with regard to vowel endings in many verses of the Qur'an, since the grammarians held different opinions as to the basic rules of (grammar). This became a lengthy subject for students (to study). Then recent scholars came, with their method of being brief. They cut short a good deal of the long discussion, though they included everything that had been transmitted. That, for instance, was what Ibn Malik 1248 did in the Kitab at-Tashil, and others. Or, they restricted themselves to elementary rules for (beginning) students. That, for instance, was what az-Zamakhshari did in the Mufassal and Ibn al-Hajib in the Muqaddimah. They also frequently versified the subject. That was done, for instance, by Ibn Malik in two rajaz poems, the large and the small one, and by Ibn Mu'ti in a rajaz poem of a thousand verses (ay'zyah).

In general, the works on this subject are innumerable and cannot all be known, and the methods of (grammatical) instruction are varied. The method of the ancients is different from that of recent (grammarians). The methods of the Kufians, the Basrians, the Baghdadis, and the Spaniards also, are all different.

Grammar has come to the point of being allowed to disappear, along with the decrease in the other sciences and crafts which we have noted and which is the result of a decrease in civilization. At the present time, there has reached us in the Maghrib a systematic work (diwan) from Egypt attributed to the Egyptian scholar, Jamal-ad-din b. Hisham. He treats in it all the rules governing vowel endings, both in general and in detail. He discusses the letters (sounds) and the individual words and sentences. He omits the repetitions found in most chapters of grammar. He called his work al-Mughni fi l-i'rab. He indicates all the fine points of the vowel endings in the Qur'an and sets them

down accurately in chapters and sections and according to basic norms all of which are very orderly. We have found in (the work) much information at-testing to (the author's) great ability and abundant knowledge of grammar. In a way, his approach follows the method of the Mosul grammarians who followed in the footsteps of Ibn Jinni and adopted his technical terminology for (grammatical) instruction. In this way, he has produced a remarkable work that shows his powerful (linguistic) habit and his acquaintance with the subject.

God "gives in addition to the creatures whatever He wishes to give to them."

#### The science of lexicography

This science is concerned with explaining the (conventional) meanings of the (words of the) language. This comes about as follows. The habit of the Arabic language, as far as the vowels called i'rab by the grammarians are concerned, became corrupted. Rules for protecting the (vowel endings) were developed, as we have stated. However, the (process of) corruption continued on account of the close contact (of the Muslims) with non-Arabs. Eventually, it affected the (conventional) meanings of words. Many Arabic words were no (longer) used in their proper meaning. This was the result of indulgence shown to the incorrect language used by non-Arab speakers of Arabic in their terminologies, in contradiction to the pure Arabic language. It was, therefore, necessary to protect the (conventional) meanings of the (words of the) language with the help of writing and systematic works, because it was to be feared that (otherwise) they might be wiped out and that ignorance of the Qur'an and the traditions would result. Many leading philologists set out eagerly on this task and dictated systematic works on the subject. The champion in this respect was al-Khalil b. Ahmad al-Farahidi. He wrote the Kitab al-'Ayn on lexicography. In it, he dealt with all (possible) combinations of the letters of the alphabet, that is, with words of two, three, four, and five consonants. (Five-consonant words) are the longest letter combinations found in Arabic.

It was possible for al-Khalil to calculate arithmetically the total number of such combinations. This goes as follows. The total number of two-consonant words is the sum of the arithmetical progression from one to twenty-seven. Twenty-seven is one letter less than the number of letters in the alphabet. For the first consonant (of the alphabet) is combined with the remaining twenty-seven letters. This results in twenty-seven two-consonant words. Then, the second letter is combined with the remaining twenty-six consonants, then the third and the fourth, and so on, to the twenty-seventh consonant, which is combined (only) with the twenty-eighth consonant. This results in one two-consonant word. Thus, the number of two-consonant words is the arithmetical progression from one to twenty-seven. The total can be figured out with the help of a well-known arithmetical operation - that is, one adds up the first and last (numbers of the progression) and multiplies the total by one-half of the number (of numbers in the progression). The resulting number is then doubled, because the position of the consonants can be inverted. The position of consonants must be taken into consideration in combining them. The result is the total number of two-consonant words.

The number of three-consonant words is the result of multiplying the number of two-consonant words by the sum of the arithmetical progression from one to twenty-six. For every two-consonant word becomes a three-consonant word through the addition of one consonant. Thus, the two-consonant words may take the place of one consonant to be combined with each of the remaining consonants of the alphabet, which number twenty-six. Thus, the sum of the arithmetical progression from one to twenty-six is calculated and multiplied by the number of two-consonant words. The result, then, is multiplied by six, which is the possible number of combinations of three consonants. The result is the total number (of words of three consonants that can be made) from the consonants of the alphabet. The same is done with four-consonant and five-consonant words. In this way, the total number of (possible) letter combinations was calculated (by al-Khalil).

Al-Khalil did <not?> arrange the chapters of the book according to the customary sequence of the letters of the alphabet. (Instead,) he used the sequence of the positions (in throat and mouth) in which the various sounds are produced. Thus, he started with the laryngeals. They were followed, successively, by velars, dentals, and labials. Al-Khalil put the weak consonants, which are the (so-called) airy consonants (alif, w, y), in the last place. Among the laryngeals, he started with 'ayn, because it is the (sound produced) farthest (back in the throat). Therefore, his book was called Kitab al-'Ayn. The ancient (scholars) did such things when they selected titles for their works. They called them after the first words or phrases that occurred in them.

(Al-Khalil) then made a distinction between (letter combinations) that are not used and those that are. The largest number of (letter combinations) that are not used are among words of four or five consonants. The Arabs rarely use them because of their heaviness. Next come the two-consonant words. They have little circulation. The three-consonant words are the ones used most. Thus, they possess the greatest number of (conventional) meanings, because they are (so much) in circulation.

All this was included by (al-Khalil) in the *Kitab al-'Ayn* and treated very well and exhaustively.

Abu Bakr az-Zubaydi, 1261 the writing teacher of Hisham al-Mu'ayyad in Spain in the fourth [tenth] century, abridged the (*Kitab al-'Ayn*) but preserved its complete character. He omitted all the words that are not used. He also omitted many of the examples clarifying words in use. Thus, he produced a very good abridgment for memorizing.

Among eastern scholars, al-Jawhari composed the *Kitab as-Sihah*, which follows the ordinary alphabetical sequence. He started with hamzah (alif). He arranged the words according to their last letter, since people have mostly to do with the last consonants of words. He made a special chapter (of each last letter), and within each chapter he also proceeded alphabetically by the first (letters) of the words and listed all of them as separate entries to the end. He gave a comprehensive presentation of the (lexicographical facts of the Arabic) language in imitation of the work of al-Khalil.

Among Spanish scholars, Ibn Sidah, of Denia, wrote the *Kitab al-Muhkam*, a similarly comprehensive work following the arrangement of the *Kitab al-'Ayn*. He wrote during the reign of 'Ali b. Mujahid. Ibn Sidah's own contribution was an attempt to give the etymologies and grammatical forms of the words. Thus, his work turned out to be one of the best systematic works (on lexicography). An abridgment of it was written by Muhammad b. Abil-Husayn, a companion of the Hafsid ruler al-Mustansir in Tunis. He changed the (alphabetical) sequence to that of the *Kitab as-Sihah*, in that he considered the last consonants of the words and arranged the entries according to them. The two (works) are thus like real twins. Kura', a leading philologist, wrote the *Kitab al-Munajjad*, Ibn Durayd 1268 the *Kitab al-Jamharah*, and Ibn al-Anbari the *Kitab az-Zahir*.

These are the principal works on lexicography, as far as we know. There are other brief works restricted to particular kinds of words. They contain some chapters, or they may contain all of them, but, still, they are obviously not comprehensive, while comprehensiveness is an obvious feature in the works (mentioned), dealing with all (the possible letter) combinations, as one has seen. Another work on lexicography is the one by az-Zamakhshari on metaphoric usage, entitled *Asas al-balaghah*. Az-Zamakhshari explains in it all the words used metaphorically by the Arabs, (and he explains) what meanings are used metaphorically by them. It is a highly useful work.

Furthermore, the Arabs may use a general term for one (particular) meaning, but (for the expression of the same idea) in connection with particular objects, they may employ other words that can be used (in this particular meaning) only with those particular objects. Thus, we have a distinction between (conventional) meaning and usage. This (situation) requires a lexicographical "jurisprudence." It is something difficult to develop. For instance, "white" is used for anything that contains whiteness. However, the whiteness of horses is indicated by the special word *ashhab*, that of men by the word *azhar*, and that of sheep by the word *amlah*. Eventually, the use of the ordinary word for "white" in all these cases came to be (considered) a solecism and deviation from the Arabic language. Ath-Tha'alibi, in particular, wrote in this sense. He composed a monograph on the subject entitled *Fiqh al-lughah "Jurisprudence of Lexicography."* It is the best control a philologist has, in order to keep himself from deviating from (proper) Arabic usage. A knowledge of the primary (conventional) meaning is not enough for (the use of proper) word combinations. It must be attested by (actual) Arabic usage. This (knowledge) is needed most by poets and prose writers, in order to avoid committing frequent solecisms in connection with the (conventional) meanings of words, whether they are used in individual words or in combinations. (Improper use in this respect) is worse than solecisms in (use of the) vowel endings. Likewise, a recent scholar wrote on homonyms and undertook to give a comprehensive presentation of them. However, he did not fully succeed, though his work contains most of the (material).

There are many brief works on the subject. They are particularly concerned with widespread and much used lexicographical materials. Their purpose is to make it easy for the student to memorize them. For instance, there are

the Alfaz of Ibn as-Sikkit, the Fasih of Tha'lab, and others. Some contain less lexicographical material than others, depending on the different views of their authors as to what is most important for the student to know.

God is "the Creator, the Knowing One."

It should be known that the tradition through which (any particular) lexicographical (usage) is confirmed is a tradition indicating that the Arabs used certain words in certain meanings. It does not indicate that they invented their (conventional meanings). This is impossible and improbable. It is not known (for certain) that any one of them ever did that.

Likewise, the meanings of words cannot be established by analogy, if their usage is not known, although, a for jurists, their usage may be known by virtue of (the existence of) an inclusive (concept) that attests to the applicability of (a wider meaning) to the first (word). (The use of the word) khamr "grape wine" for nabidh "date wine" is established by its use for "juice of grapes" and by application of the inclusive (concept) of "causing intoxication." (This is so) only because the use of analogy (in this case) is attested by the religious law, which deduces the soundness of (the application of) analogy (in this case) from the (general norms) on which it is based. We do not have anything like it in lexicography. There, only the intellect can be used, which means (relying on) judgment. This is the opinion of most authorities, even though the Judge (al-Baqillani) and Ibn Surayj and others are inclined to (use) analogy in connection with (the meaning of words). However, it is preferable to deny its (applicability). It should not be thought that the establishment of word meanings falls under the category of word definitions. A definition indicates (the meaning of) a given idea by showing that the meaning of an unknown and obscure word is identical with the meaning of a clear and well-known word. Lexicography, on the other hand, affirms that such-and-such a word is used to express such-and-such an idea. The difference here is very clear.

The science of syntax and style and literary criticism

This is a 'science which originated in Islam after Arabic philology and lexicography. It belongs among the philological sciences, because it is concerned with words and the ideas they convey and are intended to indicate. This is as follows:

The thing that the speaker intends to convey to the listener through speech may be a perception (tasawwur) regarding individual words which are dependent and on which (something else) depends and of which one leads to the other. These (concepts) are indicated by individual nouns, verbs, and particles. Or, (what the speaker intends to convey) may be the distinction between the things that are dependent and those that depend on them and (the distinction between) tenses. These (concepts) are indicated by the change of vowel endings and the forms of the words. All this belongs to grammar.

Among the things that are part of the facts and need to be indicated, there still remain the conditions of speakers and agents and the requirements of the situation under which the action takes place. This needs to be indicated, because it completes (the information) to be conveyed. If the speaker is able to bring out these (facts), his speech conveys everything that it can possibly convey. If his speech does not have anything of that, it is not real Arabic speech. The Arabic language is vast. The Arabs have a particular expression for each situation, in addition to a perfect use of vowel endings and clarity.

It is known that "Zayd came to me" does not mean the same as "There came to me Zayd." Something mentioned in the first place (such as "Zayd" in the first example) has greater importance in the mind of the speaker. The person who says: "There came to me Zayd," indicates that he is more concerned with the coming than with the person who comes. (On the other hand,) the person who says: "Zayd came to me," indicates that he is more concerned with the person than with his coming, which (grammatically) depends on (the person who comes).

The same applies to the indication of the parts of a sentence by relative pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, or determinations appropriate to the situation. It also applies to "emphatic" connection in general. For instance, (the three sentences): "Zayd is standing," "Behold, Zayd is standing," and "Behold, Zayd is indeed standing," all mean



something different, even if they are alike as far as vowel endings are concerned. The first (sentence), without the emphatic particle, informs a person who has no previous knowledge as to (whether Zayd is standing or not). The second (sentence), with the emphatic particle "behold," informs a person who hesitates (whether he should acknowledge the fact of Zayd's standing or not). And the third (sentence) informs a person who (persists in) denying (the fact of Zayd's standing). Thus, they are all different. The same applies to a statement such as: "There came to me the man," which is then replaced by the statement: "There came to me a man." The use of the form without the article may be intended as an honor (for the man in question) and as an indication that he is a man who has no equal.

Furthermore, a sentence may have the structure of a statement and thus be a sentence that conforms, originally (at least), to something in the outside world. Or, it may have the structure of a command and thus be a sentence that has no correspondence in the outside world, as, for example, requests and the different ways they (can be expressed).

Furthermore, the copula between two (parts of a) sentence must be omitted, if the second (part) has an integral place in the sentence structure. In this way, the (second part) takes the place of an individual apposition and is either attribute, or emphasis, or substitute (attached to the part of the sentence to which it belongs), without copula. Or, if the second (part of the) sentence has no such integral place in the sentence structure, the copula must be used.

Also, the given situation may require either lengthiness or brevity. (The speaker) will express himself accordingly.

Then, an expression may be used other than in its literal meaning. It may be intended to indicate some implication of it. This may apply to an individual word. For instance, in the statement: "Zayd is a lion," no actual lion, but the bravery implicit in lions, is meant and referred to Zayd. This is called metaphorical usage. It also may be a combination of words intended to express some implication that results from it. The statement: "Zayd has a great deal of ash on his pots," is intended to indicate the implied (qualities) of generosity and hospitality, because a great deal of ash is the result (of generosity and hospitality). Thus, it indicates those (qualities). All these things are meanings in addition to the (original) meaning of the individual word or combination of words. They are forms and conditions that the facts may take and that can be expressed by conditions and forms of speech that have been invented for that purpose, as required by the particular situation in each case.

The discipline called syntax and style (bayan) expresses the meaning that the forms and conditions of speech have in various situations. It has been divided into three subdivisions.

The first subdivision has as its subject the investigation of forms and conditions of speech, in order to achieve conformity with all the requirements of a given situation. This is called "the science of rhetoric" (balaghah).

The second subdivision has as its subject the investigation of what a word implies or is implied by it—that is, metaphor and metonymy, as we have just stated. This is called "the science of style" (bayan). (Scholars) have added a (third) subdivision, the study of the artistic embellishment of speech. Such embellishment may be achieved through the ornamental use of rhymed prose (saj'), which divides (speech) into sections; or through the use of paronomasia (tajnis), which establishes a similarity among the words used; or through the use of internal rhyme (tarsi'), which cuts down the units of rhythmic speech (into smaller units); or through the use of allusion (tawriyah) to the intended meaning by suggesting an even more cryptic idea which is expressed by the same words; or through the use of antithesis (tibaq); and similar things. They called this "the science of rhetorical figures" ('ilm al-badi').

Recent scholars have used the name of the second subdivision, bayan (syntax and style), for all three subdivisions 1298 because the ancient scholars had discussed it first.

The problems of the discipline, then, made their appearance one after the other. Insufficient works on the subject were dictated by Ja'far b. Yahya, al-Jahiz, Qudamah, and others. The problems continued to be perfected one by one. Eventually, as-Sakkaki 1302 sifted out the best part of the discipline, refined its problems, and arranged its chapters in the manner mentioned by us at the start. He composed the book entitled al-Miftah fi n-nahw wa-t-tasrif wa-l-bayan "On Grammar, Inflection, and Syntax and Style." He made the discipline of bayan one of the parts (of the book). Later scholars took the subject over from (as-Sakkaki's) work. They abridged it in authoritative works which are in circulation at this time. That was done, for instance, by as-Sakkaki (himself) in the Kitab at-Tibyan, by Ibn Malik in the Kitab al-Misbah, and by Jalal-ad-din al-Qazwini in the Kitab al-Idah and the Kitab at-Talkhis, which is shorter than the Idah. Contemporary Easterners are more concerned with commenting on and teaching (the Miftah) than any other (work).

In general, the people of the East cultivate this discipline more than the Maghribis. The reason is perhaps that it is a luxury, as far as the linguistic sciences are concerned, and luxury crafts exist (only) where civilization is abundant, and civilization is (today) more abundant in the East than in the West, as we have mentioned. Or, we might say (the reason is that) the non-Arabs (Persians) who constitute the majority of the population of the East occupy themselves with the Qur'an commentary of az-Zamakhshari, which is wholly based upon this discipline. The people of the West chose as their own field the (third) subdivision of this discipline, the science of rhetorical figures ('ilm al-badi'). They made it a part of poetical literature. They invented a detailed (nomenclature of rhetorical) figures for it and divided it into many chapters and subdivisions. They thought that they could consider all that part of the Arabic language. However, the reason (why they cultivated the subject) was that they liked to express themselves artistically. (Furthermore,) the science of rhetorical figures is easy to learn, while it was difficult for them to learn rhetoric and style, because the theories and ideas of (rhetoric and style) are subtle and intricate. Therefore, they kept away from those two subjects. One of the authors in Ifriqiyah who wrote on rhetorical figures was Ibn Rashiq. His Kitab al-'Umdah is famous. Many of the people of Ifriqiyah and Spain wrote along the lines of (the 'Umdah). It should be known that the fruit of this discipline is understanding of the inimitability of the Qur'an. The inimitability of (the Qur'an) consists in the fact that the (language of the Qur'an) indicates all the requirements of the situations (referred to), whether they are stated or understood. This is the highest stage of speech. In addition, (the Qur'an) is perfect in choice of words and excellence of arrangement and combination. This is (its) inimitability, (a quality) that surpasses comprehension. Something of it may be understood by those who have a taste for it as the result of their contact with the (Arabic) language and their possession of the habit of it. They may thus understand as much of the inimitability of the Qur'an as their taste permits. Therefore, the Arabs who heard the Qur'an directly from (the Prophet) who brought it (to them) had a better understanding of its (inimitability than later Muslims). They were the champions and arbiters of speech, and they possessed the greatest and best taste (for the language) that anyone could possibly have. This discipline is needed most by Qur'an commentators. Most ancient commentators disregarded it, until Jar-Allah az-Zamakhshari appeared. When he wrote his Qur'an commentary, he investigated each verse of the Qur'an according to the rules of this discipline. This brings out, in part, its inimitability. It gives his commentary greater distinction than is possessed by any other commentary. However, he tried to confirm the articles of faith of the (Mu'tazilah) innovators by deriving them from the Qur'an by means of different aspects of rhetoric (balaghah). Therefore, many orthodox Muslims have been on their guard against his (commentary), despite his abundant knowledge of rhetoric (balaghah). However, there are people who have a good knowledge of the orthodox articles of faith and who have some experience in this discipline. They are able to refute him with his own weapons, or (at least) they know that (his work) contains innovations. They can avoid them, so that no harm is done to their religious beliefs. Such persons do not risk being affected by the innovations and sectarian beliefs. They should study (as-Zamakhshari's commentary), in order to find out about certain (aspects of) the inimitability of the Qur'an. God guides whomever He wants to guide to "an even road."

#### The science of literature

This science has no object the accidents of which may be studied and thus be affirmed or denied. Philologists consider its purpose identical with its fruit, which is (the acquisition of) a good ability to handle prose and poetry according to the methods and ways of the Arabs. Therefore, they collect and memorize (documents) of Arabic speech that are likely to aid in acquiring the (proper linguistic) habit. (Such documents include) high-class poetry, rhymed prose of an even quality, and (certain) problems of lexicography and grammar, found scattered among (documents of Arabic poetry and prose) and from which the student is, as a rule, able to derive inductively most of the rules of Arabic. In addition, they mention certain of the battle-day narratives of the Arabs, which serve to explain the references to (battle days) occurring in the poems. Likewise, they mention famous pedigrees and general historical information of importance. The purpose of all this is not to leave the students investigating such things in the dark about any (of the documents of) Arabic speech, about any of the (literary) methods used, or about any of the methods of Arab eloquence. Merely memorizing them does not give (a student the proper linguistic) habit, unless he first understands them. Therefore, he must give preference to everything upon which understanding of (Arabic literature) depends.

(Philologists) who wanted to define this discipline said: "Literature is expert knowledge of the poetry and history of the Arabs as well as the possession of some knowledge regarding every science." They meant (knowledge) of the linguistic sciences and the religious sciences, but only the contents (of the latter) that is, the Qur'an and the traditions. No other science has anything to do with Arab speech, save in as much as recent scholars who have occupied themselves with the craft of rhetorical figures ('ilm al-badi') have come to use allusion (tawriyah) by means

of (references to terms of) scientific terminologies, in their poetry and their straight prose (tarsil). Therefore, litterateurs need to know scientific terminologies, in order to be able to understand (such allusions).

We heard our shaykhs say in class that the basic principles and pillars of this discipline are four works: the Adab al-katib by Ibn Qutaybah, the Kitab al-Kamil by al-Mubarrad, the Kitab al-Bayan wa-t-tabyin by al-Jahiz 1320 and the Kitab an-Nawadir by Abu 'Ali al-Qali al-Baghdadi. All other books depend on these four and are derived from them. The works of recent writers on the subject are numerous.

At the beginning of (Islam) singing (music) belonged to this discipline. (Singing) depends on poetry, because it is the setting of poetry to music. Secretaries and outstanding persons in the 'Abbasid dynasty occupied themselves with it, because they were desirous of becoming acquainted with the methods and (literary) disciplines of the Arabs. Its cultivation was no blemish on probity or manliness. The early Hijazi Muslims in Medina and elsewhere, who are models for everybody else to follow, cultivated it. Such a great (scholar) as Judge Abul-Faraj al-Isfahani wrote a book on songs, the Kitab al-Aghani. In it, he dealt with the whole of the history, poetry, genealogy, battle days, and ruling dynasties of the Arabs. The basis for the work were one hundred songs which the singers had selected for ar-Rashid. His work is the most complete and comprehensive one there is. Indeed, it constitutes an archive of the Arabs. It is a collection of the disjecta membra of all the good things in Arab poetry, history, song, and all the other conditions (of the Arabs). There exists no book comparable to it, as far as we know. It is the ultimate goal to which a litterateur can aspire and where he must stop - as though he could ever get so far!

Let us now return to the verification of our remarks about the linguistic sciences in general (terms).

God is the guide to that which is correct.

#### 45. Language is a technical habit.

It should be known that all languages are habits similar to crafts (techniques). They are habits (located) in the tongue and serve the purpose of expressing ideas. The good or inadequate (character of such expression) depends on the perfection or deficiency of the habit. This does not apply to individual words but to word combinations. A speaker who possesses a perfect (linguistic) habit and is thus able to combine individual words so as to express the ideas he wants to express, and who is able to observe the form of composition that makes his speech conform to the requirements of the situation, is as well qualified as is (humanly) possible to convey to the listener what he wants to convey. This is what is meant by eloquence.

Habits result only from repeated action. An action is done first (once). Thus, it contributes an attribute to the essence. With repetition it becomes a condition, which is an attribute that is not firmly established. After more repetition it becomes a habit, that is, a firmly established attribute.

As long as the habit of the Arabic language existed among the Arabs, an Arab speaker always heard the people of his generation (race) speak (Arabic). He hears their ways of address and how they express what they want to express. He is like a child hearing individual words employed in their proper meanings. He learns them first. Afterwards, he hears word combinations and learns them likewise. He hears something new each moment from every speaker, and his own practice is constantly repeated, until (use of proper speech) becomes a habit and a firmly established attribute. Thus, (the child) becomes like one of (the Arabs). In this way, (Arab) languages and dialects have passed from generation to generation, and both non-Arabs and children have learned them. This is (what is) meant by the common saying: "The Arabs have (their) language from nature." That is, they have it from (their own) original habit, and while (others) learned it from them, they themselves did not learn it from anyone else. The (linguistic) habit of the Mudar became corrupt when they came into contact with non-Arabs. The reason for that corruption was that the generation growing up heard other ways of expressing the things they wanted to express than the Arab (ways). They used them to express what they wanted to express, because there were so many non-Arabs coming into contact with the Arabs. They also heard the ways in which the Arabs expressed themselves. As a result, matters became confused for them. They adopted (ways of expressing themselves) from both sides. Thus, there originated a new habit which was inferior to the first one. This is what is meant by "corruption of the Arabic language." Therefore, the dialect of the Quraysh was the most correct and purest Arabic dialect, because the Quraysh were on all sides far removed from the lands of the non-Arabs. Next came (the tribes) around the Quraysh, the Thaqif, the Hudhayl, the Khuza'ah, the Banu Kinanah, the Ghatafan, the Banu Asad, and the Banu Tamim. The Rabi'ah, the Lakhm, the Judham, the Ghassan, the Iyad, the Quda'ah, and the Arabs of the Yemen lived farther away from the Quraysh, and were (variously) neighbors of the Persians, the Byzantines, and the Abyssinians. Because they had contact with non-Arabs, their linguistic habit was not perfect. The Arabic dialects were used by Arab philologists as arguments for (linguistic) soundness or corruption according to the (degree of) remoteness of (the tribes speaking them) from the Quraysh.

And God knows better.

52. The division of speech into poetry and prose.

It should be known that the Arabic language and Arab speech are divided into two branches. (One of them) is rhymed poetry. It is speech with meter and rhyme, which means that every line of it ends upon a definite letter, which is called the "rhyme." The other branch is prose, that is, non-metrical speech.

Each of the two branches comprises various sub-branches and ways of speech. Poetry comprises laudatory and heroic poems and elegies (upon the dead). Prose may be rhymed prose. Rhymed prose consists of cola ending on the same rhyme throughout, or of sentences rhymed in pairs. This is called "rhymed prose" (saj'). Prose may also be "straight prose" (murassal). In (straight prose), the speech goes on and is not divided into cola, but is continued straight through without any divisions, either of rhyme or of anything else. (Prose) is employed in sermons and prayers and in speeches intended to encourage or frighten the masses. The Qur'an is in prose. However, it does not belong in either of the two categories. It can neither be called straight prose nor rhymed prose. It is divided into verses. One reaches breaks where taste tells one that the speech stops. It is then resumed and "repeated" in the next verse. (Rhyme) letters which would make that (type of speech) rhymed prose are not obligatory, nor do rhymes (as used in poetry) occur. This (situation) is what is meant by the verse of the Qur'an: "God revealed the best story, a book harmoniously arranged with repeated verses (mathaniya). It raises goose pimples on the skin of those who fear their Lord." God also said: "We have divided the verses." That is why the ends of the individual verses are called "dividers" (fawasil). They are not really rhymed prose, since the (rhyme) which is obligatory in rhymed prose is not obligatory in them, nor are there rhymes as in poetry. The name "repeated verses" (mathani) is generally used for all the verses of the Qur'an, for the reasons mentioned. It is used in particular for the first surah, because of the prominence (of repeated verses) in it, just as the (general) word "star" is used for the Pleiades. Therefore, the (first surah) was called "the seven repeated (verses)." One may compare what the Qur'an commentators have said in explanation of the fact that the first surah is called "the repeated (verses)." One will find that our explanation deserves the preference.

It should be known that each of these branches of poetry has its own particular methods, which are considered peculiar to it by the people who cultivate that branch and which do not apply to any other (branch) and cannot be employed for it. For instance, there is the nasib, which is restricted to poetry. There are the praise of God and prayer (du'a'), which are restricted to sermons, and there are the formulas of blessing (du'a'), which are restricted to addresses, and so on.

Recent authors employ the methods and ways of poetry in writing prose. (Their writing) contains a great deal of rhymed prose and obligatory rhymes as well as the use of the nasib before the authors say what they want to say. When one examines such prose, (one gets the impression that) it has actually become a kind of poetry. It differs from poetry only through the absence of meter. In recent times, secretaries took this up and employed it in government correspondence. They restricted all prose writing to this type, which they liked. They mixed up (all the different) methods in it. They avoided straight prose and affected to forget it, especially the people of the East. At the hand of stupid secretaries, present-day government correspondence is handled in the way described. From the point of view of good style (balaghah), it is not correct, since (in good style) one looks for conformity between what is said and the requirements of the given situations in which the speaker and the person addressed find themselves. In recent times, secretaries introduced the methods of poetry into this type of prose-with-rhyme. However, it is necessary that government correspondence be kept free from it. The methods of poetry admit wittiness, the mixture of humor with seriousness, long descriptions, and the free use of proverbs, as well as frequent similes and metaphoric expressions, (even) where none of these are required in (ordinary) address. The (constant) obligatory use of rhyme is also something witty and ornamental. All of this is quite incompatible with the dignity of royal and governmental authority and with the task of encouraging or frightening the masses in the name of the ruler. In government correspondence, what deserves praise is the use of straight prose - that is, straightforward speech with only a very occasional use of rhymed prose in places where (sound linguistic) habit can use rhymed prose in an unforced manner - and (forms of) speech that conform properly to the requirements of a given situation. The (existing) situations are always different. Each situation has its peculiar method (of expression. A situation may require) lengthiness or brevity, ellipsis or assertion, directness or allusion, the use of metonymy or metaphors. Government correspondence done in the (afore-mentioned) way, that is, in a method proper to poetry, deserves censure. The only reason why (our) contemporaries do it is the fact that non-Arab (speech habits) exercise a firm hold over their tongues, and, as a result, they are unable to give their speech its proper measure of conformity with the requirements of a given situation. Thus, they are unable to use straight speech. It is a difficult task and (takes) long effort to achieve eloquence in it. They eagerly use the type of rhymed prose (mentioned), in this way covering up their inability to make their speech conform to the things they want to say and to the requirements of the particular situation (with which they deal). They make up for their (inability in this respect) by greatly embellishing

(their speech) with rhymed prose and rhetorical figures (alqab), They neglect everything else. Present-day secretaries and poets in the East use this method most and apply it in an exaggerated manner to all kinds of speech. They go so far as to tamper with the vowel endings and inflections of words when it happens to them that these conflict with some paronomasia or antithesis (that they want to use). In such a case, they give preference to the paronomasia and pay no attention to the (correct) vowel ending, (preferring to) corrupt the form of the word so that it might fit the paronomasia.

When this matter is studied critically from the point of view of our preceding remarks, it will be seen that our remarks are correct.

God gives success.

53. The ability to write both good poetry and good prose is only very rarely found together in one person.

The reason for this is that, as we have explained, it is a habit (located) in the tongue. If another habit previously occupied the place of (that habit), the subsequent habit has, not enough room to develop, because the acceptance and obtainment of habits is simpler and easier for natures in their original state. If there are other previous habits, they resist the (new habit) in the substance that is to receive the (new habit). They prevent it from being quickly accepted. Thus, there arises incompatibility. It becomes impossible for the (new) habit to develop (to perfection). This is, in general, the case with all technical habits. We have proved that fact in the proper place with an argument similar to the one used here. The same applies to languages. They are habits of the tongue which are in the same position as the crafts. It can be observed how persons with some previous non-Arab (speech habits) are always deficient in (their knowledge of) the Arabic language. Non-Arabs who previously spoke Persian cannot master the Arabic linguistic habit and will always be deficient in Arabic, even though they may study and (come to) know it. The same is the case with Berbers, Byzantines, and European Christians. One rarely finds among them any one who possesses a good Arabic linguistic habit. The only reason here is that their tongues previously had the habit of another language. This goes so far that a student whose native language is one of the (non-Arabic) languages, but who studies (his subjects) among Arabic speaking-people and from Arabic books, will never be perfect in his knowledge and attainments. The only reason is the language.

It was mentioned before that languages and dialects are similar to the crafts. It was also mentioned before that the crafts and the habits of them do not come together in groups. Persons who previously had some good habit 1436 are rarely able to become skilled in another or to master it completely.

"God created you and whatever you do."

54. The craft of poetry and the way of learning it.

This discipline is one of the disciplines connected with Arab speech. (The Arabs) call it "poetry" (shi'r). It exists in all the other languages. Here, however, we speak only about Arabic poetry. It is possible that the speakers of other languages, too, find in (poetry) the things they desire to express in their speech. However, each language has its own particular laws concerning eloquence. (Poetry) in the Arabic language is remarkable in (its) manner and powerful in (its) way. It is speech that is divided into cola having the same meter and held together by the last letter of each colon. Each of those cola is called a "verse." The last letter, which all the verses (of a poem) have in common, is called the "rhyme letter." The whole complex is called a "poem" (qasidah or kalimah). Each verse, with its combinations of words, is by itself a meaningful unit. In a way, it is a statement by itself, and independent of what precedes and what follows. By itself it makes perfect sense, either as a laudatory or an erotic (statement), or as an elegy. It is the intention of the poet to give each verse an independent meaning. Then, in the next verse, he starts anew, in the same way, with some other (matter). He changes over from one (poetical) type to another, and from one topic to another, by preparing the first topic and the ideas expressing it in such a way that it becomes related to the next topic. Sharp contrasts are kept out of the poem. The poet thus continuously changes over from the erotic to the laudatory (verses). From a description of the desert and the traces of abandoned camps, he changes over to a description of camels on the march, or horses, or apparitions (of the beloved in a dream). From a description of the person to be praised, he changes over to a description of his people and his army. From (an expression of) grief and condolence in elegies, he changes over to praise of the deceased, and so on. Attention is paid to retaining the same meter throughout the whole poem, in order to avoid one's natural inclination to pass from one meter to another, similar one. Since (the meters) are similar (to each other), many people do not notice (the need to retain the same meter).

The meters are governed by certain conditions and rules. They are the subject of the science of prosody. Not every meter that may occur in nature was used by the Arabs in poetry. The (meters used) are special ones called meters (buhur) by the prosodists, who restricted their number to fifteen, indicating that they did not find the Arabs using other natural meters in poetry.

It should be known that the Arabs thought highly of poetry as a form of speech. Therefore, they made it the archive of their sciences and their history, the evidence for what they considered right and wrong, and the principle basis of reference for most of their sciences and wisdom. The poetical habit was firmly established in them, like all their other habits. The (Arabic) linguistic habits can be acquired only through technical (skill) and (constant) practice of (Arab) speech. Eventually, some sign of the (poetical) habit may be obtained.

Of the forms of speech, poetry is a difficult thing for modern people to learn, if they want to acquire the habit of it through (study of it as) a technique. Each verse is an independent statement of meaning suitable for (quotation) by itself. It requires a kind of refinement of the (poetical) habit, for the (poet) to be able to pour poetical speech into molds suitable to this tendency of Arabic poetry (to have verses that are units by themselves). A poet must produce (a verse that) stands alone, and then make another verse in the same way, and again another, and thus go through all the different topics suitable to the thing he wants to express. Then, he establishes harmony among the verses as they follow upon each other in accordance with the different topics occurring in the poem.

(Poetry) is difficult in its tendency and strange in its subject matter. Therefore, it constitutes a severe test of a person's natural talent, if he wants to have a good knowledge of (poetical) methods. (The desire) to press speech into the molds of (poetry) sharpens the mind. (Possession of) the Arabic linguistic habit in general does not suffice. In particular, a certain refinement is needed, as well as the exercise of a certain skill in observing the special poetic methods which the Arabs used.

Let us mention the significance of (the word) "method" (uslub) as used by (poets), and what they mean by it.

It should be known that they use it to express the loom on which word combinations are woven, or the mold into which they are packed. It is not used to express the basis (upon which) the meaning (of a statement rests). That is the task of the vowel endings. It also is not used for perfect expression of the idea resulting from the particular word combination used. That is the task of eloquence and style (bayan). It also is not used in the sense of meter, as employed by the Arabs in (connection with) poetry. That is the task of prosody. These three sciences fall outside the craft of poetry.

(Poetical method) is used to refer to a mental form for metrical word combinations which is universal in the sense of conforming with any particular word combination. This form is abstracted by the mind from the most prominent individual word combinations and given a place in the imagination comparable to a mold or loom. Word combinations that the Arabs consider sound, in the sense of having the (correct) vowel endings and the (proper) style, are then selected and packed by (the mind) into (that form), just as the builder does with the mold, or the weaver with the loom. Eventually, the mold is sufficiently widened to admit the word combinations that fully express what one wants to express. It takes on the form that is sound in the sense (that it corresponds to) the Arabic linguistic habit.

Each branch of (poetical) speech has methods peculiar to it and existing in it in different ways. Thus, in poetry the subject of inquiring after the traces of abandoned camps is treated in the form of direct address. For instance:

O house of Mayyah on the height, and the cliff.

Or, it is treated in the form of inviting one's (traveling) companions to stop and inquire. For instance:

Stop you two, and let us inquire about the house whose inhabitants left so suddenly.

Or, it is treated in the form of asking one's (traveling) companions to weep for the abandoned camp. For instance:

Stop you two, and let us weep in remembrance of a beloved and an encampment.

Or, it is treated in the form of asking about the answer given to an unspecified addressee. For instance:

Did you not ask, and the traces informed you?

Or, for instance, the traces of abandoned camps are greeted by commanding an unspecified addressee to greet them. For instance:

Greet the houses near al-'Azl.

Or, (they are greeted) in the form of praying for rain for them. For instance:

Let a pouring rain water the traces of their abandoned camps,

And let them be covered by luxuriant verdure.

Or, (they are greeted) in the form of asking the lightning to give them rain. For instance:

O lightning, look out over an encampment in al-Abraq

And drive the clouds there, just as she-camels are driven.

Or, for instance, in an elegy grief is expressed in the form of asking (people) to weep. For instance:

So be it. Let the matter be described and treated as an odious one.

There is no excuse for an eye whose tears are not shed.

Or, (it is expressed) in the form of stressing the importance of the happening. For instance:

Did you see whom they carried by on wooden boards?

Did you see how the light of the (tribal) council went out?

Or, (it is expressed) in the form of stating that (all) created things are destined to misfortune because of the loss (of the mourned person). For instance:

Verdant pastures! (You have) no protector and guardian.

Death took away the (warrior) with the long lance and the great power.

Or, (it is expressed) in the form of expressing disapproval of the lifeless objects that show no grief, as in the verse of the Kharijite (poetess):

O trees of the Khabur! What is the matter with you that you are green,

As if you were feeling no grief for Ibn Tarif

Or, (it is expressed) in the form of congratulating the adversary of (the deceased), that he can now rest from the force of (the deceased's) onslaught. For instance:

Rabi'ah b. Nizar, lay down (your) lances.

Death took away your adversary, who was always going on raids.

There are many similar things in all branches and ways of (poetical) speech.

Word combinations in (poetry) may or may not be sentences. They may be commands or statements, nominal sentences or verbal sentences, followed by appositions or not followed by appositions, separate or connected, as is the case with the word combinations of Arabic speech and the position of individual words in respect to each other. This teaches a person the universal mold which he can learn through (constant) practice in Arabic poetry. (This universal mold) is an abstraction in the mind derived from specific word combinations, to all of which the (universal) mold conforms. The author of a spoken utterance is like a builder or weaver. The proper mental form is like the mold used in building, or the loom used in weaving. The builder who abandons his mold, or the weaver who abandons his loom, is unsuccessful.

It should not be said that knowledge of the rules of eloquence suffices in this respect. We say: They are merely basic scientific rules which are the result of analogical reasoning and which indicate by means of analogical reasoning that the word combinations may be used in their particular forms. We have here scientific analogical reasoning that is sound and coherent, as is the analogical reasoning that establishes the rules concerning the vowel endings. (But) the (poetical) methods which we try to establish here have nothing to do with analogical reasoning. They are a form that is firmly rooted in the soul. It is the result of the continuity of word combinations in Arabic poetry when the tongue uses them. Eventually, the form of (those word combinations) becomes firmly established. It teaches (the poet) the use of similar (word combinations). (It teaches him) to imitate them for each word combination (that he may use) in the poetry (he produces), just as we have mentioned before in connection with speech in general.

The scientific rules that govern the word endings or syntax and style (bayan) do not teach (poetry). Not everything that is correct according to analogical reasoning, as used in connection with Arabic speech and the scientific (grammatical) rules, is used by (poets). They use certain ways (of expressing themselves) which are known and studied by those who have expert knowledge of (poetical) speech and the forms of which fall (automatically) under those analogical rules. If Arabic poetry is to be studied under this aspect and under the aspect of the methods in the mind that are like molds (for poetical expression), it means studying word combinations as they are used by the (Arabs). It does not mean studying the things required by analogical reasoning.

Therefore, we have stated that the molds in the mind are the result of expert knowledge of Arab poetry and speech. Such molds exist not only for poetry but also for prose. The Arabs used their speech for both (poetry and prose), and they used certain types of divisions for both kinds of speech. In poetry, these are metrical cola, fixed rhymes, and the fact that each colon constitutes a statement by itself. In prose, as a rule, (the Arabs) observed symmetry and parallelism between the cola. Sometimes, they used prose rhymes, and sometimes straight prose. 1463 The molds for each kind of (expression) are well known in Arabic.

The author of a spoken utterance builds his utterance in (the molds) used by (the Arabs). They are known only to those who have expert knowledge of (Arabic) speech, such that in their minds they have an absolute universal mold, which is the result of abstraction from specific individual molds. They use (that universal mold) as their model in composing utterances, just as builders use the mold as their model, and weavers the loom. The discipline of speech composition, therefore, differs from the studies of the grammarian, the stylist (literary critic), and the prosodist. It is true, though, that observance of the rules of those sciences is obligatory for and indispensable to (the poet).

When all these qualities together are found to apply to a spoken utterance, it is distinguished by a subtle kind of insight into those molds which are called "methods." Only expert knowledge of both Arab poetry and Arab prose gives (that insight).

Now that the meaning of "method" is clear, let us give a definition or description of poetry that will make its real meaning clear to us. This is a difficult task, for, as far as we can see, there is no such definition by any older (scholar). The definition of the prosodists, according to whom (poetry) is metrical rhymed speech, is no definition or description of the kind of poetry we have in mind. Prosody considers poetry only under the aspect of the agreement of the verses (of a poem), with respect to the number of successive syllables with and without vowels, as well as with respect to the similarity of the last foot of the first hemistich of the verses of a poem to the last foot of the second hemistich. This concerns meter alone and has nothing to do with the words and their meaning. (The definition of the prosodists mentioned) can serve as a definition (of poetry) for them. But as we look at poetry, as including vowel endings, eloquence, meter, and special molds (of expression peculiar to poetry), there can be no doubt that the definition of (the prosodists) is not a valid (definition of poetry) for us. We must have a definition that will give us the real meaning of poetry in our sense.

We say: Poetry is eloquent speech built upon metaphoric usage and descriptions; divided into cola agreeing in meter and rhyme letter, each colon being independent in purpose and meaning from what comes before and after it; and using the methods of the Arabs peculiar to it. The phrase "eloquent speech" in our definition takes the place of genus. (The phrase) "built upon metaphoric usage and descriptions" differentiates (poetry) from (eloquent speech), which does not have that (and which must be differentiated) because it is mostly not poetry. The phrase "divided into cola agreeing in meter and rhyme letter" differentiates (poetry) from the (kind of) prose speech that nobody would consider poetry. The phrase "each colon being independent in purpose and meaning from what comes before and after it" explains the real character of (poetry), because the verses of poetry can be only this way. This does not differentiate (poetry) from other things. The phrase "using the methods . . . peculiar to it" differentiates (poetry) from (speech) that does not use the well-known methods of poetry.<sup>1469</sup> Without them, it would not be poetry but merely poetical speech, because poetry has special methods which prose does not have. Likewise, prose has methods which do not apply to poetry. Rhymed speech that does not use those methods is not poetry. It was in this sense that most of the professors of literature whom we have met were of the opinion that the rhymes of al-Mutanabbi' and al-Ma'arri are by no means poetry, because these (two men) did not follow Arab poetical methods. The phrase in (our) definition, "using the methods of the Arabs . . ." differentiates it from the poetry of non-Arab, nations. (This is) for those who are of the opinion that poetry exists both among Arabs and among other (people). (On the other hand,) those who are of the opinion that poetry exists only among the Arabs would not need the phrase. They might say instead: "using the methods peculiar to it" (omitting the words "of the Arabs").

Having finished with the discussion of the real character of poetry, we shall now return to the discussion of how poetry is produced. We say: It should be known that the production of poetry and the laws governing the (poetical) craft are subject to a number of conditions. The first condition is to have an expert knowledge of its genus—that is, the genus of Arabic poetry. (This is the thing) that eventually creates a habit in the soul upon which, as on a loom, (the poet is able) to weave. The material for memorizing should be selected from the most genuine and purest and most varied (poetry). The selection, at the least, should comprise the poetry of outstanding Muslim poets such as Ibn Abi Rabi'ah, Kuthayyir, Dhu r-Rummah, Jarir, Abu Nuwas, Habib (Abu Tammam), al-Buhturi, ar-Radi, and Abu Firas. Most of the material would come from the Kitab al-Aghani, because it is a collection of all Muslim poetry and the choicest pre-Islamic poetry. The poetry of poets who have no expert knowledge of (the old poetical material) is inferior and bad. Brilliance and sweetness is given to poetry only with the help of memorized knowledge of much (old poetical material). Those who know little or nothing of it cannot (produce) any (real) poetry: They merely produce bad rhymes. They would do better to keep away from poetry.

After the poet is saturated with memorized (poetical material) and has sharpened his talent, in order to be able to follow the great examples, he proceeds to make rhymes himself. Through more and more (practice), the habit of (rhyme making) becomes firmly established and rooted (in him).

It is often said that one of the conditions governing (poetical production) is to forget the memorized material, so that its external literal forms will be wiped out (of the memory), since they prevent the real use of (the poetical habit). After the soul has been conditioned by them, and they are forgotten, the method (of poetry) is engraved upon the (soul), as though it were a loom upon which similar such words can be woven as a matter of course.

The poet, then, needs solitude. The place he looks at should be a beautiful one with water and flowers. He like-wise needs music. He must stir up his talent by refreshing it <sup>1486</sup> and stimulate it through pleasurable joy.

In addition to the (afore-mentioned) conditions, there is another. The (poet) must be rested and energetic. This makes him more collected and is better for his talent, so that he is able to create a loom similar to that which is in his



memory. It has been said: "The best time for it is in the morning right after waking up, when the stomach is empty and the mind energetic, and in the atmosphere of the bath." It has (also) often been said: "Stimuli to poetry are love and drunk-ness." This was mentioned by Ibn Rashiq in the Kitab al-'Umdah. The 'Umdah is especially devoted to poetry and has given it its due. No work on poetry like it 1490 has been written either before or since. (Then too,) it has been said: "If (the poet) finds it difficult (to make a poem) after all that, he should leave it for another time. He should not force himself to do it."

(The poet) should have the rhyme (in mind), when the verse is first given shape and form. He should set it down and build (his) speech on it all the way through to the end, because, if the poet neglects to have the rhyme (in mind) when he makes a verse, it may be difficult for him to get the rhyme into its proper place, for it often is loose and unstable. If a verse is satisfactory but does not fit in its context, (the poet) should save it for a place more fitting to it. Every verse is an independent unit, and all that is to be done is to fit (the verse into the context of the poem). Therefore, (the poet) may choose to do in this respect whatever he wishes. After a poem is finished, (the poet) should revise it carefully and critically. He should not hesitate to throw it away, if it is not good enough. Every man is fond of his own poetry, since it is a product of his mind and a creation of his talent.

(The poet) should use only the most correct word combinations and a language free from all (poetic) license, since the (use of it) is a defect as far as the linguistic habit is concerned. He should avoid it, because it might deprive (his) speech of eloquence. The leading authorities forbade the later-born (poets) to use (poetic) license, since by avoiding it they might be able to obtain the most exemplary (linguistic) habit. (The poet) should also keep away, as much as he can, from involved word combinations. He should try to use only those whose meaning can be understood more quickly than the (individual) words they contain. The same applies to putting too many ideas into one verse, which make it somewhat complicated to understand. The choicest (verse) is the one whose words conform to the ideas (it contains) or are more copious (than the ideas). If there are many ideas, the verse becomes crowded. The mind examines the (ideas) and is distracted. As a result, (the listener's literary) taste is prevented from fully understanding, as it should, the eloquence (of the verse). A poem is easy only when its ideas are more quickly grasped by the mind than its words. Thus, our shaykhs used to criticize the poetry of the poet of eastern Spain, [Abu Bakr] b. Khafajah, for crowding too many ideas into one verse. They used also to criticize the poetry of al-Mutanabbi' and al-Ma'arri, because it does not follow the methods of the Arabs, as was mentioned before. Thus, the poetry of the (two men) was rhymed speech inferior to poetry. The judge in such matters is (one's) taste. The poet should also keep away from farfetched and pre-tentious words. (He should) also (keep away) from vulgar words that become hackneyed through usage. (The use of such words) deprives the poem of eloquence. (He should) also (keep away) from ideas that have become hackneyed by being generally known. (Their use,) too, deprives the speech of eloquence. It becomes hackneyed and almost meaningless. For instance, such phrases as "The fire is hot" and "The heaven above us" (belong in this category). The closer a poem gets to being 'meaningless, the less can it claim to be eloquent, since (meaninglessness and eloquence) are (opposing) extremes. For this reason, poetry on mystical and prophetic subjects is not, as a rule, very good. Only the best poets are good in it, and (even they) only in small (portions of such poetry) and with great difficulty, because the ideas with which such poetry deals are generally known to the great mass and, thus, have become hackneyed.

If a person, after (observing) all (these conditions), (still) finds it impossible to produce poetry, he should (try and) practice it again and again, since talent is like an udder, giving milk only when it is milked, drying up and giving little milk 1501 when it is left alone and neglected.

In general, (the subject of) poetry and how to learn it is exhaustively treated in the Kitab al-'Umdah by Ibn Rashiq. We have mentioned (such information) on poetry available to us, as far as we were able. Those who would like to study the subject exhaustively must turn to the ('Umdah). It contains all one could wish. (Our remarks) should suffice to give an idea. God gives support.

People have written poems dealing with poetry and its requirements. The following poem, which, I believe, is by Ibn Rashiq, is among the best statements made on the subject:

God curse poetry! How many

Kinds of stupid poets have we met!

They prefer strange (expressions) to what

Would be easy and clear to the listener.

They consider the absurd a sound idea,

And vile speech something precious.

They ignore what is right in (poetry).

On account of (their) ignorance, they do not know that they are ignorant.

Not we, but others, blame them.

We, in fact, find them excusable.  
 Poetry is that which is harmonious in its rhymes,  
 Even if in (its) descriptions, it is varied.  
 Each part of it has the same form as the other parts.  
 Front and back have come to be alike in it.  
 Every idea in a (poem) comes to you as you  
 Wish it would be, if it were not. It has attained such great beauty of style that  
 Its beauty comes close to being clear to those who look (at it).  
 Its words are like faces,  
 And the ideas contained in it are (their) eyes.  
 It fulfills all the wishes one might have.  
 Those who recite it are adorned with its beauty.  
 When you praise a noble free man in a poem,  
 You should set out to be as profuse as anyone.  
 You should make the nasib easy and to the point.  
 You should make the laudatory (part) truthful and clear.  
 You should avoid whatever might not be nice to hear,  
 Even if it is properly put metrically.  
 When you satirize him,  
 You should consider the ways of those who use gross language blameworthy. 1504  
 You should consider frank statement in (satire) medicine.  
 Recourse to allusions you should consider a hidden illness.  
 Whenever in (a poem) you lament those who will one day soon  
 Depart, and the women who are carried away (in their litters),  
 You should suppress (your) grief, You should subdue  
 The tears that are stored up in (your) eyes. a  
 And when you express censure (of a friend), you should mingle promises  
 With threats, and harshness with gentleness.  
 Thus you will leave the person whom you censure  
 Wary as well as assured, strong as well as weak.  
 The soundest poetry is that which is outstanding in poetical  
 (Form), clear and transparent.  
 When recited, it must make everyone desirous (of producing something similar),  
 And when one wishes to make a (poem like it), this must be found impossible.  
 The same subject is also dealt with in the following verses of a poet an-Nashi: 1506  
 Poetry is (a thing) the crookedness of whose front you have straightened out,  
 And the belt of whose back you have tightened through careful revision,  
 The cracks in which you have repaired through profuseness,  
 And whose half-blind eyes you have opened through conciseness,  
 The near and remote parts of which you have gathered together,  
 And whose stagnant (well water) and spring water you have united,  
 And in which you have provided, wherever required,  
 (Like with) like, and counterpart with counterpart.  
 If you praise in a (poem) a noble, generous person,  
 And repay with gratitude all the debts due him,  
 You should present him with what is (most) precious and grave (in poetry)  
 And distinguish him with what is important and valuable (in it).  
 Thus, (poetry) should be generous in the use of its various types,  
 And easy (to understand) in the (general) agreement of its various branches.  
 If in (a poem) you lament dwelling places and the people who lived there,  
 You should make the grieved person to shed the water of the sutures of his skull. 1509  
 If you want to hint at something dubious,  
 You should leave the matter midway between clear and cryptic.  
 Thus you make the person who hears it mingle his doubts  
 With clarity, and his conjectures with certainty.

If you censure a friend because of a slip,  
 You should cover the severity of censure with gentleness.  
 Thus, you will leave him civilized by mildness,  
 Reassured in the face of his sadness and grievances.  
 (But) if you want to attack the (girl) you love,  
 When she breaks with you, with seductive (poetry),  
 You should (try to) enslave her with fine and subtle (verses)  
 And inflame her with (their) concealed and hidden (meanings).  
 If you would apologize for a mistake you (yourself) have made,  
 You should go at it (with verses somewhere) between fanciful and clear.  
 Thus, your sin will turn out in the eyes of him who is affected by (your poetry),  
 To be a censure of himself obliging him to swear (that he did nothing wrong).

55. Poetry and prose work with words, and  
 not with ideas.

It should be known that both poetry and prose work with words, and not with ideas. The ideas are secondary to the (words). The (words) are basic.

The craftsman who tries to acquire the habit of poetry and prose uses words for that purpose. He memorizes appropriate words from Arab speech, so as to be able to employ it frequently and have it on his tongue. Eventually, the habit of the Mudar language becomes firmly established in him. He becomes free from the non-Arab (linguistic habits) in which he was reared among the people of his race. He considers himself like a (half-breed) child who grows up among Arab Bedouins and learns their language as a child learns it. Thus, eventually, he becomes like one of them, as far as their language is concerned.

As we have mentioned before, this comes about as follows. Language is a habit concerned with speech. One tries to acquire it by repeated practice with the tongue, until one has acquired it, as is the case with (all other) habits. Now, tongue and speech deal only with words. Ideas are in the mind. Furthermore, everyone may have ideas. Everyone has the capacity to grasp with his mind whatever (ideas) his mind wants and likes. No technique is required for their composition. But the composition of speech, for the purpose of expressing (ideas), requires a technique, as we have stated. (Speech) is like a mold for ideas. The vessels in which water is drawn from the sea may be of gold, silver, shells (mother-of-pearl), glass, or clay. But the water is one and the same. The quality of the vessels filled with water differs according to the material from which they are made, and not according to the water (in them). In the same way, the quality of language, and eloquence in its use, differ according to different levels (of attainment) in the composition of speech, depending on the manner in which an utterance conforms to (the situation) that it wants to express. But the ideas are one and the same.

A person who is ignorant of the composition of speech and its methods, as required by the (Arabic) linguistic habit, and who unsuccessfully attempts to express what he wants to express, is like an invalid who attempts to get up but cannot, because he lacks the power to do so.

God "teaches you what you did not know."

56. The (linguistic) habit is obtained by much memorizing.

The good quality of (the linguistic habit is the result of) the good quality of the memorized material.

We have mentioned before that those who desire to learn the Arabic language must memorize much material. The quality of the resulting habit depends on the quality, type, and amount of the memorized material. Those who memorize the poetry of Arab Muslims or the poetry of Habib (Abu Tammam), al-'Attabī, Ibn al-Mu'tazz, Ibn Hani, or ash-Sharif ar-Radi, or the Rasa'il (prose letters) of Ibn al-Mugaffa', Sahl b. Harun, Ibn az-Zayyat, al-Badi, or as-Sabi, will acquire a better habit, of a higher order of eloquence, than those who memorize the poetry of such recent poets as Ibn Sahl or Ibn an-Nabih, or the prose correspondence of al-Baysani or the 'Imad al-Isfahani, 1533 because they are inferior to the (older writers). This is obvious to the intelligent critic who has (literary) taste.

The quality of a person's own later use (of the language) depends on the quality of the material learned or memorized. After (a person has improved his material and his use of it), he can improve his habit. By raising the level of the memorized literary material, the resulting level (of one's habit) becomes higher, since nature takes (habit) as its model and the powers of a habit grow through nourishing it. This comes about as follows. The soul is

one in species according to its natural disposition. It differs in human beings depending on (its) greater or lesser intensity in connection with perceptions. This difference of the (soul) is the result of the differing perceptions, habits, and colorings that condition the soul from the outside. (Such conditioning) causes its existence to materialize and transforms its form from potentiality into actuality.

(Now,) the habits obtained by the soul are obtained only gradually, as we have mentioned before. The poetical habit originates with the memorizing of poetry. The habit of secretary-ship originates with the memorizing of rhymed prose and prose correspondence. The scientific habit originates in contact with the sciences and with various perceptions, research, and speculation. The juridical habit originates in contact with jurisprudence and through comparing the problems and considering them in detail and through deriving special cases from general principles. The mystical habit originates through worship and dhikr exercises and through inactivation of the outward senses by means of solitude and as much isolation from human beings as possible, until (the person who does that) acquires the habit of retiring to his inner sense and his spirit and thus becomes a mystic. The same is the case with all the other (habits). Each one of them gives the soul a special coloring that conditions it.

The good or bad quality of a particular habit depends on the (condition) under which the habit originated. A high-class habit of eloquence results only from the memorizing of high-class language material. This is why all jurists and scholars are deficient in eloquence. The sole reason is in the original character of the material they memorize, in the scientific rules and juridical expressions of which (their material) is full and which deviate from the proper method of eloquence and are inferior (to it). The expressions used for rules and sciences have nothing to do with eloquence. (Now,) when such memorized material is the first to occupy the mind and is large and colors the soul, the resulting habit comes to be very deficient and the expressions connected with (that material) deviate from the methods of Arab speech. This, we find, applies to the poetry of jurists, grammarians, speculative theologians, philosophers, and others who are not saturated with memorized knowledge of the purest and noblest (most genuine) Arabic speech.

Our excellent colleague, Abul-Qasim b. Ridwan, the writer of the 'alamah of the Merinid dynasty, told me the following story. "One day, I had a conversation with our colleague Abul-'Abbas b. Shu'ayb, the secretary of Sultan Abul-Hasan, who was the leading philologist of his time. I recited to him the beginning of a qasidah by Ibn an-Nahwi, 1544 without mentioning him as the author. (The qasidah runs:)

I did not know when I stood near the traces of the abandoned dwelling places

What the difference was between the new ones and those that were almost effaced.

(Ibn Shu'ayb) said to me immediately, 'That is a poem by a jurist.' I asked him how he knew that. He replied: 'Because he says: "What the difference was." That is a juridical expression and does not belong to the methods of (proper) Arab speech.' Full of admiration, I told him that it was indeed a poem by Ibn an-Nahwi."

Secretaries and poets are not like that. They choose carefully the material they memorize. They have contact with the methods of Arab speech with regard to prose correspondence. They select the good material from (Arab) speech.

One day, I had a conversation with Abu 'Abdallah b. al-Khatib, the wazir of the rulers of Spain. He was the leading authority on poetry and secretaryship. I said to him, "I find it difficult to compose poetry when I want to, despite my understanding of (poetry) and my knowledge of the good language material in the Qur'an, the traditions, and the various (other) branches of Arab speech, although I know little by heart. It may be that I am affected by my knowledge of scientific poems and the rules of (literary) composition. I have memorized the large and the small poem by ash-Shatibi on Qur'an readings and Qur'an orthography, and I know them by heart. I studied the two works of Ibn al-Hajib on jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence, the Jumal on logic by al-Khunaji, and many of the rules of scientific school instruction. That has filled my memory and harmed the habit for which I was prepared through the good material from the Qur'an, the traditions, and (other documents of) Arab speech. It prevented my talent from developing." (Ibn al-Khatib) looked at me in amazement for a while. Then he said, full of admiration: "Would anyone but you say a thing like that?"

The remarks made in this section explain another problem. They explain why both the poetry and the prose of the Muslim Arabs are on a higher level of eloquence and literary taste than those of pre-Islamic Arabs. We find that the poetry of Hassin b. Thabit, 'Umar b. Abi Rabi'ah, al-Hutay'ah, Jarir, al-Farazdaq, Nusayb, Ghaylan Dhur-Rummah, al-Ahwas, and Bashshir, as well as the literary products of the ancient Arabs of the Umayyad dynasty and the early years of the Abbasid dynasty, (including) their sermons, their prose correspondence, and their discussions with the rulers, are on a much higher level of eloquence than the poetry of an-Nibighah, 'Antarah, Ibn Kulthum, Zuhayr, 'Alqamah b. 'Abadah, and Tarafah b. al-'Abd. (They also are on a higher level) than the prose and discussions of pre-Islamic (authors). A sound taste and a healthy natural disposition will confirm the (correctness of this observation) to the intelligent critic of eloquence.

The reason for this is that (authors) who lived in Islam learned the highest form of speech (as it is found) in the Qur'an and in the traditions, which for human beings is inimitable. It entered into their hearts. Their souls were brought up on the (linguistic) methods (of this kind of speech). As a result, their nature was lifted, and their habits with regard to eloquence were elevated, to greater heights than had ever been reached by their pre-Islamic predecessors, who had not learned the (highest) form of speech and had not been brought up on it. Therefore, their prose and poetry were better in texture and of a purer brilliance than their (predecessors'). They were more solid in construction and more even in execution, because their (authors) had learned the high-class speech (of the Qur'an and the traditions). When a person thinks this (explanation) over, his literary taste will attest to its correctness, if he has taste and understands eloquence.

I once asked our shaykh, the sharif Abul-Qasim, the (chief) judge of Granada in our day, why the Muslim Arabs were on a higher level (of eloquence) than the pre-Islamic Arabs. (Abul-Qasim) was the chief authority on poetry. He had studied (it) in Ceuta with certain shaykhs there who were pupils of ash-Shalubin. He had (also) made a profound study of philology and acquired a more than perfect knowledge of it. Thus, he was a man who, with his taste, could be expected not to be ignorant of (this question). He remained silent for a long while. Then he said to me, "By God, I do not know." Whereupon I said, "I shall suggest to you (an idea) concerning this problem that has come to my mind. Perhaps, it explains it." And I mentioned to him what I have noted (here). He was silent in amazement. Then, he said to me: "Doctor (faqih), this is a remark that deserves to be written down in gold(en letters)." After that, he (always) treated me with deference. He listened to what I had to say in class and acknowledged my excellence in scholarship.

God "created man" and "taught him clarity."

57. An explanation of the meaning of natural and contrived speech. How contrived speech may be either good or deficient.

It should be known that the secret and spirit of speech – that is, expression and address - lie in conveying ideas. If no effort is made to (convey ideas), (speech) is like "dead land" (mawat) which does not count.

The perfect way of conveying (ideas) is eloquence. This is shown by the literary critics, definition of eloquence. They say that (eloquence) is conformity of speech to the requirements of the situation. Knowledge of the conditions and laws governing the conformity of word combinations to the requirements of the situation is the discipline of eloquence (rhetoric). The conditions and laws were deduced from the Arabic language and have become a sort of rules. The manner in which word combinations are used indicates the relationship that exists between two interdependent (parts of an utterance). (It does so) with the help of conditions and laws constituting the main part of the rules of Arabic. The situations that apply to the word combinations - which may be earlier or later position, determination or indetermination, implicit or explicit (reference), statements used restricted or absolute, and so on - indicate the situations that envelop from outside the (existing) relationship and the persons discoursing with each other. (They do so) with the help of conditions and laws that constitute the rules of a discipline belonging to rhetoric and called the "science of idea expression" ('ilm al-ma'ani). Thus, the rules of Arabic are comprised under those of the science of idea expression, because the (purpose of) indicating the (existing) relationship is part of the (purpose of) indicating the situations that envelop that relationship. Any word combinations unable to indicate the requirements of a given situation because of some defect in the rules governing the vowel endings or the rules governing the ideas, are (like-wise) unable to establish conformity (between themselves and) the requirements of the situation; they belong to the (group of things) of which no use is made, which belong in the category of "dead land."

After the requirements of a given situation have thus been indicated, there come the diverse ways in which the mind moves among the ideas with the help of different kinds of (word) meanings. In its conventional meaning, a word combination indicates one particular idea, but then the mind moves on to what might be the consequence of, or have as its consequence, that idea, or (what might) be similar to it and, thus, express (some idea) indirectly as metaphor or metonymy, 1571 as has been established in the proper places. This moving around causes pleasure to the mind, perhaps even more than (the pleasure) that results from indicating (the requirements of the situation) All these things mean attainment of a conclusion from the argument used to prove it, and attainment, as one knows, is one of the things that cause pleasure.

The different ways the (mind) moves around in this way also have (their) conditions and laws, which are like rules. They were made into a (special) craft and called "the (science of) style" (bayan). (This science) is sister to the science of idea expression, which indicates the requirements of a given situation. The (science of style) has reference to the ideas and meanings of the word combinations. The rules of the science of idea expression have reference to

the very situations that apply to the word combinations, as far as they affect the meaning. Word and idea depend on each other and stand side by side, as one knows. Thus, the science of idea expression and the science of style are both part of rhetoric, and both (together) produce perfect indication and conformity to the requirements of the situation. Consequently, word combinations that fall short of conformity and perfect indication are inferior in eloquence. (Such word combinations) are linked by rhetoricians to the sounds dumb animals make. The preferred assumption is that they are not Arabic, because Arabic is (the kind of speech) in which indications are in conformity with the requirements of the situation. Thus, eloquence is the basis, genius, spirit, and nature of Arabic speech.

It should further be known that in the usage of (philologists), "natural speech" means the (type of) speech that conveys the intended meaning and, thus, is perfect in its nature and genius. Just speaking is not what is meant by (natural speech) as a (kind of) expression and address; the speaker (who uses natural speech) wants to convey what is in his mind to the listeners in a complete and definite fashion.

Thus, after perfect indication (of the requirements of the situation has been achieved), the word combinations, (if expressed) according to that genius that is basic (to Arabic speech), have (their) different kinds of artistic embellishment. In a way, they give them the brilliance of correct speech. Such (kinds of artistic embellishment) include the ornamental use of rhymed prose, the use of phrases of identical structure at the end of successive cola (muwazanah), allusion (tawriyah) to a cryptic idea by a homonym, and \* antithesis, so that there will be affinity (tajanus) between the words and ideas (used). This gives brilliance to speech and pleasure to the ear, and sweetness and beauty, all in addition to indicating (the meaning).

This craft is found represented in the inimitable speech (of the Qur'an) in numerous passages, as, for instance: By the night when it covers; and the day when it reveals itself.

Or:

As to those who give and fear God and believe in what is most beautiful ...1581

and so on, to the end of the cola division in the passage. Or:

But as to those who deviate and prefer the life of this world . . .

and so on, to the end of the passage. Also:

And they think that they are doing good.

There are many similar things (in the Qur'an). (But) it comes (only) after (the meaning) has been indicated perfectly by the word combinations (as they are) basically, before the rhetorical figures occur in them.

(Rhetorical figures) also occurred in pre-Islamic speech, but spontaneously and unintentionally. They are said to occur in the poetry of Zuhayr.

Among the (early) Muslim (authors), they occur both spontaneously and intentionally. These (authors) did remarkable things with them. The first to have a good knowl-edge of the method of (rhetorical figures) were Habib b. Aws (Abu Tammam), al-Buhturi, and Muslim b. al-Walid. 1586 They very eagerly set out to achieve a (contrived) technique and did remarkable things with it.

It is (also) said that the first to concern themselves with (rhetorical figures) were Bashshar b. Burd and Ibn Harmah, 1590 who were the last (poets whose poems) are used as evidence for (the grammatical and lexicographical problems of) the Arabic language. They were followed by Kulthum b. 'Amr al-'Attabi, Mansur an-Numayri, Muslim b. al-Walid, and Abu Nuwas. After them came Habib (Abu Tammam) and al-Buhturi. Then, there appeared Ibn al-Mu'tazz. He gave the whole craft of rhetorical figures its definitive form.

Let us mention examples of natural (speech) which is free from (contrived) technique, such as, for instance, the verse of Qays b. Dharih:

I go out from among the tents; perhaps, I

Shall talk about you to my(self) in secret, being alone.

Or the verse-of -Kuthayyir:

I, in my passion for 'Azzah after

Our relationship had come to an end for me, and for her,

Am indeed like one who hopes for shade from a cloud that, as soon as

He settles down to his siesta, clears away.

This, indeed, is natural (poetry) that is uncontrived in its good composition and in the solidity of its word combinations. If, later on, some (contrived) technique were added upon such a foundation, its beauty would (merely) be increased.

Contrived (speech) has been frequent since the time of Bashshar and Habib (Abu Tammam) and other (authors) of their class. (They were followed) by Ibn al-Mu'tazz who gave the craft of (rhetorical figures) its definitive form. (These authors) served as models to later (writers) who used the course they had prepared and wove on their loom.

People who cultivate the craft of (rhetorical figures) distinguish numerous subdivisions and use different terminologies for the rhetorical figures (alqab). Many of them consider them part of rhetoric, although (these figures) are not concerned with indicating (the meaning of speech), but provide embellishment and brilliance. The early representatives of the discipline of rhetorical figures considered them not to be a part of rhetoric. Therefore, they mentioned them as part of the literary disciplines (adab) which have no (particular, defined) subject. This was the opinion of Ibn Rashiq in his Kitab al-'Umdah, and of the Spanish litterateurs. They mentioned various conditions governing the use of the (rhetorical figures). Among them, there is the condition that they should express the intended meaning in an unforced and unstudied manner.

The spontaneous occurrence of (rhetorical figures) causes no comment, because (in such cases, the rhetorical figures) are in no way forced, and the speech (in which they occur) cannot, therefore, be criticized as (linguistically) faulty. The forced and studied use of (rhetorical figures) leads to disregard of the basic word combinations of speech and thus destroys all basis for indication (of the meaning of speech). It removes outright all eloquence and leaves speech only the (rhetorical) embellishments. This (however, actually) is the situation that is preponderant among (our) contemporaries. (But) people who have taste in eloquence despise (them because of) their infatuation with the various (rhetorical figures) and consider that (propensity an indication of their) inability to do better.

(Thus,) I heard our shaykh, Professor Abul-Barakat al-Ballaffiqi, 1598 who knew the language and had a natural taste for it, say: "The thing I most desire is some day to see one of those who practice the different branches of (the craft of) rhetorical figures in poetry or prose, punished with the most severe punishment and publicly denounced thus giving warning to his pupils not to concern themselves with this (contrived) technique. (Otherwise,) they might fall in love with it and forget all eloquence."

Another condition (governing the use of rhetorical figures) is that they be used sparingly and in no more than two or three verses of a poem, which suffices to adorn and give it brilliance, while the use of many (such rhetorical figures) would be a blemish. This was stated by Ibn Rashiq and others.

Our shaykh, the sharif Judge Abul-Qasim as-Sabti, who was the chief cultivator of the Arabic language in his time, used to say: "The different kinds of rhetorical figures may occur to a poet or a secretary, but it is ugly if he uses many of them. They belong among the things that embellish speech and constitute its beauty. They are like moles on a face. One or two make it beautiful, but many make it ugly."

Pre-Islamic and (early) Islamic prose followed the same lines as poetry. Originally, it was straight prose, considering (only) creation of a balance between the larger portions of (speech) and its word combinations, to indicate that it's balanced by means of cola into which it is divided, a without adherence to rhyme or concern for (contrived) techniques. (This was so) until the appearance of Ibrahim b. Hilal as-Sabi', the secretary to the Buyids. He concerned himself with (contrived) techniques and the use of rhyme. He did marvelous things with it. (However,) people criticized him because of his propensity for (using such things) in government correspondence. He could do that only because his rulers were used to non-Arabic (speech) and had nothing to do with the authority of the caliphate which caused eloquence to flourish. Afterwards, the prose of later (authors) became more and more contrived. One forgot the period when straight prose had been used. Government correspondence came to be like private correspondence, and Arabic came to be like the common language. Good and bad became (inextricably) confused with each other.

All these (statements) show that contrived, studied, or forced speech is inferior to natural speech, because it has little concern for what is basic to eloquence. The judge in such matters is (one's) taste.

And God created you and "taught you what you did not know."

antithesis, and other rhetorical figures (alqab) invented and enumerated (by literary critics) and for which they set up conditions and laws and which they called "the discipline of rhetorical figures" (badi').

Both the older and the more recent (literary critics), as well as those of the East and the West, have differed (with each other) in enumerating the (different) kinds and subdivisions (of the rhetorical figures), just as they have differed as to whether (the discipline of rhetorical figures) should be considered part of rhetoric or not. That (it should not) was the opinion of the Westerners. The Easterners considered it as a part of (rhetoric), but not as something basic to speech. They considered it as something that, after one has seen to the conformity of speech with the requirements of the situation, gives it brilliance and ornateness and provides it with sweetness and beauty. Without such conformity, a speech is not Arabic, as mentioned before, and no embellishment can dispense with it in (speech). Moreover, (the rhetorical figures) are derived from the language of the Arabs by using it and investigating its word combinations. Partly, they are heard (used by the Arabs), and their existence is attested. Partly, they are derived and acquired. One knows this from the works of the authorities.

When they speak about "contrived speech," they mean word combinations representing the different types and kinds of rhetorical figures. They also speak of natural speech in (their books) as speech possessing perfect indication. The two (things) are opposed to each other. This shows that the craft of (rhetorical figures) is opposed to rhetoric. Since the craft of rhetorical figures had no (particular, defined) subject and, consequently, was not a science, the litterateurs of ancient times considered (rhetorical figures) as part of the literary disciplines and included them in literary (adab) works.

This was done by Ibn Rashiq in the *Kitab al-'Umdah*. In it, he discussed the craft of poetry in an unprecedented manner. He showed how to produce poetry. He had this (subject) followed by a discussion of the rhetorical figures. The same was done by other, Spanish litterateurs.

It has been said that the first to concern himself with this (contrived) technique was Abu Tammam Habib b. Aws al-Tai. He loaded his poetry with rhetorical figures (alqab). The people after him followed him in this respect. Before (him), poetry had been free from (rhetorical figures). The pre-Islamic and the outstanding (early) Islamic poets had not concerned themselves with them in their poetry and had not made much use of them. They occur in their (poems), but only spontaneously as a gift of (outstanding linguistic) talent, and not as the result of constant practice and studied application. Healthy natures have a good taste for them. But (rhetorical figures) are found in (early poetry) only as the result of perfect conformity (of the words to the meaning), faithful regard for the rights of eloquence, and freedom from harmful, forced use of the rhetorical figures or, from crude, studied application and constant practice (of them). Thus, innate natural disposition makes it natural that embellishment (with rhetorical figures should be found) in (that poetry).

The prose of the pre-Islamic and outstanding (early) Islamic (authors), too, was a straight prose divided into cola without rhyme or meter, until the appearance of Ibrahim b. Hilal as-Sabi', the secretary to the Buyids. He concerned himself with the use of rhymed prose in (his) speech and adhered to it in (his) government correspondence, in imitation of the rhyme of poetry. He was at liberty to do so, because his rulers were used to non-Arabic (speech), and he himself had the outlook of common persons, that has nothing to do with royal aspirations or with the authority of the caliphate which wants authoritative eloquence. He dealt with the lower regions of artificially adorned speech in the same way as is done in private correspondence. At the time, he was successful with it [?], and his fame grew. Afterwards, the speech of later (authors) became more and more contrived. One forgot the period when straight prose was in use to express authoritative eloquence. Government correspondence came to be like private correspondence, and Arabic came to be like the common language. Good and bad became (inextricably) confused with each other, and the nature (of authors) was unable to achieve basic eloquence in speech, because little attention was paid to it. Everybody now is infatuated with the different branches and kinds of the craft of (rhetorical figures) in poetry and prose and greatly concerned with cultivating every type of it. (But) the great rhetoricians always despised it and disapproved of its cultivation at the expense of other (things).

I have seen our shaykhs censure persons concerned with linguistic matters who occupied themselves (unduly) with (rhetorical figures). (I noticed that) they had a low opinion of them.

(Thus,) I heard our shaykh Professor Abul-Barakat al-Ballafiqi, who knew the language and had a natural taste for it, say: "The thing I most desire is some day to see one of those who practice the different branches of the craft of (rhetorical figures) in poetry or prose, afflicted by the most severe punishment and publicly denounced, so that his pupils will be deterred from occupying themselves with the craft of rhetorical figures." He was afraid lest eloquence suffer from it and be forgotten.

Our shaykh, the sharif, Judge Abul-Qasim as-Sabti, who was the chief cultivator of the Arabic language and its standard-bearer (in his time), used to say: "The different kinds of rhetorical figures may occur spontaneously to a poet or a secretary.

Still, it is ugly if he repeats them. They belong among the things that embellish speech and constitute its beauty. They are like moles on a face. One or two make it beautiful, but many make it ugly."

All the (statements) of these excellent men consider cultivation of the craft of rhetorical figures (alqab badi'iyah) to be (linguistically) faulty, as it might deprive speech of its high eloquence. Such statements by them show that contrived speech is inferior to natural speech. We have shown here its secret and real character. The judge in such matters is (one's) taste.

And God knows better. He "taught you what you did not know."

#### 58. People of rank are above cultivating poetry.

It should be known that poetry was the archive of the Arabs, containing their sciences, their history, and their wisdom. Leading Arabs competed in it. They used to stop at the fair of 'Ukaz 1605 to recite poetry. Each would submit his product for criticism to outstanding and intelligent personalities. Eventually, (Arab poets) came to vie in



having their poems hung up at the corners of the Holy Sanctuary to which they made pilgrimage, the house of their ancestor Ibrahim (the Ka'bah). This was done by Imru'u-l-Qays b. Hujr, an-Nabighah adh-Dhubyani, Zuhayr b. Abi Sulma, 'Antarah b. Shaddad, Tarafah b. al-'Abd, 'Alqamah b. 'Abadah, al-A'sha, and the other authors of the nine Mu'allaqat: Only a person who had enough power among his people and his group ('asabiyyah) and who held the proper position among the Mudar, was able to get so far as to have his poem hung up there. This (fact) is stated in connection with the reason why such poems were called Mu'allaqat. Then, at the beginning of Islam, the Arabs gave up the (custom). They were occupied with the affairs of Islam, with prophecy and revelation. They were awed by the (linguistic) method and form of the Qur'an. They were (thus) silenced. For a time, they no longer discussed poetry and prose. Then, those (great happenings) continued, and right guidance came to be something familiar to the Muslims. There was no revelation (saying) that poetry was forbidden or prohibited. The Prophet listened to poetry and rewarded (the poet) for it. Under these circumstances, the Arabs returned to their old customs with regard to poetry. 'Umar b. Abi Rabi'ah, the leading Qurashite of his time, wrote poetry of a high rank and on a high level. He often submitted his poetry to Ibn 'Abbas, who paused to listen to it in admiration.

Then there came great royal authority and a mighty dynasty. The Arabs approached the (caliphs) with their laudatory poems, and the caliphs rewarded them most generously according to the quality of the poems and their position among their people. They were eager to have poems presented to them. From them they learned remarkable stories, history, lexicography, and noble speech. The Arabs saw to it that their children memorized the poems. This remained the situation during the days of the Umayyads and in the early days of the 'Abbasid dynasty. One may compare the report, by the author of the 'Iqd, about the conversation of ar-Rashid with al-Asma'i, in the chapter on poetry and poets. It shows that ar-Rashid possessed a good knowledge of the subject and was firmly grounded in it. He was concerned with the cultivation of (poetry). He was able to discern good speech from bad speech, and he possessed a wide memorized knowledge of (poetry). Later on, people came whose language was not Arabic, because they had a non-Arab (background) and a deficient knowledge of the (Arabic) language, which they had learned as a craft. (Poets) did write laudatory poems for the non-Arab amirs, who did not possess the (Arabic) language, (but) they did so only in order to win their favor, and not for any other reason. This was done, for instance, by Habib (Abu Tammam), al-Buhturi, al-Mutanabbi, Ibn Hani, and later (poets). Thus, the predominant purpose of producing poetry came to be mere begging and asking for favors, because the particular use that, as we have mentioned, the early (Arabs) had made of poetry no longer existed. This is why people of ambition and rank among later (Muslims) disdained poetry. The situation, thus, changed. Concern with poetry came to be (considered) a blemish or fault in leaders and people holding great positions.

God causes the change of night and day.

## Chapter 4

### 1. French Renaissance. Henry de Croy. *L'Art et Science de Rhétorique pour Faire Rimes et Ballades*

*L'Art et Science de Rhétorique pour Faire Rimes et Ballades*



S'ensuit l'art et science de rhétorique pour congnoistre tous les termes / formes et patrons / exemples / couleurs et figures de dictiers tailles modernes qui maintenant sont en usage. C'est assavoir / comme lignes doublettes / vers sizains / vers septains / vers huitains / vers alexandrains / rigme batelee / rigme brisee / rigme enchainee / rigme a double queue / rigme en forme de complainte amoureuse / rondeaulx simplex de une / de deux / de trois de .iiii. et de cinq sillabes / rondeaulx jumeaulx et rondeaulx doubles / simples virlais / doubles virlais et responce / fatras simples et fatras doubles / ballades communes / ballades balladante / ballade fatrisee / simple lay / lay renforcé / champ royal / servantois / ricquerac & baguenaude. De laquelle rhethorique ensuivent les exemples.

#### Exemple

Rhethorique vulgaire est une espece de musique appellee regna musique laquelle contient certain nombre de sillabes avecques aucune suavité en forme de douceur et de equisonance. Et ne se peut sans diction / ne diction sans sillabe ne sillabe sans lettre. La lettre est sillabe qui ne se peut diviser / comme A B C d E &c. desquelles lettres les unes sont voielles et les autres consonantes. Les voielles sont A E I O V. La sillabe est une assemblee de lettres soubz un seul accent indistamment proferee / comme Ar Bar Bal &c. Et la diction est celle qui contient une ou plusieurs sillabes / comme Art Artus / Balam &c. Et ja soit ce que toutes dictions latines aient parfaits sons: tousjours en langage rommant qui l'ensuit ce qu'il peut sont trouvees aucunes dictions ou sillabes imparfaites. C'est a dire qu'ilz n'ont point parfaite resonance. Lesquels aucuns nomment femenines dictions et les parfaites masculines. Les masculines ont parfaites dictions & sont / c'est assavoir comme dormir Aimer / Chanter et Aller. Et les femenines

ont diction imparfaites / c'est assavoir comme donnent / chantent / aiment et allent. Et est assavoir que toutes diction imparfaites et de singulier nombre finent par imperfection et faintement consonant. C'est assavoir / comme vierge mere dame royne. Et le plus elles se finent en .t. ou en .s. comme / rent et comme pucelles gentes.

Item toutes et quantefois que la syllabe imparfaite finissant en .E rencontre en mettre une desdictes voielles aiant vray son de voielles ladictes syllabe se boute avecques ladictes voielle et ne font ensemble que une syllabe / comme se on disoit. Ma dame aime ung autre que moy. Ceste syllabe me qui est la moitié de dame s'en treboute avecques ceste autre syllabe da / qui aussi est la moitié de dame. Et le residu de aime qui est me syllabe imparfaite se compte avecques ceste diction ung et n'est compté le dessusdit mettre que pour huit sillabes. Et est assavoir que tous mettres dont la derreniere syllabe est imparfaite de quelque quantité qu'il soit excède le mettre parfait d'une syllabe.

Comme par cest exemple

vive le roy et son party

vive toute fleur de noblesse

vive qui tient sans departy

Contre l'ennemy qui nous ibisfait

Autre taille de rigme qui se nomme doublette la plus facile & commune que l'on puist faire: Et se peut faire en toutes quantités de sillabes et le plus souvent en huit ou en neuf sillabes. De ceste maniere de rigme est composé le rommant de la rose. Et plusieurs histoires et farces en sont composees.

Exemple

Quant mon oeil dort mon cueur s'evaille

Du mal d'amours qui me traveille

Autre taille de vers sisains qui se font en moralitez et jeux de personnages en responce ou redargutions. Et sont communement de trois lignes / de quatre lignes et de sept lignes et composees de six sillabes.

Exemple

La guerre

J'ay bruit regne en court

En champs et en court

En l'autre et en l'une

La paix

je suis sans secours

Mais apres decours

Voit on prime lune

Autres vers septains de huit sillabes et de sept lignes sont trouvez en plusieurs euvres dont la derreniere ligne chet en commun proverbe.

Exemple

Paix ameine nous bon temps

Pour mener joyeux soulas

Il y a plus de quatre ans

Que les povres gens sont las

Guerre nous prent en ses las

Mais elle mourra a quelque heure

En peu d'eure dieu labeure

De ceste taille brisee septaine descend une autre mode de vers brisez laquelle est reduicte ad ce mesmes. Et n'ont les lignes des parfaites sillabes que trois sillabes en ligne pour ce que la tierce est prononcee en double tierce contre l'imparfaite. Ceste espece de rigme fut mise avant au jeu de rendre compte et reliqua.

Exemple

Habondance / decevance

Pou avance / le salu

Arrogance / de puissance

N'a d'usance / Riens valu

Responce

Quelque esleut / n'a voulut

Voler d'ung orgueilleux loire

Tout solut / tout concludt

Povreté met gens en gloire

Autre taille de vers huitains appelez vers françois sont assez communs en plusieurs livres et traictiez comme en la belle dame sans mercy / l'ospital d'amours et le champion des dames. Desquelz la croisure des mettres ensemble la quantité des sillabes est notoire par cest exemple.

Exemple

Souffrons a**soi**ns bons    Compaignons  
Bourgeois lo**ser**viteurs    de noblesse  
Barons en p**er**sons    Besongnons  
Souffrons a**soi**ns bons    Compaignons  
Vuidons so**er**ons    Gentillesse  
François lo**ser**viteurs    Son nous blesse  
Souffrons a**soi**ns bons    Compaignons  
Bourgeois lo**ser**viteurs    De noblesse

Sept rondeaulx en ce rondeau sont yssus & cordelez

Il n'y fault clou ne cordeaulx / sept rondeaulx

Mettez sus et rondalez sont yssus et cordelez

Doubles rondeaulx se font par lignes doublettes avecques quelque une sengle qui se consone avecques l'une des autres. Et ceste maniere de rondeler sert aux chansons de musique comme le serviteur et autres de cinq lignes.

Exemple

Quant vous aurés assés musé  
Autant que j'ay pour vous usé  
Et la verité bien sçaurés  
Espoir que pitié vous aurés  
D'ung simple innocent pou rusé  
Jamais ne seray refusé  
Ne de mal servir accusé  
Se mes pas sont bien mesurez  
Quant vous aurez assez musez  
Se trouve me suis si osé  
D'avoir vostre bruit alosé  
Dont je suis beacop honorez  
Le don de mercy me donnez  
Affin que ne soye abusé  
Quant vous aurez assez musé

Autre taille de rondeaulx doubles qui se nomment simples virlais pour ce que gens lais les mettent en leurs chançons rurales comme gente de corps et se font en ceste maniere

Exemple

J'ay mis mon cueur en une lourde  
Qui est tresbelle bacelotte  
Mais elle a la mamelotte  
Aussi grosse que la cahourde  
Pource que fine femme est fourde  
Quant ce vient a compter a l'oste  
J'ay mis mon cueur en une lourde  
Savez vous pour quoy je me hurde  
d'une si faicte jeune sotte  
Pour ce que quant je m'en assotte  
Elle dit mainte belle bourde  
J'ay mis mon cueur en une lourde  
Qui est tresbelle bacelotte

Doubles virlais se font comme le premier couplet dessusdit. Et puis ung autre vert sisain ou croisé de differente termination au premier.

Exemple

Amours me tient pour son soudart  
je serviray a ses gaiges

doux regards & plaisans langaiges  
sont pourtrais en son estandart  
Espoir me soustient le menton  
desir me donne a hault vouloir  
Le bien celer est le baston  
pour quoy je puis trop mieux valoir  
Qui n'est plain de science et d'art  
ja ne fera beau vacelage  
mais pource que je suis volage  
et que je sçay lancer le dart  
Amours me tient pour son soudard

Respons en taille palernode est une espece de rhetorique en maniere de champst ecclesiastique ou plusieurs nombres  
se rejectent ou corps principal

Exemple

A la fleur de virginité  
en qui dieu print humanité  
suivons le cours  
Et prions par humilité  
que humaine fragilité  
baille secours  
Car les delis mondains sont cours  
et c'est le terme limité  
a chascun du jour de sa fin  
dont nous est nécessité  
d'abreger tost nostre chemin  
pour avoir secours en pité  
a la fleur de virginité  
Trompt avons suivi vanité  
et c'est le terme limitté  
a chascun du jour de sa fin  
quoy ou nous allons a declin  
et si n'avons riens prouffité  
A la fleur de virginité  
Dont nous estoit nécessité  
d'abreger tost nostre chemin  
monstrons nostre divinité  
pour avoir secours au parfin  
A la fleur de virginité

Autre espece de rhetorique nommee fatras Et sont convenables en matiere joieuse pour la repetition des mettres qui  
sont de sept et de huit / desquelz les ungs sont simples & n'ont que ung seul couplet. Les autres sont doubles et ont  
deux couplets et pareille substance et termination. Mais la premiere ligne du premier couplet sera seconde au second  
couplet

Exemple

Povres gens sont en malaise  
Ou gens d'armes logez sont  
Povres gens sont en malaise  
Ne demeure soif ne aise  
Fenestre huis ne baston ront  
Qui n'arde comme fournaise  
Pour chauffer poux & punaise  
Qu'ilz mengeuent ce qu'ilz ont  
Tout tond art tout ront  
Tout ce desrigle degoise  
Tout trebuche au plus parfond  
Si fault que chascun se taise

Ou gens d'armes logez sont  
 Ou gens d'armes logez sont  
 Povres gens sont en mesaise  
 Ou gens d'armes logez sont  
 L'ung escorche l'autre tondt  
 L'autre qui la fille baise  
 taste se l'anette pont  
 et l'oste reçoit le bont  
 d'ung baston ne lui desplaise  
 si l'ostesse est trop mauvaise  
 On lui fait passer le pont  
 brief il n'est chose qui plaise  
 ou sodars viennent et vont  
 Povres gens sont en malaise  
 Ou gens d'armes logez sont

Balade commune doit avoir refrain et trois couplets et renvoy de prince. Le refrain est la derreniere ligne des dessusdis couplets et du renvoy de prince duquel refrain se tire toute la substance de la balade ainsi que la saiette au signe de bersial. Et doit chascun couplet par rigueur d'examen avoir autant de lignes que le refrain contient de sillabes. Si le refrain a huit sillabes et la derreniere est parfaicte. La balade doit tenir forme de vers huitains. Se le refrain a neuf sillabes les couplets seront de neuf lignes dont les quatre premieres se croisent La cinquieme / la sixieme / la huitieme sont de pareilles terminations differentes aux premieres. Et la septieme ligne / la neufvieme pareilles et distinguees a toutes autres. Si le refrain a dix sillabes les couplets de la balade seront de dix lignes. dont les quatre premieres se croisent: La cinquieme pareille a la quatrieme / la sixieme / la septieme et la neufvieme de pareille termination. La huitieme et la dixieme egalles en consonances. Se le refrain a six sillabes les couplets auront onze lignes / les quatre premieres se croisent / la cinquieme et la sixieme pareilles en rime. La septieme / huitieme et dixieme egales en consonance. La neufvieme et unzieme de pareille termination. Et est aussi a noter que tout renvoy lequel a la fois se commence a son refrain est pareil comme les autres couplets mais il ne contient que cinq lignes au plus. Et prent ses terminations et remettez en rimant selon les derrenieres lignes desdis couplets

Exemple de balade commune

des mirmidons la hardiesse entreprendre  
 pour envahir le trespuissant athlas  
 de medee les cautelles aprendre  
 pour impugner les ars dame palas  
 faire trembler du monde la machine  
 foudroier mars qui contre nous machine  
 fonder chasteaulx sur le mont parnasus  
 voler en l'air ainsi que pegasus  
 endormir gens a flaiol de mercure  
 n'est il besoing pour parvenir lassus  
 il fait assez qui son salut procure  
 Home mortel voulant a salut tendre  
 vers angleres ne doit jeter ses las  
 a diana la vierge doit entendre  
 sans embraser de venus les soulas  
 pas ne s'endorme a la herpe orpheine  
 ne par bacus ait somme morpheine  
 que prins ne soit es laqs de vulcanus  
 car cerberon aux gros cheveux canus  
 l'endormiroit en sa prison obscure  
 dont qui se sent en ses lats detenus  
 Il fait assez qui son salut procure  
 Promotheus nous a formé de cendre  
 craindre devons d'atropos le dur pas  
 quant jupiter des cieulx voudra descendre  
 pour nous juger plato n'y fauldra pas

ains que triton voise sonnans la busine  
prions argus qui nous garde & consine  
sans arrester a l'ostel tantalus  
passons la mer avecques dedalus  
si apollo nostre ame ne nous cure  
Pour resister aux infernaux palus  
Il fait assez qui son salut procure  
Prince du puis le grant dieu saturnus  
demogorgon pheton phebé phebus  
ne demandent grant labeur ne grant cure  
mais que le corps soit bien entretenus  
Il fait assez qui son salut procure

Balade baladant tient pour les termes de termes de balades communes si non que les couplets sont comme vers septains / d'autres huitains. Aucuns dient que elles sont de vi. de x. et de xi. sillabes. Et est batelée a la .iiii. sillabe en certaines lignes. Car en toutes les lignes de x. ou de xi. sillabes soit en balades ou en autres tailles tousjours la .iiii. sillabe ou pied doit estre de mot complect. Et doit on illecques reposer en la prononçant.

Exemple de balade baladant

Juifz ont dit que nostre redempteur  
Fut enchanteur / par art diabolique  
Faulx seducteur / fol prevaricateur  
Menteur venteur facteur de voye oblique  
mais saint jehan dit qui nous bien inspira  
qui nous crea & si bien nous ama  
qu'il nous forma a son divin semblant  
Il fut enfant du pere triumphant  
soleil luisant sente ou ne desvie  
Fleur florissant vray messias naissant  
dieu tout puissant verité voye & vie  
Seul fut creant increé createur  
Gubernateur de l'eternel fabrique  
Fabricateur supernel salvateur  
Operateur du hault trosne angelique  
La quaranaine en ce monde jeusna  
Il sermonna et nous illumina  
Loy nous donna grace sentier plaisant  
Regarissant maint mesel pourrissant  
En relevant d'enfer l'ame ravye  
Par ce faisant se monstra florissant  
dieu tout puissant verité voye et vie  
de verité fut administrateur  
& constructeur de la foy catholique  
Reparateur certain resusciteur  
& fondateur de texte evangelique  
par le saint sang que de lui degousta  
nous racheta de mort qu'adam gousta  
moult lui cousta la pommette flairant  
Son chemin grant il nous fut demonstrant  
Puis fut montant a sa gloire assouvie  
si dy pourtant permanable durant  
Dieu tout puissant verité voye et vie  
Prince du puis se estes obeissant  
nous commandant gagner gloire infinie  
Lassus regnant le verrés dominant  
Dieu tout puissant verité voye et vie

Balade fatrisée ou jumelle sont deux balades communes tellement annexées ensemble que le commencement de l'une donne refrain à l'autre. Ceste couleur de rhétorique descend à faire regret comme il appert de saint Quentin ou l'escuier trouva saint Maurice mutilé sur les champs.

Maurice le beau chevalier  
Tu es mort hélas que ferai ge  
je ne te puis vie batillier  
Ne susciter ne conseillicier  
Tu as payé mortel truage  
quel perte quel deul quel dommage  
Quelle cruelle occision  
O terrible prodicion  
O terrible prodicion  
Faulx empereur de rommenie  
Mauldicte generation  
Pute enge pute nation  
Pute gente pute progenie  
Vous avez par grant tyrannie  
Mis à mort et fait exillier  
Maurice le bon chevalier  
Maurice le bon chevalier  
Noble duc de hardi courage  
Tu estoies venu batailler  
Le bien publique habillier  
Tant preux et par haultain parage  
Mais les traitres remplis de rage  
Ont failly de promission  
O terrible prodicion  
O terrible prodicion  
Faulx tirans plains de diablerie  
destruit avez la legion  
de la thebee region  
Et sa noble chevalerie  
Entre lesquelz la fleur flourie  
Estoit pour tous cueurs reveillier  
Maurice le bon chevalier  
Maurice le bon chevalier  
que dira ton hault parentaige  
si tost qu'il pourra soutillier  
comment on t'a fait detrencher  
et meurdrir en fleur de ton aage  
quel desconfort quel grief outrage  
quelz pleurs quel lamentation  
O terrible prodicion  
O terrible prodicion  
As tu fait ceste vilennie  
Tu en auras punition  
Et horrible damnation  
Avec l'infemale maignie  
La terre est couverte & honnie  
du sang du bon duc familier  
Maurice le bon chevalier  
Prince vous avez par envie  
Assommé et fait travaillier  
Maurice le bon chevalier

Les simples doubles lignes / formés de demies lignes en contradictions



Exemple

Fleur de beaulté gracieuse  
Precieuse  
Gemme d'onneur excellente  
vive ymage sumptueuse  
Vertueuse  
Blanche d'amour nouvelle ente  
Ma deesse ma regente  
Propre et gente  
Ma tresloyale amoureuse  
Corps & biens & champ & sante  
Vous presente  
Ne me soiez rigoureuse

Quant une longue ligne est enlaccée entre la longue et la courte adonc est lay renforcé. La forme en est clere en l'oroison de la glorieuse vierge marie qui se commence. En protestant. Et avecques ce que ledit lay est renforcé a la fois est il fatrisé par la reprise des deux premieres lignes comme cy apres est declaré

Exemple

Quant mon cueur se desconforte  
Bon espoir me reconforte  
Sa main forte  
Me tient corps & ame ensemble  
Que me sonstient & supporte  
En chambre / en sale & en porte  
Et me porte  
Quelque part ou bon me semble  
Amours qui les cueurs assemble  
Me monstre maint bel exemple  
Large et ample  
Quant mon cueur se desconforte  
Mais a la fois quant je tremble  
Plus fort que foible tremble  
Tout d'ung amble  
Bon espoir m'est reconfort

Champ royal se recorde es puis ou se donnent couronnes & chapeaulx a ceulx qui mieulx le savent faire. Et se fait a refrain comme ballade / mais il y a cinq couplets et renvoy.

Exemple

Quant terpendrex sa herpe prepara  
de sept cordons selon les sept planettes  
A jupiter piate compara  
Sol a mese et fit par ses sonnettes  
Paripate ressembler a saturnus  
Licanos / mars / paramese / venus  
Ne te livra la planette mercure  
Quant ses sept cordons sur son acure  
Concavees apoint saude & bien vernie  
Furent assez il eut par art et cure  
Herpe rendant souveraine armonie  
Ceste herpe qui si belle forme a  
Puisse figurer par vives raisons nettes  
A marie vierge que dieu si bien forma  
Du tronc jessé et de ses racinettes  
La seche anne dont on faisoit refus  
Porta le bois royal et le bel fus  
Dont ceste herpe eut humaine facture  
Prudence / force / attrempance / droicture

Foy / esperance et charité unie  
 Sept cordes sont qui la font sans facture  
 Herpe rendant souveraine armonie  
 Au temple fut presentee et sonna  
 Si hault que dieu ouyt ses chansonnettes  
 Riche salut gabriel lui donna  
 Et lui dist vierge entens mes chans honnestes  
 Le filz de dieu conceveras jesus  
 Sur ce teneur respondit au dessus  
 je ne congnois virile creature  
 Neantmoins selon ta parole ou lecture  
 Il me soit fait / lors fut elle garnie  
 De art de musique et fut par conjecture  
 Herpe rendant souveraine armonie  
 Car a ce mot disant tout s'acorda  
 Au gendre humain marchant sus espinettes  
 Si doux accord sa corde recorda  
 Qu'elle endormist serpenteaux et ranettes  
 Ces tresdoux mots sont de la bouche yssus  
 Que les haulx cieulx de dieu fais & tissus  
 Jadis formés lui ont fait ouverture  
 Et ont prise infernale cloture  
 Pour retirer humaine progenie  
 Si dis qu'elle est plus que dessus nature  
 Herpe rendant souveraine armonie  
 Pan oncques mieulx ne baritonisa  
 Diapason au son de ses musettes  
 Pithagoras oncques n'argonisa  
 dyapante de si douces busettes  
 Par ung accord que sont les sept vertus  
 Sept planettes dont sept cieulx sont vestus  
 A surmonté sans vilaine morsure  
 Devant son filz qui endura mort sure  
 Est anoncée & en gloire infinie  
 Le bien formant par compas et mesure  
 Herpe rendant souveraine armonie  
 Prince du puis qui chantez d'avanture  
 donnez acord plain champt et floriture  
 A l'umble fleur des vierges espanie  
 Et vous orrés a la gloire future  
 Herpe rendant souveraine armonie

Les servantois servent pareillement au puis et aux rondeaulx Ausquelz il y a certaines rigles que les princes desdis  
 puis y mettent affin de contraindre le facteur sans trop ouvrer de sa puissance par son mouvement lequel prend laict  
 et terminations es premieres lignes / l'une amoureuse laquelle traicte de matiere d'amours Et contient cinq couplets et  
 l'envoy sans refrain. Mais lesdis couplets de pareille consonance sont Et lesdis servantois le plus souvent sont fais en  
 l'onneur de la vierge marie et pour l'onneur de sa tresglorieuse naissance / saincteté et tresparfaicte vie.

Exemple

L'amoureux cours prouveu de prudence  
 Doit mediter par divin pensement  
 Car l'escripture ou nous devons credence  
 Nous recite demonstrant plainement  
 Comment de la lignee prefiguree  
 De jessé dont une vieille adree  
 D'excellens dons qui porta sans amer  
 La belle fleur que dieu vout tant amer

Que l'esprit saint par treshaulte puissance  
 Vint reposer dessus sans entamer  
 Integrité par aucune nuysance  
 Le bien descend de l'amant par science  
 Voulant la lettre exposer haultement  
 Prendre jessé fondé en pacience  
 Pour dieu puissant regnant triumphamment  
 Qui produisit par euvre decretee  
 Ceste vierge par sainte anne notee  
 Sur laquelle dieu vout la fleur poser  
 Se fut marie ou qui vint reposer  
 L'esperit saint par lequel sans instance  
 De puis jesus son filz bien exposer  
 Car elle en eut la divine acointance  
 Si doit l'amant des son adolescence  
 La vierge aimer et fleur pareillement  
 Car l'esperit pour la divine essence  
 Elle receut reposant saintement  
 Car elle fut de si bonne heure nee  
 Que la grace de dieu lui fut donnee  
 Pour son enfant concevoir et porter  
 Lors incarné pour nos maux supporter  
 Se fut euvre d'admirable substance  
 Quant vierge fut devant son enfanter  
 Vierge enfantant et apres sans doubance  
 Or avons dont tout par benivolence  
 La noble fleur prouffitant grandement  
 Aux malades car par sa soustenance  
 Leur rent sancté de corps et sauvement  
 O vierge sainte et bien moriginee  
 Vostre liesse en douleur fut tournee  
 Quant vostre filz vout en la croix monter  
 Pour les pecheurs aider et conforter  
 Endurant mort passion et souffrance  
 Puis au tiers jour il vout ressusciter  
 Et vous donna de sa joye remembrance  
 Dame d'onneur de haulte preference  
 Fleur fleurissant miraculeusement  
 En mer / en terre & en circunference  
 Du haultain ciel et divin firmament  
 Ou ciel lassus dignement couronnee  
 La pouez vous trinité contempler  
 En unité et en graces impetrer  
 Pour departir en louable ordonnance  
 Pour nous servir quant nous devons finer  
 Puisse de dieu obtenir indulgence  
 Prince prions la vierge sans cesser  
 Que la paix soit unie par toute france  
 Riens au monde ne pourrons posséder  
 Que fruit de vie amour et esperance

La ricqueracque est en maniere d'une longue chanson faicte par couplets de six ou de sept sillabes la ligne et chascun couplet a deux diverses croisees la premiere ligne et la tierce de sillabes imparfaites. La seconde et la quarte de parfaites et pareillement la seconde croisee distinguees et differentes en termination. Et doit tenir ceste mode de sillabes et tous ses couplets affin qu'elle soit convenable au champ de ceste taille couloura messire georges chastellain ses croniques abregees

Exemple

Vous orrés choses estrange  
D'ung folastre bien fait  
Qui se disoit estre ange  
Mais quant se vint au fait  
Voulut monter en gloire  
Volant comme ung plouvier  
Il mist trop bas son loire  
Si cheut en ung vivier

Bagnenaudes sont couplets fais a volenté contenant certaines quantités de sillabes sans rime et sans raison pou  
recommandee ymo repulsee de bons ouvriers et fort auctorisee du temps maistre jehan de virtoc

Exemple

Qui veult tresbien plumer son coq  
Bouter le fault en ung houseaulx  
Qui boute sa teste en ung sac  
Il ne voit goute par les traulx  
Sergens prennent gens par le nez  
Et moustarde par les deux bras  
Plus tost le soleil a pied  
Que ne fait le lievre a cheval  
Pour quoy fait on tant de harnois  
Quant les gens sont armez d'escaille  
Se vous avez mauvaise femme  
Boutez sa teste en ung soufflet  
Sans lui bailler point de soufflet  
Si en faictes mailles de faulx  
Jamés plus ne seras mehaulx

De rigmes en goret et plusieurs autres menues tailles ne font les rhetoriciens quelque estime pour ce qu'elles sont  
vicieuses & condamnables. Mais qui vult practiquer la science choisisse plaisans equivoques termes leonismes et  
laissent les bergiers des champs user de leur theorique et rhetorique rurale. Et quant une seule diction nuyst signifie  
porter dommage & privation de l'euvre par ses exemples declarez

Exemple

Telle bouche dit bonne nuyt  
Qui de la langue fort ne muyt

Rigme leonisme est quant deux dictions sont semblables et en pareille consonance en sillabes comme il appert ou  
chapitre de jalousie

Exemple

Prudes femmes par saint denis  
Autant est que de fenix

Rime ruralle est quant les derrenieres sillabes n'ont pas totale consonance ains participent en aucunes lettres.

Exemple

Amours me font par nuyt penser  
ou je n'ose par jour aller

Rime en goret est quant les derrenieres sillabes de la ligne participent en aucunes lettres

Exemple

C'est le lict de nostre coute  
On le fait quant on se couche

Redictes en sens sont sinonismes dictions qui signifient une mesme chose

Exemple

Le sage homme ne doit aller  
trop fort s'il ne veult ambuler

Plate redicte estant deux dictions sont mises en rime l'une contre l'autre & sont pareilles en voix et en signification.

Exemple

Qui veult amis avoir  
Il fault argent avoir

Autre exemple

Que dictes vous de vostre amant  
Pour vous a le cueur si transi  
ne scet il latin ne rommant  
qui vous face entendre a mercy  
Certes dame s'il est ainsi  
que par vostre default define  
je tesmongneray sans nul sy  
que vous seriez murdriere fine

Autre taille de vers huitains se fait par autre croisure de laquelle monseigneur l'indiciaire fut principal inventeur

Exemple

Dictez le mot du bon du cueur  
sans mettre avant tant de refus  
prenez mercy contre rigueur  
donnez secours a ma langueur  
ou je mourray martir confus  
oncques en tel danger ne fus  
mon dieu pren mon ame en tes mains  
qui meurt tantost il languist mains

Pareille taille de vers huitains est maintenant en usage et n'y a difference si non que les mettres sont de dix et de xi  
piedz

Exemple

qu'est devenu le temps du bon berger  
pour lors regnoit duc philippe de bourgongne  
qui bien laissoit les contes abreger  
les famis loups en noz champs heberger.  
Ains les chassoit plus loing qu'en castelongne  
pour le present tel point tel mort tel hongne  
qui n'oseroit hurter contre nos pars  
Quant bergier dort les moutons sont espars

En pareille forme de vers huitains se fait rhetorique batellee Et est dicte batelee pour ce qu'elle a sa volee de  
resonance en la finable sillabe comme dessus elle a ung autre son et raison en la .iiii. sillabe en maniere de batellage.  
de ceste nouvelle mode sont coulourez la complainte de gresse : le trosne d'onneur / le temple de mars / les ouvrages  
de la pucelle : et la ressource du petit peuple. Et en a esté inventeur maistre jehan molinet de valenciennes.

Exemple

Plourez gens sont a tous lez reversez  
tensez bersez consacrez confondus  
tapez trompez tormentez troudelez  
brullez riflez tempestez triboulez  
pelez coulez espantez esperdus  
passez pendus martelez morfondus  
rongez tonduz pensifz patibulez  
pris et surpris pillez & petellez

Autre taille de rime nommee vers douzains ou deux estaz. Et en sont plusieurs histoires & oraisons richement  
decorees comme O digne preciosité et autres : dont le formulaire & croisure se demonstre par cest exemple

Exemple

Dame ne vous sonvient il pas  
du tresgrant labeur et despas  
Que pour vous j'ay fait et passez  
Comme desriglé sans compas  
J'ay perdu repos et repas  
A pou que n'en suis trespassez  
Si tous voz dons ne sont passez  
je vous prie que me repaissez  
d'ung regard d'ueil plain de solas

Mes griefz tormens seront cassez  
Riche seray trop plus que assez  
hors de dangier et de ses lats  
dame ne vous sonvient il pas

Vers alexandrains sont de xii. ou de xiii. sillabes pour mettre. Et n'a que une seule termination le nombre des lignes et est a la voulenté de l'acteur. Ilz sont nommez alexandrains pource que les histoires de alixandre sont faictes en ceste forme. Et plusieurs autres rommans des batailles anciennes tiennent ceste taille mesme l'abregé de troyes ensuit ce train

Exemple.

Puis que le duc perdit de nanci la journee  
Justice trespasa forte guerre fut nee  
L'eglise en a perdu ses rentes ceste annee  
noblesse en a esté durement fortunee  
Et povres gens en ont tresdure destinee

Autre taille de rime qui se nomme queue annuee pour ce que la fin du mettre est pareille en voix au commencement de l'autre et est divers en signification. Et se peut ceste taille causer en balades vers huitains et rondeaulx de chanson

Exemple

Trop durement mon cueur soupire  
Pire mal sent que desconfort  
Confort le fait plus n'a riens fort  
Fort se plaint ne scet qu'il doit dire  
Ire me tient en grief martire  
Tire me suis a mortel bort  
Trop durement mon cueur soupire  
Pire mal sent que desconfort  
En desesper mon cueur se mire  
Mire je n'ay si non la mort  
Mort vouldroie estre sans support  
port n'ay quelque ung ma vie empire  
Trop durement mon cueur soupire  
pire mal sent que desconfort

Rhetorique a double queue se veult engendrer par les tailles dessusdictes tant la penultime et la derreniere sillabes ont pareille termination

Exemple

Guerre la pulente / lente  
qui tout en sa tasse / tasse  
A mys / la regente / gente  
de paix en / soubasse / basse  
le temps que dieu compasse / passe  
Ainsi s'en vont tousjours jours  
et n'avons quelque secours

Pour faire amoureuses complainctes et autres doleances ainsi que a fait maistre arnoul grebert qui en fut premier inventeur de belle rhetorique

Exemple

A vous dame je me complains  
je vois plourant avant les plains  
car je congnois que pleurs et plains  
puis que je vis  
vostre gent et gracieulx vis  
j'aime mieulx estre mort que vifz  
neantmoins que volentiers que envis  
je me soubmés  
Au dieu d'amours qui desormés  
me fait servir d'estrange més  
de danger et de refus mais

c'est par amer  
vostre beaulté plainier d'amer  
qui a fait mon cueur entamer  
sy que je voudroie en la mer  
estre perilz  
Estre noié mors et pourris  
mis avecques les sains esperis  
l'ame dont les yeulx ont pou ris  
fusist sauvee

De toutes quantités de sillabes et dictiones se font rondeaulx simples et dictiers communs de chançons et autres

Exemple

Rondeau d'une sillabe

je  
boy  
se  
je  
ne  
voy  
je  
boy

Rondeau de deux sillabes

Ton nom  
me plet  
Caton  
ton nom  
mais  
non  
ton plet  
ton nom  
me plaist

Rondeau de trois sillabes

je suis pris  
en voz lats  
Tout souspris  
je suis pris  
pou espris  
de soulas  
je suis pris  
En voz lats

Rondel de quatre sillabes fait sur la devise du duc philippe de bourgongne

Autre n'auray  
Tant que je vive  
Son serf seray  
Autre n'auray  
je l'ameray  
Soit morte ou vive  
Autre n'auray  
Tant que je vive

Rondel de v. sillabes

Ou est le mignot  
Ma tresdoulce amye  
dis moy ung seul mot  
Ou est ton mignot  
monstre moy margot  
et si ne faulx mye

Ou est ton mignot  
ma tresdoulce amye

Rondeaulx jumeaulx composez ensemble et tient le petit partie du grant & le grant partie du petit.

Exemple sur le mot du duc charles de bourgongne

je l'ay empris  
Bien en adviengne  
Ou qui soit pris  
je l'ay empris  
Ou qui soit pris  
ne d'ou qui viengne  
je l'ay empris  
Affin qu'en haulx biens je parviengne  
par prouesse qui m'a surpris  
je l'ay empris bien en adviengne  
pour avoir pris je l'ay empris

Tant les plates redictes que les redictes finies en goret & ricquerac sont contees en termes de rhetorique et condammées en rigoureux examen il les fault éviter de toute puissance & querir termes plus riches & mieulx recommandez come dictiones aucunement pareilles sans estre equivoquées & contraires en signification. Et est de necessité prendre ces termes cy dessoubz transcrip.

Exemple

fureur	severité	paresse	vaillance	felicité	utilité
faveur	serenité	proesse	vengence	ferocité	tranquilité
vertueux	humilité	honneur	devotion	pleur	famine
vicieux	hostilité	horreur	derision	fleur	ferme mine
vigueur	honesteté	pureté	predication	charité	commande
Rigueur	honteuseté	povreté	prodicion	cherité	gourmande
purification	invite	langueur	testue		
putrefaction	devite	longueur	teste nue		

Pareillement doit le facteur querir et serchier aucuns vers composez de proportions comme a / de / re / com / par / sub. Car lesdis verbes enchainent en riche rime et ont diverses significations

Exemples

Prendre	Aprendre	Despendre	Comprendre	Reprendre	Souprendre
Faire	A faire	deffaire	Confaire	Refaire	Souffaire
Porter	Aporter	deporter	Comporter	reporter	suporter
Venir	avenir	devenir	convenir	Revenir	suvenir
Tendre	Atendre	destendre	contendre	Retendre	soubs attendre
Verser	Averser	deverser	converse	Reverse	souverse
mettre	a mettre	demettre	commettre	remettre	soubmettre
Poser	Aposer	deposer	composer	Reposer	supposer
Paire	Apairer	despaire	contraire	retraire	soustraire
Porter	aporter	desemporter	comparer	reparer	soubs parer
Tenir	atenir	detenir	contenir	retenir	soustenir
Pourtraire	proposer	perverse	pretendre	pas faire	parvenir
Point traire	postposer	pas verse	pres tendre	parfaire	prevenir

Exemple de equivoques a quatre

veloye	je ne dormoye pas
vouloye	d'une lievre
voloye	de vouloir
vol oye	oye volant

sçavoye	sçavoir
savoie	pays



sa voie	cheminant
savoie	de sçavoir
sansonet	oysel
sans son nect	ung sonnet
sans sonnest	sans son d'instrument
sanson est	sanson le fort a esté
l'avoye	je l'avoye
La voye	chemin
Lavoye	laver
Lavoye	veoir
sonnoye	sonner
son oye	une oye
son oye	ouyr
son noye	noyer
chevalet	cheval
ce valet	serviteur
ce val let	laide valee
ce val est	vallee est
de licts	de couches
De lis	fleurs
delicts	plaisances
delis	menus
d'ivers	yvers
Dix vers	x. vers
divers	estrange
dix vers	x. mettres
mains	deux mains
Moins	mendre
mains	demourer
mains	plus ne mains
devis	deviser
de vis	face
des vis	montee a vis
de vis	membres
viellart	ung viellart
viel art	viel home qui art
viel lart	du lart
viel art	ancienne science
j'amasse	Amer
j'amasse	assembler

Jamasse        une masse  
 je masse        pour faire amasse  
 Comme tresor florissant par nature  
 hault triumphant par eternelle fabrique  
 A vous honneur treschrestien roy puissant  
 Replendissant soubz science auctentique  
 louer on doit tel sens tant magnifique  
 En rethorique quant on y prent pasture  
 sens est parfaict adjoustant sa musique  
 dont fault venir aulx termes contestant  
 equivoquant congnoissant la droicture  
 Comme tresor &c  
 Vault il pas mieulx adjouster la replique  
 a composer quant l'engin sy procure  
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 O quel Renom quant sens a bien s'applique  
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 sans repugner les termes de droicture  
 Comme tresor &c  
 Visez musez de hault en bas lisez  
 Nom et surnom du Roy vous trouverez  
 Charles huitiesme que dieu doint bonne vie  
 et en la fin la grant joie parfournie

Cy finist l'art et rethorique de faire rimes et balades imprimé a paris le dixieme jour de may l'an mil quatre cens quatre vings et treize par anthoine verard libraire demourant a paris sur le pont nostre dame a l'image saint jehan l'evangeliste ou au palais au premier pillier devant la chapelle ou l'en chante la messe de messeigneurs les presidens



IHS

ANTHOINE VERAD HUMBLEMENT TE RECORDE CE QU'IL A IL TIENT DE TOI PAR DON POUR  
PROVOCQUER TA GRANT MISERICORDE DE TOUS PECHEURS FAIRE GRACE ET PARDON

## 2. Italy Renaissance. Antonio Maria Conti. [\*De Eloquentia Dialogus Antonio Maria Conti\*](#)

### De Eloquentia Dialogus

Naturae varietas quam in rebus plurimis contemplari licet, ut in caelesti globo stellis longe diversis velut emblematis vermiculato, in toto terrarum orbe variis animalium ac plantarum generibus refertissimo, in virentium pratorum amoenitate, in variegatis florum coloribus, in magna praediorum ubertate, saepenumero torpescentem animum solet excitare. Cum enim homines qui non omnino fuerint illiberaliter educati, rerum vicissitudines ac temporum mutationes assidua mentis agitatione considerant, in admirationem maximam facile perducuntur; atque ideo fit ut rerum causas eis in mentem plerunque veniat investigare, aut saltem, ex his rebus quae ante oculos positae sunt, de caelestibus et quae nullo modo, dum vitam agimus, videri possunt, disputare.

Concesseramus in Ambrosianum viridarium, in quo ferunt olim Afrum illum Augustinum, Christianae reipublicae lumen ac ornamentum, ad Christi persuasionem animum inclinasse, ac ibidem, lavacro conspersum sanctissimo, pristinas vitiorum et pravae mentis sordes abluisse; ibi tum una mecum eius caenobii praeses Angelus Appianus, suavissimo vir ingenio, cui propter egregiam morum integritatem, vitae sanctimoniam et summam omnium liberalium artium eruditionem non facile parem invenias, aderat et doctissimus praeceptor meus Primus Comes cuius viri laudes non hic est animus explicare: dabitur alias (ut spero) locus eas opportunius memorandi. Etenim quis brevi posset oratione comprehendere? cura in trium linguarum classicis authoribus nihil fere possit inveniri quod ille non diligenter excusserit, nihil in liberalibus disciplinis quod non optime perceperit, nihil memoria dignum quod perfecte non edidicerit. Taceo de sanctissimis eius moribus, de vitae severitate, de continua rerum divinarum cogitatione ac locutione. Cum igitur sub frondosa quadam arbore consedissemus et de communibus studiis aliquid dicere meditaremur, antequam quisquam inciperet, ecce Primi frater, Antonius Comes, iuvenis literarum omnium sitientissimus et omnis politioris literaturae peritissimus, mihi plusquam Pyladaea necessitudine coniunctus, quippe qui studiorum similitudine detinemur et ab ineunte aetate fere semper una viximus, sub eodem praeceptore Primo meruimus; quod si nos eadem uno partu mater edidisset, non maiori possemus esse benevolentia copulati. Hunc cum vidissem, mirandum in modum sum exhilaratus: nam diebus viginti ferme non videram, qui mihi totidem annis longiores fuisse visi fuerant.

“Opportune” inquam “advenisti, frater” — nam alio nomine nunquam illum appellare soleo: “hoc erat illud quod ignota mihi causa laetabatur animus meus: praesagiebat enim te venturum”. “Quam” inquit ille “mihi venisse iucundum est, postquam hic simul eos reperi quos omnium plurimi facio ac maxime diligo. Servet vos omnes pariter Christus optimus maximus”.

Tunc Angelus, ut est semper, alacri vultu ac fronte modestissima: “Teipsum” inquit “optabamus. Age, nobiscum asside ut aliquid ex studiis tuis nobis impertias”. “Quid” inquit Antonius “vobis impertiani qui tantum iam labore et industria effecistis ut in doctrinis omnes quos hactenus mihi videre contigit, equis, ut aiunt, albis longe praecedatis? Me potius a vobis aliquid aequum est, tanquam a perpetuis fontibus, haurire. Ut enim arbores istae quas in hac paradiso tam pulchre comatas ac quasi ridentes aspicimus, primo quidem flores emittunt, postea vero fructus qui paulatim maturescant, nihil tamen horum per se solae faciunt sed ab omnium genitrice terra succum accipiunt ac vigorem procreandi, sic ego nunc in studiis quasi florescere mihi videor, ex quibus aliquando confido futurum ut fructus aliquid percipiam. Sed interim vestro, qui doctrina praecellitis, mihi opus est auxilio. Quod nisi fieret, tanquam terrae succo non adiuta planta, nihil, ut video, possem in literis proficere”.

Tum Angelus iocabundus (noverat enim iuvenis industriam et ardentissimum literarum studium): “An” inquit “sicut implumis avicula nidulo nondum evolare didicisti? Aut adhuc in natatione tibi cortice opus est? Atqui ego te Delium illum iam superasse natatorem existimabam et aliorum iam posse fieri moderatorem”. “Non iniuria” inquam ego “Angele, istam de Antonio opinionem concepisti; nam saepenumero mecum non mediocriter admirari soleo profectum eius in omni doctrinae genere. Nihil est enim quod ingenii acumine non penetret, studiorum assiduitate non vincat, memoriae tenacitate non comprehendat; quare siquid coram vobis recusat dicere, non illius inscitiae sed incredibili modestiae potius, qua maxime praeditus est, ascribendum esse arbitror”.

Hic subridens Antonius ac in me reiectis oculis: “Tu quidem” inquit “pro tua singulari et iam pridem mihi perspecta benevolentia, de me semper magnificentissime loqueris; verum ipse cognosco quam sint exiguae vires ingenii mei. Sed postquam mecum tanquam ex syngrapha pergitis agere et contendere ut aliquid proferam, mihi autem quod dicam in praesentia, vestra dignum expectatione, venire in mentem penitus nihil potest, fratrem meum Primum qui et potest facere et faciet libentissime (nisi mea me fallit opinio) precabor ut me levet hoc onere et hanc dicendi provinciam suscipiat; quod obsecro, mi frater ac idem praeceptor honorande, ne recuses”.

Tum Primus cogitabundus spectare coepit ordine positas vites quae tum primum odore fragrantissimo redolentes, deflorescebant, in quincunces speciosissimos redactas arbores quae diversa quidem poma et ea nobilissima, sed tamen adhuc acerba, sustinebant, quamplurimis ac versicoloribus variegatum floribus solum, senticeta purpureis ac candidissimis rosis optime circumquaerue redolentia. Nos taciti cum expectatione meditantem intuebamur, cum ille sic locutus est: “Equidem, Antoni frater, iucundissime, siquid esset inter nos de pietatis studiis disputandum, dicerem aliquid libentissime, cum praesertim locus hic amoenissimus et haec omnia tam bene vernantia caelestis illius a Christo promissae regionis memoriam nobis sufficere videantur. Videte quam rideant omnia; quid hoc spectaculo speciosius? quid aptius ad aeternae vitae meditationem? Nam sic opinor omni tempore, sed longe praestantioribus virere floribus campos Elysios, non eos quos asphodelo consitos apud inferos beatorum sedes esse poetae fabulati sunt, sed ad quos nos qui Christum sequimur, quotidie laborantes, speramus aliquando pervenire. Itaque nobis in hac vita Deus quasi specimen quoddam dedit olim futurae beatitudinis. Videtis quam bene oleant hi caduci flores: quales fore censetis eos qui nunquam poterunt emarcescere? Quid? An non harum tam suavis odor vitium nostrum ob oculos principem Christum videtur obiicere, qui se vitem (ut est in sacris literis), legatos autem suos palmites appellavit? Nam ut palmes, si viti semper adhaereat, dulcissimos potest racemos producere, sin autem casu defractus fuerit, arescit ilico et ad combustionem tantum utilis est, sic homo, donec per res bene gestas capiti Christo coniunctus fuerit, vitam in melius quotidie transigere potest, donec tandem una cum eo immortalis felicitate perfruatur; quod si forte per flagitia Christum reliquerit, brevi tempore praeda fit iniquissimo Daemone. Iam vero nonne arbores istae quae magna fructuum sarcina sunt inclinatae, nostri nos officii videntur admonere? quae primo flores emittentes, deinde fructus acerbos, quales nunc pendere videtis, sic paulatim auxiliante solo nutriunt, ut tandem ad maturitatem perducantur; ita nos eo tempore flores emittimus cum bonam animo concipimus voluntatem, fructus autem cum quae nobis a Deo commissa sunt, ea bene gerimus; hi fructus tunc maturescere dicuntur cum tales fiunt actiones nostrae ut per eas, Christi beneficio, vitam mereamur immortalem. Quare si vobis ita videtur, utar oratione qua saepe soleo, vosque — me appellabat et Antonium — ad studium summae virtutis adhortabor; nisi forte quid aliud Angelo videatur”.

“Mihi vero” inquit Angelus “nihil posset accidere iucundius. Nam quamvis sacras quotidie literas evolvamus et divorum exempla ac monumenta nos satis possent ad virtutem extimulare, tamen viva voce nihil efficacius inveniri potest, praesertim cum ab optimo viro proferatur”. “Atqui non ego te” inquit Primus “ qui nos in hac facultate longe lateque praecedis, verum hos adolescentes qui nunc in aetatis fervore constituti sunt, ad virtutem exhortari statutum habeo: tu, si libet, eorum quae dicuntur iudex assideto”.

Hic cum silentio maximo nos ad audiendum ostendissemus esse praeparatos, hoc modo Primus exorsus est: “Equidem cogitanti mihi de communibus mortalium studiis, saepenumero venit in mentem non mediocriter admirari atque etiam indignari tantam esse hominum insaniam atque vecordiam, ut, cum aeternam consequi gloriam ac beatitudinem quam minimo labore possint, per inertiam ac libidinem turpissimis in rebus malint tempus, hoc est rem multo preciosissimam, frustra contere. Cum enim mens illa sempiterna ac perfecta sapientia quam nos Deum appellamus, qui caelestia maxime procurat, deinde in terris homines et quae ad hominum utilitatem pertinent, omni mortalium generi ab ipsis statim incunabulis igniculos quosdam addiderit virtutis ac beatitudinis acquirendae, quamplurimi variis animi perturbationibus ac morbis impediti ac distracti, quod a natura iusti et aequi desiderium habent, id penitus obruunt et a caeca ac temeraria animi dominatrice cupiditate praerepti, reginam omnium bonorum rationem conculcare non erubescunt.

“Neque enim quisquam vitiis inquinatus naturam aut fatum aut sydera, quod nonnulli faciunt, merito potest incusare, quae ut hunc ad vitia propensioem quam illum proferant, cogere tamen possunt omnino neminem; verum ut virtutum aut vitiorum viam complectatur, hoc in cuiusque situm est potestate. Non enim merito vel punirentur improbi, vel iusti praemia mererentur, si vel illi male, vel hi bene facere necessario cogerentur. Sed tamen, ut diximus, omnibus adipiscendae virtutis ac fugiendae vitiositatis desiderium a teneris — ut aiunt — unguiculis statim innascitur. Quis enim omnium inveniri potest tam angusti animi tamque parvi quem si roges an beatus esse velit, non ilico respondeat id se vel maxime cupere? Praeterea virtutis nomen ac probitatis etiam apud improbissimos sanctissimum est ac maxime venerabile. Nam quis est adeo perditus qui se probum ac virtute praeditum appellari non vehementissime gaudeat? Adde quod etiam saepenumero digladiari solent improbi siquis eos audeat bonos viros esse denegare. Planum igitur ac manifestum est hoc virtutis ac felicitatis desiderium nobis a natura Dei beneficio traditum esse. Cur ergo, dicet aliquis, tam pauci sunt qui virtutem amplectentur? Cur viam quae potest ad beatitudinem perducere plurimi non sequuntur? Quia cupiditatibus illaqueati, non ita corpus afficiunt ut obedire consilio rationique possit, et cum meliora, tanquam ea quae oculis cernuntur, aspiciant ac laudent, tamen quoniam appetitum rationi non subiiciunt, deteriora consectantur; nonnulli etiam adeo rudes et in bonis lusciosi inveniuntur,

ut, cum optima sequi cupiant, bonum ac malum internoscere non valeant, atque ita fit ut pro bonis pessima complectantur.

“Sunt qui maxime divitiis inhiantes sperent futurum ut, cum amplissimas possessiones et incommemorandam pecuniam adepti fuerint, bene beateque vitam agant; sed nunquam eos explere videmus cupiditatis sitim, at potius continenter plura conquirentes, maiora semper appetentes, plurima congerere studentes, aspiciamus. Nam, ut optime dixit Aquinas poeta, “crescit amor nummi quantum ipsa pecunia crescit”. Hoc accedit etiam avaris incommodi, quo minus possint ad virtutem aspirare, quod divitiarum cupiditate captus animus confestim evalescit. Cum enim aurae divinae particula quaedam sit animus noster, sublimis et erectus, caelestia tantum ac immortalia meditari concupiscit, ad eam gestiens beatitudinem ad quam destinatus est aliquando pervenire; cum vero pecuniarum illecebris illectus eis inhiare coeperit, nihil magnificum potest, nihil praeclarum cogitare, nihil quod ad honestatem spectare videatur; nec alia de causa toties in sacris literis divites improbantur ab aeterna foelicitate repelluntur. Quare nihil esse credatis honestius, nihil magnificentius quam divitias contemnere.

Sed existunt etiam qui, facile contemptis pecuniis, honore sperent ac gloria futurum ut immortalitatem consequantur. Quo fit ut quicquid agant ac meditentur, id ipsum totum popularis tantum aurae captandae gratia facere videantur; quod quam sit inane ac indignum homine christiano, non dubito quin intelligatis. Neque enim fieri potest, ait Chrisostomus, ut qui gloriae dulcedine capitur, magnum aliquid aut egregium sapiat. Hoc illud est quod tantopere Christus insectatur ut popularis gloriae cupido neget se pro benefactis mercedem ullam donaturum. Quapropter hoc etiam vitium eum oportet eradere qui velit ad summam illam foelicitatem ascendere.

“Maxime vero omnium impedimento est virtutum (ut ita dicam) candidatis, voluptatis illecebra quae ita quos semel coepit illaqueat ut, tanquam improbissima syren, eos confestim deturbet in turpitudinis barathrum. Haec a vobis praeter omnia caetera, studiosi discipuli, summopere cavenda est, ista praesertim aetate quae maxime vicina lapsibus est; sanguinis enim fervore compulsa adolescentia ad varias facillime cupiditates inflammatur. Sed iampridem vos, ut spero, pestem hanc animorum repudiastis. Cogitatis enim quantopere virtutis sit inimica: nam quid virtuti potest inimicius inveniri quam quod omnem tollit honestatem? Quid inter appetentem voluptatis hominem ac teterrimam interesse belluam existimatis? ‘Tu quum tibi Deus, — inquit Cicero sive mater, ut ita dicam, rerum omnium natura dederit animum, quo nihil est praestantius neque divinius, sic te ipse abiicies atque prosternes ut nihil inter te atque inter quadrupedem aliquam putes interesse?’

“Haec audiant vitiis excaecati qui summum bonum voluptate metiuntur. Vos vero qui iam ex animis vestris haec impedimenta summovistis, de his rebus nihil opus est amplius admonere; verum agite, quod coepistis iter fausto pede perficite. Iacta sunt praeclara beatitudinis fundamenta; iam quod difficillimum esse solet estis executi, siquidem principium totius esse dimidium etiam proverbio dicitur; iam, relictis vitiis, virtutum studia coepistis amplexari, magnam de vobis amicis omnibus expectationem concitastis. Illud cogitate: vobis alterutrum omnino esse necesse, aut cum summa laude et utilitate progrediendum, aut cum summo dedecore et infamia retrocedendum; quorum alterum vestrum est, animi magnitudine praestantium, alterum ignavorum, animi mollicie desperantium, quos pro fragilissimo voluptatis vitro, multo praeciosissimas aeternitatis margaritas non piget amittere. Difficilis est et ardua virtutis via, sed honesta solent esse difficilia; quod enim expositum est omnibus ut vel ab ignavissimo quoque possit apprehendi, quis id audeat honestum appellare? At vero quod laudabile et cum utilitate coniunctum, quamvis maxime sit arduum ac difficillimum, id generosis animis etiam facillimum videri solet, qui nullum laborem pertimescunt, sed amplissima sibi proponunt praemia quae consequantur, laudem, decus, immortalitatem. Virtus enim, ait philosophus, radices habere videtur amaras, sed fructus affert suavissimos.</p>

“Istam quam elegistis vitam optimam, mihi credite, iocundissimam paulatim reddet consuetudo nec vero labore aut difficultate, tanquam tempestate, repelli vos sinatis. Quin potius illud considerate: si tanta patiuntur mercatores pericula, si non horrescunt fluctibus turgidum mare, si per saxa, per ignes non trepidantes irruunt, ignotas adeunt regiones, fortunae vitam exponunt ut brevi perituras divitias affatim congerant, si vigilant artifices totas plerunque noctes, quanto vos studio convenit eas acquirere divitias quae nunquam poterunt interire? Facite vobis ob oculos continue versentur tot heroes praeclarissimi qui laboribus sibi iter in caelum aperuerunt et hic etiam insignem sibi gloriam pepererunt. Quanquam nolo vobis, ut paulo ante monui, tanquam scopum mundanam gloriam proponatis: quid enim inanius? Sed tamen si virtutem summo studio ac diligentia complexi fueritis, ingens etiam gloria sponte sua subsequetur. Non enim credendum est sibi gloriam hanc proposuisse sanctos illos Hieronymum, Augustinum, Ambrosium, innumerabiles alios, sed ipsam tantum honestatem ac Christi vitam imitandam; tamen de eorum fama nulla unquam aetas conticescet. Hoc enim ita sapientissimo cuique solet accidere, ut quanto magis gloriam spreverit, tanto magis illa cumulator redeat.

“Quare summum illum vobis scopum proponite Christum: ab hoc omne principium, ad hunc omnem actionumstrarum exitum referatis. De hoc noctes atque dies cogitatis. Huius vitam, mortem, gloriam animo continenter evolvatis. Sacrosanctam Evangelii legem ac divinos omnes libros nocturna versate manu, versate diurna. Non enim fieri potest, inquit ille vere aureus Chrisostomus, ut qui frequenter divinis vacat, is miseram agat vitam. Omnia vobis caetera sordeant prae his quae ad Christum pertinent. Ita fiet ut aliquando quam optatis foelicitatem acquiratis immortalem et ab optimo quoque viro maximam reportetis et laudationem et gloriam”.

Haec cum dixisset Primus, paulisper habitum est silentium. Tum Angelus: “Plane mihi, Prime, videris ” inquit “ optimos imitatus medicos qui, morborum causas perscrutati, pharmacis prius eas conantur evellere quam facientes sanitatem medicinas adhibeant: quis enim unquam valetudinem ut recuperet sperare potest nisi prius morbi causam de venis fugaverit? Ita virtutis viam ingredi penitus nemo potest qui non ante pravas ab animo cupiditates eraserit. Quid porro virtuti potest inimicus inveniri quam tria illa quae modo vitia numerasti: divitiarum sitis, voluptatis illecebra, gloriae cupiditas? Neque enim ullo modo fieri potest ut qui trium horum aliquo vitiorum irretitus sit, minimam virtutis partem possit acquirere. Quod si quis ab his omnino se potuerit expedire, maximum is ad virtutem gradum iam se fecisse certum habeat.

“Sed illud sane etiam a te expectabam, ut aliquid de literarum studiis ac maxime de eloquentia diceres. Hos enim adolescentes in hac parte totis viribus ut aliquando fiant eloquentes, insudare video. Qui plane mihi videtur labor esse supervacaneus; cur autem ita videatur, dicam postea, si prius hac de re sententiam tuam audivero; quare, cum alia multa dixeris, hoc etiam explicandum est a te ut hi sciant adolescentes quid hac in re sibi faciendum esse videatur”.

Hic arridens Primus: “Scio” inquit “quam rem agas, Angele: cupis me ad hoc, ut aliquid de eloquentia disseram, impellere, quo illa ipsa, quam te non probare dicis, eloquentia rationes meas omnes et argumenta quibus eam probavero, convincas. Nullum enim adhuc te vehementiorem in dicendo cognovi neque ad refellendum acutiorem. Sed tamen, quoniam ita velle videris, dicam sententiam meam. Tu siquid contra dixeris, ipsa tamen per se suum fulgorem explicabit: non enim ullo modo eloquentiam sine eloquentia potes improbare. Vos autem”— me appellabat et Antonium — “pergite porro sicuti coepistis, totis viribus ad eloquentiam incumbere, quae rerum omnium (divina semper excipio) sine controversia praestantissima est, nec vos quasi tumultuantes de gradu deiiciat siquid Angelus contra dixerit; quin potius ita colligite. Ex omnibus rebus id excellentissimum ac praestantissimum existimandum est quod meliorem nostri partem, hoc est animum, ornare et expolire potest, quodque in admirationem homines adducere solet et maximam plurimis utilitatem reportare. Doctrinas enim ac artes liberales et denique virtutes omnes hac de causa complectimur, quod illis humanus animus maxime poliat. Quid gemmas, uniones, chrysolithos, adamantes et caeteras omnes? Num alio nomine praeciosae sunt nisi quod eas homines soleant admirari? Iam vero argentum et aurum ob id tantum plurimi penditur, propterea quod humanis usibus et conventionibus, emptionibus ac venditionibus aptissimum esse videatur. Nullum autem animi maius ornamentum culto ac prudenti sermone potest inveniri, nihil quod maiorem possit admirationem concitare, nihil denique quod utilius sit humano generi reperitur.

“Quid enim pulchrius quam aliquem existere hominem qui caeteros ea re praecedat qua sola caeteris animantibus homines antecellunt? Quid honestius aut decentius quam ita sermonem posse temperare ut nihil non concinne, prudenter ac ornate dicere videaris, nihil humile ac sordidum, sed omnia nobilia ac splendida? Quid admirabilius quam mentes audientium quocumque volueris oratione posse convertere? Cum omnes fere loqui sciant, ipse solus ita loquaris ut caeteri nihil omnino scire videantur. Ut suspensos ita teneas auditorum animos et attonitos ut, vel invitos, pedibus in sententiam tuam cogas discedere? Age porro, quid utilius eloquentia? Quid liberalius? Qua feruntur patrocina supplicibus, excitantur afflicti, datur miseris salus, rei periculis liberantur, civitates optime gubernantur, sedantur plebis seditioes ac discordiae, ad sacrarum cultum religionum populi pertrahuntur. Quare si quod animi nostri magnum est ornamentum quodque in admirationem ducit universos homines et quod utilitatem solet afferre plurimam, id omnium est praestantissimum, eloquentiam autem et ornamentum animi non mediocre et magnopere mirabilem et utilissimam esse probavimus, nemini dubium esse potest quin eloquentia sit omnium praestantissima”. Quae cum dixisset, finem ille.

Angelus autem: “Ne tu” inquit “astute mecum agis! qui prius, ne verbis meis fidem habeant, hos alienare velis quam ex me quicquam audierint. Deinde cum tuam tantum de eloquentia sententiam postulassem, ipse nobis argumentis vel potius praestigiis quibusdam oculorum aciem ita praestrinxisti ut vile plumbum in aurum purum putum, quod vocant, immutare videreris. Sed iam mutua talione tecum agam, non quidem quod ut verum occultare velim, quod tu fecisse mihi videris, sed magis ut, detectis insidiis, ipsa per se veritas elucescat. Verum iam aperto Marte congregiendum: possem equidem te plumbeo statim, quod aiunt, gladio iugulare; sed aperienda prius est sententia mea. Siquid esset quod ad bene beateque vivendum homini christiano maxima dicendi facultas studio comparata

prodesse posset, nunquam profecto committerem ut eam non maxime comprobarem; quid enim impudentius dici aut fingi potest quam id condemnare quod nostrae persuasioni ac religioni sit non solum accommodatum, sed etiam utilissimum? Sed cum videam ex eloquentiae studio non solum nullam christianis utilitatem, sed etiam damnum maximum proficisci, quid est quod huic studio multam operam impendendam esse existimem? aut potius cur summopere non improbem? Quid enim damnosius accidere potest quam, relictis gravioribus studiis, inani tantum verborum farragini perdiscendae bonas horas consumere? Cum praesertim Christus ipse, nostrae religionis author, suis legibus sancitum esse voluerit ne multum loquamur, propterea quod in multa locutione crimen aliquod semper incidere posse videatur. Nos autem supervacanei sermonis vitium, quod omnes fere mortales occupavit, non solum pro virili non conamur aliqua ex parte resecaere, sed etiam, si diis placet, loquacitatem nostram studiis adiuvamus.

“Nam quod ais esse mirabilem eloquentiam quod attonitos reddat audientes, idem de schenobate aut praestigiatore aut etiam circulate quovis dici potest, neque tamen iccirco tale genus hominum praestantissimum esse dicitur. Quod vero disputas eloquentia reos liberari, civitates gubernari, populos ad religionem trahi, speciosius mihi dixisse videris quam quod ita sit. Nam quis id primum tibi concedat eo nomine utilem esse eloquentiam quod reos a periculis liberet? Qui si mali sint, num utile tibi videtur eos liberare? Sin autem boni nonne potius innocentia tecti liberabuntur quam cuiusquam eloquentia? Quis Susannam illam Hebraeam falsa criminatione liberavit? An non (si quid Ambrosio credimus) sua taciturnitas? Quae si voluisset oratorem conducere qui se defenderet, nequaquam visa fuisset, ut erat, innocens. Quid Socratem illum, Apollinis iudicio sapientissimum, commemorem? Cui, cum esset in carcere, facundissimus orator Lysias orationem attulisse dicitur, qua videbatur illum inique accusatum eripere posse: maluit homo sapientissimus iniuste condemnari, quam eloquentiae praesidio liberari. Quod si innocentes, sed maleficos, eloquentia defendit, cum illi nihil sibi conscii non timeant, hi vero scelerum conscientia stimulati patrocinium quaerant, non solum non utilis est eloquentia, sed etiam damnosissima quippe quae defendat quos oppressos oportuit.

“Quod autem dicis eloquentia civitates gubernari, id mihi magis disputandi gratia quam quod ita sentias dixisse videris. Neque enim te ignorare arbitror optimis legibus et virorum prudentia regi civitates, non eloquentia, quae multo frequentius nocere quam prodesse civitatibus invenitur. Quis enim ignorat quantum tumultus in re publica romana duorum Gracchorum eloquentia concitavit? Quantum item Saturnini? Quantum apud Athenienses Pisitrati?

“Illud nullo modo tolerandum quod ais populos ad religionem eloquentia trahi. Quaenam est ista quam praedicat eloquentia? Num ea quam in sacris literis invenimus? Quis ignorat ex sacris libris expulsam esse eloquentiam tanquam inutilem? Aut eam dicis qua se gloriatur Corinthios lucrifecisse Paulus? cum ait: “Cum venirem ad vos, fratres, non veniebam cum eminentia sermonis aut sapientiae, annuncians vobis testimonium Dei”. Et paulo post: “Sermo meus et praedicatio mea non erat in persuasoriis humanae sapientiae verbis sed in ostensione spiritus ac potentiae, ut fides vestra non sit, in sapientia hominum, sed in potentia Dei”. Quid? Hic videtur tibi Paulus eloquentiam laudare? ac non potius repellere? Non igitur eloquentia est quae trahit ad religionem homines, sed ostensio Spiritus et Evangelii nuntiatio. Nam quod ais animi nostri maximum esse ornamentum plausibilem eloquentiam, id ego semper constantissime pernegabo. Neque unquam praeter virtutem ac honestam vitam humanae mentis ulla esse ornamenta existimabo, neque quicquam expetendum praeter religionem et unius Dei per sacras literas, ubi nulla est eloquentia, cognitionem. Quid enim expetendum quod non sit utile? Porro quid utile quod non idem sit honestum homini christiano? Atqui nullus id honestum existimabit quod etiam improbissimo cuique possit esse commune; eloquentia autem eiusmodi est ut etiam homo pessimus eam habere possit. Non igitur erit honesta eloquentia; quodsi non honesta, neque utilis; si vero non utilis, non solum non expetenda, sed etiam fugienda esse videbitur. Quod autem fugiendum est perniciosum sit necesse est. Quare non solum eloquentia non praestantissima, quod tu conclusisti non optime, sed etiam perniciosissima christiano viro iudicanda est”.

Haec cum dixisset, nos taciti quid ad haec esset obiecturus Primus expectabamus. Cum ille: “Si te scirem” inquit “Angele, similem verbis animi sententiam etiam habere, summopere te hortarer ut de opinione tam sinistra decederes; vel si nolles audire, tibi notam ingratitude inurerem, qui, cum tantum debeas eloquentiae quantum hoc tempore vel nulli vel fortasse paucissimi, tamen eam suis ipsius telis auderes insectari. Sed cum haec disserendi gratia, primoribus tantum labris, non ex animo te dixisse non ignorem, nihil de te aut ingratitude tua dicam; ipsam tantum eloquentiam obiecto clypeo protegere conabor ac defendere; tu vero tuis argumentis aerem verberasse videberis. Primum igitur tua dicta tentabo refellere, deinde quae causae meae confirmandae proderunt, ea nitar ut in medium conferam.

“Atque ut hinc potissimum incipiam, quid illo sorite vitiosius, quem tanquam validissimum in peroratione tibi conservaras? Equidem prima auditione non mediocriter confusus sum mihiq; audire videbar inexplicabiles Chrysippi ceratinas aut crocodilitinas; sed postquam diligentius introspexi, nihil unquam mihi visum est inanius.



Nam sic opinor collegisti: nihil utile quod idem non etiam honestum, nihil honestum quod improbo possit esse commune. Haec effata tibi facile concesserim, quanquam prius illud non multis est probabile. Sed videamus quid his subiungatur: eloquentia eiusmodi est ut etiam homo pessimus eam habere possit. Quid ais, Angele? Vide ne parum dialectici sit hominis rerum definitiones aut ignorare aut cognitae non considerare. Homo pessimus eloquentiam habere potest? An ignoras idem esse ac si diceres: “Stultissimus potest esse sapientissimus”? Nam quid aliud est eloquentia quam copiose loquens sapientia? Quid aliud orator quam vir bonus dicendi peritus? Num pravus homo sapiens aut bonus esse potest? Quis hoc sanae mentis audeat dicere? Atqui tu, vel nescius vel forte etiam prudens, hoc conclusisti. Nam quisquis eloquens est is etiam sapiens ac vir bonus sit necesse est, siquidem eloquentia est sapientia et orator vir bonus. Porro si pravus est eloquens, idem etiam erit sapiens et bonus? Quod nullo modo fieri posse quis ignorat? Neque igitur homini malo contingere potest eloquentia. Quo sublato, videsne quam cito causa cecideris? Sed haec agenda videntur explanatius.

“Multum interest, Angele, quid esse putes eloquentiam; nam si verborum tantum inanem (ut iniqui) farraginem illam existimas, recte quidem improbas, sed plurimum videlicet erras in finitione. Sin autem, ut opinor, persuasum habes eloquentiam maius quiddam esse quam verborum farraginem, neque omnino sine rerum plurimarum, et divinarum et humanarum, cognitione hominem aliquem eloquentem esse posse, quid te facere dicam cum rem tam laudabilem vituperas, nisi pessime? Nam quod ais non oportere dimitti studia graviora, quae sunt tandem ista graviora studia, aut quid est quod incumbamus studiis nisi ut eloquentiam augeamus et ut, multis collectis rationibus, nobis ipsis ad bene beateque vivendum et aliis quamplurimis auxilio esse possimus? Quid enim quis discit quod non, cum perceperit, quam maxime cupiat provalere? Hoc enim omnibus natura comparatum est, ut scire desiderent et quae sciunt alios docere velint; quod cum faciunt, quis est qui non cupiat se quam optime dicere? Huc igitur studia diriguntur et hac tantum de causa studemus, ut esse possimus eloquentes; nihil enim aut parum prodest occulta doctrina. Nullum igitur eloquentiae studio gravius inveniri potest.

“Sed Christus, inquis, nobis iussit ut pauca loqueremur. Undenam, quaeso te, sumis hoc in eloquentiam esse dictum? Cave ne cum eloquentes inimicos habere velis, etiam theologos irritassis si male torseris Evangelia. Non enim tibi par erit proelium, quanquam plurimum etiam in ea facultate valeas; sed si te semel opprimerint Scotizantes, ex illis tenebricosis laqueis non ita facile te poteris extricare; iam vero contra Thomistarum et Occamistarum vociferationes nihil tibi proderit ista tua tam admirabilis scientia. Sed redeat unde aberravit oratio. Christus ibi longas Ethnicorum preces vituperat quibus, quod optabant, a Deo se impetrare posse confidebant; tu vero scilicet novus interpret, Christi verba torques in eloquentiam. Nam si malum est loqui, cur non perpetuo tacemus? Si vero bonum, cur, cum id facimus, non conamur ut quam optime faciamus? Sic enim fieret ut loquacitatis vitium quod, ut vere dicis, omnes fere mortales occupavit, excideremus, et politissimo sermone simul et utilissimo ea tantum quae probanda sunt diceremus.

“Quam vero belle de schenobate aut praestigiatore lusisti, perinde quasi quicumque schenobates ad orationem pertineat aut haec similitudo non toto, quod aiunt, diametro dissideat! Mihi vero visus es, cum quid contra diceres non haberes, studio tamen contradicendi tam absurdam finxisse similitudinem. Quid enim habet simile funambulus cum eloquentia? Cum ille quamvis ridicula quaedam et quae mirabilia videantur efficiat, tamen nec sibi nec aliis utilis, ab omnibus vilipenditur et lusus tantum gratia spectatur. Haec autem ita rapit et immutat hominum mentes, ita vel invitae cogit ad utilissima quaeque, ut plane divina esse videatur. Nec fieri potest ut, cum quis eloquentem semel audierit, eum non maximopere suspiciat et maius quiddam in eo quam in homine veneretur. Quanam seditio tanta inter ferocissimas gentes potest exoriri quam, si supervenerit eloquens, non ilico sedare possit et pacem inter inimicos conciliare? Et quid seditione vulgi truculentius? Menenius Agrippa fabula tantum eloquenter recitata et sapienter interpretata iratam plebem patribus conciliavit: quanto id facilius effecisset si fontes eloquentiae penetrasset? Quid, cum ad Demosthenis et Aeschinis contentionem ex tota Graecia concursus fieret? Num eos qui concurrerunt Graecos tanquam ad praestigiatos spectandos convenisse censes? Aut cum ex ultimis orbis terrarum regionibus ad Patavinum Livium audiendum quidam veniebant, nonne tibi videntur eius eloquentiam, non tanquam rem inanem, ut tu appellas, sed tanquam valde mirabilem ac prope divinam fuisse admiratos?

“Sed haec quae ex tuo dixisti, ut sunt leviae, ita facile refelluntur; illud potius aliquam rationi meae difficultatem, quod ex Paulo recitasti, videtur afferre; nam de Susanna ac Socrate postea videbimus. Sed tamen hoc etiam quod ait Paulus facillimum est amoliri, cum non eloquentiam vituperet, sed ei tantum ostensionem Spiritus ac Dei potentiam praeponeat videatur. Illis enim Ecclesiae nascentis primordis magis erant, fateor, necessaria miracula cum, ut deorum cultum ac maiorum suorum religionem penitus imbibitam immutarent, non sola potuissent homines eloquentiae persuasionem compelli, nisi miracula etiam accessissent quae divinum illud opus esse, non humanum

declararent. Sed posteaquam ad Christum versi fuerant, tunc necessaria fuit etiam eloquentia quae debiliū et infirmorum animos quotidie confirmaret, desides excitaret, errantes corrigeret, ferventes magis accenderet.

“Unde videmus etiam quanta scripserit arte Paulus quem tu fingis eloquentiam damnare cum ipse sit eloquentissimus; cuius rei, praeterquam quod eius epistolae declarant, testis est etiam Augustinus qui rerum ac verborum exornationes ac eloquentiae nervos in eius scriptis conatur ostendere. Quare, non eo modo quo tu censes ea verba Pauli quae modo recitasti sunt interpretanda ut credamus eum, qua summopere praeditus erat, eloquentiam condemnare. Sed cum ad Corinthios scribat qui a prophetis falsis plurimi seducebantur, eis tantum artificiose in memoriam Spiritus ostensionem ac miracula reducit, ut meminerint se, non tantum Pauli verbis quantum Evangelii virtute ac miraculis, Christi fidem accepisse.

“Neque vero ex sacris literis, ut ais, expulsa est eloquentia; imo vero magis credibile est ab eis principium habuisse, deinde paulatim hominum sapientissimorum studiis accrevisse. Non enim fieri potest ut res tam divina aliunde quam a divinis literis principium sumpserit, cum praesertim plurimas in sacris Bibliis orationes videamus quas certo scimus esse in hebraeo sermone disertissimas et quae etiam apud nos speciem quandam prae se ferunt elegantiae. Illos vero quos prophetas appellamus, quorum ego eloquentiam cum eorum scripta hebraice lego maiorem in modum suspicio, nihil aliud fuisse credendum est quam oratores facundissimos quos Deus e multis eligebat ut essent qui populum ad religionem pertraherent.

“Horum unus Daniel cum innocentem Susannam ad supplicium duci videret, eam eloquentia sua liberavit, et quanquam, ut ais Ambrosio, placere, taciturnitate innocentiam suam testaretur, tamen nisi Dei monitu vox Danielis affuisset, nihil omnino fuisset impedimento quo minus de illa supplicium indignissimum sumeretur. Socrates autem, inquis, perire maluit quam oratione Lysiae liberari. Sit ita sane. Num ideo damnavit eloquentiam Socrates? Illam sibi orationem, quod forte parum eloquens videretur, non viro dignam videri dixit: non de eloquentia tota iudicium fecit; nisi forte credis eum qui subaeratum aurum spernit, obrizum etiam et purum aurum reprobare. Quid vero de eloquentia Socrates senserit, eius discipulus Plato palam innuit qui eum ubique introducit eloquentissime disserentem quare te frustra vides haec exempla collegisse.

“De Gracchis autem et Saturnino et Pisistrato nihil attinet dicere, cum illi cives seditiosissimi fuerint. Nos autem nullum eloquentem nisi eundem bonum virum esse dicimus; ut autem partem aliquam habuerint eloquentiae, non tamen ideo tanta virtus damnanda esse videbitur, neque omnino vitia pravorum hominum ad res transferenda; nam non res in vitium, sed malefacta cadunt.

“Quod autem legibus ac prudentia civitates gubernari, non eloquentia, tibi videri dicis, non satis ipse prudenter ac legitime, quod pace tua dixerim, ab his rebus eloquentiam separas, quas neque tu ignoras sine illa nullo modo posse consistere. Quem enim primum, ut alte repetamus, leges invenisse quibus civitates regerentur existimas, aut quem credis induxisse populos ut legibus obedire non recusarent? Num infantissimus aliquis tibi fuisse videtur, et qui nulla foret eloquentia praeditus? Quomodo ergo tam facile paruerunt ei qui nullam legum rationem, quare bonae viderentur, posset per infantiam reddere? An sponte sua rudis populus et libere vivendi cupidissimus, legibus, tanquam iugo, colla supposuit? Quin magis mihi verissimile fit eloquentissimum fuisse hominem qui, ratione reddita cur una in civitate simul habitare, legibus uti quam optimis optimum esset, oratione facundissima populorum animos ita demulserit et immutarit ut suae cogeret eos parere voluntati.

“At vero postquam in una moenia convenere, regi coepere certe non minus eloquentia quam receptis legibus. Cum enim viros prudentissimos de aequitate ac iure disserentes audirent, facundia deliniti, iis quae optima videbantur, parendum esse censuerunt itaque, nisi prius eloquentia fuisset, nullas penitus, ut opinor, leges haberemus; nec vero a prudentia, tanquam membrum a corpore, segreganda est eloquentia: pars enim eius esse dicitur cui literarum omnia studia tribuuntur. Quod si prudentis est amplecti studia literarum, cur tibi prudentis esse non videatur eloquentiam perdiscere quae studiorum omnium quasi lumen est et ornamentum? Quanto vero facilius et melius civitatum gubernatores populos ad iustitiam amplexandam et iniquitatem vitandam impellere possent si cum prudentia magnam quoque facundiam copularent!

Quid de Christi praecone dicendum est? cui tam necessariam esse arbitror eloquentiam quam etiam sacrarum scientiam literarum. Quid enim? An non videmus in theologica facultate doctissimos plerunque homines, quod facundia destituti sunt, ita frigide concionari ut nihil omnino, quamvis plurima verba profuderint, auditorem commoveant, sed totum fere tempus inanibus quaestiunculis, quas involvisse silentio multo praestitisset, altissima vociferatione contere? Quid enim ea populo prosunt quae Scotus et eius farinae comites somniant, quibus ad religionem ne tantillum quidem accendantur, sed ea cum audierint, in divinis rebus multo tardiores efficiantur? Quanto praestantius esset eloquentiae post divinas literas totis nervis incumbere et, reiectis dialecticorum sophismatibus in quibus

tanquam ad syrenaeios scopulos consenescent, tantam studio facundiam comparare, ut audientium mentes immutare, impellere, trahere, rapere possent ad honestatem capessendam; ut quaeque pessima vitia sunt ita maxime consecrari, improbare, profligare, exterminare, futuras improbis poenas oculis subiicere, minis perterrefacere, inferorum sedes aperire, tortiones, cruciatus, supplicia scelerum patefacere; virtutem autem, ut dignissimum est, ad caelum extollere, eius praemia, decus, immortalitatem, gloriam, beatitudinem ita dicendo prosequi ut eorum desiderio maiorem in modum auditorum mentes inflammentur, doleant, metuant, sperent, tempus sibi frustra praeteritum conquerantur, in posterum relegata cupiditatum siti, totam uni virtuti statuam operam impendere.

“Quae si quis diligentissime persequatur, quantum honestatis excitabit incendium, quam mirabiles ad capessendam virtutem ignes in mortalium animis commovebit, quam facile vitia tanquam fumi vanescere videbuntur, purior virtutis flamma subsequetur. Sed me tempus deficeret si vim universam eloquentiae velim explicare. Vides, ut opinor, nisi vel videre nolis, vel Hipsaea caecior effectus sis, quantopere sit utilis eloquentia. Sed me temporis angustia (video enim advesperascere) cogit esse brevior. Posthac alias nisi de ista sententia discesseris, multo longiorem et elegantior sermonem expectato”.

Hic subrisit Angelus, et: “Praeter spem” inquit “hodie Primum orantem ex tempore vidimus. Quid si paratus accessisset? Quid si iterum contingat ei de eloquentia dicere? Sed nihil opus est: iam enim in tuam sententiam pedibus discessi”. Quibus dictis, post paulo discessimus.

### 3. Germany: The First Entries of Rhetorical Terms in German Lexica of the Renaissance

#### Dasypodius. Dictionarium

Voces Propemodum Universas

in autoribus latinę linguę probatis, ac  
uulgò receptis occurrentes Germanicè  
explicans, pro iuuentute Germanica  
primum in literis Tyrocinium  
faciente, fideliter & magno  
labore iam recens  
concinnatum.[1]

Aa Pubem Germanicam Petrus  
Dasypodius

*Acumen*, Subteylheytt / spitzigkeytt. Et de īgenio dicitur, scharpfsinnigkeytt.

*Acumnio*, Jch mach spitzig, oder spitze

*ingeniū* Scharpfer verstand. *acuta uox*, Kleyne, hohe stim.

*Aenigma*, Ein verdunckelte frag / oder red / ein rātersche. Vnde *aenigmatistes*, Der rāterschen fürhaltet.

*Allegoria*, So man ein anders meynet dann die wort an inen selb lauten.

*Analogia*, proportio lati. Anlicheytt gleichförmigkeytt.

*Analytica*, orum, Auflösungen der argumenten.

*Anastrophe*, pe. cor. inuersiola. Verkerung der ordnūg in zweien wortē. ut *Italiam contra*, pro cōtra Italiā.

*Antiphrasis*, Ein lātzuertendig red / do man das widerspyl versthon soll.

*Antistoechon*, Da ein bűchstab für den andern gesetzt wirt. *Sella pro sedda*.

*Antithesis*, pe. cor. Ein gegensatz.

*Aphaeresis*, penul. cor. Ein abschneidung eins bűchstabens / oder sylben vom anfang des worts.

*Arguo*, Jch straffe oder schilt, *Proprie* Jch zeyg an. Vnde *argumentum*, Ein anzeygung / bewårung / vnd befestigung.

*Etiā*, Ein kurtzer begriff / oder jnhalt eins dings. Et *uerbū argumentor*, Jch brauch bewårungen. *Inde argumentatio*,

Ein beschliessende red oder bewårung. *Argumentosus*, a, um, Das vil bewerbung hat oder kunstreich ist.

*Argutus*, a, um, Listig / renckig / klűg. Item, *Wollautend* / hell. *Arguta uox*, Helle stim. *Klein* / spitzig. *Argutum*

*caput*, Spitzig klein haupt. *Argutulus*, dimi. et *argutia*. Klűgheytt / spitzfindigkeytt / renck. Item, *argutor uerbum*, Jch

brauch spitzfindigkeytt oder renck in der red. Vnde *argutatio*.

*Ars*, Kunst / listigkeytt. *Artifex*, Ein künstler oder handwercks manhandwercksman. *Artificium*, Kunst /

handthierung. *Artificiosus*, a, um, Kunstreich. *composita*, Iners, Vnwűssend aller kunst. Item, *Faul* / tragsam /

műssig. *Inertia*, Vnwűssenheytt / faulheytt. *Solers*, Klűg / geschwind / sinreich. *Solertia* / klűgheytt / synreiche.

*Breuis*, e. Kurtz. Vnde *Breuitas*, kurtze. itē *Breuilouquium*, & *Breuilouquētia*, Kurtze der rede. & *Breuiarium*, grecē

*Epitome* Ein kurtze begreiffung eins handels. *Breue* significat etiā quod uulgo *bullā*, Ein Brieff oder register. Item

*aduerb*. *Breuitas*, kurtzlich / oder zűm kurtzesten / auffkurtze weiß. Et *breui*, in kurtzer zeit / Et *Breuius*, as, Jch

kurtzere, mach lurtzer. *Hinc* *Abbreuiator*, Ein kurtzerer / der ein ding kurtzeret. Et *Abbreuiatio*, Ein kurtzerung.

*Catechesis*. pe. pro. Ein mundtlich vnderrichtung.

*Catachresis*, pen. pro. Ein mißbruchung.

*Catastrophe*, Ein vmwendung, metaph, Ein außgang oder end eins ietlichen dings. *Postrema pars Comœdiarum*.

*Chria*, Ein gemeyner spruch / der etwas anzeygt.

*Clarus*, a, um, Heyter / scheinbarlich / hell & *Metaph*. Edel / furtreffenlich. Et comp. *Pręclarus*, Vast furtreffenlich,

*Claritas* & *Claritudo*, Helle. *Claritas solis*, Helle der sonnen. Item, Edelkeytt. *Claritas generis*, Edelkeytt des

geschlechts. *Clareo*, Jch binn heyter. Item. Jch binn bekant oder verrűmpt, unde *Inclareo* & *Inclaresco*. Jch binn vast

bekannt / rüchtig. Item Claro, as, & declaro. Jch mach hell / ich erklǟr, unde Declaratio, Ein erlütierung vnd erklǟrung. Clarifico etiam significat Jch mach scheinbar. Clarigare autem est clare repetere res ablatas. Offenlich oder lut erfordern das entfür̄t oder genommen güt / oder zūgefūgt̄n schaden begeren zū widerlegen. Ita solebant Romani facere, hasta in hostium agrum missa, bellum indicturi, So pflagendpflāgtē die Rōmer mit etlichen besunderen worten den feinden abzesagen / sy schicktē ein Legaten der ein spieß auff der feind boden warffe. *Clarigatio*, Ein solliche offenliche erforderung.

*Conuitium*, Ein scheltwort / oder schmachredschmach red. *Conuitior*, aris, Jch lestere / ich schilte.

*Delecto*, as / Vide LACIO.

*Delibero*, as, Jch radtschlage / erwige. Item, Jch zweyfle. *Deliberatum est*, Es ist entschlossen / es muß also sein.

*Deliberatio*, Ein erwegen / radtschlagung. *Deliberatiuus*, a, um, Radtschlāgig.

*Dialectica*, ae, Vel dialectica, orum, Die kunst zūredenzū reden von eim ietlichen ding / oder ein ding ordenlich zū erklǟren. *Dialecticus*, Einer der die kunst lert oder verstat. *Dialectos*, Ein eygenschafft der sprach / oder eygene weyß zeredenzū reden.

*Doxa*, latinē gloria & opinio, Ein herligkeyt / ehr / oder ein meynung / won. Vnde *Paradoxon*, Das wider den gemeynen won ist / vnmeynig / seltzam / vngehört.

*Ecologa*, penul. corre. Ein erkiesung / außlesung / erwelung. *Aegloga* alius est. De qua uide supra.

*Econ*, uel *Eicon*, *ἑκών* latine imago, Ein bildtnuß / gleychnuß. *Econcula*, uel *Iconcula* diminuti.

Ein kleins bildlein.

*Ecphrasis*, Ein außtrückelich erklǟrūg

*Elenchus*, latinē argumentū, index, Ein begreyffung / inhalt / anzeyg / oder register. Item, Ein scheltūg. Vnde *Elenchicus*, Scheltechtig. Sunt etiam *Elenchi* proceriores maragritae, Langlechtig / gerade bārlen die man an die oren henckt.

*Elogium*, Ein herlich zeūgnūß / oder herlicher spruch. oder sunst ein gezeūgnūß zū loben / oder schmach.

*Eloquentia* &c. Vide LOQVOR.

*Emblemata*, Verschroten werck oder die gewürfleten esterich vnd wend. Item quicquid ornatus gratia inseritur, Was von zierd wegen hinein gesetzt wirt. *Emblema* dicitur, id est, insitum uel insertum.

*Emphasis*, latinē expressio, Ein außtruckung / da man etwas verborgens auß eim wort harauß truckt.

*Enthymema*, pen. pro. Ein erdichtung oder betrachtung. Item, Ein vnuolkemelich bewārung / oder *Syllogismus* der nūr auß eim schleūßt.

*Epilogus*, penul. correp. latinē cōclusio uel cumulus, & peroratio, Die abred / oder der beschluß der rede.

*Epistola*, Ein sendbrieffsend brieff. *Epistolium*, Ein kleyner brieff. *Epistolaris*, e, Das zū eim brieff gehört.

*Epitheton*, penul. cor. latinē adpositum, uel adiectiuum, Ein zūsetziger nam.

*Epitome*, pen. cor. Ein kürtzerung einer langen red. Vide BREVIARIVM. *Epitoma*, atis, perperam dicitur.

*Etymon*, latinē uerum, certū, War / gewiß. Vnde *Etymologia* ueriloquiū, War redung / anblegung / anzeigūg der vrsprügs eins wörtlins

*Eulogium*, latinē benedictum, Ein lobung / gūte red.

*Exordium*. Vide Ordior.

*Hyperbaton*, penultima cor. latinē *Transgressio*, Ein übertrettūg / da die ordnung der worten verwirt ist / vnnd das verbum lang hernach volget.

*Hyperbole*, latinē superlatio, uel superiectio, Ein überhebung mitt worten / mer dann glaublich ist / so man ein ding groß machet / oder zū vil vernichtet.

*Icon*, latinē imago, Ein bildtnuß. *Iconcula* diminutiuum. Item *Icon*, *ἑκών*, Ein vergleychnuß nach eines anderen gestalt oder bildtnuß. *Iconicus*, a, um, Außtruckelich gebildet. *Iconium*, Ein statt Capadocie / oder Lycaoniae potius, In welcher Paulus vnd Barnabas geprediget haben.

*Idolum*, pen. pro. latinē simulachrū, Ein bild oder gōtz. *Idolatra*, Ein gōtzen ehrer / gōtzen diener. *Idolatria*, GōtzendienstGōtzen dienst. *Idolothyum*, GōtzenopfferGōtzē opffer.

*Imago*, inis, Ein bildtnuß. Et *Imagines*, Für adelkeyt des geschlechts. *Fumosae imagines*, Ein alter adel. *Subitae imagines* Ein neüwer adel. Nam *Cerea simulachra maiorum suorum in armarijs olim per atria disponebant Romani, ad generis nobilitatem ostendendam, quae & Stemmata dicuntur.* Item, Ein gleychnuß. Vide *Icon*. *Imaguncula*

diminu. Ein kleins bildle. Imaginosus, a, um, Voll bildtnuß. Imaginor, aris, Jch bild ein / begreyff im gemüt. Imagino, as, ich gib oder mach bildnuß. ut speculum imaginat. Imaginatio, EinbildungEin bildung. Imaginarius, a, um, EingebildetEin gebildet / gewānet / gemeint. Et Imaginarij, Die fendrych / panertragerpaner trager &c.

*Liberalis*, e, Redlich / freyhe / das eim freyhen zūstehet. *Liberalis causa*, Ein handlung d· freyheit. Terent. Ego hanc liberali causa assero manu, Jch greyff die zū recht an / das sie frey sey / oder ich erredte die zū freyheit mit recht. *Illiberalis*, Vnredlich / vnfreyhe. *Liberales artes*, Die freyhen künsten / so freyhen menschen zūgehōrenzū gehōren / vnd allein von freyhen gelernet würden. *Illiberales artes*, Die vnfreyhen / knechtischen künst / als die handtwerck. *Liberè*, pen. cor. aduerb. Auffrecht / freyhe / on falsch. Dic liberè, Sags freyhe / warlich. *Liberalis etiam significat*, Gütig / freygābig. Vnde *Liberalitas*, GütikeitGütigkeit / freygābigkeit / reylichkeit / reychlikeitreychlichkeit. *Liberaliter*, aduerb. Reylich / vollkommenlich. *Illiberaliter*, Vngütigklich / vnmiltigklich / karig. *Liberalis forma*, Ein hüpsche / freyhe gestalt. *Illiberalis forma*, Ein heßlich / vnfreyhe / knechtische gestalt. Et *libero*, as, Jch freyhe / ledige. *Liberasti me magno metu*, Du hast mich von grosser forcht erlediget. *Delibero*, as, ich radtschlage / zweyfle / betrachte. *Quidam uolunt à libra deductum esse*. Vnde *Deliberatio*, Ein Radtschlahung / betrachtung. Et *Deliberatorium*, Ein ort da man Radtschlaget. *Deliberatiuus*, a, um, Radtschlägig.

*Locus*, in singulari masculi. in plura. mascu. & neut., Ein ort / platz. *Loco mouere*, Verstossen von seim stand vnd wirdigkeit. In *locum substituere*, An das ort des abgestorbnē oder abgesetzten verordnen. *Loco filij habere*, Wie ein kind haben. *Loco solarij*, Für ein trost / ergetzlichkeit *Loci plura. tantum*, Die bārmüter in den weyberen. aliàs *uterus & uulua*. *Vulgo matrix*, Item *Loci plural. apud Dialecticos & Rhetores*, Bestimpte vñ gemeyne ding daruondauon man bewārungen nimpt. *Topica Graecè*. Item *Locus*, Ein gelegenheit. *Nunc non est narrandi Locus*, Es ist ietzund nit gelegēheit dz ichs sage. *Pecuniam in loco negligere maximum interdum lucrum est*, Es ist zū zeyten ein grosser gewiñ / so es gelegēheit hat / dz gelt nicht achten. *Summo loco natus*, Von hohem stamē / oder geschlecht geboren. *Humili loco natus*, Von vnedlem / oder schlechtem stamme geboren. *Locum dare precibus*, Die bitte erhōren. Et *Loculus* diminu. Vnde *Locellus*, Ein kleins örtlin. Item, Ein seckel / oder dāsche. *marsupium*. Et *Feretrum*, Ein dotten bare. *Locuples, etis*, Reych an gelegnen gūtern. *Metaph. Ansichtig / glaubwirdig*. *Locuples testis*, Ein glaubwürdiger zeūge. *Hinc Locupleto, as, pen. pro.* Jch mach reych. Itē Jch mach grösser / oder ich mehre. *Hinc Locupletatio*, Ein reichmachung / ein mehrūg. *Augmentatio. Collocupleto*, ich mach zūmal / oder vast reich *Loculamentum*, Ein gehaltnuß / binkorb oder dergleichen. *Loco, as, Jch setze / ordne / stelle / ich gehalt hindersich*. Item, Jch leyhe auß / verleyhe vmb zinß. *Locare domum*, Das hauß verleyhen. Jch verdinge. *Locaui huic agrum fodiēdum*, Jch hab dem den acker verdingt zūgrabenzū graben. *Locare suam operam*, Beholffen sein mit arbeit. *Locare filiam*, Die dochter verheüraten. *quod Elocare potius dicitur*. *Hinc Illocabilis*, Die nit verheüratet mag werdē. *Locatarius*, Ein bedinger eins houses / oder ackers. Der es besteet vmb zinß. *Locariū*, Hauß zinßHaußzinß. *Locito, as, frequenta*. Jch leyhe emsig auß. *Cōposi. Abloco, as, pen. cor.* Jch leyhe hinweg vmb zinße. *Colloco*, Jch gib oder stelle auß. *Colloco in te beneficiū*, Jch beweyse dir ein gūthtat. *Eloco*, Jch verheurate / oder leyhe auß vmb zinß. *Elocare equum, bouem &c.*

*Logice*, uel *Logica*, Die kunst recht zū reden / vnd vrteylen von allen dingē. aliàs *Dialectica*.

*Logos*, latinè *sermo*, uel *ratio*, Ein rede / oder rechnung. *Hinc Logista, ae*, Ein rechenmeister / der rechnen leret. *Vulgò Algorista dicitur*. Vnde *Composi. Catalogus, Epilogus, Dialogus &c.* De quibus supra. *Logodaedalus*, Ein klūgreder / wortzierer.

*Loquor*, eris, Jch rede. *Locutor*, Ein vilreder / laferer. *Locutuleius, idē*, Ein laferman / klapperer. *Loquax*, Schwetzig / redreych. *Loquacitas*, Schwetzigkeit / klapperheit. *Loquela*, Die red / oder außsprechung der wort. *Loquentia*, Redung. *Quamuis in cōpositione magis utamur, Breuiloquentia, & breuiloquiū*, Kurtze redung. *Grandiloquentia*, Brachtige redung. *Grandiloquus, a, ū, pe. cor.* Brachtredig. *Magniloquus, idē*. *Blandiloquētia*, SchmeichelredūgSchmeychel redūg. *Blandiloquus*, Ein lieb koserliebkozer. *Multiloquiū*, Schwetzigkeit / vil redungvilredung. Et *huiusmodi alia. Cōposi. à Loquor, Alloquor, pen. cor.* Jch sprich an. *Allocutio, & Alloquiū*, Ein ansprechung. *Colloquor*, Jch rede zūmalzū mal / halt gesprech. Vnde *colloquiū*, Ein mitgesprech / zūsamē redung. *Ad colloquiū admittere*, Mit jhm reden lassen. In *colloquiū uenerūt amborū exercituū duces*, Beyder herzeūgen hauptleūthaupt leūt haben ein gesprech gehalten miteinandermit einander. *Circuloquor*, Jch vmbrede / bedeüte mit vnständ / oder vil worten. Vnde *Circulocutio Graecè periphrasis*, Ein vmbredung / erklärūg mit mervil worten. *Eloquor*, Jch red auß. *Hinc Eloquens nomē, Wolberet. Eloquentia*, Wolredung / zierde der rede. *Eloquiū*, Ein wort

oder außsprechung. Elocutio, Die wolsetzūg oder zierung mit worten des dz man erfunden / oder zū reden fürgenommē hat. Pertinet ad Oratorem. Interloquor, Jch rede darzwüschendar zwüschē / vnderspriche / verhindere. Obloquor, Jch widerspreche / widerrede / ich lestere / nachrede / schelte. Proloquor, Jch thūn ein vorred / oder ich sprich auß. Vnde Proloquiū, Ein volkomner spruch.

Lora, ε, fœmi. gen. siue Lorea, Leürē tranckLeürentranck. Vinū secundariū, So man wasser an die außgetruckten trester

|| [106r1]

*Meta*, Ein ietlich auffgespitzt ding. Ein steyn oder holtz das vnden breyt / vnd oben gespitzt ist. wie ein kegel. *Meta fœni*, Ein hewschohhewstock / ein auffgespitzter hauffen hewß. Item, Ein ziel / oder ende. / ein marckstein. Nam termini agrorum pyramidalis forma effigiari etiam nunc moris est. *Meta lactis*, Ein gespitzter kâß. *Ad metam peruenire*, Das ziel erlangen / zūm end kommen. Et à carceribus usque ad metam, Von anfang biß zūzum ende.

*Meta*, μετὰ praepositio graeca, latinè cum, uel trans, & post. Vnde Composi. *Metabasis trāsitio*, Ein überschreitung / da man in der rede an zeygetanzeigen was gesagt sey / vnd fürhaltet was man weyter sagen wolle. *Metabole*, μεταβολή, mutatio, Ein verenderung. *Metaphora*, μεταφορά, latinè translatio. Vide supra. *Metathesis*, μετάθεσις, pen. cor. latinè transpositio, Ein versetzung der büchstaben. ut Tymbre pro Tymber. *Metamorphosis*, pen. pro. μεταμόρφωσις, Transfiguratio, Ein verenderung der gestalt. *Metaplasma*, μεταπλασμός, Transformatio, Ein anderst gestaltung der rede. Cuius multae sunt species, ut Aphaeresis, Prothesis, Paragoge, Epenthesis, &c. Quibus poetę in carmine licenter utuntur, alioquin in oratiōe soluta pro uitijis putandae. *Metapontū*, Ein stat in Italien. In sinu Tarentino. Vnde *Metapontinus*, a, um, Dz darauß ist.

*Metonymia*, latinè trāsnominiatio, Ein verwächßlung der namen / so man dz geschirr nimpt für dz tranck / das drinnen ist / oder dergleychender gleychen.

*Narro*, as, Jch sag / erzele. *Narratio*, Ein erzehlung. *Rerum gestarū expositio*. Quid noui narras? Was sagstu neüws? *Male narras*, Du bringst böse botschafft. *Narratiūcula*, dimi. Cōpo. *Enarro*, Jch erkläre / leg auß. *Enarrator*, Ein außleger / erklärer. & *Enarratio*, Ein erkläring vnbekanter dinge. *Denarro ferē idē quod*

|| [130r1]

*Oraculum*, Ein weissagung / oder antwort der Götter / die ein mensch auß spricht / ein angezeygter wil Gottes / Gots spruch durch ein menschen. *Prophetarum libri mera cōtinent oracula*, Der Propheten böcher sein lauter Gottes spruch oder rede. *Oraculum esse puta*, Laß dir sein als obs Gott selbs het geredet. *Aliquando accipitur pro templo*, Für ein tempel. Item, Für ein spruch eins glaub würdigenglaubwürdigē, oder ansichtigen menschen. *Oracula Catonis*, Die spruch Catonis.

*Orator*, & *Oratio*. Vide oro.

*Oro*, as, Jch bitte / ich begäre. Item, *orare causam*, Ein rede vor gericht thūn / ein fürsprech oder redner sein.

*Hinc Orator*, Ein wolreder / ein gesandter fürsprech etwas zū bittē / oder versprechen / ein fürsprech. Et *oratoria substanti*. Die kunst wol zū reden. *Oratorius*, a, um, Das zū wolreden gehöret. *Ars Oratoria*. *Rhetorica*. *Oratoriē aduer*. Nach der wolrederwolredner wise. *Oratio*, Ein volkomne rede. *Propriē* Ein lange rede / welche mit fleiß gestellet ist. *Aliquando significat*, Ein gebätt. *Oratiūcula*, diminuti. Ein kurtze red / oder gebätlin. *Cōpos*. *Adoro*, as, Jch bätte an / verehere / beweiß göttliche ehr. *Adoratio*, Ein anbättung / vereherung mit gebärden. *Exoro*, Jch erbitte / erwerbe mit gebätt. *Exorabilis*, e, Erbittig / milt. *Inexorabilis*, Vnerbittig / vnmilt. *Peroro*, Jch rede gar außherauß / beschließ die rede / ich bewege mit redē. Vnde *Peroratio*, Der beschluß in der rede / die abrede / darin man alle erzelte ding kürztlich āferet / vnnnd an mütungen bewaget. aliās *Conclusio*.

*Puto*, as, Jch seubere / reynige / hauwe / oder schneyd das vnnütz hinweg. *Putare arbores*, Die bäum erhauwen / reynigen. *Putare uites*, Die räben schneidē. *Hinc Putatio*, Seuberūg. *Putatorius*, a, um, Das zū seuberung / reynigung gehört. *Falx putatoria*, Ein räbmesser / schneidmesser. / ein hâb. *Putamen*, Ein abschelffe / abseuberung / schelffe. *Putamen nucis*, Ein nußschelffe. *Putamen oui*, Ein eyer schaleeyerschale. *Puto etiam significat*, Jch betrachte / schetze. *Putare rationem*, rechnen / die rechnung machē. *Putare rem*, Die sach erwâgen. *Compos*. *Amputo*, penul. cor. Jch hawe ab / oder vmbschneidevmb schneide. *Computo*, Jch rechne. *Computatio*, Ein rechnūg. *Deputo*, Jch achte / schätze. *Deputare rationem*, Die rechnung machen. *Frustra egomet mecum has rationes deputo*. *Terentius*,

Jch mach die rechnunge vergäbens mit mir. Disputo, Jch erwige gegen einander / ich erleutere. Disputatio, Ein erleuterung mit wortē / erklärang. Imputo, Jch leg zū / ich gib die schuld. Postputo, Jch rechne gering / setz hindan. Reputo, idem quod Deputo, Jch achte / ermesse. Supputo, Jch rechne. Putor, oris, Gestanck / böser geschmack. Putidus, a, um, Stinckig / übelriechig. Putidiusculus, a, um, diminuti. Putida oratio, Ein vnzierliche red.

*Rhetor*, Ein lerer der wolredenhey / oder ein wolrederwol reder. Orator. Rhetorica, Die kunst wol zū reden. Rhetoricus, a, um, Das zū sōllichē gehōrt. Rhetoricor, aris, Jch rede nach der weiß der wolrederwol reder / oder ich befließ mich in der kunst Rhetorica.

*Sophia*, latinè Sapientia, Weishey. Sophos spaiens, Weiß.

*Sophisma*, latinè commentum, Ein geschwind / klüg / erdichtet rede / ein betrug. Sophista, Ein klüg / oder spitz reder / betrieger mit worten. Olim idem quod Rhetor. Sophisticæ, Die kunst mit geschwindigkeit vnd spitzfündigkeyts spitzfündigkeyt zū reden.

*Syllepsis*, latinè Conceptio, uel cōprehensio, Ein zamenbegreyffungzūsamē begreyffung / so das fūrtrefflicher / das minder fūrtrefflich mit begreyffetmitbegreyffet. Figura apud Grammaticos.

Syllogismus, latinè Ratiocinatio, Ein ordenliche rechnung / da etwas volgen muß.

Synechdocha, latinè Comprehensio, uel ut Cicero uertit, Intellectio, Eyn begreyffung oder verstehung. Figura Grammatica, So man auß eym teyl das gantze begreyffet / oder durch einen vil verstehet / oder je auß eym das ander verstandē wil habē. Vnde Synechdochicos, latinè Comprehensiuè, Begreyffenlich. Aduerbiū.

*Tropus*, latinè motus, uel mutatio, Ein verwendung / so man etwas auß seiner eygen bedēntnuß in ein andere verwendet. Huius species sunt, Metaphora, Allegoria, Catachresis, Metalepsis, &c. de quibus suis locis dictum. Tropicus, a, um, Wendig. Et duo circuli dicuntur Tropici, Die zwen cirkel / in welchen die Son sich wendet. Cancri, & Capricorni.

*Zeugma*, latinè adiunctio, Ein zūfügung. So vil sprūch / oder wort / mit eim uerbo vereinbaret werden.

PETRVS DASYPODIVS

Lectori

IAM ANTEA TESTATVS SVM TIBI

lector hunc laborem nō ex destinato mihi  
susceptum fuisse, nec iustum satis ad scribendum  
habuisse tempus, tantum abfuit, ut in castigando  
censura seuerior adhiberi potuerit. Nam eodem  
ferè momento tantum scribebatur, quantum operis ad  
praelum laborantibus sufficerit, ac simul quicquid excusum  
fuerat, mox à follibus, ut dici solet, festinanter nimis  
relegebatur. Est autem oculis usque adeo nemo perspicacibus, ac  
lynceis, ut omnia peruideat, nusquàm caecutiat. Proinde si  
mendas aliquot, uel erratula (quae non uisi leuicula putamus esse  
literis alicubi transpositis, aut inuersis, nonnunquàm  
redundantibus, uel contrà, quemadmodum, ut exemplum  
adducamus, in Compositis ab Asse, Thesis pro Tressis, Cetussis pro  
Centussis. Item Textans pro Dextans, &  
huiusmodi perpaucis accidit) reperies, qui tuus est  
candor benignè corrigito, nobisque, quibus  
istud haud incuria, sed otij  
penuria neglectum est, gratiam facito.  
Vale.





#### 4. England: Henry Peachum. The Garden of Eloquence

##### SCHEMATES RHETORICAL

Schemates Rhetorical be those figures or forms of speaking, which do take away the wearisomnesse of our common speech, and do fashion a pleasant, sharpe, and evident kind of expressing our meaning: which by the artificiall forme doth give unto matters great strength, perspicuitie and grace, which figures be devided into three orders.

##### The first order

The first order containeth those figures which do make the oration plaine, pleasant, and beautifull, pertaining rather to words then to sentences, and rather to harmonie and plesant proportion, then to gravitie and dignitie, and the figures of this first order I devide into fower kinds, according to their sundrie formes, of which the first are of Repetition, the second of Omission, the third of conjunction, the fourth of separation.

##### Figures of Repetition.

Epanaphora

Epiphora

Symploce

Ploce

Diaphora

Epanalepsis

Anadiplosis

Epizeuxis

Diacope

Traductio

Paroemion

These are called the figures or repetition, by which one word may with much comelinesse be rehearsed in diverse clauses, and may ten maner of wayes be pleasantly repeated: and likewise one and the same letter by Paroemion may be repeated in the beginning of diverse words.

##### Epanaphora.

Epanaphora, or Anaphora, is a forme of speech which beginneth diverse members, still with one and the same word.

First in long periods. An example of Cicero in the praises of Pompey: A witnesse is Italie, which Lucius Cilla being victor confessed, was by the vertue and counsell of this man delivered: A witnesse is Celicia, which being environed on every side with many and great dangers, he set at libertie, not with terror of warre, but quicknesse of counsel: A witnesse is Africa, which being opprest with great armies of enemies, flowed with the blood of slaine men: A witnesse is France, through which a way was made with great slaughter of Frenchmen for our armies into Spaine: A witnesse is Spaine, which hath very often seene, that by this man many enemies have ben overcome and vanquished.

By short periods, Examples of holy Scriptures: “The Lord sitteth above the water floods. The Lord remaineth a king for ever. The Lord shall give strength unto his people. The Lord shall give his people the blessing of peace.” Psal.29.

By Comaes. An example of Scripture: “Whom they loved, whom they served, whom they ran after, whom they sought and worshipped.” Jerem.8.

By Interrogation: “Where is the wise? Where is ye Scribe? Where is the disputer of this world?” 1.Cor.1.

By a double Epanaphora in an Antithesis, thus, The covetous man is ever poore. The contented man is alwayes rich. The covetous man is an enemy to him selfe. The contented man is a friend to others. The covetous man is full of care. The contented man is full of comfort.

By a certaine increase in the clauses following, thus, I desire you for the love I have borne to you, for the love you have borne to me, and for the love which our good God doth beare to us all, that you will remember these my last words, uttered with my last breath.

The use of this figure.

1.To repate a word of importance.

The use hereof is chiefly to repate a word of importance, and effectuall signification, as to repate the cause before his singular effects, or contrariwise the effect before his severall causes, 2.To delight the eare.

or any other word of principall accompt. It serveth also pleasantly to the eare, both in the respects of the repetition, and also of the varietie of the new clause.

The Caution.

Although this figure be an exornation of great use, yet it may be too often used in an oration. Secondly ye repetitions ought not to be many, I meane the word ought not to be repeated too oft, as some do use it, in a most wearisome Tautalogie. Thirdly heede ought to be taken, that the word which is least worthie or most weake, be not taken to make the repetition, for that were very absurd.

Epiphora.

Epiphora is a figure which endeth diverse members or clauses still with one and the same word.

An example: Since the tiem that concord was taken from the citie, libertie was taken away, fidelitie was taken away, friendship was taken away.

Examples of the holy Scripture: “When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I imagined as a child.” 1.Cor.13.

Another: “Have we not prophecied in thy name? have we not cast out devils in they name? and done miracles in thy name?” Mat.

Ambition seeketh to be next to the best, after that, to be equall with the best: last, to be chiefe and above the best.

The use of this figure.

This figure is esteemed of many to be an ornament of great1.The praise of this figure.

eloquence, yet it is very sparingly used in grave and severe2.To leave the repeated word sounding.

causes, it serveth to leave a word of importance in the ende of a sentence, that it may the longer hold the sound in the mind of the hearer.

The Caution.

It appeareth by experience that this figure is not commonly used by eloquent authors, but sparingly, and as it were thinly. Not to be often used.

sprinkled, as all exornations are, and therefore it ought not to be too much in use, if we desire to follow the examples of the most eloquent authors.

Symploce.

Symploce is a forme of speech which maketh many members or clauses following to have the same beginning & the same ending which the first had going before, comprising both the last ornaments in one.

An example of Cicero: who were they that often brake their leagues? the Carthaginians? Who were they that made cruell warre in Italie? the Carthaginians, Who defaced all Italie? the Carthaginians. Who crave pardon now? the Carthaginians.

Another: Him would you pardon and acquite by your sentence, whom the Senate hath condemned, whom the people of Rome have condemned, whom all men have condemned.

By the increase of a word in the clause following, thus, Dido builded Carthage. Dido builded renowned Carthage.

By the increase of a word in diverse clauses: O cruell death, why hast thou taken away my father, my deare father, my deare and most loving father, and hid him in the darke, where I cannot find him?

The use of this figure.

1. Meete for any affection.

This figure may serve to any affection, and is a singular ornament, pleasant to the eare, which of some is called the Rhetoricall circle, 2. Pleasant to the eare.

and of others the Muscicall repetition. The use of 3. Called the Rhetoricall circle.

it is so much more pleasant as it is used more sparingly.

The Caution.

1. Too many members do not well.

Too many members of this figure do much blemish the beautie of it, and bewrayeth the affectation, for this ornament is much deformed if it be stretched with the tenters of foolish fancie, as oft it is, and likewise many others.

Ploce.

Ploce is a forme of speech by which a proper name being repeated, signifieth another thing.

An example: Yet at that day Memmius was Memmius, in the first place Memmius is the proper name of a man, but in the second, it signifieth his manners, which were well knowne.

Another: In that great victorie Caesar was Caesar, that is, a mercifull conquerer.

Another: Cicero continued Cicero unto the day of his death, meaning, a lover of his countrey, and a most faithfull patrone of the common wealth.

The use of this figure.

This exornation serveth aptly to signifie the constant nature or permanent qualitie of a man well knowne, by the repetition of his name: it containeth in it also a repetition pleasant for the brevitie, as when we say Memmius was Memmius, Casar 1. Brevitie.

was Caesar, and likewise for the Emphaticall signification in the repeated name. 2. Emphaticall signification.

The Caution.

It is good to foresee that the proper name which we purpose to repeate be ye name of such a one, as is or hath bene wel known, 1. The man ought to be well knowne whose name is repeated.

and likewise his maners and naturall inclination: otherwise it must needs be a sounding repetition without sense.

Diaphora.

Diaphora is much like to Ploce, but yet they differ, onely in this, that Ploce repeateth a proper name, and this a common word. An example: What man is there living but will pitie such a case: if he be a man, in the repetition man signifieth humanity, or compassion proper to mans nature.

Another: If your cause be just, feare not the Judge, for he wil do right because he is a Judge. In the former place Judge signifieth his person and authoritie, in the later, the consideration and speciall end of possessing that authoritie.

Another: Phisition heale thy selfe if thoug beest a Phisition, that is, if thou hast the skill and science of Phisicke.

The use of this figure.

This figure like as Ploce, serveth both to the pleasure of the 1. Pleasant to the eare.

and sense of the mind. 2. Emphaticall.

The Caution.

Wisdome would, that the word which is to be repeated, 1. A chosen word.

be a word of importance, that may containe in it an effectuall signification, and not every common word, for that were absurd: considering that many words may be repeated without change of signification.

Epanalepsis.

Epanalepsis is a forme of speech which doth both begin and also ende a sentence with one and the same word.

An example of Virgill: Many things of Priam she did demand, and of Hector manie things.

Another: Full oft she spake of Italie, of Hesperia shore full oft.

An example of Cicero: At midnight thou wwentest out of thy house, and returnedst againe at midnight.

An example of Esay: "O ye carelesse cities, after yeares, and dayes shall ye be brought in feare, O ye carelesse cities." Esa. 34.

Another of Paule: "Rejoyce in the Lord & againe I say rejoyce." JPhilip. 4.4.

The use of this figure.

1. To be considered.

The chiefe use of this exornation is to place a word of importance 2.To be remembered.

in the beginning of a sentence to be considered, and in the end to be remembered, and also it hath a sweetnesse in the sound<sup>3</sup>.Sweetnesse of sound.

of the repetition.

The Caution.

1. Too many wordes betweene the repetition drowneth the first word.

Too many members or words betweene the beginning and the end, do drowne the first word before the last be heard: whereby it looketh the grace and seetnesse of a repetition. ON the other side, it ought not to be repeated too soone, lest it returne barraine<sup>2</sup>. Too fewe have no grace.

and emptie.

Anadiplosis.

Anadiplosis is a figure by which the last word of the first clause is the beginning of the second.

An example of Virgill: Now followeth faire Assur, Assur trusting to his steede. Another: With death, death must be recompenced. On mischief, mischief must be heapt.

An example of Moses: "For the Lord thy God bringeth thee into a good land, a land that floweth with milke and honie." Deut.8

Another of Esay: "This is an obstinate people, and dissembling children, children that refuse to heare the voyce of the Lord." Esa.30.

Another of Paule: If we live, we live unto the Lord, if we die, we die unto the Lord.

The use of this figure.

This exornation doth not onely serve to the pleasantnesse of 1.Pleasantnesse of sound.

sound, but also to adde a certaine increase in the second member. Of some this figure is called the Rhetoricall Eccho, for that it<sup>2</sup>. Compared to an Eccho.

carrieth the resemblance of a rebounded voyce, or iterated sound.

The Caution.

In this figure we ought to take heede, that the word repeated be<sup>1</sup>. Not in the weaker cause.

not put in the weaker clause, or without new matter, or vainly<sup>2</sup>. Not without new matter.

as in wanton songs.<sup>3</sup>. Wanton songs.

Epizeuxis.

Epizeuxis is a figure whereby a word is repeated, for the greater vehemencie, and nothing put betweene: and it is used commonly with a swift pronounciation.

An example of Virgil: A Coridon, Coridon, what madnesse hath thee moved?

An example of Cicero: Thou, thou, Anthonie gavest cause of civill warre to Caesar, willing to turne all upside downe.

An example of Esay: "I, I, which shal beare you to your last age." Esa.46. Another: Awake, awake and stand up O Jerusalem.

This figure may also be joynd with other repetitions, as in this example of king David bewailing the death of his sonne Absalom, O my sonne Absalom, my sonne, my sonne Absalom, would God I had died for thee, O Absalom my sonne my sonne.

The use of this figure.

This figure may serve aptly to expresse the vehemencie of any<sup>1</sup>. Apt for any affection.

affection, wheter it be of joy, sorrow, hatred, admiration<sup>2</sup>. Compared to a quaver in Musicke.

or any such like, in respect of pleasant affections it may be compared to the quaver in Musicke, in respect of sorrow, to a double<sup>3</sup>. To a double sigh.

sigh of the heart, & in respect of anger, to a double stabbe with<sup>4</sup>. To a double stab.

a weapons point.

The Caution.

Words of many syllables are unfit for this repetition, for if one should repeate abomination, it would both sound<sup>1</sup>. Words of many syllables unfit.

ilfavouredly, and also be long a doing: for the difference is great<sup>2</sup>. Brevitie & beautie.

betweene saying O my sonne, my sonne, and O abomination, abomination, the one hath brevitie and beautie, the other prolixitie<sup>3</sup>. Prolixitie & deformity.

and deformitie.

Diacope.

Diacope is a figure which repeateth a word putting but one word betweene, or at least verie few.

An example: I will now frame my song of Jove, how Jove hath dealt with me.

An example of king David, "My heart is fixed, O God, my heart is fixed." Psal.57.

The use of this figure.

This figure may be used to expresse any affection, but it is most<sup>1</sup>. Apt for any affection.

fit for a sharpe invective or exprobration, as, Thou knowest not foolish man, thou knowest not the price or value of vertue, and<sup>2</sup>. Used in meditation.

also an apt ornament for meditation: Thou art my portion O my God, thou art my portion. I have sinned, O thou maker of men, I have sinned, and what shall I do?

The Caution.

The repetition of a wanton or idle word is a vice to be shunned<sup>1</sup>. Wanton words shuned.

in this figure, which is a fault (I confesse) in the matter and not in the forme, but the faults in the forme are either in the word repeated or in the interposition: in the word repeated, when it is too short, as to say, O sicke and very sicke, O sicke and like to 2. Too short a word maketh an ill sound.

die. In the interposition, when likewise it consisteth of too fewe syllables, thus: Will, I say, will is the cause of my wo, which forme of speaking doth rather offend the eare then please it.

Traductio.

Traductio is a forme of speech which repeateth one word often times in one sentence, making the oration more pleasant to the eare.

An example out of Daniel: "O king thou art a king of kings." Dan.2.

Another: "In the beginning was the word, and word was with God, and God was the word." Joh.1.

Another: No man ascendeth up to heaven, but he that came downe from heaven, even the sonne of man which is in heaven.

Another: "To the weake I became as weake, to win the weake." 1.Cor 9.

The use of this figure.

This exornation is compared to pleasant repetitions and 1. Pleasant to the eare.

divisions in Musicke, the chiefe use whereof it, either to garnish<sup>2</sup>. It garnisheth the oration.

the sentence with oft repetition, or to note well the importance<sup>3</sup>. It noteth a word of importance.

of the word repeated.

The Caution.

The vice that may disgrace this figure is called Tautologia,<sup>1</sup>. Too manie repetitions do cause loathsomnesse.

which is a tedious and wearisome repetition of one word, either in an unorderedly fashion, or too often repetition, thus, If you have a friend, keepe your friend, for an old friend is to be preferred before a new friend, this I say to you as your friend.<sup>2</sup>. Odious to the eare.

Paroemion.

Paroemion is a figure of speech which beginneth diverse words with one and the same letter, making the sentence more readie for the tongue, and more pleasant to the eare.

An example: What can it prevaile you, to fit and weepe upon your wound, or what may it profit you to mourne upon your miserie? the one is no salve, hte other no succour.

Another: Let comfort banish care, and hope releeve heavinesse. Let wisdom keepe your thoughts from wanering.

This figure may proceed to moe repetitions in poetrie then in prose, for in poetrie there are found sometime fower or five words beginning with ye same letter, & lawful inough for light matters.

An example of Poetrie: When friendly favor flourished, I found felicitie but now no hope doth helpe my heart in heavinesse so hard.

Pleasant in proverbes.



This figure giveth a pleasant facilitie in a Proverbe or short sentence, as, to hold with the hare, and hunt with the hound: soone ripe, soone rotten: faire words make fooles faine, and many other such like: which facilitie and pleasantnesse of sound, do cause such proverbes and sentences to be the better esteemed, and the oftner used.

The use of this figure.

1. Facilitie to the tongue.

The use hereof pertaineth to the facilitie of the tongue, and delight of the eare, which taketh pleasure in repetition joyned 2. Pleasantnesse to the eare.

with varietie, as there is in this figure, where the same letter bringeth with it a new word.

The Caution.

The affectation of this figure is wont to fall into two faults, either into excesse of repetition, or into a jarring sound called 1. Excesse a signe of folly.

Casemphaton, into excesse, as thus, A planted place of pleasure plaine, where pleasure that me please, or thus, This mischievous money, maketh many men, marvellous mad. What folly there is in this forme of speach children may discern.

2. Jarring sound.

In a harsh and jarring sound, thus: Neither honor, nor nobilitie. Another: In my drowsie and dreadfull dreame, me thought I saw a Dragen drinking blood.

An example in Latine set down by Cornificius, O tite, tute Tate tibi tanta tyranne tulifti. These examples of the faults are sufficient to the wise to avoyd the vice of like excesse in this figure.

## FIGURES OF OMISSION

Zeugma threefold. 1. Prozeugma. 2. Mezozeugma, 3. Hypozeugma, Asyndeton. In these figures there is some word omitted, which a full construction doth require, which notwithstanding hath by the omission a pleasant grace of brevitie.

Zeugma.

1 Prozeugma the first kind, is a figure of speech which putteth some word in the first clause, and omitteth it in the other following. An example of Cicero: For neither art thou he Catiline, whom at any time shame could call back from dishonestie, either feare from perill, or reason from madnesse. Here the verbe could call backe is the common word which is exprest in the first clause, and understood in the rest following.

Another: The people of Rome destroyed Numance, wan Carthage, cast downe Corinth, overthrew Frigellas. In this example the people of Rome is the common word.

Another: Povertie hath gotten conquest of thy riches, shame of thy pride, danger of thy safetie, folly of thy wisdome, weakenesse of thy strength, and time of thy imagined immortalitie.

2 Mezozeugma the second kind, when the common word is put in the middle clause. An example: What a shame is this, that neither hope of reward, nor feare of reproch could any thing move him, neither the perswasion of his friends, nor the love of his country.

3 Hypozeugma the third kind, when the common word is put in the last clause. An example: The foundation of freedome, the fountaine of equitie, the safegard of wealth, and custodie of life, is preserved by lawes.

The use of this figure.

This is a very pleasant exorantion, serving as well to the delight1.Pleasant to the eare.

of the eare, as to a commendable kind of brevitie, whereby2.Commendable brevity.

the tedious repetition of a word is artificially avoyded.

The Caution.

There ought to be in this figure an observation of a meane, that there be not too many clauses, lest the common word be obscured 1.Not too many clauses folowing the common word.

with too great a multitude: for if there follow too many members after the first, it may be forgotten, & likewise of a word in the midst: but if there be too many clauses, put before the last clause wherein it is exprest, it doth hold the mind of the hearer in too long dispense. It is good to avoyd this figure in writing of testaments 2.Litigions in testaments.

and evidences, least it may breed ambiguitie and contention. As for example: I bequeath to my son Ambrose an hundreth pounds, to my sonne Robert fiftie, and to my servant N.ten. Here pounds is the word exprest in the first clause, but not in the other: nowe that the same word is understood in the other it is likely, but not proved: and therefore may breed a question.

Ayndeton.

Asyndeton is a figure which keepeth the parts of speech together without the helpe of any conjunction.

An example of Caesar, where he saith, I came, I saw, I overcame. Another of Cicero: Neither did he thinke any thing wel accomplished which he commanded: for there was nothing which he him selfe would not take in hand, prevent, labour, he was able to suffer cold, thirst, hunger.

An example of Scripture: "For in her is the spirit of understanding, which is holy, the onely begotten, manifold, subtle, moveable, cleare, undefiled, evident, harmeslesse, loving the good, & c." Sapien.7.22.

The use of this figure.

1.To avoyd often repetition of one word.

This forme of speech is chiefly used to avoyd the the tedious repeating of a conjunction, partly fo rhte better sound of the speech, 2.Brevitie.

and partly for expedition and brevitie, and it serveth most fitly to 3.Knitte like things together.

utter things of like nature.

The Caution.

The greatest fault that may be committed in this figure is, when it uttereth contraries, as if one should say, pleasure paine, peace warre, life death, it were very unapt in sense, and ill sounding in the eare.

FIGURES OF CONJUNCTION.

Figures of Conjunction are these, Polysindeton, Homeoptoton, Homeoteleuton, Paregmemon: these figures do joyne the parts of our speech together, either by conjunction of Grammer, or by similitude of sound.

Polysindeton.

Polysindeton is a figure which knitteth together the parts of an oration with many conjunctions, contrarily to that above.

An example: He was both an enemy to his country, and a traitor to his Prince, and a contemner of lawes, and a subverter of cities.

An example of the Evangelist Luke: "Where abode both Peter, and James, and John and Andrew." Act.

Another of the Apostle Paul: "For I am sure that neither death, neither life, neither things to come, neither height, neither depth, neither any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God." Rom.8. Another: Ye observe dayes, and moneths, and times, and yeares.

The use of this figure.

This figure hath the most special respect to knit many things 1. To knit together.

of like nature together, and to distinguish and separate contrary 2. To distinguish.

matters asunder, and for this cause it may be called the chaine of speech, forasmuch as every chaine hath a conjunction of 3. Compared to a chaine.

matter, and a distinction of linkes.

The Caution.

Too long a continuance in adding conjunctions bringeth a deformitie to this figure, and therefore ought to be avoyded.

Homeoptoton.

Homeoptoton of the Latines is called Similiter cadens, and it is a figure which endeth diverse clauses with like cases, but in respect of the English tongue which is not varied by cases, we may call it setting of diverse nounes in one sentence which ende alike with the same letter or same syllable: thus, He came into Cilicia, and then spied out Africa: and after that came with his armie into Sardinia.

Another: In activitie commendable, in a commonwealth profitable, and in warre terrible.

Another: Art thou in povertie? seeke not principality, but rather how to relaeve thy necessitie.

Let God be worshipped the king obeyed, & thy parents honored.

1. A grace to Proverbes.

This figure giveth an excellent grace and facilitie to certaine proverbes and briefe sentences, as to these and such like: Foolish pittie undoeth many a citie, A friend in neede is a friend in deede, In space commeth grace. These & many other of this forme are very ancient, and may be used in grave causes.

The use of this figure.

A pleasant sound to the eare.

The use of this exornation tendeth chiefly to delight the eare by the like fall, and similitude of the sounde, wherein the nature of that sense take singular pleasure.

The caution.

1. After action to be shunned.

In the use of this figure too great affectation of copie must be shunned, lest it cause excess which alwaies doth bring with it sachie and weariness of the hearer as it doth in the daintiest<sup>2</sup>. Just number and meeter to be avoyded.

meates and sweetest musicke, also heed ought to be taken that the memebers be not compounded of just numbers, lest the sentence fall into a rime, or verse in meeter.

Homeoteleuton.

Homeoteleuton called of the Latines *similiter definens* is a figure which endeth diverse members alike in such partes of speech, which have no cases, that is in Verbes and Adverbs.

An example: He is esteemed eloquent which can invent wittily, remember perfectly, dispose orderly, figure diversly, pronounce aptly, confirm strongly, and conclude directly.

Another: No marvell though wisdom complaineth that shee is either wilfully despised, or carelesly neglected, either openly scorned, or secretly abhorred.

The use of this figure.

This exornation like as the former pertaineth to the delectation<sup>1</sup>. Delectation to the eare.

of sound, and also giveth a pleasant perspicuitie to the word first expressed.<sup>2</sup> Perspicuity to the sense.

The Caution.

The thing in this Caution to be observed, is, that excess and too <sup>1</sup>. Affectation and excess.

great affection be shunned.

Paregmenon.

Paregmenon is a figure which of the word going before deriveth the word following.

An example of Essay: I will destroy the wisdom of the wise.

Another: "They have stumbled at the stumbling stone." Rom.9.

Another "The first man was of the earth earthy, the second man was the Lord from Heaven heavenly." 1.Cor.15.45.

There are sometime three wordes of like affinity set in one sentence, thus Never marvel at that which is so little a marvel, except it were more marvellous.

Sometime there is a double Paregmenon in one sentence whereof this may be an example: He wished rather to a die a present death, then to live in the misery of life.

The use of this figure.

The use hereof is twofold, to delight the eare by the derived<sup>1</sup> To delight the eare.

sound, and to move the mind with a consideration of the nigh affinity and concord of the matter.<sup>2</sup> To joyne affinity.

The Caution.

The abuse which may be committed by this figure is, when<sup>3</sup>. A superfluous.

one of ye wordes of affinity is superfluous, as if one should say Example.

2. Unapt or not in use.

Merrie mirth, mournfull mourning, friendly friendship. Secondly when the derviatiō is unapt, or not in use.

## FIGURES OF SEPARATION

Paranomasia, Antanaclasis, Articulus, Membrum, Compar, Hypozeuxis, Taxis.

These I call figures of Separation, in respect that they do separate words & clauses one from another, either by distinguishing the sound, or by separating the sense.

Paranomasia.

Paranomasia is a figure which declineth into a contrarie by a likelihood of letters, either added, changed, or taken away. Added thus, be sure of his sword, before you trust him of his word. Another: so fine a launderer, should not be a slanderer. Changed thus, More bold in a butterie then in a batterie. A fit witsesse, a fit witlesse. Taken away, thus, This is not stumbling, but plaine tumbling.

1. To allude.

This figure is commonly used to illude by the Addition, change 2. To be sparingly used.

and taking away. This figure ought to be sparingly used, and especially in grave and weightie causes, both in the respect of the light and illuding forme, and also forasmuch as it seemeth not to be found without meditation and affected labor.

The Caution.

1. Discretion required in using it.

As the use ought to be rare, so the allusion ought not to be tumbled out at adventure. Also heede ought to be taken of whom it is used, and against whom it is applied.

Antanaclasis.

Antanaclasis is a figure which repeateth a word that hath two significations, and the one of them contrary, or at least, unlike to the other. An example: Care for those things which may discharge you of all care. Care in the first place signifieth to provide, in the last the solicitude and dread of the minde. Another: In thy youth learne some craft, that in thy age thou mayst get thy living without craft. In this example craft in the first place signifieth science, occupation or trade; in the second, deceit and subiltie.

The use of this figure.

This figure as it uniteth two words of one sound, so it distinguisheth them asunder by the diversitie of thier sence, wherby 1. It uniteth and distinguisheth.

it moveth many times a most pleasant kind of civile mirth, which is called of the Latines Facetiae, or Urbanitas. 2. Apt for Urbanine.

The Caution.

For as much as this figure serveth to wittie allusions, & often 1. Excesse.

to pleasant occasions of mirth: it may fall easily into excesse, 2. Importunitie.

or untimely use, which follie and boldnesse do oft commit. Also regard ought to be had that this figure be not framed of an unfit equivocation.

Articulus.

Articulus is a figure which setteth one word from another by cutting the oration thus: By thy follie and wickednesse thou hast lost thy substance, thy good name, thy friends, thy parents, and offended thy Creator.

Another example: My friends and faithful souldiers, now is the time to shew your selves valiant, couragious, hardie, bold, & constant, considering for what value you shal fight, for your religion, for your wives, your children, your goods, your libertie, your lives, and your countrie, either to die with honor, or live with renown. An example of the Prophet Jeremie: "I will make them to be a reproofe, a proverbe, a scorne, a shame, I will make them desolate, wast, despised, hissed at, and accursed." Jerem.5.

The use of this figure.

This figure serveth to pleasant brevitie, and also is very convenient 1.Fit for brevitie.

to expresse any vehement affections: in peaceable and 2.Fit for any vehement affection.

quiet causes it may be compared to a sembreefe in Musicke, but in 3.Compared to a sembreesse.

causes of perturbation and hast, it may be likened to thicke & violent 4. To thicke strokes or thundring shot.

strokes in sight, or to a thick & thundring peale of ordinance.

The Caution.

1.Words of many sillables unap for this figure.

It is not convenient & agreeable to the propertie of this figure to use words in it which have many sillables, for long words are repugnant to the swiftnesse and hast which this exornation doth cheefly respect.

Membrum.

Membrum is a figure which in few words endeth the construction, but not the sense.

An example: Thou hast neither profited the commonwelth, done good to thy friends, nor resisted thy enimies.

An example of Tobias: Thou light of our eyes, thou staffe of our age, thou conforter of our life, thou hope of our generation.

Another of the Apostle Paul: "God was shewed in the flesh, justified in the spirit, seene among Angels, preached to the Gentils, beleevd on in the world, and received up in glorie." 2.Tim.3.

The use of this figure.

1.Brevitie.

This figure is a pleasant and excellent ornament of eloquence, 2.Copie.

servng both to comply brevity, 3.Varietie.

and copious variety, and is meet for 4.Meet for grave causes.

grave causes.

The Caution.

Too many members are not meet for this figure.

There ought not to be in this exornations too great a difference in the quantitie of the members, neither ought the members to extend to too great a number, for by the one the delectation of the sound is interrupted, by the other the sence is obscured.

Compar.

Compar, of the Grecians called Isocolon, and Parison is a figure or forme of speech which maketh the members of an oration to be almost of a just number of sillables, yet the equalitie of those members or parts, are not to be measured upon our fingers, as if they were verses, but to bee tried by a secret sence of the eare: use & exercise may do much in this behalfe, which maketh it an easie matter to make the parts accord in a fit proportion. First, when the former parts of a sentence, or of an oration be answered by the later, and that by proper words respecting the former.

An example of Cicero: He left the citie garnished, that the same might be a monument of victory, of clemencie, of continencie, that men might see, what he had conquered, what he spared, what he had left: compare ye the parts of the later clauses with the former, and you shall see how fitly they are matched.

Examples of the holy scripture, as when the sentence consisteth of two members, thus: "The Ox hath knowne his owner, and the Asse his maisters crib." Esa. 1.

Another: "See that equitie flow as the water, and righteousness as a mightie streame." Amos. 5.

Also it coopleth contraries, thus: An innocent although he be accused, he may be acquitted, but the guiltie except he be accused he cannot be condemned.

Also by this figure effects may be made to answer their efficients, consequents their antecedents, habite privation: also contrariwis, and that by a very pleasant forme and proportion. This ornament is very often used of Solomon in his Proverbs, and of Esay in his Prophetesies.

The use of this figure.

This figure of all others is most straightly tied to number and proportion, and therefore is most harmonically. The use Delectation of the eare.

wherof doth cheefully consist in cuasing delectation by the vertue of proportion and number, albeit holy authors doe use it, yet they do it in easie & plaine forme, but if the most artificial and exact forme of this figure be respected, ye use of it is more agreeable for pleasant More fit for pleasaunt matters then grave causes.

matters than grave causes, and more fit for Commedies then Tragedies.

The Caution.

Inequalitie of number is the fault which doth most digrace the 1. Inequalitie of number.

beautifull forme and proportion of this ornament, and therefore to be most diligently avoided, neither ought this exornation in the most artificiall forme be used in grave and serious causes, for as 2. Seldome in grave causes.

much as it may bewray affectation, which in gravitie is misliked.

Hypozeuxis.

Hypozeuxis is a figure or forme of speech which joineth to everie thing a due verbe, which is the contrarie to Zeugma.

An example: such is mans depressed nature and perverse inclination, that taking away the use of government, every kind of evill shal quickly oppresse every part of goodnes, ambition shal strive for honor, pride shall disdain

obedience, malice proceede to murder, theft deprive true possessors, idlenes neglect labor, impietie scorne religion, and raging tumults violate peace, and turne a happie state into a miserable confusion, whereupon it insueth that open rebellion is raised, good men murdered, virgins defloured, holy places polluted, houses burned, cities defeaced, lawes despised, the whole earth confounded, and the omnipotent power of God either little regarded or utterly forgotten.

The use of this figure.

1. Pleasant in brevitie.

This figure is not only very pleasant in respect of the brevitie and 2. Pithie in the matter.

varietie of the matter, but also very pithie in respect of the causes and effects accompanying one another, and is fit for 3. Meete for grave causes.

grave causes, notwithstanding it may be used in other also.

The Caution.

1. Unpropernes of verbs.

The especiall warning which this caution may give, is to take 2. Not to moe things than one.

heed that the verbe be not unproper, nor that one verbe serve 3. But once expressed.

to moe things then one, nor one verbe be more then once repeated.

Taxis.

Taxis is a figure or forme of speech, which distributeth to every subject his most proper & naturall adjunct.

1.

An example: The feare of so great a danger and the terror of so likelie a destruction, caused noble men to consult, the minds of wisemen to doubt, the faces of valiant captains to wax pale, the hearts of lusty youth to quake, old men to tremble, and women to weepe.

2.

Another: Princes for their dignities, magistrates for their authorieite, rich men for their wealth, captains for their courage, counsellors for their wisdome, & holy men for their profession, are assaulted of the mightie, and envied of the wicked, from whence it commeth that they are often either deprived of thier lives, or spoiled of that they possesse.

3.

Another: The power of God among his own people is renowned, his woonders are recorded, his judgements pondered, his promises beleevd, his threatnings feared, his goodnesse praised, and his justice duly regarded.

Another. The divine wisdome hath assigned Kings to raigne, 4.

Judges to heare causes & give sentence, Advocates to plead, subjects to obey, the wise to give counsell, and the rich to give almes.

The use of this figure.



This figure is a singular ornament of eloquence, well deserving that commendation, and that in sundrie respects first for 1. A pleasant harmonie

that it ministreth a pleasant harmonie to the eare, secondly, for that it presenteth proper countenances of persons to the eye of the minde. Thirdly, for the excellent brevitee in noting the adjuncts 2. Description by a propertie

of persons, duties of degrees, and proper words with their proper relations. 3. Excellent brevitee.

The Caution.

The especiall regard to avoyd the abuse, which this figure may commit, is to take heed that we do not attribute unproper adjunctes 1. Improprietie of Adjuncts.

to the subjects, for it were not onely verie unproper, but also verie absurd to attribute weeping to valiant Captaines, and consultation to youth: or to say that rich men are envied for their wisdom, and holie men for their wealth, which forme of speech is verie unproper. And this vice or fault is called, Acyrologia: which is an unproper speaking in forme and sense.

## FIGURES OF SENTENCES

Figures of Sentences are those by which either our affections are elegantly expressed, or matters mightily magnified. The difference between the figures of words, and the figures of sentences is great, found out in thier formes and effectes, for the figures of wordes are as it were effeminate, and musicall, the figures of sentences are manly, and martiall, those of words are as it were the colour and beautie, these of sentences are as the life and affection, which are divided into figures of affection, and figures of Amplication.

The second order.

Figures of the second order are such as do make the oration not onely pleasant and plausible, but also verie sharpe and vehement, by which the sundrie affections and passions of the minde are properly and elegantly uttered, and the either by the figures of Exclamation, Moderation, Consultation, or Permission.

## FIGURES OF EXCLAMATION

Under the name of Exclamation I do comprehend all those figures which are used most commonly to utter vehement affections in vehement formes, not only such as do expresse the passions of the mind by a forme of outcrie, but also all those which are of a vehement and sharpe kind, and of nigh affinitie to Exclamation.

Ephphosis..

Ephphosis of the Latines called Exclamatio, is a forme of speech by which the orator through some vehement affection, as either of love, hatred, gladnesse, sorrow, anger, marvelling, admiration, feare, or such like, bursteth forth into an exclamation or outcrie, signifying thereby the vehement affection or passion of his mind.

Examples of the love, this example of David. "O how amiable are thy tabernacles thou Lord of hosts?" Psalm. 84

Another of Solomon: "O lord how gracious and sweet is thy spirit?" Sap. 12.

2.

Of Hatred? O most wicked presumption, from whence art thou sproong up to cover the earth with falshood and deceit?

3.

Of joy or gladnesse, an example of the Apostle Paul: O Death where is thy sting? O Grave where is thy victorie?

O how joyfull a thing is mercy in the time of anguish and trouble?

4.

Of sorrow, an example of Ieptha: Alas my daughter thou hast brought me low.

Another: O lamentable miserie, alas for pitie.

5.

Of anger: O cursed tyrannie, O most detestable crueltie.

Another of the Apostle Paul: "O full of all subtiltie and deceit, thou child of the divell, & c." Act.13.

Of marvelling: O man what art thou? which disputest with God, & c.6.

Another, "O the deepenesse of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, & c." Rom.11.

Of feare: "O thou man of God flee such thinges." 1.Tim.6.7.

This is worthy by the way to be noted, that albeit singuler examples are here set for the explication of singular affections or passions, yet notwithstanding many and iverse affections may meete and joyne in causing of our exclamation, as may be seene in the example of Paul to Timothie last expressed: O man of God flee such things.

The causes of this exclamation are more than one: There is love in Paul toward Timothie, for because he loveth him he disswadeth him from danger. There is feare in Paul, for that which he possesseth by love, he feareth lest it should be lsot by negligence.

There is also in Paul an hatred of the evil, from which he doth disswade Timothie. There is in Paul a care of Gods glory lest it should be obscured in his owne servant: all which affections joyning together caused the Apostle to say: O thou man of God flee such thinges.

The use of this figure.

The principall end of use of this figure is by the vehemency of our voice and utterance to expresse the greatness of our affections To move the like affection in others.

and passions, and hterebly to move the like affections in our hearers.

The Caution.

There are diverse and necessarie observations to be considered concerning the use of this figure.

First that it be not used without some great cause that may instly move to so vehement a forme of speech, for it is a manifest 1. Not to be used without some great cause.

token of follie to use an exclamation upon small occasions, and for light causes.

Secondly, that it be not too often used lest it become odious.2. Often used it becometh odious.

Thirdly, that it be not applyed unaptly in the partes of a treatise or publick Oration: it were ridiculous to begin a publike speech with this figure, crying, O, or Alasse: it might sooner move 3. Unfit to be in an oration.

laughter then lamentation.

Extremities.

Fourthly regard ought to be had, that the utterance of the exclamation fall not into an extremitie, either offending in  
4.Defect

defect or in excesse, for too low and soft an exclamation, betokeneth 5.Excesse

a cold affection, and contrariwise, that which is too much strainde, signifieth either extremitie of passion, or want of discretion.

Lastly, that it be not put in the conclusion of an oration or publike speech, for in so doing it might be the cause of merry effect.

Ara.

Ara called of the Latins Imprecatio, is a forme of speech by which the Orator detesteth, and curseth some person or thing, for the evils which they bring with them, or for the wickednesse which is in them.

An example of Detestation: “O most abhominable impietie, worthie to be buried in the bottome of the earth.” Cicero.

An example of Cursing: “Wo to the bloodthirstie Citie which is full of lyes and robbrie.” Naum.3.

Another of David against Doeg: Let the ungodly have dominion over him, and let Sathan stand at his right hand, when sentence is given upon him, let him be condemned, and let his praier be turned into sin, let his daies be few, & c.

The use of this figure.

1. Tit, to detest.

This figure is the fit instrument of speech to expresse the bitterness of the detestation within us against some evill person, or evill thing, and forasmuch as it sendeth forth the flame of revenge kindeled in our affections, it may well be compared to the 2. Compared to wilde fire.

casting of wildfire, or poysoning of shotte, to destroy the enemie.

The Caution.

1. A rare use.

The use hereof ought to be verie rare, and not to rise but against intollerable impietie, not measured by man malice, but assigned 2. A curse bought and sold.

by the divine sentence, not to curse for reward as did Balaam, but to signifie whom God doth curse, as doth the Prophets and Apostles.

Eulogia.

Eulogia, in Latine Benedictio, is a forme of speech by which the Orator pronounceth a blessing upon some person for the goodnesse that is in him or her.

An example of king David: “And David sent messengers unto the men of Jabesh Gilead, and said unto them: Blessed are ye of the Lord, that ye have shewed such kindnesse unto your Lord Saul, that you have buried him.” 2.Sam.8.2.5.

“Blessed is the man which considereth the poore and needie.” Psal.41.

“Blessed be God the father of our Lord Jesus Christ.” 2 Cor.5.

“Blessed are those servants, whom the Lord when he commeth shall finde waking.” Luc.12.

“Happie are the people that be in such a case, yea blessed are the people which have the Lord for their God.” Psal.144.

The use of this figure.

The use hereof. tendeth to the extolling and praise of the thing 1.To praise.

which maketh happie, and to declare the happinesse and felicitie 2. To declare the felicitie of the possessor.

of the possessor, and also it is a forme of speech which doth much<sup>3</sup>. To move love to the cause.

move to the love of the thing which is the cause of blessednesse.

The Caution.

As the use hereof is verie effectuell & forcible to worke a love and delight in men to the cause which make men happie and blessed, so is the abuse of it odious, as when blessing is pronounced False placing of blessings.

upon false casuses and wrong persons, as to say, Blessed are the rich, blessed is the glutton, happie are the proud, for this is the opinion and saying of the Epicure, but Eliphaz proveth the contrarie, saying: “I have seene the foolish deepe rooted, and suddenly I his habitation.” Job.5.3.

Mempsis.

Mempsis, in Latine Querimonia, is a forme of speech by which the Orator maketh a complaint, and craveth helpe.

An example of King David: “Why standest then so farre O Lord, and hidest thy selfe in the needfull time of trouble? the ungodlie for his owne lust doth persecute the poore.” Psal.10. And after his long complaint against the wicked for their pride against God, and for their oppression of the poore, he turneth to God by petition, craving his helpe to succour the poore, and his justice to punish the oppressors, saying: Surely thou hast seene it, for thou beholdest ungodliness and wrong, that thou maist take the matter into thy hand. The poore committeth himselfe unto thee, for thou art the helper of the friendlesse, breake thou the power of the ungodlie and malicious, take away his ungodnesse and thou shalt finde none.

Another: “For thy sake also are we killed all the day long, and are counted as sheepe appointed to be slaine, & c.” Psal.44.

The use of this figure.

To move compassion.

This forme of speech as it riseth from the griefe which is suffred for injuries, so doth it tend by complaint & praier to seeke succour and redresse, by this forme billes of complaint are exhibited to the Courts of judgement, and supplications to Princes.

The Caution.

Complaining without cause is common.

This figure or forme of speech of all others is most common, and oftenest abused, for what is more common then complaints, and what speech oftener used without just cause then complaining one of another. Therefore in using this figure regard ought to be had, that the complaint be not a false accusation, or as the proverbe is of the swine, a great crie and a little wooll, much ado about nothing, a hue and crie and no robbery.

Threnos.

Threnos is latine Lamentatio, and Luctus, is a forme of speech by which the Orator lamenteth some person or people for the miserie they suffer, or the speaker his owne calamitie.

An example of the Prophet Jeremy: "O that my head were full of water, and mine eyes a fountain of teares, that I might weepe day and night, for the staine of the daughter of my people." Jerem.9.

The greatest part of Jeremies lamentations, is framed by this forme of speech.

Job lamenteth his owne miserie in this maner: "Why died not I in the birth? Why did not I perish assoone as I came out of the wombe? Why set they me upon their knees? Why gave they me sucke with their brests?" Job.3.

The use of this figure.

As the use of this figure riseth from the feeling of miserie, so itMost apt to move pitie.

serveth and is most forcible and mightie to move pittie and compassion in the hearer.

The Caution.

As this forme of speech is most passionate, so ought it to be most serious and voyd of fiction & faining, for counterfait lamentation doth seldome move pitie, for it is commonly berayed or 1.Counterfait lamentation

knowne either by the cause or by the person, by ye cause, as fained lamentations in Tragedies, by the person, and that teither by his condition, or by some signes of his affection, by his condition, as the lamentations of common beggers, which are commonly2. Lamentation of common beggers.

counterfai'ted, by signe of affection, as when the speaker expresseth a lamentable matter with a cold or careless affection.3. Carelesly expressed

Also heed ought to be taken that the lamentation be not great when the cause is litle, or litle when the cause is great, the one of these4. Without proportion.

is found in children lamenting for litle losses, the other in stoicall nature or carelesse people.

Euche.

Euche, in latine Votum, is a forme of speech by which the Orator or speaker expresseth a solemne promise or vow; either made with condition, or rising from some vehement affection.

Examples of vowes made with condition. First of Jacob, Ge.28.21. Then Jacob vowed a vow saying: If God wil be with me, and will keep me in this journey which I go, and wil give me bread to eate, and cloth to put on, so that I come againe unto my father in safetie. Then shall the Lord be my God, and this stone which I have set up as a pillar, shall be Gods house, and of all that thou shalt give me, will I give the tenth unto thee.

Another of Jeptah: And Jeptah vowed a vow unto the Lord and sayd, I thou shalt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands then that thing that commeth out of my house to meet me when I come home in peace from the children of Ammon, shall be the Lords, and I will offer it for a burnt offering.

An example of a vow rising from affection, and without condition, is expressed in the Psalme 132.

The use of this figure.

An effect of gratitude.

This forme of speech is used chiefly to signifie our gratitude and thankfull remembrance for the thing obtained by our petition.

The Caution.

1. Deliberation.

The pronouncing of a vow ought to follow pondered deliberation, lest it be rashe, or unlawfull: rash, as was the vowe of 2. Rashnes.

Jeptah, unlawfull, as the vow of the Jewes, that they would neither 3. Unlawfull. Act.23.

eat nor drinke till they had killed Paule.

Asphalia.

Asphalia, in Latine Securitas and Certitudo, is a forme of speech by which the speaker persuadeth a securitie and safetie to his hearer by offering himselfe a suretie for the confirmation of his warrant.

An example of Juda persuading his father Jaconb to let Benjamin his yongest sonne go into Aegypt with the rest of his brothers, who used this forme of speech, saying: "I will be suerty for him, of my hand shalt thou require him, if I bring him not to thee, and set him before thee, then let me beare the blame for ever." Ge.49.9.

Also it is made in a mightie forme thus: My blood for thy blood, my life for thy life, my soule for thy soule.

The use of this figure.

1. To incourage.

This figure or forme of speaking is most apt and forcible to ad courage in dreadfull adventures, and to give comfort

2. To give confort.

and assurance in doubtfull causes, which is a singular vertue of speech and worthy of great praise, namely if it be used in certaintie and truth.

The Caution.

How much this forme of speech is abused, the examples of deceitfull 1. Deceitfull warrants.

warrants may dayly teach. And therefore the most notorious abuse of this figure is to deceive by a false warrant, and deceitfull countenance of speech. Clients are often incouraged by this figure to enter into contention, and confidently to proceed, till an empty purse parteth the fray. And likewise many a sicke patient is most warranted his life, when his death is neerest at hand.

Eustathia.

Eustathia in Latine Constantia, is a forme of speech by which the orator or speaker promiseth and protesteth his constancie concerning something. An example of Tertullian: Let Lions clawes teare out our bolwels, let the Gibbet hang us, let the fire consume us, let the sword cut us asunder, let wild beasts tread us under their feet: yet we Christians are by praier prepared to abide all paine and torments.

Another example of Paul: "Who shall separat us from the love of Christ? shall tribulation, or anguish, or persecution, or famine, or nakednes, or perill, or sword." Rom.8. And by and by after he addeth: I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, neither things present, nor things to come, neyther height, nor depth, nor any other creature shalbe able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

An example of Poetrie, Virgil AEGlog.1.

{Therefore the stags so light of foote, like birds shall feede in th'aire,

The seas shall faile, and fishes leave all bare upon the shore,  
The Parthian Pilgrime first shall drinke of Arax river cleere,  
Or one of Germanie shall drinke of Tibris flowing streames,  
The bounds of both gon round about, & passed far and neere,  
Before this face and countenance shall slip out of my brest.

Another of Poetrie.

{The fish shall flie the floud, the serpent bide the fire,

Ere ever I for game or good will altar my desire.

The use of this figure.

To manifest the secret affection of the heart.

This figure or forme of speech serveth most aptly to declare the firme & unremoveable of the mind, and to make manifest the deepe rooted affection of the heart, and that by sundry By contempt of death.

formes, as by contempt of torture and death it selfe, by comparison of impossibilities, or unlike things as is alreadie shewed byBy impossibilitie.

example, and by diverse other like formes of speaking.

The Caution.

Not in light causes.

The speciall warning that may concerne this figure, is that it be not used in evill causes, or in light and trifling matters, for to protest and promise a stedfast mind in an evill thing, looseth the vertue and dignity of the figure.

Epimone.

Epimone in Latine Perseverantia, is a form of speech, by which the speaker continueth and persisteth in the same cause, much after one forme of speech.

There is a good example hereof in Abrahams praier or sute to God for the Sodomites, saying: “if there be fiftie righteous within the Citie wilt thou destroy, and not spare the place for the fiftie rigeous that are therein? That be far from thee, & c.” Gen.18. And thus he continueth perseverantly his suite and praier to the first request.

Another example of Christ, speaking to Peter: “Simon Joanna lovest thou me more then these? feede my sheepe” Joh.21.: which saying he repeateth three times, one shortly after another.

The use of this figure.

1. To signifie the greatnesse of the desire.

By this forme of spech the greatnesse of the desire is signified, either by often craving that which necessity requireth, or many time commaunding that, which reason directeth By this figure and maner of speaking the condemned man doth often pray Luc.18.1.2.3.

& crie for mercie: the hungry repeateth his request many times, and necessitie will have no nay: whereby it commeth often times to passe, that albeit once or twice faile, yet many times may prevaile. And likewise in rules, commaundements, and warnings 2. To warne effectually.

twise may be remembred when once may be forgotten.

The Caution.

Albeit that the propertie of this figure, consisteth in the multitude of requests and often warnings, yet moderation Importunat petitions are odious.

ought to restraine it from excesse and importunate requestes, which betokeneth either notable impudency, or shamelesse folly: a notorious vice in the greatest use among beggers, in whom it is used and brought forth by long custome.

Obtestatio.

Obtestatio is a forme of speech, by which the Orator expresseth his most earnest request, petition, or praier.

And example of Terence: O Chremes I beseech thee for Gods sake and for our old friendships sake, which hath continued ever since wee were children which time hath also encreased, and for thy onely daughters sake, & my sons, whom I have committed wholly to thy governement, help me in this matter.

Another of Cicero: O Caesar for thy promise, thy constancy, and thy mercies sake, discharge us from this feare, specially that we may not so much as suspect that nay part of anger remaineth in thee, for thy right hands sake I beseech which thou gavest to Deiotarus in promise.

Another: If innocency may deserve favour, if misery may move to pittie, or praier prevaile with me: let your mercy for Gods sake relieve misery, and your compassion extend to us that are ready to perish.

The use of this figure.

This is that forme of speech, which men in necessitie and distresse To beseech most earnestly.

do use as a meane whereby to seeke, and obtaine relief and comfort in their miseries, as in hunger for food, in perplexity for counsaile, in perill for defence, in trouble for deliverance, in the state of condemnation for mercy and life.

The Caution.

There are diverse abuses of this figure, namely when it is 1. In unlawfull petitions.

used in unlawfull petitions, and for trifling matters, also 2. In smal causes.

when the name of God is vainely used in requests and petitions, as it is usually of common beggers and vagabonds, charging and as it were adjuring men to give them.

Optatio.

Optatio is a forme of speech, by which the speaker expresseth his desire by wishing to God or Men.

An example of Cicero: I would the immortall Gods had granted that wee might rather have given thanks to Servius Sulpitius being alive, than now to examine his honours being dead.

Another of the holy Scripture: "I would to God, that my Lord were with the Prophet that is in Sameria." 2.Reg.2.

Another of Paul: "I would to God they were separated from you." Gal.5.



The use of this figure.

To signify a desire.

The use hereof tendeth to signify our desires by our wishing, which we cannot accomplish by our power.

The Caution.

1. Unlawfull wishes.

In this forme of speech these observations are to be remembered, that wee wish not such thinges as are either unlawfull, or impossible, the one although it be very usuall, yet it is not without 2. Impossible thinges.

corruption of will, nor the other without vanity of minde.

Thaumasmus.

Thaumasmus in Latine Admiratio, is a forme of speech, by which the Orator declareth how much hee marvelleth at something as either why a thing is done, or left undone, or at some strange effect, whose secret cause maketh him to wonder.

An Example of Job. "He doth great things, and unsearcheable, yea marvellous things without number." Job.9.10.

Another: "O the deepenes of the riches, of the wisdom and knowledge of God, & c." Rom.11.

Holy men have alwaies had the works and wisdom of God, in great reverence and admiration, to the extolling of his glory, and open confession of their own wickednesse.

By this figure the Orator sometime wondereth, at the boldnesse and pudency of wicked deedes.

Sometime at the negligence of men, in not preventing danger, or at their brutish security when the battel axe of destruction hangeth over their heads.

Sometime at impunitie, when he seeth great wickednesse pass free without punishment or rebuke.

Sometime at the accusation of some person, in whom he hath a good opinion.

The use of this figure.

The vertue of this Figure is very great and Emphaticall in a prudent Orator, and serveth to sundry and excellent purposes, as in praising highly persons or things: As when the Orator declareth his admiration at their goodnesse and excellency. Excelent to praise and commend.

In dispraising most hatefully: As by wondering that such a notorious 2. Most apt to dispraise or rebuke.

& wicked person is not either cut off by ye lawes of men, or destroyed by the judgements of God. In reproving and rebuking, as in saying: I marvell or wonder much what moved you to do it, or to be so far overseene as to take it once in hand: & likewise in blaming the negligence and omission of some necessarie and profitable thing, and that by a marvelling at the cause: to speake briefly, it hath many uses, and is very significant, and Emphaticall.

The Caution.

The speciall parts of this Caution do tend to give warning that this forme of speech be note used to marvell at common things, or small matters, and also that it be too often used, lest too2. At common things, or smal matters.

common a custome of admiration and wondring weakeneth the strength of it, and impaireth the dignitie, and may also betoken an ignorance in the speaker, according to the common saying, Qui saepe admiratur neceire videtur.

Onedismus.

Onedismus called of the Latines *Exprobratio*, is a forme of speech by which the speaker upbraideth his adversary of ingratitude, and impietie.

An apt example of this figure Virgil hath elegantly expressed by Dido Queene of Carthage, upbraiding Aeneas with the great and manifold benefites which he had received of her, and accusing him of unkindnesse & cruelty now purposed toward her, and by comparing these together she increaseth her wrath & in the midst of her flaming furie she bursteth forth and exclaimeth against him thus:

No Goddess never was thy Dam, nor thou of Dardans kinde.

Thou traytor wretch but under rockes, and mountaines rough unkinde.

Thou wert begot, some broode thou art of Beast or Monster wild.

Some Tigers thee did nurce and gave to thee their milke unmilde.

And a little after she addeth:

No stedfast truth there is, this naked miser by I tooke,

Whome seas had cast to shore, and of my Realme a part I gave,

His fleet I did relieve, and from their death his people save.

Essay.5.

The Prophet Esay by this forme of speech in a similitude of a Vineyard frutefully planted and carefully fenced, doth set before the peoples eyes, Gods goodnesse and mercy towards them. And by the wild and evill frute, which that vineyard brought forth, he accuseth them of most sinful ingratitude.

The use of this figure.

To rebuke ingratitude.

The use hereof is easily seene, and may therefore be the sooner noted: it tendeth most specially to reprove and rebuke ingratitude, a most ill weede wheresoever it groweth, and therefore well woerthy to be pluckt up by the rootes, with the weedehook of rebuke and shame.

The Caution.

Directed by wisdom.

Wisdom and charity ought to direct the use of this figure, lest it be used for every little displeasure as foolish persons Not for smal displeasures.

are wont to do, making a new account of an old reckoning, Opposed against charity.

which is an absurditie offending against good manners, a folly repugning wisdom, and an effect of mallice opposed against charity.

Orcos.

Orcos, in Latine *Jusiurandum*, is a forme of speech by which the speaker expresseth an oath for the better confirmation of something affirmed or denied, which doth necessarily require a sure and high testimonie.

An example of Moses: "I call heaven and earth to record against you this day, that you shall shortly perish from the land whereunto ye go over Jordan to possess it." Deut.4.2.20.

Another of Joab saying thus to David: "Now therefore up come out, and speake comfortable unto thy servants, for I swear by the Lord, except thou come out, there will not tarry with thee one man this night, and that will be worse unto thee, than all the evils, that fell on thee from thy youth hitherto." 2.Sam.19.7.

Another of the Apostle Paul: "for God is my witness whom I serve in my spirit in the Gospel of his name, that without ceasing I make mention of you always in my prayers, & c." Rom.1.9.

Sometime the speaker useth to confirme his saying by swearing by his faith, credit, and truth, or such like formes of confirmation.

The use of this figure.

The use of this forme of speech serveth most aptly & properly To confirme

to confirme matters either by high and divine testimonie, or 2. To confute.

by the gage of the speakers faith and credit, and therefore it is best becoming a grave man which is indued with age and credit.

The Caution.

The cheefe points of this caution are these: first to take heed 1. Not to swear by the creature, & omit the creator.

that we call not those things to witness with us, which cannot give witness, as to swear by creatures & to omit the testimony of the creator, as did Joseph when he swore by the life of Gen.42.14.

Pharaoh, and Nabucodonezer by his throne. Secondly that we Judit.1.12

swear not to perform wickedness, as did Jezebel that she would 2.Reg.2.

kill Elisha the Prophet. Thirdly, that we swear not rashly, as did 2. Not to swear to perform iniquitie.

Herod the Tetrarch to the daughter of Herodias. Fourthly, that we swear not to deceive, or to confirme untruth, as did Antiochus to the Jewes, thereby to deceive them, as Peter did when he 3. Not rashly.

swear he knew not the man.

Fifthly, that we use not this forme of confirmation often, for 4. Not with purpose to deceive.

often swearing cannot be without sinne, it becometh odious to the hearer, and diminisheth the credit of the speaker. 5. Not to use it often.

Anamnesis.

Anamnesis in Latine Recordatio is a forme of speech by which the Speaker calling to remembrance matters past, doth make recitall of them Sometime matters of sorrow, as did Dido a litle before her death saying:

Oh happy (weleaway) and over happy had I bene,

If never Trojan ship alas, my countrey shore had seene,

An example of sacred Scripture: "By the rivers of Babel we sate and wept there, when we remembered Sion." Psal.137.1.

Another of the prodigall sonne: "Then he came to himselfe and said, how many servants at my fathers house, have bread inough, and I die for hunger, I will rise and goe to my father, & c." Luke.15.17

Sometime with joy: "As Jacob did in his returne from Laban his wives father, saying: With my staffe came I over this Jordan, and now I have two droves." Gen.32.10.

Another of David saying, "I will remember the works of the Lord, and call to mind thy wonders of old time." Psal.77.

Another of Salomons Proverbes: "Now have I hated instruction & my heart despised correction, & have not obeyed ye voice of them that taught me, nor inclined mine eare to them, ye instructed me? I was almost brought into al evill, in the middest of the congregation & assembly." Prou.5.12.

The use of this figure.

To make mention of time past.

The use of this figure serveth in sted of a necessarie memorial of time past, whereby we are put in mind what we have beene, what we have done, what we have heard or seene, what we have suffred, what we have received, and so to compare it with the time present for the profite of our selves and of our hearers.

The Caution.

1. No evill matters.

The chiefest respect of this Caution is, that evill matters bee not remembered, as to call into remembrance offences forgiven and long forgotten, or occasions which may renew unprofitable 2. Nor occasions of renewing sorrow.

sorrow or move anger, or actions of vanitie which were better to lye buried than to be revived.

Protrope.

Protrope in Latine Adhortatio, is a forme of speech, by which the Orator exhorteth and perswadeth his hearers to do some thing.

An example of Cicero: Have respect & regard, Judges, Cicero contra verrem.

what doth appertain to your name, estimation, and safetie of the common wealth. Wherefore Judges looke to your selves, your wives, your children and goods, maintaine and uphold the renowne, and safetie of the Romane people.

Another: If ever God have had respect to a just cause, or ever gave victorie where it was due, or ever lent his hand to equitie against tirannie, or ever preferred his people, and confounded his enemies, he will this day fight with us, and for us, and give us a glorious victorie, be our enemies never so many, and we never so few, and therefore shew your selves this day valiant, couragious and constant, fight this day for yoru honour, and for your countrie, cast off this day all feare that may make you weake, & arme your selves with hope that may make you strong, and be ye assured of an honourable and glorious conquest, after which shall ensue incomparable joy, great wealth, and immortal fame.

Examples in the holie scripture are most plentiful, and may everie where be found.

The use of this figure.

The use of this figure is great, and often necessarie and needfull to be used, the vertue and power whereof is worthie of high praise and commendation, for when commanding cannot force, Of mightie power to move and perswade.

nor promises allure, nor commination terrifie, as alone by themselves working in their single strengthes: yet Adhortation having al these conjoynd with it, and also sundry reasons of mightie power, as helping hands to force and move the mind forward, to a willing consent, doth prevaile in his purpose.

It is necessarie to observe, that everie exhortation or imparative mood is not an adhortation, as to say, do this, or do that, eschew evil, and do good, seeke peace and ensue it, and such like, these formes are not Adhortations, but onely bare commandements without any reasons annexed the authoritie of the commander excepted: but ye forme of speech which deserveth the name of Protrope or Adhortatio, hath not only the forme of a commandement \*As, profitable, pleasant, easie, honest, & c.

or of a promise, but also sundry & mightie \* reasons to move the minde and understanding of man not only to a willing consent, but also to a fervent desire to performe the thing abhorted.

The Caution.

The greater power that this figure hath, the more mischief it may worke, if it be perverted and turned to abuse, and therefore it is necessarie to forewarne and forbid those evill partes which may pervert and abuse so excelent a vertue and instrument of counsell.

It is abused by moving and leading to unlawfull things, as Unlawfull actions.

by moving of sedition, tumults, or rebellion among the simple people, by leading ignorant persons into dangers and miserie, by Seducing the simple.

seducing unstable mindes into false religion and vanities, and by many mo like effectes, which Sathan doth alwaies further to the uttermost of his power.

Dehortio.

Dehortio, is a forme of speech opposed to Adhortatio, in respect of the use and end, and therefore the contrarie being explicated and knowne, it shall not be needfull to make any further declaration of this, considering it may be understood by the examples, use & Caution of the other contrary.

Paronesis.

Paronesis in latine Admonitio, is a forme of speech by which the speaker expresseth an admonition, or warning to his hearers.

An example of Cicero: For Gods sake take heed Judges lest through hope of present peace, you bring not in continual warre. By this warning Cicero disswadeth the Senat from making league with Antony.

Gen.6.13.14.

Hitherto doth belong the warning that almightie God gave to Noa, concerning the flood and preparing the Arke.

And likewise the admonition of the Angels to Lot, concerning Gen.19.11.13.

the destruction of Sodom.

An example: "Beware of false Prophets which come unto you in sheepes cloathing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves, you shall know them by their frutes." Mat.7.15.

Another: "My sonne if sinners do entice thee, consent thou not, if they say come with us and we will laie wayt for blood, & c." Prov.1.10.

The use of this figure.

This forme of speech doth properly belong to reveale dangers, To reveale dangers.

and to dehort the hearer from them, a singular vertue proceeding from goodnesse, love, and faithfull friendship, and therefore To dehort.

ought to be accepted as a singular benefit.

The Caution.

There are two faultes which may be committed in giving admonition or warning, the one by ambiguitie, the other by unportunitie, by ambiguitie, as when the warning is given in a1. Ambiguitie.

doubtfull forme of speech which may be taken and understood two maner of waies, whereof the one is false and deceitfull, in such forme were the blinde prophesies signified in times past which as they say gave noble men warning but in such ambiguitie and obscuritie that the true meaning could never be knowne, till destruction had ended the strife.

The second fault is committed by importunitie, that is, when2. Importunitie.

admonition commeth too late.

Cataplexis.

Cataplexis in latine Comminatio, is a forme of speech, by which the Orator denounceth a threatening agasinst some person, people, citie, common wealth or country, conteining and declaring the certaintie or likelihood of plagues, or punishments to fall uppon them for their wickednesse, impietie, insolencie, and generall iniquitie.

Examples hereof are most plentiful in the holie Prophets agaynst Nations and Citties, but most chieflie agaynst Jerusalem, agaynste Baball, againste Damascus, Aegypt, the Philistines and Moabites, with many other moe.

Another example is to be seen, Mat. 23.37.38. And another in Jonas. 3. Yet fortie daies, and Ninivy shall be destroyed.

The use of this figure.

To deterre.

This figure pertaineth properly to deterre and drive men from sinne and wickednesse, and to force them to repentance, the effect whereof is seene in the example fo the Ninivites, Jonas 3.5.6.7.

The Caution.

There is in this forme of speech required discretion and wisdom, to denounce comminations, whether private or publike, lest by the folly and unaptnesse of thier forme, they loose their effect and vertue, which follow may diverse waies be committed, 1.Unequall.

first by inequality, as when the Orator threateneth greater punishments then the offences do deserve by equitie, as to threaten destruction and desolation, when it deserveth not so great a correction. Esay 3.24.

The prophet Esay threateneth by an apt proportion and relation, as stinke against perfumes, baldnesse agasint dressing of the haire, sackcloth against stomachers, & c.

The like maner and forme of relation Christ useth were he threatenth, saying: "Wo be to you that are full, for ye shall hunger: Wo be to you that now laugh, for ye shall waile and weepe." Luc.6.25.

Also by inequality, as when the Orator useth lesse threatnings then their desertes require, as to threaten whipping to offences which deserve hanging: this looseth his effect by faintnesse.

## 2. Incredible

Secondly, folly of commination may be committed by threatening and denouncing incredible punishments, as to threaten destruction by a diluge or a conquest, and desolation by the Antipodes or by a people either unknowne or far distant.

Categoria.

Categoria, in Latine Accusatio, or Criminis reprehensio, is a forme of speech by which the speaker openeth and detecteth some secret wickednesse of his adversary, and laieth it open before his face.

An example of Christ detecting Judas: "He that dippeth his hand with me in the dish, he shall betray me." Mat.26.23.

Another of Paul accusing Elymas the sorcerer, saying: "O full of all subtiltie and all mischief, thou childe of the divel, and enemye of all righteousnesse, wilt thou not cease to pervert the strait waies of the Lord?" Act.13.10

Another example there is, in the 52. Psalm of David, accusing Doeg of great wickednes, but chiefly of the mischief of his toong.

Christ accuseth the Scribes and Pharises of hypocrisie and Luc.11.

corruption.

The use of this figure.

The use hereof is chiefly required to accuse and reprehend hypocrisie, and intollerable impietie. To accuse and rebuke.

The Caution.

The most speciall poynt in this Caution is, that the accusation 1. Not false.

be not false, as those are many times which proceede from malice or envy, as the accusations of the Jewes against Christ, and likewise against Paul. Secondly, that it be not amplified without 2. Not amplified.

great cause. Thirdly, that it be not objected after a jesting or light maner, when it requireth a serious and sharpe forme. Fourthly, 3. Not after a light maner.

that it be not applied out of due time and fit place.

Paeanismus.

Paeanismus is a forme of speech which the Orator, or speaker useth to expresse his joy, either for the cause of some good thing obtained, or some evil avoyded.

An example: "And the women sang by course in their play, & said, Saul hath slain his thousand, & David his ten thousand." 1.Sam.18.7.

Another of Moses: "I will sing unto the Lord, for he hath triumphed gloriously, the Horse and him that rode upon him hath he overthrowne in the sea." Exo.18.1. Here Moses extolleth the glory of the victory, and triumpheth with great joy, praising the lord, and his power which was the cause, and describing the effect which was the drowning of Pharoah and his hoste.

To this forme of speech pertaineth this saying in the song of the virgine Mary: "From henceforth all generationns that call me blessed. And also this: He hath filled the hungry with good things, and the rich he hath sent emptie away." Luc 1.

Another: "O death where is thy sting? O grave where is thy victorie?" Cor.15.

The use of this figure.

The use of this figure hath his principall place in triumphs and triumph.

joyes for victories, and may be likened to the Trophes of martiall fame. Hence saith Horace. Et potius noua cantemus Augusti trophaea. This figure after a fort is lively represented in the Larkes song, which she singeth everie morning, in joy that the darknesse is gone and the light come.

The Caution.

Not unjust or against the poore.

The most especiall poynt of this Caution is, tha this figure be not used to insult upon the oppression of the poore, or affliction of innocents as Davids enemies did, saying there there so would we have it, and also were is now thy God??41.

Bdelygmia.

Bdelygmia, in latine Abominatio, and Fastidium, is a forme of speech which the speaker useth to signifie how much he hateth and abhorreth some person, word, deed, or thing, and it is used commonly in a short forme, and in few words. Against a person thus: Out upon him wretch. Against an odious word thus: Peace for shame. Against an odious deed, thus: Fie upon it. Against an odious thing, thus: Away with it, I love not to heare of it, I abhorre it: Avoyd Sathan, Mat.4.

Sometime with mo words, thus: No more for shame, bury it in silence, whose eyes can looke upon it, and not loath it, or whose eares can heare it, and not abhorre it?

The use of this figure.

To make odious. Not against good things.

The use hereof, tendeth onely to make things as odious to the hearer, as they are to the speaker, or at the least to signifie how odious they are, and what hatred they deserve. And the Caution hereof, tendeth to warne that it be not used either against things worthie of love, or things indifferent.

Proclees.

Proclesis in latine Provocatio, is a forme of speech by which the Orator provoketh his adversary to the conflict of the controversie, and that either by a vehement accusation, or by a confident offer of justification. By accusation, this of Eliphaz provoking Job, may be an example: "Is it for feare of thee that I wil accuse thee, or go with thee into judgement? Is not thy wickednesse great? and thine ungratious deeds abhominable? for thou hast taken the pledge from thy brother for nought, and spoyled the clothes of the naked." Job.22.

Another example of Elihu: "If thou canst give me answer, prepare thy self and stand before me, here Elihu provoketh Job without accusation." Job.33.5.

By offer of justification, this example of Christ is very effectuall, where he saith: "Which of you can rebuke me of sinne?" John.8.

Another of Josephs brethren: "with whomsoever of thy servants it be found let him die, and we also will be my Lords servants." Gen.44.9.

The use of this figure.



The right use of this figure doth most effectually serve, to commend & countenance a good cause, & in respect of our lawes, 1. To justifie a good cause.

it may be compared to the partie which having a good cause, maketh hast to joyne in issue, & also it may well be compared to the touchstone 2. Compared to the touchstone.

which either justifieth the gold, or bewrayeth the brasse.

Apocarteresis.

Apocarteresis in latine Tollerantia, is a forme of speech by which the speaker signifieth that he calleth away all hope concerning some thing, & turneth it another way.

An example of Job in these words: "He hath destroyed me on every side, and I am gone, and he hath removed mine hope like a tree." Job.19.10 Job in these words signifieth that he hath no more hope of worldly prosperitie and comfort, and therefore he turneth the eye of his hope to heaven, saying: "I know that my redeemer liveth, & c." verse 28. Whereby he comforteth himself ye better to indure & suffer so great and heavy a burthen of misery.

Ezechias despairing of life, turneth himself to praier and weeping. Esa.; 8.2.

Another: Let the widow weepe, and the fatherlesse children lament: Let kinffolke sorrow, and friendes mourne, yet cannot all this prevaile, for he is gone, and cannot be called againe, his absence must needs be suffered, when his presence cannot be redeemed, and therefore thinke on men that live, and let the dead rest.

The use of this figure.

1. A similitude.

As the sicke patient being forsaken by his phisition, and despairing both of health and life, betaketh himself to God to whose custodie he commendeth both his bodie and soule, expecting the grave for teh one, and heaven for the other.

2. Another similitude.

And as a besieged citie fainting in hope of her strength against the force of her enemy, turneth to supplication, or parling, even to this figure by a pitifull complaynt of despaire under a heavy 3. To move compassion.

burthen, helpeth mightly to move compassion, considering that of all miseries, the greatest misery and most to be pitied, is to be in misery without confort of friends, or hope of reliefe.

The Caution.

This figure is most abused when the sufference and despaire is 1. Counterfait despaire.

counterfayted. Secondly, when the passion and misery is declared, 2. Hope omitted.

and the hope omitted, which is the sinew and life of sufferance.

FIGURES OF MODERATION.

Figures of Moderation are such, as are lesse vehement then those which I have alreadie spoken of under the name and title of Exclamation. These following pertaine to more milde affections, and do require a more moderate forme of pronuntiation and utterance then those above rehearsed, which are proper to vehement affections and mightie possessions.

Martyria.

Martyria in Latine Testatio, is a forme of speech by which the Orator or Speaker confirmeth some thign by his owne experience.

An example of Eliphaz the Themanite: "I have seene the foolish deepe rooted and suddenly I cursed his habitation." Job.3.5.

Another of the Prophet David: "I have seene the wicked in great prosperitie, and flourishing like a greene Bay tree, I passed by, and he was gone." Psal.37.35.

Another of the same Prophet: "I have been yong, and now am old, yet I never saw the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging their bread." verse.2.5.

In these examples here shewed, Eliphaz and David do prove that which they speake, by the experience which they had in their time soon come to passe Likewise ye Evangelist Iohn sayth: "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seene with our eies, which we have looked upon, & c." 1.Joh.1.1.

The Orator by this forme of speech speaketh of things removed from the knowledge of his hearers, & alledged his owne testimonie, grounded upon his owne knowledge, The judge reciteth Judges.

the causes or cases falling out in his time and determined with the consent of the best opinions in his presence or place of authoritie.

The Phisition maketh report of his own prooffe in diseases and The Phisitions.

cures, and sometime doth record them tot he great benefite and good of the posterity.

The Captaine which hath been in many battels, at many sieges, assaults, defences, and encounters, and hath had experience Captaines.

in many stratagemes, doth teach yonger souldiers, and confirmeth that which he counselleth by his owne testimonie founded upon often prooffe.

The traveller maketh descriptions of Citties and Countries, Travellers.

where hee hath beene, and declareth the sundry fashions, and strange manners of far nations and people.

The use of this figure.

1. To confirm.

This forme of speech is of great strength, either to confirme or 2. To confute

confute, especially if the Orator or speaker be a man of gravity, and knowen credit, whom this figure doth best beseeeme. Also 3. To cause delectation

it causeth a diligent attention and joynd with delectation: for by nature men take more pleasure to heare the author of experience speake himselfe viva voce, then either to reade his expearence written, or to receive it from others by report and tradition.

The Caution.

1. Untruthes detected.

This figure being a forme of speech of so great, grave, and necessarie use, it is so much the more to be regarded that it 2. Publishing lewd profes odious, and mischevous.

bee not abused by the untruth of the testimonie which is wont to be the roote and Fountaine of many vanities, and wicked errors in the World, or by publishing the prooffe of evill conclusions, whereby the practise thereof may be further increased.

Apodixis.

Apodixi in Latine Experientia, and evidens probatio, is a forme of speech by which the Orator groundeth his saying upon generall and common experience, it differeth from Martyria in this, that in Martyria the Orator confirmeth his saying by the testimony of his owne knowledge, in this he inferreth his reason, and confirmation from knowen principles, which experience doth prove and no man can deny.

An example of Paul the Apostle: "Be not deceived, God is not mocked, for whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reape." Gal.6.7.

Another of Bildal the Shuite: Can a rush grow without mire, or the grasse grow without water?

Another of Salomon: Can a man take fire in his bosome, and his clothes not be burnt: or can a man go upon coles, and his feet not be burnt? Here in these two examples taken from the experience of Nature, are the reasons of their conclusions grounded.

Another of the Prophet David: They that go downe to the sea in ships, and occupy thier businesse in great waters, they see the workes of the Lord, and his wonders in the deepe.

To this place do belong many Proverbs and common sayings which are taken from generall prooffe and experience, hence is this saying: Trust not a horses heele, nor a dogs tooth. And likewise this: Fire and water have no mercy. Briefly the greatest part of all notable sayings and common Proverbs were first framed upon experience, and are still supported by it: among which there are diverse in meeter as this here following and many such like: I have heard my father say and eke my mother sing.

There is no fishing to the sea, nor service to the king. Which saying is proved most true by the experiene of all time.

The use of this figure.

Of all the formes of speech there is not one more apt, or more<sup>1</sup>. Mighty to confirme.

mighty to confirme or confute then this, which is grounded upon the strong foundation of experience confirmed by al times, 2. To confute

allowed of in all places, and subscribed to by all men.

The Caution.

There are diverse faultes which may be committed in the abuse of this figure: First when the sentence of experience is<sup>1</sup>. Not commonly known.

not commonly knowen and generally received, for then it breedeth a doubt, and proveth nothing. That wheat will turne into<sup>2</sup>. Not generally received.

darnell is a maxime of hush andmen approved: contrariwise that darnell wil turne into wheat, some men say they have proved it, but others will not beleeve it. Also when the saying is partly true and partly false, then is it no good maxime.

Apomnemonsysis.

Apomnemonsysis, called of some Dieu commemoratio, that is, the rehearsal of a saying: It is a forme of speech by which the Orator reciteth some saing or sentence of another worthy of remembrance and observation. An example of

the holy Scripture: "O hypocrites Esay, prophcyed well of you, saying" Matth 15.7.: "This people draweth neere unto me with their mouth and honoureth me with their lippes, but their heart is far from me." Esay.29.13.

Another of the Apostle Paul: "For in him we live, and mone, and have our boeing, as certaine of your owne Poets have sayd, for we are also his generation." Act.17.8.

The use of this figure.

1. To confirm.

By this place it is, that the Orator for the cause of better confirmation, confirmation, confutation, consolation, praise or reprehension reciteth2. confute.

some apt sentence, or fit testimonie of approved Authors, 3. To praise.

and applieth it to his purpose. In divinity the sentences of sacred 4. To reprehend.

Scriptures, and the excellent sayings of ancient and learned fathers, in the profession of the lawes, the recorded opinions and determinations 5. To Comfort.

of the most grave and prudent Judges, in the doctrine of PHisicke, the rules and directions of the best approved Authors: in the lectures of Philosophy the most high and prudent reasons of the most renowned Philosophers, and so consequently in all others.

The Caution.

The first and chiefe point that is to be observed concerning this figure by way of Caution, is to take heed that good sayings be not applyed to evil purpose, which commeth many times1. A good sentence all applyed.

to passe by mans ignorance, insolency or mallice, or by Satans subtiltie. 2. By ignorance.

By ignorance men mistaking the sence of the authority alledged, fall into grosse errors. By insolency proud and wanton 3. By insolency.

persons do oft apply sacred sentences to most prophane and vile uses wresting chast sayings to unchast sences. By malice, 4. Sacred scriptures vilely abused.

hipocrites and heretikes do most wickedly pervert the true sence and meaning of the holy Scriptures, as did the Scribes & Pharisyes5. By malice.

the law of Moses.

6. By Satans subtilty.

By Satans subtilty opposed against all truth, which tendeth either to the glory of God or the salvation of man: as may appear in the 4. of Matthew and 6. verse, where he most deceitfully and maliciously abuseth that saying of the Prophet: "He shall give his Angels charge over thee, with the rest following." Psal.90.12.

Antirrthesis.

Antirrthesis is a forme of speech by which the Orator rejecteth the authority, opinion or sentence of some person: for the error or wickednesse in it.

An example: Job to his wife saying to him blaspheme God and die, made this answeere saying: "thou speakest like a foolish woman." Job.2.10.

Another of the Apostle Paul rehearsing the common saying of the Epicures: Let us eate and drinke, for to morrow we shal die, which he rejecteth thus: “Be not deceived (saith he to the Corinthians) evill words corrupt good manners.” 1. Cor. 15.32

This same forme of speech Christ useth against Satan Mat.4. where he rejecteth the subtil attempts and false allegations of Satan by the mightie power and truth of his answeres.

The use of this figure.

This forme of speech doth specially belong to confutation and To confute errors.

is most apt to refell errors and heretics, and to reject evil counsell and lewd perswasions.

The Caution.

As this figure is mighty to confute falshood, so regard ought to be had that it be not bent against the truth, which the enemies Not to be used against the truth.

of the truth are wont to do, as did ye Philosophers of the Epicures sect at Athens against Paul, saying: “what will this babler say? others sayd, he is a setter forth of strange Gods.” Act.17.18.

Euphemismus.

Euphemismus in Latine boni ominis captatio, that is, a Prognostication of good, and it is a forme of speech, by which the Orator either interpreteth an uncertaine thing to the better part, or else declareth before that some good thing shall come to passe afterward, which he speaketh from divine revelation, or else collecteth it by some likely signes and tokens.

An example of the Apostle Paul: I exhort you to be of good courage, for there shalbe no losse of any mans life among you, but of the ship onely.

To this figure or forme of speech do belong the propheticall blessings of Jacob concerning the happy success that should come to his posteritie long time after. Act.27.22.

But the most generall use of this figure is to collect by probable signes the likely effectes of good cuases, and to foretell them, as by the good towardnesse of youth to prognosticate the vertue and felicity of the future age, for a good beginning doth promise a good end, a good cause a good effect, a holy life a happy death, whereupon I may say mentioning some good man, and now dead, I speake of him that is in heaven.

The use of this figure.

1. To plant hope.

This figure pertaineth properly to consolation, hope and encouragement, 2. To encourage.

and may be compared (in respect of the early signification) to those signes in the firmament which do betoken 3. Compared to signes of serenity.

and prognosticate severity, or to the prosperous spring, which ministreth hope of a plentiful harvest.

The Caution.

1. Deceitfull flattery.

The greatest abuse that this figure may commit is, when it turneth away from the right and lawfull use to deceave and seduce by flattery and malice, or by the false interpretation of 2. Malicious fraud.

dreames. The abuse of this figure hath prognosticated and promised to many men felicity, crownes and kingdomes, and have performed wofull miserie, captivity and destruction, and therefore needfull to be forewarned and good to be avoided.

Ominasio.

Ominasio is sometime taken in good part and then is it Euphemismus last spoken of, but it is more oft put for the contrary, and then it is a forme of speech, by which the Orator foretelleth the likeliest effect to follow of some evill cause. Prov. 6. 10.

An example of Cicero against Antony: If thou followest these purposes, beleve me thou canst not long continue.

An example of holy Scripture: How long wilt thou sleep O sluggard, when wilt thou arise out of thy sleepe, & c. Therefore thy poverty commeth upon thee as one that travelleth by the way, & thy necessity like an armed amn. By this figure the Orator foresheweth beggery to the slothfull, shame to the proud, mischief to the quareller, and the gallowes to the thiefe.

The use of this figure.

This figure tendeth to the commination and warning of the To forewarn by threatning likely effects.

hearer, whether it be applied against him, or against any other. The principall effect whereof is, that by the consideration of the evill end foreshewed, ye cause of that evil effect is oftentimes by grace and wisdom avoided.

The Caution.

This forme of speech is abused diverse wayes: first when it riseth from anger and malice without any likely conjectures<sup>1</sup>. Furious foretellings differ little from malicious wishes.

gathered from causes, such as men do commonly utter in thier rage, making malicious prognostications against the parties with whom they be angry, as that they wil be hanged, or that the Evill will one day fetch them, it would be a very wofull world if all such Prognostications should prove true: but for as much as they seldome take effect, the malicious planet is generally contemned, and the false Prognosticator is commonly derided.

Secondly, this figure is abused by prognosticating the infortunate<sup>2</sup>. Fortelling destinies by the birth time.

life or death of men by the time of their birth: as collected by constellation, and influence fo some malicious Planet.

Thirdly it is abused by foretelling of ill fortunes, and that either<sup>3</sup>. By Physiognomy and Palmistry.

by Phisognomy, or Palmistrie, which are nothing else but meere illusions and vanities more worthy to be abhorred than to be beleved.

Fourthly, by false prophesies, fained by the vanity and wickednesse<sup>4</sup>. By Hypocrisy.

of men, foretelling the death of great men, the mutation of kingdomes, the great mortality of men, and the utter confusion of all the world with the preffred and forenamed times, as the yeare, the day, and sometime the houre, which have so often failed, and proved false, that wise men will beware how to beleve them.

Fiftly, it is wont to be abused by foolish observations of certaine accidences, as to gather conjectures of some trouble, losse, death of some frendes, and such like, by dreames, by bleeding of 5. By accidences & dreams

the nose, by spots upon the hand, by the stumbling of a horse, by the death of beefe, by a hare crossing the way, and by an infinite number more of such like uncertaine signes and flase causes of conjectures.

Diatyposis.

Diatyposis is called in Latine Informatio & Testamentum: In Rhetorick it is a forme of speech, by which the speaker or Orator commendeth certaine profitable rules and precepts to his hearers and to the posterity.

An example of Salomon: “My sonne hearken unto my wisdom, and incline thine eare unto my prudence, that thou maist regard counsell, & thy lips observe knowledge, & c.” Prov.5.1.2.

Another: My sonne keepe thy fathers commandements, and forsake not the law of thy mother. After these precepts, he addeth the rules, and partes of his counsell: Joseph geveth instruction to his brothers what answere they should make to Pharaoh.

Paul delivereth rules to Timothie concerning Bishops, Deacons, widowes and servants. 1.Tim.3.

Peter geveth good precepts to wives concerning their subjection to their husbands, and their modestie in apparel. 1.Pet.3.

Another of Jethro giving rules to Moses for the election of Judges, saying: “Moreover provide thou among all the people, men of courage, fearing God, men dealing truly, hating covetousnesse, & appoint such over them to be rulers over thousands, rulers over hundreds rulers over fifties, & rulers over ten, and then let them judge the people at all seasons, & c.” Exodus 18, 21, 22.

The use of this figure.

The practice and use of this forme doth necessarily require gravity Authority required.

and authoritie in the speaker and rule giver: Examples hereof are the Patriarks, Apostles, Lawmakers, magistrates, parents & governours, for from these (as conduits of wisdom, ordeined by almighty God for our direction) we receive the wholesome rules and profitable counsell of life, by which we are guided through ye wilderness of this life illuminated in the midst of our darknesse, and supported from falling into wilful confusion. By this forme the wisdom of the Creator geveth precepts to his creatures, Patriarks to their posterity, Prophets to their people, Princes to their subjects, Parents to their children, and old age to tender youth.

The Caution.

This forme of speech becommeth faultie and unlawfull, by 1. Wicked counsell.

the corruption of men, abusing their wittes as by giving ungratious and evil counsailes, or their authoritie by making ungodly lawes and adicts, or by commanding & persuading things blameworthy as did Rebeccah, commanding and counselling her 2. Unrighteous preceptes.

sonne Jacob to steale his fathers blessing, and thereby to prevent Esau his elder brother. Briefly this forme of speech is abused by 3. By whom it is abused.

false prophets and teachers, by wicked Princes, ungodly parents, and ungratious counsellors.

Antisagoge.

Antisagoge is a forme of speech by which the Orator joyneth to a precept, of vertue, a promise of reward, and to the contempt of a precept, he denounceth a punishment, whereof this example of Moses may sufficiently shew the forme, where he saith: “If thou shalt obey the voyce of ye Lord thy God, and observe and do all his commandements, which I command thee this day, then the Lord thy God wil set thee on hye above all the nations of the earth. And all these blessings shall come upon thee & c.” Deu.28.1.2. “But if thou wilt not obey the voyce of ye Lord thy God, to keepe and do all his commandements, and his ordinances, which I command thee this day, then all these curses shal come upon thee and overtake thee, & c.” Vers.15.16.

The use of this figure.

This forme of speaking doth alwaies carry with it a mightie power<sup>1</sup>. To plant a hope.

and force to move men to the obedience of lawes and preceptes: for by the promise it worketh a hope of that which men<sup>2</sup>. To move a feare.

desire, and by the threatning it moveth hate, and by them both an obedience of that which is commaunded: what forme of speech in this respect can do more, or what so much?<sup>3</sup>. To perswade to obedience.

The Caution.

This figure is then abused when promises of rewards or threatening<sup>1</sup>. Unlawfull allurements.

of punishment, are used to move and further the obedience of unlawfull precepts, or the performance of wicked counsell. As did Balake the King of the Moabites, promising Balaam promotion of honour, and great gifts to curse his enemies the Israelites.<sup>2</sup>. Wicked threatnings.

And as did Nabucodonezer threatening all that would refuse to worship his golden image, should be cast into a fire furnace. These two examples may suffice to shew how much the wicked abused their willes, in wicked precepts, their wealth in allurements, and their power in terrors, al which tend to the abuse of this excellent forme of perswasion.

Paradiogesis.

Paradiogesis is called in Latine Narratio quae sit obiter atque in transitu, and properly in Rhetoricke it is called a forme of speech by which the Orator telleth or maketh mention of someting that it may be a fit occasion or introduction to declare his further meaning, or principall purpose, which is a speciall and artificiall forme of insinuation. A verie apt example we have in the 17. of the Acts, of Paul who tooke an occasion by the Aultar which he saw in Athens as he passed by, both to reprove the idolatry of the Athenians, and also to teach them the true worship of the living God. The Evangelist Luke doththus record it: Then Paul stood in the midst of Mars street, & said: Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious, for as I passed by, I found an aultar wherein is written unto the unknowne GOD, whom ye then ignorantly worship, him shew I unto you, God that made the worlde, and all things that are therein, seeing he is Lord of heaven & earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands, neither is worshipped with mens hands, as though he needed any thing, seeing he giveth to all life and breath and all things, and so consequently, he proceedeth to the full declaration of his purpose.

The use of this figure.

It is verie necessarie to foresee that the narration may be like to the purpose that shall follow, and then this figure becommeth as it were an artificial & cunning key of speech to open the doore of To speake by apt occasion.

occasion wherby ye purpose & desire of the mind do find an apt and easie enterance into the desired lbiertie of utterance, and the way that is thus prepared, is both readie, profitable, and worthe of singular praise, and no doubt a speciall point of wisdom.

The Caution.

If the occasion be unlike and unfit for the matter of the drift<sup>1</sup>. Unlike.

and desire following, it is a great deformitie to this figure, and <sup>2</sup>. Unfit.

bewrayeth the imperfection of the speaker.

Occasion.

Also in this respect regard ought to be had, that this forme of<sup>3</sup>. Of quarel.



speech here described be not abused to find out a fit occasion either 4. Of detraction.

for a malicious quarrell, an envious detraction or a foolish tale. 5. Of a foolish tale.

Pareuresis.

Pareuresis, in latine Admuentio, and Excoritata excusatio is a forme of speech by which the speaker alledgeth a premeditated excuse conteining reasons of such might as are able to vanquish all objections. A most artificall example hereof is found in the answere of Aeneas to Dido, in the 4. booke of Aeneidos, whereof I have gathered the summe both of the objections of Dido, and of the answeres & excuses of Aeneas, and have put them into partes as they stand in the Author, and first of her objection then after of his excuse and answere.

First, she objecteth by her suspition gathered from probable tokens1.

and very likely signes, his unkinde and wicked purpose to steale away from her, to whom she declareth her most fervant love, charging him with his promise, faithfully plighted to her.

Secondly, she telleth him that for his sake, she is hated of forraine2.

Princes, and despised of her owne people, that for his sake her high and exalted fame were utterly lost.

Thirdly, she declareth that for his sake the danger of conquest3.

both of Carthage and her kingdome were most like to ensue, if he should wilfully persist, & wickedly proceed in this his evil purpose, which did most wofully and grievously appeare unto her.

To whose objection Aeneas maketh an anwere consisting of many parts as followeth: First he confeseth her kindnesse, goodnesse, and liberalitie. Secondly, he uterly denieth that ever his entent was to depart by stealth. Thirdly, he telleth her that wedlocke was never his meaning, nor his commng. Fourthly, he saith, that he greatly desireth to restore his ancient citie of Troy. Fifthly, he alledgeth that ye Oracle of Apollo calleth him from Carthage to Italy. Sixthly, he argueth from equall comparison, that if she might take delight and pleasure to ddwell in Carthage her native Citie and country, why might not the Troyans likewise repaire to the land which they most longed after? Seventhly, he sheweth her that his fathers ghost doth every night warn him away. Eightly, that he did wrong to his sonne Ascanus, to withhold him so long from Italy, his promised enheritance. Ninthly, he signifieth that by a message from God himselfe, both appearing to his eyes and sounding in his eares, he is commanded to remove and depart from thence, and therefore wisheth her to content her selfe, and cease her wailing for his love which might not prevaile, and therefore in vaine.

The use of this figure.

To repel surmised accusations.

This figure is a singular frame, and fortresse of speech, able to repell all the violence and force either of untrue and surmisedTo answer unreasonable requests.

accusations, or unreasonable requests: or a ready fountaine to quench all vehement expostulations, and burning complaints of unkindnesse unjustly conceived.

The Caution.

False excuses need no examples.

The true and lawfull use of this figure, is opposed by fained and false excuses, whereof there be too many examples in the world, and therefore the lesse need here to put an example.

Philophronesis.

Philophroneſis in latin Benevolentia and Exceptio benigna, is a forme of ſpeech by which the ſpeaker perceiving the might of his adverſary to be too reat and too ſtrong againſt him, uſeth gentle ſpeech, faire promiſes, and humble ſubmiſſion, to mitigate the rygor and crueltie of his adverſary: we have a notable example hereof in Jacob: who fearing the malice and might of his brother Eſau, uſed this meanes to appeaſe his reage and crueltie. He commeth before his family, as ſoone as he ſaw Eſau, he ſhewed a ſigne of dutiful ſubmiſſion he bowed himſelfe ſeven times moſt humbly before he came neare to him, calling him his Lord, and himſelfe his ſervant, his family al children came likewise in ſeemly and ſuppliant order, and humbled themſelves at his preſence, yeelding obeiſance and reverence unto him, by meanes whereof the firery and flaming wrath of Eſau was turned into teares of compaſſion.

The lyke example of ſubmiſſion there is in the third Chapter of Judith, where the Embaſſadores of the Iſraelites, do deliver their humble ſubmiſſion of Olophernes, in theſe words ſaying: Behold we are the ſervants of Navucodonozor the great King, we lye downe before thee, uſe us as ſhall be good in thy ſight, behold our houſe and all our places, and all our fieldes of wheate, and our flockes, and our heards, and all our lodges and tabernacles lye before thy face: uſe them as it pleaſeth thee. Behold, even our Citties and the inhabitants thereof are thy ſervants: come and take them as it ſeemeth good to thee. So the men came to Olophernes and declared them unto him after the ſame maner.

The uſe of this figure.

The uſe of this figure is of a ſingular vertue, both in reſpect To appeaſe wrath, & mitigate tyrannie.

of civill pollicie it often appeaſeth the malice of enemies, mollifieth the cruell hearts of tyrants, ſaveth the life of innocents, and preventeth the deſtruction of Cities and countries, which the histories of tunes do ſufficiently confirme. In reſpect of ſpirituell wiſedome this forme of humble ſubmiſſion of man to his high judge, & imperiall prince moveth compaſſion, turneth away his heavy diſpleaſure, and obtaineth grace and mercy. If Achab being a wicked man found favour in Gods ſight to eſcape preſent puniſhment due to his iniquitie, onely b humbling himſelfe before him, how much more ſhal good men in the true and contrite humilitie of repentance prevaile with the ſame God, who never deſireth the death of a ſinner, but rather that he may convert and live?

The Caution.

The counterfait ſubmiſſion of hypocrites is opposed to the true<sup>1</sup>. Fained ſubmiſſion.

uſe of this figure which is wel obſerved by Jeſus Sirach, who deſcribed it thus: “There is ſome (ſaith he) that being about wicked purpoſes do bow downe themſelves, and are ſad, whoſe inward part burne altogether with deceyt.” Eccle.19.25. And alſo he ſheweth 2. Counterfaith ſubmiſſion may practice miſchief.

that ſuch a one under clour of humble ſubmiſſion, will execute his malice upon thee before thou ſhalt be able to prevent him.

Syngnome.

Syngnome in latin called Ignocentia, is a form of ſpeech by which the Orator or ſpeaker being a patient of many and great injuries, or of ſome one great and greevous wrong, pronounceth pardon and forgiveness to his adverſary, who was the worker of all his miſerie.

An example of our Saviour Chriſt on the croſſe, praying for his enemies, ſaying: “Father forgive them, for they knowe not what they do.” Luc.3.34.

Another of Steven the Martyr at his death, who cryed with a loud voice, ſaying: “Lord laie not this ſinne to their charge.” 2.Cor.2.10.

Another of Paul: To whom ye forgive anything, I forgive alſo.

The uſe of this figure.

To commend the charme of the speaker.

The use of this figure doth aptly serve to commend the clemencie, charitie and mercy of the speaker, and also to note the impietie of the malefactor, and that significantly in the forme of remission, To accuse significantly.

, for pronouncing of pardon and forgiveness, is never without a note and signification of injury.

The Caution.

In the use of this figure it is necessarie and also a speciall of poynt of wisdom to take heede, that forgiveness be not graunted, 1. Too great sufferance, & too much remission are supporters of impunitie.

where punishment or correction is needfully required, for too great a lenitie and readinesse to forgive, is the manifest supporting of impunitie, whereupon the common proverbe did first rise: That foolish pitie, undoeth many a Citie.

Also it is a part of charitie, to regard that this forme of speech<sup>2</sup>. A Cunning accusation to raise suspition.

be not used to raise a false suspicion, or an injurious accusation, which is doen by proclaiming or pronouncing forgiveness to him which hath done no injurty, as for to say: God forgive him. This saying is a kinde of accusation, and sufficient to raise a suspition, and yet expreseth nothing.

Epicrisis.

Epicrisis in latine Adjudicatio, is a forme of speech by which the Orator reciting a sentence or saying of some Authour, addeth and delivereth his opinion or judgement upon it, and that either in the priase or dispraise of it, or in giving light to it, which is best performed in a short addition.

In praise, as when the Orator having recited some notable saying of an Author worthie of observation, he addeth his commendation to it, commending it for the excellency, in respect of the wisdom, equitie, holinesse, comfort, pleasantnesse, or profit contained in it. In dispraise, as when the orator delivereth his judgement upon a saying which seemeth to him evill, and worthie of that note, dispraising it in the respect of the folly, iniquitie, prophanesse, untruth, or absurditie which it containeth.

In giving light to it, as when the orator perceiving ye words, or sentence of an Author to be obscure or ambiguous to his hearer, sheweth his knowledge judgement or opinion upon it, wherby he maketh that plain and evident, which was before darke and hard to be understood.

An example of our Saviour Christ, saying: "Ye have heard that it was sayd to them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery, but I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." Mar.5.27.

Philip enterpreteth a place of Esay to the Eunuch. Act.8.35.

The use of this figure.

This figure in respect of the praise which it giveth to a sentence or a doctrine, causeth attention and love, attention when the 1. To cause attention.

praise go before the sentence, love when it follow after. In respect of the dispraise it worketh the contrary, except when the saying is first odiously noted to procure attention to the large declaration following.

In respect of interpretation, or addition of lightsome glosses,<sup>2</sup>. To make darke sense evident.

it is an ordinary meane to avoyd errors, and a lanterne of light to direct in the darknesse of speech.

The Caution.

The most usuall and ocmmon abuse of this figure, groweth either of ignorance or envy, for ignorance often commendeth that which deserveth hatred, and envy is readie to detract and diminish the estimation of good things. And as concerning the addition of light to the sense, ignorance is alwaies a deceitfull guide to lead the judgement into errors.

Paramythia.

Paramythia, in latine Consolatio, is a forme of speech which the Orator useth to take away, or diminish a sorrow conceived in the minde of his hearer.

An example of Aeneas in Virgil, and thus translated.

O mates (quoth he) that many a wo have big, & borne ere this,

Worse have we seene, and these also shall end, when Gods will is.

Another of Eliphas the Themanite, who hath in his example left an excellent president for a profitable forme of consolation. First, he observeth oportunitie, staying til time had made a preparation for the salve of consolation, and then he commeth as a most prudent and divine Phisition, and ministreth his medicine of spirituall comfort, in these words saying: Blessed is the man whom God correcteth, therefore refuse not thou the chastening of the almightie, for he maketh the wound and bindeth it up, he smiteth and his hand maketh whole. AFter this he addeth many branches of Gods mercy, loving kindnesse, and fatherly protection towards his children, and thereupon concludeth that Job ought to apply all these considerations to himselfe, as most precious medicines able to minister consolation and strength to his fainting spirit.

The use of this figure.

The use of this figure is great, and most necessarily required in this vale of misery, where mens harts are often fainting, and their mindes falling into despaire, for so great are mens losses in this fraile life, and so little is their fortitude to beare them, that they fall downe in their weaknesse lying still opprest under their heavy burthen, never able to rise againe, without the strength of comfort and consolation: for so great is the infirmitie and frailty of man being left alone to himselfe in affliction and misery, that he is compared to the waxe that melteth at the heate of the fire & to the smok ye is driven away with ye power of ye wind. Against this weaknesse, consolation ministreth strength & restoreth men to life and joy, that were dying in misery and sorrow.

The Caution.

The first point of care and regard in the use of this figure is 1. Consolation among scornors unmeete.

to take heede that consolation be not applyed where correction and commination be more needefully required, as thy do which apply the use of comfort to hypocrites and scornors of Gods judgements.

Secondly, that it be not minsistred out of season, as either too 2. Oportunity necessary to be observed.

soone, when the wound is new made, and the blood running swiftly in the streame of effusion, I meane the sorrow newly begun, and the affections confounded with the beholding, and consideration of the wofull losse or miserie: or too late, as when the sorrow is either forgotten, or wel asswaged, for then it may by a needlesse remembrance rather renew and call against the sorrow nye at an end, then utterly quench it.

Thirdly, that it be not unproper and impertinent to the cause and necessitie to which it is applyed.

Fourthly, that it be not weake by reason of the foundations consisting only in Philosophy and humane wisdome which do many times rather increase sorrow theen diminish it: these and many mo such like faultes offending against the true forme of consolation ought most carefully and diligently to be shunned, otherwise the use of consolation shall take small effect.

Eucharistia.

Eucharistia in Latine Gratiarum actio, is a forme of speech, by which the speaker geveth thanks for benefites received.

An example of Cicero: To thee O Caesar wee give most hartly thanks, yea great thanks wee yeeld to thee.

Another of our saviour Christ: Father I thanke thee for that thou hast heard me.

This forme of speech is used much with acknowledging the benefites received, and the unworthinesse of the receiver, whereof we have an example in Jacob the Patriarch, where he saith in these words: "I am not worthy of the least of all thy mercies, and all the truth which thou hast shewwed unto thy servant, for with my staffe came I over this Jordan, and now I have two droves." Gen.31.10.

Sometime it is joynd with a confession of the unableness of the receiver to requite the giver, after the example of David, where he saith: "What shal I give unto the Lord for all the benefites towards me? or, for all the benefites which he hath bestowed upon me?" Psal.16.

The use of this figure.

1. To extoll the goodnes of the giver.

This forme of speec tendeth to two speciall endes, to extoll the goodnesse of the giver by whom the speaker or thanksgiver hath been favoured, relieved, enriched, advanched, instructed, 2. To declare the gratitude of the receiver.

pardoned or protected. And to expresse the mindfull gratitude of the receiver, who by his giving thanks declareth that he hath neither buried the benefite, nor forgotten the giver, but setting them both before the eyes of his mind, acknowledgeth his bounden 3. To commend the benefite received.

duty towards so great favour and goodnesse with his heart, and to praise him with his mouth.

The Caution.

To give small thanks for great benefits argueth ingratitude Many abuses.

or folly: and contrarise to yeeld great thanks for trifles betokeneth flattery: To repeat thanks openly without some fit occasion inducing to it, is a point of folly. So in giving thaneks to name the benefites, namely if thy be very small and scarce worth thanks, in an absurdity in the speaker, and a disgrace to the giver: to give scornful thanks for frendly gifts is a most vicked and impudent ingratitude: To give compelled thanks doth accuse the receiver either of ingratitude, or of forgetfulnesse.

Proecthesis.

Proecthesis is a forme of speech by which the speaker defendeth by his answer, containing a reason of that which he hath said or done, proving thereby that he ought not to be blamed.

An example of Job, who being acused & rebuked of his friends of impaciency and anger, or sinne and folly, replyeth thus: "O that my greefe were well weied, and my miseries layed together in the ballance" Job.6.2: and by and by after he addeth, saying: "Doth ye wild asse bray when he hath grasse, or looweth ye Ore when he hath fodder?" Verse.5.

In this forme of speech our Saviour Christ doth many times defend his doings against the accusation of his enemies: as, for healing the man with the withered hand on ye Sabboth, he saith unto them: "Is it lawful to do good or to evil on the Sabboth? to save a man or to destroy him: And also in matthew: which of you having one sheepe, if it fall into a pit on the Sabboth, wil not pull it out and raise it up?" Mar.3.4

In like manner he defendeth his Disciples being accused for pulling the eares of corne on the Sabbath day, by alledging the example of David eating the shew bread in his great hunger. Secondly by shewing his authority being Lord of the Sabbath. And thirdly by citing a sentence of Ose, which he thus applyeth: "If you knew (saith he) what this meaneth, I will have mercy and not sacrifice, you would not have condemned the Innocentes." Ose.6.8. And being also accused by his enemies for eating and drinking with Publicans and sinners, he answereth saying: "They that are whole neede not the Phisition, but they that are sicke: And also I am not come to call the righteous but sinners to repentance." Math.12.13.

The use of this figure.

This figure is a forme of confutation, and is commonly used in 1. To excuse.

the defence of lawful sayings, and actions, and also to confute 2. To defend.

untrue surmises, and false accusations. 3. To confute.

The Caution.

In the use of this figure it is the part of the Orator to looke to the lawfulness of ye cause before he taketh it in hand to defend: for to maintaine wicked sayings or lewd deedes is a manifest iniquity. An example whereof we have in Roboam Salomons sonne, who both unwisely and unjustly defended the rigor and oppresion of his government, aming this cruel answere to his people that complained: "My Father (saith he) chastised you with roddes, but I will chastice you with scourges." 2.Reg.12.14.

Also to regard that his answere may containe a sufficient reason, and not to alledge will for reason, or answere as Pilate did to the Jews, finding fault with his superscription, that I have written (saith he) I have written.

Epiphonema.

Epiphonema is an exclamation of a matter uttered, or approved, conteining the summe and conclusion thereof: And first of a matter uttered.

An example: So weighty a matter it was to set up the Romane nation

Another of the holy Scripture: "So mightily grew the word of God and prevailed." Act.19.20.

Of matters approved, an example of Peter saying thus to his Lord: "Lo, we have forsaken all and followed thee." Matth.19.2.7.

Another: "He hath doen all things well: he hath made both the deafe to heare, and the dumbe to speake." Mar.7.37.

The use of this figure.

1. To admire & commend.

The use hereof serveth properly to signify the content, well liking, or admiration of the speaker in respect either of the 2. To signify consent.

words uttered, or of the matter approved: for which cause it may be called the Rhetoricall plausus, for it evermore endeth with a proclaimed liking, or much marvelling, that is to say, an amplifying of honesty, wickednesse, pleasure, dignity, profit, losse.

The Caution.

1. Folly.

In the use of this figure prudent discretion, and exact judgement 2. Rashnes.

are necessarily required, lest folly or rashnesse do acclaime either 3. Malice.

vainly without cause, or wickedly without respect of equitie and due consideration: as did Davids enimies, crying, “there, there, so would we have it” Act.12.22.: or as did Herods hearers, shouting and saying: the voice of a God and not of a man:

#### FIGURES OF CONSULTATION.

Figures of consultation I call such, which by reason of their forme and interrogation seeme to consult and deliberate with the hearers, the figures of this order are of great strength and force in an oration, and as it were the principall motion and life thereof: they quicken the dulnesse of the hearer, they cause attention, and do urge the hearer to the consideration of the answer, or to the expectation thereof: they are mighty, and also most apt to confirme or confute, to praise or dispraise, to accuse or defend, and briefly they are most fit formes for a most earnest and vehement oration.

#### Interrogatio.

Interrogatio, a demanding or asking, of which there be two kindes, the one simple and plaine, which is, when we aske with desire to receive an answer: as did the mariner of Ionas: Tell us (say they) of whose cause are we thus troubled? 1. Interrogation plaine.

what is thine occupation? and whence comest thou? what councillier art thou? and of what nation? And as ye wise men did, saying: Where is he that is borne king of ye Jewes? The other kind of interrogation is figurative, and it is when we 2. Interrogation figurative.

aske not with intent or desire to receive an answer, but onely because we would thereby make our speech more sharpe and vehement, and much better further our purpose: and this forme of speaking may serve very wel and aptly to expresse any affection, as may appeare in these examples following.

1. Love: “How faire art thou? and how pleasant art thou O my love?” Come.6.5. Another example of David: “O how sweet are thy wordes unto my throat?” Psal.119.

2. Hatred: “Why wilt thou have pleasure in an harlot?” Prov.5.

3. Desire: How long tarriest thou Lord?

4. Anger: How long Catiline wilt thou abuse our patience? Another of our Saviour Christ: “O faithlesse & crooked generation how long shall I be with you? how long shall I suffer you?” Mat. 17.

5. Admiration, Virgil: What is it that the greedy hunger of gold doth not urge and compel mortal men to attempt?

6. Doubting: What shall I do, wither shal I go, to whome shal I flee for succour?

7. Wishing: Shal I not see him before I die? ye is, I would I might.

8. Sorrow or pittie: Why dyed not I in my birth? Why set they me upon their knees, and gave me sucke with their breastes?

9. Despaire, as Sinon in Virgil: Alsse 9saith he) what ground, what sea may me (now wretch) receive? What shall I do?

This figurative demaund hath many and diverse kindes differing among themselves as their descriptions and examples shall declare.

#### Erotema.

Erotema is a forme of speech by which the Orator doth affirme or deny somthing strongly.

An example of Esay: "Are you not children of Adultery and a seed of dissimulation?" Esay.57.

Another: "Is not thy wickednesse great, and thine ungratious deedes abominable?" Job.22.

Another: "Doth God pervert the thing that is lawfull, or doth the Almighty pervert justice? can a rush be green without moisture, or may the grasse grow without water?" Job.8.3.11. that is to say, it cannot.

The use of this figure.

1. To confirm.

This figure giveth to speech not onely life and motion, but also 2. To confute.

great strength and a coragious countenance, which is much comended in the supporting of good causes, and also very necessary to countenance truth and verity: and it may aptly be compared to the point or edge of a weapon, wherewith the Champion defendeth himselfe, and woundeth his enimie.

The Caution.

1. Subtilty or craft.

This figure is most commonly abused by subtilty and impudency, 2. Impudent boldnesse.

as either in accusing falsly, or in denying shamelesly.

Pysma.

Pysma is a figure by which the Orator doth demaund many times together, and use many questions in one place, whereby he maketh his speech very sharpe and vehement, and it differeth from Erotema, forasmuch as that may be answered with one word either granting or denying, but this not without many. Cicero for Roscius: In what place did he speake with them? with whom did he speake? did he hire them? whom did he hire, and by whom? To what end, or how much did he give them?

An example of the sacred Scripture: "Will the Lord absent himselfe for ever, and will hee be no more intreated? Is his mercy cleane gone for ever? and is his promise come utterly to an end for evermore? hath God forgotten to be gracious? and will hee shut up his loving kindnesse in displeasure?" Psal.

The use of this figure.

This figure serveth fitly for pittifull complaints, provocations, 1. To complaine.

insultations, confirmations, and such like: and like as 2. To move pittie.

the former, it is mighty to confirme, to confute, to provoke, to 3. To provoke.

cause attention, to moove affections, and it is well and aptly represented in the conflict of battaile, as in the manifold strokes 4. To insult.

of the sword, thicke volies of arrowes, and in the thundring 5. To confirm.

peales of cannon shot. 6. To confute.

7. To cause attention.

The Caution.



Plaine meaning & just dealing would taht this figure should1. To deceive by fraud.

not be used to decave the hearer by the multitude of questions, and thereby to countenance falshood and oppresse the2. To oppres by multitude.

truth: as doth the fallace in Sophistrie, called Plures interrogationes.

Hypophora.

Hypophora is a forme of speech by which the Orator answereth to his owne demaund.

An example of the Prophet Esay: "Whom hast thou defied and blasphemed? against whom hast thou lifted up thy voice, and exalted thy proud lookes? Even against the holy one of Israel." Esay.37.

Another of the Apostle Paul: Shall we continue in sinne, that grace may abound? God forbid.

An example of the author to herennius. Our auncestors if thy condemned any woman of one offence, they deemed her by plaine judgement to be convicted of many: by what reason? for whom they judge unchast in life, they esteemed also guilty of poysoning: why so? because it must needes be, that she which addicteth her body to unlawful lust doth feare many: who be they? her husband, her parentes, and others to whom she seeth the infamy of her dishonesty doth concerne: what then? it must needes be that by any meanes shee may, shee will indevor their destruction, whom she feareth so much: wherefore? because there is no honest means to hold her back whom the greatnesse of the offence maketh fearfull, intemprancy bold, and womans nature rash. What judged they of her which was condemned of poisoning? Also of necessity unchast of body: wherefore? because nothing might sooner move her to that wickednesse then dishonest love and intemperate lust. Forasmuch as they thought that the body of that woman could not be chaste whose mind was corrrpt: what did thy not observe the same in men? no: why so? because any desire doth thrust men forward to any one mischief, one desire leadeth women to all mischiefes.

Another example of the same Author: Our elders did wel provide this law, that it should not be lawfull to put to death any king whom they should take in battaile: why so? because it were against reason and equity to imploy that power which fortune hath given to us, in the punishment of those whom the same fortune had a little before placed in a most high and honorable estate: what for that he brought his army as an enemy? I do forget it: why do you so? because it is the part of a constant and valiant Captaine to esteeme them his enemies which do contend for the victory, and to judge them men which are overcome, to this end, that fortitude may diminish warre, and humanity encrease peace: but would he have done the like if he had won the field? I am perswaded he would not have been so wie: why then dost thou spare him? becuase I have alwaies used to contemne, and not to imitate such folly.

The use of this figure.

This exornation is an excellent ornament of speech, and veriel. To retaine attention.

convenient to garnish eloquution, for that it reteineth ye minde of the hearer in attention, as well with the comelinesse and grace 2. To move expectation.

of speech, as with the expectation of the reason and answeres ensuing.

The Caution.

The principall respect that ought to be had in this figure, is to 1. needlesse questions.

take heed that the questions be necessary, and the answers direct, and furnished with sufficient reasons: and therefore both in2. Indirect or weake answeres.

the invention, and also in the use of this exornation, there is necessarily required both with and judgement, lest it fall into a barennesse of matter, and want of due forme.

Aporia.

Aporia is a forme of speech by which the speaker sheweth that he doubteth, either where to begin for the multitude of matters, or what to do or say, in some strange and doubtfull thing. Cicero for Roscius; Of what shall I first complaine O Judges? or where shall I first begin? Of what or of whome shall I call for helpe, of the immortall gods, or of the Romane people? or shall I most pitifully crave your defence, who have the highest authorie?

Another example of the same Author: whether he tooke them from his fellowes more impudently, gave them to an harlot more lasciviously, removed them from the Romane people more wickedly, or altered them more presumptuously, I cannot wel declare.

Sometime the speaker useth many doubttes, together, thus: Where shall I seeke? where shall I search? whom shall I aske? Which way shall I go?

Sometime he doubteth what word to use. I know not what to terme it, folly or forgetfullnesse, ignorance or wilfulnesse.

The use of this figure.

This figure most properly serveth to deliberation, and to note<sup>1</sup>. To deliberate

the perplexitie of the minde, as when a declaration is necessarily required, and the knowledge either through multitude of<sup>2</sup>. To signifie perplexitie.

matters, or ambiguitie of things can direct nothing, or say very litle.

The Caution.

1. Too many doubts.

We ought in the use of this figure to take heed that we put not too many doubts or to doubt where there is litle need,  
2. Needlesse doubts.

or none at all, lest the speaker sheweth himself to be very simple, 3. Tokens of ignorance.

ignorant, or very forgetful, according to the saying: Qui dubitat aut miratur, nescire videtur.

Anacensis.

Anacensis is a forme of speech by which the Orator formeth to aske counsell of his adversary, or to deliberate with the Judges what is to be done, or what ought to have bene done.

An example of Cicero: What should I have done Judges, for I know I needed not your helpe there, but you in a maner mine, should I have contended with private weapons against the people's Tribune?

Another example of Esay: "To whom will you liken God? Or what similitude will you set up unto him? shall the carver make him a carved image? or shal the Goldsmith cover him with gold?" Esay. 40.

Another of the Apostle Paul: "This would I learne of you, received ye the spirit by the workes of the law, or by hearing of faith preached?" Gallat 3.

The use of this figure.

1. To deliberate.

This figure like as Aporia pertaineth to deliberation and also 2. To comprehend.

serveth fitly to reprehension, and confutation.<sup>3</sup> To resell.

The Caution.

1. An ill cause to be excluded.

In using this figure, it is necessary and good to have an honest and an upright cause, so true that the adversary may not deny it, and so just that the Judges may not condemne it, without oppressing of manifest equitie.

FIGURES OF PERMISSION.

Figures of Permission, or Concession, are such formes of speech as do after a sort commit the cause in hand, or matter in controversie to the consideration and judgements of others, as either of the judges or of the adversaries, and these formes do serve most specially to confirmation.

Synchoreisis.

Synchoreisis, is a forme of speech by which the Orator trusting strongly to his cause, giveth leave to the Judges or his adversaries, to consider of it with indifference, & so to judge of it, if it be found just and good, to allow it, if evil, to condemne and punish it.

An example of Cicero: But now Judges I leave the whole, and the most lawfull right of my cause, which I have declared, and commit it unto you to judge and determine it, as reason and wisdom shall direct you.

Another example of Job: "If I have walked in vanieite, or if my foote hath made hast to deceive. Let God wey me in the just ballance, and ye shall know mine uprightnesse if my steppes hath turned out of the way, or my heart hath walked after mine eye, or if any blot hath cleved to my handes: let me sow, and let another eate, yea let my plants be rooted up." Job. 31. Hereby Job sheweth wherein his uprightnesse consisteth, that he was guiltlesse and innocent before men, not offending against the second table.

Another of Peter: "Whether it be right saith he in the sight of God, to hearken unto you more then unto God, judge ye." Acts. 4.

The use of this figure.

This figure is most excellent to justifie a good cause, and may fitly be compared to the touchstone and the ballance, instruments 1. To justifie.

of triall and equitie: for this forme of speech committeth<sup>2</sup>. To confute.

the examination of the cause to be tryed by the touchstone of prooffe, and by the ballance of equitie and conscience.

The Caution.

He that shall use this forme of speech, ought to take heed ye his<sup>1</sup>. Looke that the cause be good.

, for otherwise he condemneth himself, & is utterly excluded from mercy & favour by his owne offer & sentence. Secondly, 2. Grant not too farre.

it behooveth him so to commit his cause ye he may notwithstanding Parcialitie & ignorance evil judges.

resume it if there be found parcialitie, perverse affection, or grosse ignorance in the persons to whom such commission is granted.

Epitrope.

Epitrope is a forme of speech by which the speaker granteth to some thing ironically, as much in meaning as an earnest forbidding, although the wordes be otherwise. Simo in Terence seemeth by his wordes very willingly to graunt, that his sonne might marry Glycerye, when in verie deede, he endevoureth with all diligence to withdraw him from her, yes quoth he, let him take her, God speed him will, let him go well and keepe house with her.

An example of Solomon: "Rejoyce O yoong man in thy youth, and let thy hart cheer thee in thy yoong daies, & walke in the waies of thine own heart, and in the sight of thine eyes." Eccles.11.9.10. The plaine and true meaning hereof, is opened in the verse following.

Another of the same Author: "Sleepe a litle slumber a litle and fold thy hands together to sleepe a litle" Prov.6.10.: but he addeth to expound his mind in the next verse.

The use of this figure.

1. To forbid.

The use hereof, pertaineth most usually to forbid, to threaten and 2. To admonish.

admonish, containing for the most part of commination, under 3. To threaten.

an ironically permission.

The Caution.

1. Not to be used where the meaning may be mistaken.

The especiall regard that ought to be had in the use of this figure, is to take heed that it be not used where ignorance and simplicitie not perceiving the figure, may take the meaning according to the words, and so commit that as it were by leave and licence, which is most earnestly forbidden.

Paradoxon.

Paradoxon, is a forme of speech by which the Orator affirmeth some thing to be true, by saying he would not have beleevved it, or that it is so straunge, so great, or so wonderfull, that it may appeare to be incredible.

Paul being accused to King Agrippa, as a teacher of erroneous doctrine, made his answer in this forme: "For the which hopes sake, O king Agrippa, I am accused of the Jewes, why should it be thought a thing incredible unto you: that God should raise againe the dead. I also thought in my selfe that I ought to do many contrary things against the name of Jesus of Nazareth, which thing I did also in Jerusalem, for many of the Saints I shut up in prison, having received authoritie of the high Priest, and when they were put to death I gave the sentence." Act.26.7.8.9.10. Here Paul sheweth, that not long before he was of the same opinion that his adversaries and the judge were now of, and was in the like maner an open enemy to the professor of that name.

The use of this figure.

This figure is then to be used, when the thing which is to be 1. To teach.

taught is new, straunge, incredible, and repugnant to the 2. To confirme.

opinion of the hearer, which this exornation confirmeth by the formes of speech before rehearsed. It is well resembled in two 3. Compared by similitudes.

kindes of men, that is, in old men and travellers, from the one sort we have the benefit of tradition, and from the other the frute of Geographie, the one kind of these men are messengers of auncient times, the other are Ambassadors of farre places.

The Caution.

In the use of this figure the speaker ought to be a man knowne<sup>1</sup>. A man of credit, & experience.

& of credit, lest ye which he affirmeth be either lightly regarded, or or ridiculously scorned: also regard ought to be had, that ye things<sup>2</sup>. Truth to be regarded.

which we report or teach by the forme of this figure be true. A far traveller that is a liar, filleth the world full of wonders, and an old man delighting in reporting untruthes, leaveth many vanities<sup>3</sup>. Seminaries of untruthes evill weedes.

, and false traditions behind him.

Parrhesia.

Parrhesia, is a forme of speech by which the Orator speaking before those whom he feareth, or ought to reverence, & having somewhat to say that may either touch themselves, or those whom they favour, preventeth the displeasure and offence that might be taken, as by craving pardon afore hand, and by shewing the necessitie of free speech in that behalfe, or by some other like forme of humble submission and modest insinuation.

An example of Cicero: I speake with great peril, I feare judges after what sort you may take my words, but for my continuall desire that I have to maintaine and augment you dignitie, I pray and beseech you, that if my speech be either bitter or incredible unto you at the first hearing, yet that you would accept it without offence spoken of Marcus Cicero: Neither that you will reject it before I have plainlie declared the whole unto you.

By this example of Cicero, we may see how this figure ought to be used, by which he made an apt enterance, and ready pathway to his purpose; which was boldly to blame the Senate, & sharply to rebuke their unconstancie, for that they were now about to joyne in peace with Anthony, who a little before was adjudged and taken for their utter and extreme enemy: and now having changed their minds, were purposed to make him their friend. In the beginning he useth a defence or mittigation, saying that hee speaketh with peril, & feareth in what sort or part his words may be taken, notwithstanding he prounuseth that, that which he hath to say, shalbe for the maintenance & honour of the Senate, by which wise & lowly preparation, he obtained their favour to heare him: then next he praieth them not to reject his wordes before he hath declared the whole, how so ever displeasent they may seeme at the first. And finally, that it might please them to take in good part, whatsoever he should expresse and utter, promising that al should be for their profit and advancement, and also protesting that it should proceed from good will and entire affection.

An example of Elihu: "I regard no maner of person, no man will I spare, for if I should go about to please men, I know not how soone my maker will take me away." Job.32. Here Elihu declareth his purpose of free speech, and addeth his reason, but he made his insinuation before.

Another of the Apostle Paul: "Preach I mans doctrine, or Gods? Or go I about to please men? for if I should, I were not the servant of Christ." Gal.1.10.

The use of this figure.

1. To insinuate.

This figure serveth to insinuate, admonish, and reprehend, and may fitly be called the Herald or Ambassador of speech, which is the onely forms that boldly delivereth to great dignities and<sup>2</sup>. To admonish.

most high degrees of men, the message of justice and equitie, sparing neither magistrates that pervert lawes, nor Princes that<sup>3</sup>. To reprehend.

do abuse their kingdomes.

The Caution.

This figure doth best besee a man of wisdom and gravitie, 1. A man of wisdom and gravitie.

who is best able to moderate the forme of his speech, and to restrain it from that rude boldnesse which doth more hurt then 2. Rude boldnesse.

good, from whence there oft springeth a malice in the hearer against the speaker: a contempt of his doctrine, and sometimes a 3. Displeasure and the effects.

punishment of his person, for now and then a rude Vae vobis, doth cause a Coram nobis. As for the Prophets they were extraordinary 4. A Coram nobis.

men, and therefore their examples in this respect are not to be imitated. 5. Prophets no presidents of this figure.

Dicaeologia.

Dicaeologia, is a forme of speech by which the Orator either defendeth his cause by equitie, or excuseth it by necessitie, or else doth extenuate it by alledging some other occasion.

An example of Cicero: I knewe not that I came against his cause till he complained, but should I not come for mine acquaintance and friends behalfe against a stranger? should I not come against favour gotten not with shew of vertue, but with gallantesse of youth? should I not come against injury, which he hath obtained by the helpe of a wicked partaker, and not by the lawe of procurators?

Another: I forsooke my friend, but the lawes compelled me: I kept friendship most faithfully, as long as the lawes permitted me, and now I am not cast off by will, but by the force of law.

The use of this figure.

This figure doth pertaine properly to defend, to excuse, and to 1. To defend.

extenuate, and it may well be compared to the sayle which 2. To excuse.

is spreadde more largelie, and wound up more narrowly as 3. To extenuate.

the weather, winde, and water requyre, and likewise to armour which is put on against fight, and put off against slight: for if defense faile, this figure turneth to excusation, if excusation cannot serve the turne, it flieth to exclamation, as the last refuge.

The Caution.

Injurious. False. Excessive. Wicked.

In using this figure we ought to regard that the defence be not injurious, nor the excuse false, nor the extenuation excessive or wicked.

Apostrophe.

Apostrophe, is a forme of speech by which the Orator turneth suddenly from the former frame of his speech to another, that is, when he hath long spoken of some person or thing, he leaveth speaking of it, and speaketh unto it, which is no other thing than a sudden removing from the third person to the second.

Cicero in his Orations, hath plentie of examples of this figure, where sometimes he speaketh to Dolabella. Antony, and others being absent as if they were present, by this figure also the Orator turneth from his direct passage, to entertaine some historie or Apologie, which are fit for his purpose, but the most usuall forme of this figure, is in turning our speech from the third person to the second.

When the LORD by his Prophet Ose had long complained of Israel, he leaveth speaking of Israel and speaketh to Israel saying: O Israel thine iniquitie hath undone thee.

The use of this figure.

?? object.

This forme of speech serveth to a pleasant variation, by removing from one person to another, and it is verie apt to vehement objections, & grevous compalints, and sometimes to praise, and it is well represented in a double forme of warre, as when a Compared military.

puisant army after long seige, turneth upon the sudden to a violent assalt and battery.

The Caution.

Unapt or violent.

The speciall points to be here observed are these. First, that the aversion be not too abrupt and violent. Secondly, that the matter be not of lesse importance, or lesse vehement which is spoken<sup>2</sup>. Of lesse importance to the second person, is a fault.

to the second person, then that which was spoken of the third: for it is alwaies counted a fault to speake more behind the backe, then before the face, I meane in the speech of an adversary.

Apoplanesis.

Apoplanesis is also another kind of aversion or turning away, and it is when the speaker leadeth away the mind of his hearer, from the matter propounded or question in hand, which maketh much against him. The way and cunning to do this, is manifold & almost infinite. Cicero when he should have answered to an accusation, in which it was objected that Caelius poysoned Metellus, for as much as it was proved that Caelius had poison prepared in his house: and furthermore that the force of that poison was tried in a servant of his, he digressed by and by to Metellus death, and maketh a suspicion that he was poisoned by the mischievous deede of Clodius: he sigheth, weepeth and bewaileth that death, whereby he staieth and appeaseth his adversaries, and causeth them to mourne with him, and to be stricken (as it were) with the same wound, and so by his vehement and forcible perswasion turneth the mindes of the Judges from the cogitation of the fact, now and then touching it a little, and slipping from it again.

The use of this figure.

This figure hath two speciall uses, the one to make an evasion<sup>1</sup>. To escape distresse.

or escape from a difficultie or hard objection, or when the cause of the Orator is weake, and not able to abide the uttermost<sup>2</sup>. To cause forgetfulnes of sorrow.

triall. The other is to asswage sorrow by leading the minde of the mourner from the matter of greefe to new objects: in respect of<sup>3</sup>. Compared to a strategeme.

evasion it may be compared to the subtiltyes of war called strategems, which do consist more in provident counsell then in confident strength, by which means it commeth often times to passe, that a few prevaile against many, and wisdom against strength.

The Caution.

Albeit that this figure may in these respects rehearsed be a<sup>1</sup>. Evil conscience.

2. Subtiltie & craft.

necessarie forme of speech, yet may it be abused by evill conscience, subtilty and craft, as when it is used to smother good causes, 3. Shifting with naughty matters.

and to shift out with evill matters, an abuse God knoweth too common.

Aposiopesis.

Aposiopesis is a forme of speech by which the Orator through some affection, as either of feare, anger, sorrow, bashfulnesse or such like, breaketh off his speech before it be all ended.

Virgil.

An example of Poetry: How doth the childe Ascanius, whom tymely Troy to thee: breaking off by the interruption of sorrow.

Another: I am loth to utter that with my mouth which is now in my minde, staying from further provocation.

Modesty bids me stay, here bashfulnesse is the cause of silence.

The use of this figure.

To restrain vehement speech.

The use of this forme of speech serveth either to stay the vehemency of our immoderate affections, proceeding to some excesse<sup>2</sup>. To move suspition.

or outrage, or to signifie by the halfe what the whole meaneth, that is, to raise a sufficient suspicion without danger of the adversary, & it is not unlike to a truce in war, or sounding to the retreat.<sup>3</sup> Compared.

The Caution.

1. Uncertaine sense.

If the sentence be broken off too soone, it leaveth the sense most uncertaine: contrariwise, if it be continued too long, it maketh<sup>2</sup>. Proceeding too far.

that manifest that should be secrete and shadowed with silence. If it be used in malice, it commonly leaveth the venome of some false suspicion behind it, all which faultes are in wisdom and <sup>3</sup>. The effect of malice.

charity to be eschewed.

Catacosmesis.

Catacosmesis, in Latine ordo, is a meete placing of words among themselves, wherof there be two kinds, the one when the worthiest word is set first, which order is naturall, as when we say: God and man, men and women, Sun and moone, life and death. And also when that is first told that was first done, which is necessary and seemly.

The other kind of order is artificiall, and in forme contrarie to this, as when the worthiest or weightiest word is set last: for the cause of amplifying, which the Rhetoricians cal Incrementum,; the description whereof shalbe set downe among the figures of Amplication.

The use of this figure.

The use of this first kind of order, doth most properly serve to the propertie and elegancy of speech, and due observation of<sup>1</sup>. Elegansie.

nature and dignitie: which forme is well represented in the civil<sup>2</sup>. Nature.



and solemne customs of nations, where the worthiest person<sup>3</sup>. Dignitie.

are alwaies first named and highest placed.

The Caution.

The grace and comelinesse of this order is often diminished, 1. Want of discretion.

and much blemished through want of discretion, or by rashnesse<sup>2</sup>. Forgetfulnesse.

of the speaker, putting the lesse worthie, before the more worthy, contrarie to evil observation and comelinesse, as to say, 3. Hastinesse.

it pleased the Counsell and the king to make this law: My Mistresse and my Maister have them commended to your worship.

To naturall and seemely order are repugnant Hyperbaton,<sup>4</sup>. Faults opposed to naturall & necessary order.

and his kindes, as Anastrophe, Hysterologia, Hysteron Proteron, Tmesis, Hypallage, Synchisis: all which are faultes of speech consisting in disorder and confusion.

The third order.

The figures of this order be such, which for the most part do both amplifie, and also garnish matters, and causes, and may be devided into fower distinct orders, according to their formes and effects, that is to say, into Distribution, Description, Comparison and Collection: these be the fower generall partes, wherof the whole body of Amplification, consisteth, and are as it were the fower mighty and plentifull streams of copious eloquence which are continually fed and filled with ye perpetuall and pleasant springs of mans wit: I meane those figures and formes of speech which the reason of man, the principall part and power of his minde, hath by long and diligent search found out, to the admirable utterance of his knowledge, and glory of his wisdom. Now as the figures of the first order have their speciall regard to the placing of words, and their proper grace in a muscally proportion, wherein the mind and wit of man even by a naturall instinct taketh pleasure and delight: And also as the figures of the second order do attend upon affections, as ready handmaids at commaundement to expresse most aptly whatsoever the heart doth affect or suffer: even so the figures of this the third order do properly serve to matters, causes, and things themselves, as artificiall and cunning instruments apt and ready to amplifie & garnish with speech any cause or purpose, which mans wit can invent or his capacity conceive: for things by distribution are set forth plentifully, by description evidently, by comparison amply, and by collection strongly. Which forms of speech with their speciall kindes are commonly called the figures of amplification. And forasmuch as the principall part of Eloquence standeth by increasing and diminishing, distributing and describing, comparing and collecting: I will first shew what amplification is, how it is divided, the use of it, and also what matters and causes are meetest for it, and after I will proceede to the particular treatise of every figure in their severall orders.

Amplification what it is.

Amplification is a certaine affirmation very great and weighty, which by large and plentifull speech moveth the mindes of the hearers, and causeth them to beleieve that which is said.

Amplification divided.

Amplification in respect of the matter wherein it consisteth is either of words or of things: of words when a very great word is put for another word which is not so great, or contrariwise, when a lesse word is put for another word which is not so little, or when a word is such and so applied, as doth amplify the thing it expresseth: of things, when things themselves are especially respected and amplified.

Now is it to be observed that Amplification is called by the name of a figure, yet as a generall of many specials, and under kindes, and that of such as do either increase matters, or enrich the Oration with apt and pleasant speech: and

those figures may conveniently be divided into fower orders, as aforesaid, that is to say, into Distribution, Description, Comparison, and Collection: of all which I will speake and intreat in their severall places, and also of thier speciall kindes, in like maner, as I have hitherto observed in the figure.

The use of Amplification.

This Exornation was first devised to increase causes, and to augment the Oration with words and sentences: wherby the hearers the sooner be moved to like of that which was spoken: and indeede it is a singuler art, and mighty to delight and perswade the mindes of men to the purpose and drift of the speaker: it is full of light, plenty, and variety, causing, the orator to teach and tell things plainly, to amplify largely,<sup>1</sup> Light.

, and to proove and conclude mightily: for being well furnished<sup>2</sup>. Plenty.

with skill and habite of this figure, he may prevaile much in<sup>3</sup>. Variety.

drawing the mindes of his hearers to his owne will and affection<sup>4</sup>. Strength.

: he may winde them from their former opinions, and quite alter the former state of their mindes, he may move them to be of his side, to hold with him, to be led by him, as to mourne or to marvel, to love or to hate, to be pleased or to be angry, to favour, to desire or to be satisfied, to feare or to hope, to envy, to abhorre, to pittie, to rejoyce, to be ashamed, to repent, and finally to be subject to the power of his speech whither soever it tendeth.

The Orator by helpe hereof either renteth all in peeces like the thunder: or else by little and little, like the flowing water creepeth by gentle meanes into the consent of his hearers.

The matter of Amplification.

Matters which fall into this kind of exornation, ought to be great, excellent good, or notorious evill, cruel, horrible, marvellous, pleasant, or pittifull: after which may follow and that worthily, desire, hatred, feare, admiration, hope, gladnesse, mirth, pittie, weeping, and such like affections.

The places from whence Orators do fetch these causes be noble and famous enterprises, great and worthy vertues, wonderful & strange accidents, wicked and horrible factes, as murders, parricides, destructions of Citties, tirannie & slaughter, rapes & wordome, perjuries, conspiracies, robberies and briefly what soever is commendable, and do merit high praise or abominable, and deserveth punishment: whatsoever is very pleasant or very lamentable, whatsoever is thought deare and precious, profitable, admirable, detestable, or dangerous, may minister matter to Amplification: and finally all such things as cannot be heard without a great motion of minde: Examples whereof are plentifull and almost everywhere to be found in the orations of Tully. He doth amplifie the theftes, the sacrileges, the robberies, the lecherous life of Verres, and also his new devised paines, and punishments: the drunkennesse, the bold presumptions, the prodigalitie, and other such like wicked offences of Antony, the crueltie of Chrysogomus, the impudencie of Erutius, the homicides of Capiton, he doth vehemently invey against Pilo, vehemently against Clodius, but most vehemently of all against Catiline. Contrariwise he doth highly praise and comend the vertues of his friends, as the knowledge, quicknesse and happinesse of Pompeius in warlike affaires and martiall enterprises: he extolleth to the Cloudes Caesars liberality towards his friends, his mercie towards his captives, and magnifieth most marvellously the number of his victories. The oration of this Orator are plentifully replenished with these exornations, and with many other like vertues of speaking, who excelled all others of his time, for by his eloquence he oft cast downe his adversaries from their estate and dignitie, oftentimes by his copious speech and vehemencie of pleading, he frayed most excellent Orators from their friends defence, by the force of his speech he compelled Caesar to pardon Legarius, whom he came most greedily to condemne, and made Catiline (a most audacious traitor) dumbe in the Senate, with great vehemency and copie, he disputeth much of religion, of duties, of the generall safetie of Citizens, of liberty given of the auncestors, of bondage odious to nature, of the intollerable evils of Antony, and other enemies of the countrey & commonwealth, like to insue: from whence as from a most plentifull fountaine may be taken most excellent and apt examples of Amplification.

Distributio.

Distributio is a generall word, comprehending diverse special kindes, by which we dilate and spread abroad the generall kinde, by reckoning by the speciall kindes, the whole by dividning it into parts, and the subject by rehearsing the accidents: the first distribution is by division of the generall, the second by partition of the whole, the third by enumeration of the subjects. There are besides divers other figures which are kinds of distribution, but yet differing from these three: for I containe all those figures under the name of Distribution, which do consist either in number or distribution.

Diaeresis.

Diaeresis in Latine Divisio, is a forme of speech which divideth the generall kind into special kinds, yet not in a dialecticall forme, but in a rhetorical maner for amplification sake, whereof this saying of Job may be an example: "Aske the cattaile, and they shall inform thee, ye fowles of the aire & they shal tel thee, the increase of the earth, and it shal shew thee, or the fishes of the sea, and they shal certifie thee" Job. 12., by which answeere of Job to his frends he declareth ye their wisdome was no other then such as the very brute beastes do daily teach, which he divideth into sundry kinds, wherby he doth pithily & elegantly set forth & amplifie their grosse ignorance. By this figure not only living creatures, but also plants, trees flowers, the lights of heaven, the stones of the earth, mettals & all other such like may be divided into their several kinds, whereby the large and bountifull worke of nature is spread abroad, and many secret causes are plainly discovered and brought into open light.

The use of this figure.

This figure is an apt and ready forme of speech to open the 1. Plenty.

bosome of nature and to shew her branches, to that end they 2. Variety.

may be viewed and looked upon, discerned and knowen. And also to spread out at large both vertues and vices in their kindes, whereby the oration is enriched with copie, & garnished with variety, which do occupy the mind of the hearer with a pleasant beholding of new matter.

The Caution.

1. Want.

As a division may be unperfect by defect, as in numbring too 2. Superfluity.

few kinds, so may it be superfluous in extending too far, by reckning by too many, by the one the oration is little or nothing 3. Confusion.

enriched: by the other it is overburdened with too great a multitude of one sort. Also the division is much deformed if things of another kind he mingled with it: for by mingling of many kinds together it falleth in an odious confusion.

Partitio.

Partitio, is a form of speech by which the orator divideth ye whole into parts. Salomon divideth his whole knowledge thus: "for he hath geven me the true knowledge of the things that are, so that I know how the world was made, & the powers of the elements, the beginning, the end & middest of times, how the times alter, and the change of seasons, the course of the yeare & situation of the starres, the nature of living thigns, the furiousnes of beastes, the power of the winds, the imaginations of men, the diversities of plants, and vertues of roots, & all things both secret and knowen do I know: for wisdome the worker of all things hath taught it me." Sap. 7.17.18.19.20. In like manner he reckneth up, & rehearseth the parts of his prosperity in the 2. chap. of his booke called Ecclesiastes. Quintus Curcius.

Another: Every nation hath his teame and his plough to get his living, his bed to take his rest, somefrute of his labour for his frend, his bow & his spear for his enemy, his bow to meet him far off, & his speare to wound him nigh at hand, mourning at burials, mirth at mariages, & religious worship in their Temples. here the generall custome of nations is the whole, which as you see is divided into certaine partes.

The use of this figure.

The use of this forme of speech serveth to minister plenty and varietie of matter, and of many fountaines or figures of eloquution, 2. Varietie.

there is not one that may be found more frutefull then this, or more plentiful in the multitude of branches.

The Caution.

As there may be a defect in reckoning too few partes, so may 1. Defect.

there be an excesse in numbring too many: also a grosse absurditie 2. Excesse.

is committed when a partition is made by Synonimies, which 3. Synonimies for partes, full wisely.

he did, that divided his Oration into these foure partes: Why? wherefore, for what cause, and to what end, this is called the division, or partition without a difference.

Enumeratio.

Enumeratio, when the subject is divided into the accidents, the matter into the antecedents, the effect into the causes, and into things annexed and following after the effect.

1 Of the subject into accidents.

An example: what may we thinke of man, when we consider the heavy burthen of his miserie, the weaknesse of his patience, the imperfection of his understanding, the conflicts of his counsels, the insatietie of his mind, the brevitie of his life, and the certaintie of his death?

An example of Job: "One dieth in full strength, in all ease and prosperitie, his brestes are full of milke, and his bones runne full of marrow. Another dieth in the bitternesse of his soule, and never eateth with pleasure. Time likewise may be distributed, as the time of peace, the time of warre, the tune of plentie, the time of dearth and famine which are the accidentes of time." Job.21.23.24.

2 A matter into the antecedents, and meanes by which it is brought to passe. That Cicero repressed teh purposes of Catiline, thus it may be set foorth. The mischievous enterprises of Catiline, who went about the utter destruction of Rome, Marcus Tullius Cicero the Consull, by his prudent foresight did quickly smel out by his singular vigilance sought out, by his high providence found out, and by his marvellous love to the ocmmon wealth shewed out. And then by his incredible eloquence he convicted them, by his grave authoritie repressed them, by his might abolished them, and by his great happinesse quite overthrew them.

3 The numbring up of the causes, is when we declare not the matter or effect nakedly, but rehearse the occasions and efficients whereby it began, proceeded, and continued, as if one should in making report of warre, shew also the occasion of the first kindeling, what were the causes of debate, who were the motioners of enterprising the same warre, what hope of ech side to get victorie, what boldnesse on both parts in their meeting.

Examples hereof are easily found in Poets and writers of histories: specially in Livius.

4 The numbring and rehearsing of effects and consequents, when we do not declare a matter simply, but shew those things which go with it, or follow after it. Anotny was the cause of civillCicero.

warre, of three slaine armies of Romane people, of the death of many noble Cittizens, of overthrowing the authorie of the Senate, and finally of all evils whatsoever.

5 Also by this figure, the Orator distributed to particular persons their particular duties to Princes and subjects, maisters and servants, to persons publicke and private, and briefly to all degrees.

Also to number and rehearse the multitude of vertues or vices knowne in some person, to his great commendation, or deserned blame.

Cicero for Cluentius, what man can there be remembred wiser then Publius octavius? in law more learned, in faith, religion, and office more diligent, more devout, and who in praising more pithie than he? more bitter in blaming? more wittie in sentence? more subtle in speaking and disputing?

The use of this figure.

1. Varietie.

The use of this exornation is great, serving both to garnish 2. Plentie.

the Oration with varietie, and also to enrich it with plentie.

The Caution.

1. Too great a multitude

Regard ought to be had in the use of this figure, that it numbred 2. False causes, effects, and duties.

not too great a multitude of matters, nor rehearse false casues, effects, or duties, which maketh ye distribution absurd.

Dilemma.

Dilemma this figure differeth from Diaeresis or Division, for that divideth the generall into the specials, but this removing one thing from another, endeth them both by shewing a reason. Cicero for Ligarius. I demaund now, whether you will revenge your owne injuries, or the injuries of the common wealth: if you do revenge the injurie of the common wealth: if you do revenge the injurie of the common wealth: what answere will you make concerning your constancie in that behalfe? If that you do revenge your owne, beware you erre not, which think that Caesar will be angry and retaine displeasure with your enemies, when he hath forgiven his own, not covetousnesse, for the maner of his life doth shew that he was never covetous, neither povertie for he hath great riches.

Another: Why should I now saie any thing to thy charge, if thou beest good, thou hast not deserved it, but if thou beest naught, thou carest not for it.

An example of the Apostle Paul: "If I do it willingly I have a reward, but if I do it against my wil, notwithstanding a dispensation is committed unto me." 1. Cor. 9.

"If I have evill spoken, beare witness of that evill: but if I have well spoken, why smitest thou me?" Joh. 18.

The use of this figure.

This figure pertaineth properly to confirme or confute, and 1. To confirm.

that after a most mightie and invincible maner of inferring 2. To retell.

a conclusion.

The Caution.

The errors into which this figure may fall, are these: Unapt 1. Unapt divisions.

divisions, and false reasons: both which do blemish and weaken 2. False reasons.

this a frome of speech.

Horysmos.

Horysmos is a forme of speech by which the Orator declareth the proper pith of some thing, and it is chiefly used, when there is a difference sought for between two words, which by defining, this findeth fourth.

1 An example: This is not fortitude but temeritie, for fortitude is a contempt of perils by honest reason: temeritie is a foolish enterprise of perils, without respect of vertue.

2 Cicero for Marcus Marcellus: for neither is this to be counted thy life, which is contained in thy bodie and breath, but that is thy life (O Caesar I say) which shall live and flourish in memorie unto the worldes end, which posteritie shal nourish, which eternitie shall ever behold.

3 Glorious victorie consisteth not in slaying of poore people, as women, children, and impotent persons, which hunger and famine, wherein resteth neither fortitude, prudence, nor pollicie, but in subduing of couragious Captaines, overcoming of valiant souldiers, and winning of strong and mightie Cities. To this distinction, a lyke answer is made, a glorious victorie consisteth not so much in crueltie as in humanitie, not so much in shedding of blood, as in shewing of mercy. Fire doth consume, & the sword doth devour, but famine by litle and litle maketh tame the most puissant nations and stoutest people of the world.

By this exornation also a word or an action, is eloquently distinguished in degrees by certaine generall wordes, thus: To powre forth thy curse against thy adversary is malignity, against an innocent crueltie, against thy parent impietie, against God blasphemie.

Another example: To refute good counsell is folly, to contemne it is wickednesse, to scorne it is madnesse.

The use of this figure.

1. To teach.

This figure is most apt and excellent to distinguish betweene words or matter of nie affinitie, or to separate one thing from another by particular definitions of each thing, whereby everie

severall matter is evidently expressed, plainly distinguished, and

brightly adorned with the shyning beames of glorious eloquence.

Epanados.

Epanados, is a figure which iterateth by parts, the whole spoken before, signifying a certaine diversitie in the parts which are divided.

An example of Poetrie: "Iphitus and Pelius, that time with me fled out, Iphitus opprest with age, and Pelias Ulisses wound made come behind." Virgill.

Another of Terence: "I never sawe a fraie more unequallie made then that, that was betweene us to day, I with bearing the blowes, and he with giving them, till we were both weary." Teren.

An example of the holy scripture: "For we are unto God the sweete favour of Chirsst in them that are saved, and in them which perish, to one the favour of death unto death, to the other, the favour of life unto life." 2. Cor. 2. 15.16.

The use of this figure.

This figure serveth to enrich the Oration by partition of them

whole, and also to garnish the same by the varietie of the severall

differences. 1. Unapt partition.

The Caution.

If the whole be unaptly parted, or the parts be separated without<sup>2</sup>. Want of difference.

evident diversitie, it confoundeth the partition with obscuritie and darknesse.

Eutrepismus.

Eutrepismus, in latine called Bonus ordo, and Ordinatio, it is a forme of speech, which doth not only number the partes before they be said, but also doth also order those partes, and maketh them plaine by a kind of definition, or declaration. By definition, an example:

There be three things which men do greedily covet, and earnestly follow, riches, pleasures, and honors, riches are the nurces of sinne and iniquitie, pleasures are the daughters of dishonesty, and guides which lead to misery: Honors are mothers and nurces of worldly pompe, and vanitie.

There are three sorts of men which do dispose of all that a man hath, the Lawyer, the Phisition, and the Divine. The Lawyer disposeth of his goods, the Phisition of his bodie, and the divine of his soule.

Another of scripture: "These be foure small things in the earth, yet they are wise and full of wisdom, the Pismire a people not strong, yet prepare they their meat in sommer, the Cunnies a people not mightie, yet make they their houses in the rockes. The Grashopper hath no king, yet they go forth by bands, the Spider taketh hold with her hands and is in Kings Palaces." Prov.30.

"These things rejoyce me, and by them am I bewtifed before God and men, the unitie of brethren, the love of neighbors, a man and a wife that agree together. three sorts of men my soule hateth, and I utterly abhorre the life of them: A poore man that is proude, a rich man that is a lyar, and an olde adulterer that doteth." Eccle.25.1.2.

The use of this figure.

1. Plentie.

The use hereof is both profitable and pleasant, it is profitable<sup>2</sup>. Varietie.

for the great plentie and copie of matter which it ministereth, and pleasant for the varietie which the severall partes containe.

The Caution.

1. Forgetfulnesse.

It is verie behouefull to take heed that when the parte be numbred in generall, they be not forgotten in the particular prosecution: as he that promised to expound the twelve articles of the Creed, and after could remember but nine.

Paralepsis.

Paralepsis, of some called Praeteritio, of others Occupatio, and it is when the Orator faineth and maketh as though he would say nothing in some matter, when notwithstanding he speaketh most of all, or when he saith some thing: in saying he will not say it: Cicero against Verres. All the time before he came to the office and government of the common wealth, he shall go free. I will make no mention of his drunken banquets nightly, & his watching with bawdes, dicers, whoremaisters. I will not name his losses, his luxuritie, and staining of his honestie, let him take his olde infamy for a vantage, the rest of his life shall alone, that I may make losse of his leaudnesse.

Another: "I do not say thou receivedst bribes of thy followes, I buste not my selfe in this thing, that thou spoyledst Cities, Kingdomes, and all mens houses: I let passe thy thefts and thy robberies: Paul to Philemon. So that I do not say, how that thou swest unto me thine owne felte also." Paul to Philemon.

The use of this figure.

This figure is most fit to accuse and reprehend, and most usually<sup>1</sup>. To accuse or upbraid.  
in a negative forme, and sometime it serveth to commend by the same forme.<sup>2</sup> To praise.

The Caution.

This figure is most abused by malice, as when it is applied in<sup>1</sup>. False accusation.  
false accusation, or in malicious detraction, and sometime also<sup>2</sup>. Malicious detraction.  
by subtiltie in a counterfeit praise, and figured flattery.<sup>3</sup> Fained praise.

Restrictio.

Restrictio, when of the generall word going before, a part afterward is excepted, or when of things first expressed, some alteration is noted.

1. Exception out of the general word.

An example of S. Paul: "We are afflicted on everie side, yet are we not in distresse: in povertie, yet not overcome of povertie; we are persecuted, but not forsaken; cast downe but we perish not." 2. Cor 4.8.9.

Another: The high thrones of Princes are glorious, yet changeable: dignities are sweet, yet they be dangerous: riches are good things, yet full of trouble: pleasures are the floures & frutes of life: yet are they full of the causes of miserie, and deceitfull baits of death and destruction.

2 Noting of alteration: "I have seene the wicked in great prosperitie and flourishing like a greene bay tree, yea, he passed away, and loe he was gone, I sought him but he could not be found." Psal.37.35.36.

The use of this figure.

1. To moderate.

This exornation is evermore used to these effects, to asswage and moderate great and swelling speeches, to mingle and temper<sup>2</sup>. Temper.

commodities with their discomodities, as felicitie with miserie, 3. To note imperfection.

and contrariwise, as cares with comfort. And also to note imperfection, in things which seeme perfect.

The Caution.

1. A generall exception.

It behoveth to take heed that the exception be not too generall, as if one should say we are in povertie, yet we want nothing. 2. An exception too small.

This kinde of exception disproveth the former assertion. Also that the exception be not too small, as if I should say, dignities are sweete, yet they are envied, this abateth nothing of the former praise.

Symphoresis.

Symphoresis, otherwise Congeries, is a forme of speech by which the Orator doth multiply and heape manie words together, signifying diverse things of like nature.



An example of the scripture: "Thus all things were mixed together with blood, manslaughter, theft, and deceit, corruption, and unfaithfulness, sedition, perjury, disquieting of good men, unthankfulness, defiling of souls, changing of birth, disorder in marriage, adultery, and uncleanness." Sap.4.

Another of the Apostle Paul: "The deeds of the flesh are manifest, which are these: Adultery, fornication, uncleanness, wantonness, worshipping of images, witchcraft, hatred, variance, zeal, wrath, strife, seditions, sects, envying, murder, drunkenness, gluttony, and such like. Contrariwise, the fruits of the spirit, is love, joy, peace, long suffering, gentleness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance." Galat. 5.

The use of this figure.

This figure may be applied to many purposes, as to praise, dispraise, accuse, defend, and confute, in vehement affections it is like the violent strokes of battaile, but in mildness it may be compared to a plentiful shower in a time of neede.

The Caution.

We ought in the use of this figure to foresee that we make not too great an heape, and that of the same heape nothing be contrary one to another.

Climax.

Climax is a figure which so distinguisheth the oration by degrees, that the word which endeth the clause going before, beginneth ye next following, thus: The empire of Greece was the Athenians, the Athenians were conquered of the Spartans, the Spartans were vanquished of the thebans, the Thebans were overcome of the macedons, who in short space joynd Asia, being subdued by war, to the empire of Greece, CiceroCicero.

for Roscius, in the cittie is bred excesse, from excesse must needes spring covetousnesse, from covetousnesse there bursteth out boldnesse, by boldnesse all wicked & ungratious deedes are furthered.

Another, "to care for vertue is love, and love is the keeping of her lawes, and the keeping of her lawes is perfection, & an uncorrupt life maketh a man familiar with God" Sapien 6.: "He that receiveth you receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me." Matth. 10.

"In the beginning was the word, and the word was God, and God was the word." Joh.1.

Another: "Knowing that tribulations bring patience, patience bringeth experience, experience bringeth hope." Rom. 5.

"All are yours, you are Christes, and Christ is Gods." 1. Cor. 3.

The use of this figure.

This exornation hath much pleasantnesse, and is chiefly applied for the augmentation of matters, it consisteth often times<sup>1</sup>. To augment.

of fower degrees, but commonly of three.

The Caution.

1. Too many degrees.

In using this figure we ought to observe a meane, that there be not too many degrees and also to foresee that the degrees following, may rather increase then diminish in signification and lastly, that they so scend that they may end with a clause of importance.<sup>2</sup> Decrease in signification.

### Descriptio.

Descriptio is a generall name of many and sundry kindes of descriptions, and a description is when the Orator by a diligent gatherin together of circumstances, and by a fit and naturall application of them, doth expresse and set forth a thing so plainly and lively, that it seemeth rather painted in tables, then declared with words, and the mind of the hearer therby so drawen to an earnest and stedfast contemplation of the thing described, that he rather thinketh he seeth it then heareth it. By this exornation the Orator imitateth the cunning painter which doth not onely draw the true proportion of thines, but also bestoweth naturall colours in their proper places, whereby he compoundeth as it were complexion with substance and life with countenance: for hence it is, that by true proportion and due coloure, cunning and curious Images are made so like to the persons which they present, that they do not onely make a likely shew of life, but also by outward countenance of the inward spirite and affection.

So great and singular is that science, that there is no creature under heaven, no action, no passion, no frame in art, nor countenance in man, whose true proportion and externall forme is not finely counterfaieted, and wonderfully imitated. Trees and plants in their colours, flowers in their bewty, beastes & birdes in their natures, men in their countenances and habite, some grave, some smiling, some angry, some weeping, some yong, some old, some asleepe, some dead, also in their degrees, as Princes and subjects, magistrates and prisoners, riche men and beggers, men of artes and occupations, ladies, gentlewomen, maidens, old women, captains, souldiers, finally al kind of persons in their countenance, gesture and apparell: even so doth the Orator by his art and his speech describe and set forth to the contemplation of mans mind, any person, deede, thing, place or time, so truly by circumstance, that the hearer shall thinke that he doth plainly behold the matter described. Now under the generall name of Description, I do not only reckon speciall kindes of description, but also all other figures, which do chiefly respect circumstances and adjuncts without form of comparison serving onely to make matters evident and lightsome.

### Prosographia.

Prosographia is a forme of speech by which as well the very person of a man as of a fained, is by his form, stature, maners, studies, doings, affections, and such other circumstances serving to the purpose so described, that it may appeare a plaine and lively picture painted in tables, and set before the eies of the hearer. The circumstances by which such descriptions be made are many, ye tthe most principal and most usuall are these, parentage, nation, countrey, kind, age, education, discipline, habite of body, fortune, condition, nature of mind, studie, former deedes, apparell, & c. By these and such like circumstances the whole man is lively painted and portraited as wel his mind as his body, and as aswel his qualities as his quantity: as for example, we may by the circumstances of age describe an old manThe description of old age.

in this manner, “with crooked limmes, and trembling jointes, his head white, his eies hollow, his sight dimmes, his hearing thicke, his handes shaking, his legges bowing, his colour pale, his skin wrinkled, weake of memory childish yet covetous, suspicious, testy, greedy of newes, credulous, misliking of the present world, and praising the former times” Eccles. 12.: also by this form great persons are described, as emperours, princes, bishops, noble captains, holy patriarks, grave judges, & great authors. By this figure Cicero painteth out Ebucius, and against Verres, he describeth Theomastus, in his oration for Roscius, Chrisogomus, and in his oration forAction.

Quintius he painteth out Nevius with Quintius by an Antithesis. The description of fained persons doth properly belong to poets, & is seldom or never used of orators: by this figure diverse historiographers do most lively describe noble captains, Kinges & Emperours to looke upon.

The use of this figure.

1. To delight.

This figure pertaineth to many purposes, as to praise, to dispraise, to delight, and to engrave in perpetuall memory,  
2. To praise.

the 3. To record.

descriptions of great persons.

The Caution.

1. Aptnes.

The chiefest regard herein ought to be concerning the aptnes<sup>2</sup>. Truth.

and truth of the circumstances.

Prosopopoeia.

Prosopopoeia, the faining of a person, that is, when to a thing sencelesse and dumbe we faine a fit person, or attribute a person to a commonwealth or multitude: This figure Orators do use as well as Poetes: the Orator by this figure maketh ye commonwealth to speake, to commend, to dispraise, to aske, to complaine, also life and death, vertue and pleasure, honesty and profite, wealth and poverty, envy and charity: to contend and plead one against another, and sometime he raiseth againe as it were the dead to life, and bringeth them forth complaining or witnessing what they knew. sometime to Cities, townes, beastes, birdes, trees, stones, weapons, fire, water, lights of the firmament, and such like things he attributeth speech, reason, and affection, and to no other end then to further his purpose and to confirme and make his cause evident, as for example: If an orator having occasion to commend some vertue to his hearers, as truth or such like, he may after he hath sufficiently praised truth, faine it a person, and bring it in bitterly complaining how cruelly she is oppressed and how litle esteemed, how often outfaced, and how much abhorred, how many be her enemies, how few her frends, how she wandreth hither and thither without intertainment, and remaineth without habitation, he may faine her complaing against false ballances, weightes and measures, against false testimonies, lies and perjurie, against wicked hipocrisie and cursed heresie, against feare, favour and avarice which are her enemies in the seats of judgement conspiring against her and violently throwing her downe from thence, and cruelly treading her underfoote, also he may cause her to accuse flatterie and detraction, theft, violence, and fraude, and to make a most true and long complaint, as well against persons that be her enemies, as against vices which do oppose and oppresse her.

The use of this figure.

This figure is an apt forme of speech to complaine, to accuse, 1. To complaine.

to reprehend, to confirme, and to commend, but the use of it ought to be very rare, then chiefly, when the Orator having<sup>2</sup>. To accuse.

spent the principall strength of his arguments, is as it<sup>3</sup>. To reprehende.

were constrained to call for helpe and aide else where, not unlike to Champion having broken his weapons in the force of<sup>4</sup>. To confirme.

his conflict calleth for new of his frendes, or of such as favour his person and cause, or to an army having their number <sup>5</sup>. To commend.

diminished, or their strength inffebled, do crave and call for a new supply.

The Caution.

It is not convenient that the Orator should use the helpe of<sup>1</sup>. Not without urgent cause.

fained persons without some urgent cause compelling him thereunto. Secondly, it is necessarie to provide that the person fained may speake to the purpose of the matter propounded, and <sup>2</sup>. To speake to the purpose.

give strength to the fainting cause, and aslo minister a pleasure to the hearer: for otherwise this figure shal be used without cause, <sup>3</sup>. To minister pleasure.

speake without profit, and be applied without pleasure.

Sermocinatio.

Sermocinatio, a forme of speech by which the Orator faineth a person and maketh him speake much or litle according to comelinesse, much like to the figure next before, but yet they differ in this, when the person whom the Orator faineth, speaketh all himselfe, then is it Prosopopeia, but when the Orator answereth now and then to the question, which the fained person objecteth to him, it is called Sermocinatio as in this example of Ose.

Ephraim thinketh thus: "Tush, I am rich, I have goods enough, in all my workes shall not one fault be found that I have offended: be it so, yet I am the Lord thy God which brought thee from the land of Aegypt, & yet wil I make thee dwell in tabernacles, Necessarie observations.

as in the daies of the solemne feast." Ose. 12. 8. In this figure warinesse and wisdom must be used that the speech may be agreeable to the person that is fained, and that it be no otherwise then is likely the same person would use, otherwise it will seeme foolish and absurd: therefore in this place it behoueth us diligently to consider the circumstances both of persons and thinges, what is their estate, condition, kind, age, disposition, manners, studies, affections, fortune, cause, place, time, and such like: for one maner of speech may become some manner of persons, which is unseemely for others: the speech of children is not so well seasoned with reason as of ye elder sort, a cuntry man hath not so fine phrases as hath a courtier, souldiers are not so civil as citizens, Judges are grave in giving their opinions, & definitive sentences, ruffins contrariwise are rash, running headlong upon mischief, ye poore man speaketh submissively, the rich man more audaciously, the victor (for ye most part) speaketh much with insulting and much in deriding, ye vanquished person fearfully & pleasingly which is well observed of poets: Daus speaketh after one sort, and Simo after another. Thraso useth boasting & bragging, Gnato flattering, but Chremes faithful & sober talke, poets & orators have alwaies been diligent in observing a comelinesse: Cicero in this behalfe was marvellous cunning & most artificall, who evermore gave meet speech in ye person whom he fained to speake, whether he were his adversary or his friend: he brought in Milo speaking valiently, Antony arrogantly, Nevius wickedly, Erutrius impudently, ever framing their speech according to their nature.

The use of this figure.

This figure serveth to complaine, to reprove, to confute, to excuse, to teach & to describe the nature or proeptries of Many uses.

peticuler persons.

The Caution.

The most necessary points of this caution are before sufficiently observed and noted.

Mimesis.

Mimesis is an imitation of speech whereby the Orator counterfaiteth not onely what one said, but also his utterance, pronunciation and gesture, imitating every thing as it was, which is alwaies well performed, and naturally represented in an apt and skilfull actor. The perfect Orator by this figure both causeth great attention, and also bringeth much delight to the hearers, for whether he imitateth a wise man, or a foole, a man learned or unlearned, isolent or modest, merrie or sorrowful, bold or fearfull, eloquent or rude, he reteineth the hearer in a diligent attention, and that for a threefold utilitie, in the imitated gesture a pleasure to the eie, in the voice a delight to the eare, and in the sense, a profit to the wit and understanding.

The use of this figure.

The use hereof serveth properly to commend and deprave, but 1. To commend.

most specially to reprehend and deride, and in respect of the 2. To deprave.

double forme, it may be compared by a double similitude as to a3. To reprehend.

glasse and an eccho, the one representing the gesture and countenance, 4. To deride.

the other resounding the imitation of voice and speech.5. Compared.

The Caution.

This form of imitation is commonly abused by flattering gesters1. Parasites.

and common parasites, who for the pleasure of those2. Depraving.

whom they flatter, do both deprave and deride other mens sayings3. Disgracing.

and doings. Also this figure may be much blemished, either4. Unaptly be excesse or defect.

by excesse or defect, which maketh the imitation unlike unto that it ought to be which is wel described in Aesops Asse, unaptly imitating the fawning dog.

Pragmatographia.

Pragmatographia is a description of things whereby ye Orator by gathering together all circumstances belonging to them, doth as plainly portray their image, as if they were most lively painted out in coulours, & set forth to be seene: If one should say the citie was overcome by an assault: he hath (saith Fabius) comprehended all in a summe, but if thou wilt open and set abroad all things, and everie particuler effect included within that summe, there shall appeare many fires and scattered flames upon houses and Temples, the noyse of houses falling downe, a confused sound of many thinges, and wofull cries, some flying with great perill, other imbracing their frends, and bidding them farewell for ever, infants shriking, women most bitterly weeping, olde men reserved by most unhappy destinie to see that day, the spoiling of temporall, and prophaning of hallowed things, the running forth of them that carrie away the spoiles, and the submission of them that entreat for their owne goods, every captive led chained before his taker, the mother rastling to retaine her sucking babe, and wheresoever great wealth is, there is also great fighting and contention among the spoilers themselves: now albeit this word Destruction might well comprise all these thinges, yet is it lesse to declare the whole then to name the partes, he comprehendeth the whole, which saith, the Cittie was taken and destroyed, and no more, but he that rehearseth all thinges orderly doth much more largely expresse the same, for he doth not onely say, the cittie was taken, tmeples overthrowen, houses burned, everie thing spoiled, but also how the cittie was taken, temples, houses and buildings destroyed, what perished else, what lamentation, what weeping, how horrible the slaughter was, the ravishing of Virgins, the shedding of blood, and many other thinges which is more then if hee rehearseth the whole in a total summe.

Ovid.7.lib.Metam.

King Aeacus (in 7. book of Metamorphosis) maketh a pittifull description of a great and cruell pestilence.

Likewise in the 8.booke of the hunting of the wild Bore.

And in the 11. of a cruell tempest.

Many like descriptions are in Virgils Aeneiados: Cicero describeth the murdering of Roscius, the luxuritie and riots of Antony with many other more.

The use of this figure.

To present things or actions to the minde of the hearer.

To this figure belong the descriptions of warres, tempestes, shipwrackes, conquestes, tryumphes, destructions of citties, and countries, murders, open shewes, dearthes and deathes.

### 1. Diverse uses.

This kinde of exornation helpeth much to amplifie, to declare things plainly, and none more forcible to move pittie.

#### The Caution.

The chiefest regard in this discription ought to be, that the principall1. Principall circumstances no omitted.

effects and circumstances be not omitted. Secondly, that they be not preposterously placed, as to rehearse that last, which2. Preposterous placing of circumstances, odious.

was first done: which fault is called Hysteron proteron.

#### Topographia.

Topographia is an evident and true description of a place, like as Cicero describeth Syracusae a Citie in Cicilia, and that excellently. In Plinie are the descriptions of Acaia, Aegypt, mount Aetna, Africa, Alexandria, a famous Citie in Aegypt, Arabia, Armenia, Asia, Athens, Bithinia, Cipres, Creta, Dalmatia, Gallatia, Hispania, Italia, the River Nilus, Pamphilia, the Ile of Rhodes, the Citie Rome, Sardinia, Cicilia, Thessalia, and many others.

#### The use of this figure.

To this figure refer Cosmography, by which is described “countries, cities, townes, temples, pallaces, castles, walles, gates, mountaines, vallies, fields, orchards, gardens, fountaines, dens, and all other maner of places” Apocal.28.: under the type of this description, the Evangelist John describeth the holy Jerusalem to the unspeakable comfort of the faithfull.

#### The Caution.

In the use of this figure diligence ought to be used, that no necessarie circumstance be omitted, the want whereof may appeare a maime in the description.

#### Topothesia.

Topothesia, a fained description of a place, that is, when the Orator describeth a place, and yet no such place: As is the house of envy, in the 6. booke of Metamorphosis, the house of sleepe in the eleventh booke, or else when the place is not such a one as is fained to be, as is heaven and hell. In the fourth booke of Aeneidos. This figure is proper to Poets, and is seldom used of Orators: and because the use hereof is rare and of small utilitie in Rhetorike, I do omit both the observation of the use, and Caution.

#### Cronographia.

Cronographia, when the Orator describeth anie time for delectations sake, as the morning, ye evening, midnight, the dawning and breake of the day, the Sunne rising, the Sun setting, the spring of the yeare, Sommer, Autumne, the Winter, the time of war, the time of peace, the old time.

### 1. The monring.

Examples, the morning: When the bright beames of the East have driven away the darke shadow of the night, and the cheerful birds do welcome the first dawning light with their glad songs, and when men shake off their soft slumbers, and everie living creature receive a new light to seeke their new foode, when the birds forsake their boughes, beasts their night lare, and when blacke cloudes be changed into a golden glorie.

### 2. The evening.

The evening: The time when darknesse ariseth in the East, and starres begin to appeare, when labourers forsake the fields, birds betake themselves to their night boughs, and beastes to their harbour, and when the silence of all creatures is encreased through desire of rest.

### 3. Midnight.

Midnight an example of Virgill: It was night, and all weary creatures tooke their sweet slumber, both woods and raging seas had left their sounds, and starres now sliding in the midst of the night, when every field is husht, both beasts and painted birdes, and water fowle of broad lakes, and such as keepe the wide and wilde country are fast in sleep, when cares were slaked, and harts had forgot their labours.

Here the Poet describeth the dead time of the night, to amplifie the dolorous sorrow of Dido, who could by no meanes finde rest at that time, when everie creature enjoyed rest.

### The spring time.

In the same maner is described the spring time, as to say that season which bringeth comfort to everie living creature, when the Sunne visiteth the face of the earth with his warme shine, the aire became temperate, fountaines and streames wax cleare, pastures greene, when the floures of every field, & the blossomes of every tree do present their beautie to the eyes of the beholder, and the new and tender breed of beastes and birds are brought forth & presented to man by the liberall hand of nature, at which time the birds sing, lambes plaie, musicke is heard, youth rejoyce, and the hearts of men become more glad: this is that time which bringeth calmnesse to the sea, temperature to the aire, beautie to the earth, clearnesse to the firmament, and a comfort to everie creature. By the like observation of circumstances, are all other descriptions of time, whether is be the time of peace, or time of warre, of plentie or scarcitie, winter or sommer, or whatsoever else.

There is another kinde of describing things and times, which is by making Images of them, which forme of description is called Icon, whereof shall be spoken hereafter.

### The use of this figure.

The use of this figure ministreth plentie of matter for this purpose, 1. Plentie of matter.

and great delectation to the mind of the hearer, wherento 2. Delectation of the hearer.

it hath the most especiall respect.

### The Caution.

He that shall use this figure ought to be skilfull in the knowledge of all, or at the least, of the most effectuall circumstances. 1. To be skilfull in the circumstances.

belonging to the time described, for otherwise the description will be both unperfect and unpleasant.

### Pathopeia.

Pathopeia, is a forme of speech by which the Orator moveth the minds of his hearers to some vehemency of affection, as of indignation, feare, envy, hatred, hope, gladnesse or sorrow: of this there be two kindes.

The first is when the Orator being moved himselfe with anie of these affections (sorrow excepted) doth bend & apply his speech to stir his hearers to the same: and this kinde is called Imagination, to which diverse vehement figures do belong, as Exclamatio, Obteslatio, Imprecatio, Optatio, Exuscitatio, Interrogatio, and such like. And to move mirth, formes of speech serving to that purpose, as Asteismus, and others of that kinde. Now as I sayd before, matters that fall into this figure ought to be great, cruell, horrible, odious, pleasant, or marvellous, for the greater ye caue is, the sooner the affections of the hearers are moved. Examples hereof are common in Tragedies, but of mirth and laughter in Comodies.

2 The other kind of Pathopeia, is when the Orator by declaring some lamentable cause, moveth his hearers to pitie and compassion, to shew maerc, and to pardon offences. To move compassion, lamentable histories are oftentimes used, and likewise the lively descriptions of wofull sufferings, and pitiful miseries, and how they may be artificially expressed. Poets complaints may give apt examples.

To pardon offences the perorations of Cicero are good presidents. A serious and deepe affection in the Orator is a mightie furtherance and helpe to this figure, as when he is zealous, and deeply touched himselfe with any of those vehement affections, but specially if he be inwardly moved with a pitifull affection, he moveth his hearers to the same compassion and pitie, by his passionate pronounciation. For true it is, that the apt bending of ye voice to the qualitie and nature of the cause, is not only a necessary dutie in an Orator, but also an excellent ornament.

The use of this figure.

This figure pertaineth properly to move affections, which is a principall and singular vertue of eloquution.

The Caution.

In the use of this figure there are many and necessary points to be observed. First that the causes themselves may be sufficient to move the mindes of the hearers to affections and passions, for it must be effectual matter, and not bare words that may worke so great effects in prudent hearers.

Secondly, that there be a discreet observation of necessarie circumstances, as in what causes, what affections are to be moved, for in divine Orations, and Sermons, to move laughter doth much diminish and oppose the modestie of so grave an action, and so serious a cause.

Secondly when and where, (that is) the time and place had need to be diligently observed, lest through want of discretion such affections be moved as are most unfit for the time, or unmeete for the place, as mourning at marriages and joyfull meetings: and contrariwise mirth at funerals & houses of mourning, are both repugnant to nature and contrary to custome.

Thirdly, it is verie needfull to shunne the untimely, and too hastie change of affections, for first to move pittie or weeping, and then presently to turne weeping, into laughter or contrariwise, wheweth the follie to be great, and maketh the action absurd.

Fourthly it is the part of a prudent Orator to observe a measure in moving affections, lest he kindle that which he is not able to quench.

Fiftly, fained matter, fond gesture, and counterfait pronounciation ought to be hated and avoyded.

Icon.

Icon, is a forme of speech which painteth out the image of a person or thing, by comparing forme with forme, qualitie with qualitie, and one likenesse with another.

I may by this figure paint out a favenous and venomous person in this forme and manner: Even as a cressed Dragon which with burning eyes, sharpe teeth, crooked clawes, gaping mouth, runneth hither and thither, and looketh everie where whom he may finde to spit his poyson uppon, whom he may catch in his mouth, crash in sunder with his teeth, venome with his tongue and rent in peeces with his pawes.

Saint Barnard painteth the cart of covetousnesse in this maner: Barnard super Cantie.

The cart of covetousnesse (saith he) is borne upon foure wheels, Pustilanimitie, Uncurtiesie, Contempt of God and Forgetfulnesse of death: it is drawne with two cattle in one yoke: Greedie catching, and Fast holding: to these there is one driver: Vehement desire of encreasing. This driver to move speedelie forward, useth two sharpe whippes: Greedinesse of getting, and Feare of loosing. This vice as you see, hath but one servant, because he is loth to hire many.



The use of this figure.

1. To praise.

The use hereof pertaineth properly to praise or dispraise, and that<sup>2</sup>. To dispraise.

as it were by a visible and lively image. To make this figure<sup>3</sup>. To describe.

and image of things, there is required a sharpe wit, great reading, and a good memory that the workmanship and cunning may cause the beholder to view it with pleasure, to admire the proportion, to commend the colours, and praise the arte and wit of the workman.

The Caution.

1. Unapt proportion.

Unapt proportion and unlikenesse, are faultes which may much deforme this ornament, & like as this forme of speech<sup>2</sup>. Unlikenesse.

is a singular jewell of eloquence, so ought the use therof to be very rare.<sup>3</sup> Rare use.

Epitheton.

Epitheton, called of Quintillian Appositum, of others Adjectiuum: Is a figure ofr forme of speech, which joyneth Adjectives to those Substantives, to whom they do properly belong, and that either to praise or dispraise, to amplifie or extenuate.

1. To praise.

To praise thus: O wonderfull clemencie, O most holy discipline. Hence it is, that we say: Gracious Princes, honorable Judges, reverend Fathers, prudent Counsellors, valiant Captaines, deare parents, vigilant Pastors, godly Ministers, faithfull friends, just Stewards, painfull labourers, & c.

Another: A Prince of singular prudence, of valiant courage, of incomparable magnanimitie, of invincible fortitude, of famous activitie, of most happy successe, & most fortunate dexteritie. Sometime the Epithet is put after his substantive, & that most elegantly, as in this example of Tertullian: We pray (saith he) for all Princes, that their life may be long, their kingdome secure, their court safe, their armies strong, their counsellors trustie, their people good, the whole world quiet, and whatsoever else that subject of Prince do desire to enjoy.

Many Epithets are often joyned to one Substantive, as for example: The judgements of almightie God are great, just, unsearchable, marvellous, and mightie.

So contrariwise, one Epithet may be applied to diverse Substantives, as may appear in this sentence converted: O happie Prince of such worthie Counsellors: O happie Counsellors of so worthie a Prince.

To dispraise thus: Wicked counsell, rash consent, and cursed<sup>2</sup>. To dispraise.

slaughter. To dispraise persons thus: Evil counsellors, unnatural parents, disobedient children, ignorant teachers, blinde guides, hypocriticall professors, & c.

To amplifie in praise thus: Heavenly musicke, famous memorie<sup>3</sup>. To amplifie.

, wonderfull art, glorious fame. In dispraise, insatiable avarice, wicked presumption, bloodie crueltie, divellish subtiltie, mad drunkennesse, horrible feare.

To extenuate thus: A small fault, a wicked cause, a feeble excuse, a momentary time. Lot useth this figure where he saith to the Angels: See now this cittie hereby to flie unto which is a litle one: he calleth it a litle one, that by extenuating the thing he desired, he might the sooner obtaine it.

The use of this figure.

Among all the forms of eloquution, there is no one exornation<sup>1</sup>. Majestie of matter.

either more generall or more excellent then this: for it carrieth alwaies with it, wheresoever it be applied a singular grace<sup>2</sup>. Beautie of the sentence.

and majestie of matter, beside the beautie wherewith it garnisheth the sentence.

The Caution.

A Speciall regard ought to be had in the frame & conjunction of this figure, that ye Epithets be not unproperly or perversely<sup>1</sup>. Unproperly or perversely applied.

applied, as to say: A valiant Phisitian, a reverend labourer, a coragious Counsellor, which is a forme of speech very unproper and also very absurd.

Periphrasis.

Periphrasis, is a forme of speech wherby that which might be said with one word, or at the least with verie few, is declared and expounded with many, and that sundrie waies.

First by explication of the name which the Grecians do call Etimologia: As when for this word Philosopher, we say a man studious of wisdom, for Parasite a flatterer for gaines sake: for Christian a worshipper of Christ.

Secondly by Annotation: that is, when by certaine markes or tokens we describe any thing, as understanding what anger is, we say it is a vehement heat of the mind, which bringeth palenesse to the countenance, burning to the eyes, & trembling to the parts of the bodie.

Thirdly by definition: For man, a living creature endued with reason, for a tyrant, an oppressor of the lawes and liberties of the common wealth.

The use of this figure.

1. Necessitie.

There be three causes to use this figure. The first necessitie, as when we cannot otherwise declare the thing, for want of a 2. Facilitie, or Perscuitie.

proper word. The second is desire of copie and facilitie, by which the thing, word, or sentence is made more evident and lightsom, 3. Modestie or chastitie of speech.

as the Pariphrases of Erasmus upon the new Testament. The third cause is desire to shunne obscenitie and naked telling of bashful matters, which is a part of modestie, much to be commended.

Thus we see that there be three speciall causes of using this exornation, and whereunto the use hath the chiefe respect, that is to say, necessitie, perspicuitie, and chastitie.

The Caution.

1. The circumlocation not too long.

The first proviso in using this figure is, to have regard that the circumlocution be not too long, whereby it may make the speech both tedious and barren, for this exornation serveth only to garnish the Oration with varietie of wordes, and never increaseth matter.

The second is to avoid curious, and needlesse Etimologies.<sup>2</sup> Needlesse Etimologies.

The third is to regard that the annotations and definitions be not false or unperfect, whereby the matter is rather obscured<sup>3</sup>. False Definitions not to be used.

then manifested.

Synonimia.

Synonimia, when by a variation and change of words that be of like signification, we iterat one thing diverse times.

An example: Wisedome in the poore man, lyeth<sup>1</sup>. Of words.

as a thing despised, rejected, oppressed, buried, and utterly extinct.

Another: Is it not a true taken of intollerable arrogancie and venemous envie, wher the tongue is stil exercised in depraving, slandering, defacing, deriding and condemning of other mens wordes and workes?

Another: Who more worthy of renowne, honor, fame, & glory<sup>2</sup>. Of sentences.

then Caesar? who more worthily esteemed, beloved, revered, & honoured then noble Caesar? who was his equall in knowledge, understanding, pollicie and wisedome? what was he that might be compared to him, either in courage of heart, in fortitude of mind or magnanimitie of nature?

Another of Virgil: How doth the child Ascanius? is he yet alive?Virgil.

doth he eate the ethereal foode? and lieth he not yet under the cruell shades? Here through affection he expresseth one thing thirse: for all that he demaundeth is no more but this, is Ascanius alive.

Another of Ecclesiasticus: "The highest doth not allow the giftes of the wicked, and God hath no delight in the offrings of the ungodly: here the first sentence is repeated by the latter, but yet with other words of the same signification, for in the former is the highest, in the latter God, in the former doth not allow, in the latter hath no delight, in the one gifts, in the other offrings, in the first wicked, in the last ungodly." Eccles.

The use of this figure.

This figure delighteth much both for the plenty of wordes and<sup>1</sup>. To delight with variety of speech.

and varieitie of sentences, but most of all for that it signifieth the worthinesse of a word or sentence, deserving repition in a changed<sup>2</sup>. To adorne and garnish the oration.

habite, whether it be in affection of praise or dispraise: this figure adorneth and garnisheth speech, as a rich and plentiful wardrop, wherein are many, and sundry changes of garments, to bewtifie one and the same person, David, Salomon, and Esay, are much delighted in the exornation.

The Caution.

1. Too great a heape of words.

In the use of Synonimies it is not good to make too great a heape of words considering the encrease no matter, for by too great a multitude, long time is spent, litle matter exprest, and although the eares of simple hearers be satisfied, yet their mindes are smally instructed.

## 2. Unlike or repugnant.

Secondly, it is requisite to regard that the words or sentences be not unlike or repugnant among themselves.

### Leptotes.

Leptotes is when ye speaker by a negation Equipollent doth seeme to extenuat ye which he expresseth: by this Job saith, that "he hath not eaten his meate along, that he hath not seene any man perish for want of clothing, or any poore for lacke of covering." Job. 31. Here if Job had said, that he had feasted many, that he had clothed every poore body that should otherwise To dispraise another.

have perished, he had not spoken so modestly, albeit that he had sayd as truly. Also by denying the superlative, it taketh the positive, thus. He is not the wisest man in the world, or he is none of the wisest, that is, he is not wise at all: this and such like formes of speaking are used for modesties sake, for it were not so seemly to say that he lacketh wit or that he is a foole: or thus it is no smal account that he maketh of his owne wit, he setteth not a little by himselfe: To commend himselfe.

here by the negation of small and little, great or much, is both signified and also properly amplified. Now if a man had some good occasion or cause to commend himselfe, he cannot by any means do it in more modest manner then by this figure, as if he should say: I was not the last in the field to fight against the enemies of my countrey, neither have I been least esteemed or worst accounted of in the love & favour of noble men, here if he should have said, I was first or one of the formost in the field, I have been best esteemed or equal with the best, it would have favoured of arrogancie and boasting, although he had said never so truely, yet is there enough said to get praise.

### The use of this figure.

This form of speech tendeth most usually to praise or dispraise, and that in a modest forme and manner.

### The Caution.

It is meete to foresee some good cause and fit occasion to use this Good cause to use this figure.

forme of speaking, lest a man should either praise himselfe with out desart, or dispraise another without caue, the one is a token of arrogancie, the other of malice, be the forme of speech never so modest.

### Frequentatio.

Frequentatio, a figure by which matter being dispersed throughout the whole oration are gathered together into one place, whereby the oration is made more pithie and sharpe, or thus: when many arguments being scattered here and there one from another are gathered together, as it were into one bundle, and layed before the eies of the hearer. Thus wehn all is done what vice is he free from, what is the cause Judges why you would deliver him? he is a betrayer of his owne chastity, he lieth in waite to doo mischiefe, he is covetous, intemperate, vicious, proud, wicked to his parentes, unkind to his frendes, troublesome to his kin, stubburne to his betters, disdainfull to his equals, cruell to his inferiours, finally intollerable to all men.

Another example, Cicero for Milo: Now truely the fortune of the Romane people seemed to me both hard and cruell, which had seene & suffered these men so many yeares to vaunt against ye commonwelth: they had lo idolatrie & adulterie profaned & polluted the most holy religions, the broke in peeces the most substantiall decrees of the Senate, they ransomed themselves with bribes before the judges, in the office of the tribuns, they molested the Senate, they cut in sunder the records of all orders made for the safety of the commonwealth.

They expelled me out of my countrey: they tooke away my goods, they fired my house, they tost tormoiled my wife and children, they denounced wicked and unlawfull warre to Pompey, they caused the slaughter both of magistrates and private persons, they burned my brothers house, they spoiled Hotruria, they cast out many from their houses and substance, they urged their purposes most earnestly, and pursued them most greedily, the cittie, Italy, provinces,

kingdomes might not mitigate their madenesse, they burned the domesticall lawes, whatsoever any had which liked them this yeare they thought should have been theirs, no man staid their purposes, but Milo himselfe.

The use of this figure.

Manifold uses.

This figure is an excellent ornament of eloquence, and is of mightie force to amplifie either praises or dispraises, accusations or defences.

The Caution.

The principall point of this Caution is to regard that the arguments be not false nor fraudulent to the supporting of iniquitie, and oppressing of innocency and truth.

Commoratio.

Commoratio is a forme of speech, by which the Orator knowing whereon the whole waight of his cause doth depend, maketh often recourse thither, and repeateth it many times by variation, whereof there be two kindes, to one which expresseth one thing with many words of the same signification which is called Sinonimia, spoken of before as in this example of Cicero: And shall so great a vertue be expelled, thrust out, banished and cast away from the citie?

Another: What diddest thou covet? What didest thou wish? what diddest thou desire? The other wick declareth one thing with diverse members, divers causes, diverse effectes and deverse reasons, Cicero when Erutius could shew no cause in his accusation, why Roscius should slay his father, he doth first amplifie the wicked fact of Parricide, declaring how great it is, & argueth that without many and great causes, such a wickednesse cannot bee committed, and contendeth that it cannot fall but upon a mischievous and most lewd men: after this he demaundeth of Erutius the cause why Roscius should slay his father, which place because it was strongest in Roscius defence, he tarieth long in it, and very often maketh his returne thither, he often demaundeth the causes of so great and horrible wickednesse, of so shameful a deed, he often amplifieth the greatnesse of the fact, and that which is great indeede, he maketh by his eloquence and vehemencie of his speech wonderfull great.

The use of this figure.

The most usuall practice of this figure is to accuse or defend, and that after a strong and forcible manner.

The Caution.

Where vertue useth this figure, it neither acceseth falsly nor defendeth fraudulently, but where craft and ill conscience beare the sway it doth both.

Systrophe.

Systrophe of some called Conglobatio, of other convolutio, and it is when the Orator bringeth in many definitions of one thing, yet not such definitions as do declare the substance of a thing by the general kind, and the difference, which the art of reasoning doth prescribe, but others of another kind all heaped together: such as these definitions of Cicero be in the second booke of an Orator, where he amplifieth the dignitie of an bystory thus: An historie saith he is the testimony of times, the light of veritie, the maintenance of memorie, the schoolemistresse of life, and messenger of antiquitie.

Another: Man is the example of imbecillitie, the image of unconstancie, the spoile of time, the bondman of miserie, the vessell of insatiable desire, and the confident castell of sudden ruine.

Pleasures are the enimies of chastitie, guides to povertie, daughters of dishonestie, and sweete baites of extreame miserie.

The use of this figure.

This figure is an ornament of singular grace and eloquence, 1. To praise.

serving most aptly and eligantly to commend vertues and dispraise 2. To describe.

vices. 3. To dispraise.

The Caution.

1. Affectation.

It is good to affect this ornament too much, nor to use it too oft, nor in using it to make too many definitions of one thing. 2. Too many definitions.

Digressio.

Digressio is the handling of some matter going out from order, but yet for profit of some pertinent cause, we may digresse for the cause of praising, dispraising, delighting or preparing. Digressions are taken either from the declaration of deeds, the descriptions of persons, places and times, the reporting of Apologies and similltudes, & likewise from common places.

The Caution.

There be diverse observations concerning digression necessary to be remembred. 1. The first is to see som cause why we should digresse, that is, that the same digression may some maner of way profit comend, & garnish the cause that we have in hand, for the digression ought in some respect to pertaine & agree to those matters which we handle, and not to be strange or far distant from ye purpose. 2. The second is to provide a forehand a perfect & readie way to goe forth aptly, and making no long stay out, likewise to foresee a fit entrance for our returne.

3 The third is, to take good heede that we do not darken our main cause and principall matter: we darken it if we goe forth abruptly, tarie too long abroad, tell thinges strange, distant, or disagreeing to the purpose, or returne into the cause overthwartly.

The use of this figure.

1. To amplifie.

If warinesse and good heed be taken, this figure is a vertue whereby the orations is amplified, garnished and wel commended: 2. To garnish.

otherwise it is a vice which doth violate both order and art, and doth greatly deforme the Oration by patching it, as it were with shreds and broken peeces.

Encomion.

Encomion is a forme of speech by which the Orator doth highly commend to his hearers, some person or thing in respect of their worthy deserts & vertues, Cicero: For if Cn. Pompey had beene 500. yeares ago, such a man he was of whom being a yoong man and a Romane knight, ye Senat might oftentimes have required aid & defence, woose noble actes with a most renowned vitory both by land & sea had spred over all nations whose three honourable triumphs are witnesses, that all the world was in our government and dominion, whom the people of Rome had commended with singular honors, now if you should say that he hath done something against ye leasgue of peace, who wil beleeve you? truly no man, for when death had quenched envy, his noble acts should have flourished in glory of an eternall renowne: whose vertues being bruted, should have given no place to doubts: and shall the friendly, approved, and perfect vertue of this man be hurt by the false report of backbiters?

By this figure we praise princes for their wisdom, religion, justice,1. Praises of Princes.

mercy, clemency, providence, blessed government, liberality and such like. Judges for their wisdom feare of God, learning,2. Praises of Judges.

care of equitie, for regarding the cause without respecting the person for their vigilancy, constancie, and gravitie. The divine Pastor, for his learning, gravitie, good life, apt gifts of teaching, care of his flocke, constancie in the truth, and charitie towards al men. Captaines for their experience, providence, fidelitie, for their courage and fortitude in fight, and for their modestie and mercie in victorie.

The use of this figure.

This forme of speech serveth to support and encrease vertue by giving due praise and commendation to it. For by this exornation, good deserts, and worthie vertues, are rewarded with the sweete frutes of their owne seede, and crowned with the garlandes of their owne flowers, that is to saie, with large fame, high honour, and immortal renoune and glorie.

For this the only forme of speech, which both speaketh while the vertuous man doth live, and also liveth when the vertuous man is dead. What shall I say? it is his plausus, his garland, his coate, his colour, and his ingraven Epitaph.

The Caution.

In praising and commending there are three most necessarie pointes to be diligently observed: The first is, that the praises be not too small for great and worthie vertues.

The second ye they be not too great for meane desertes, and too high for base persons.

The third that they be not perversely applied, that is to say, where rebuke and shame is rather due.

Comparatio.

Comparatio is a word of large and ample comprehension, and therefore it may stand as a generall head and principall of many figures, but namely of those which do tend most especially to amplifie or diminish by forme of comparison, as either from the greater to the lesse, from the lesse to the greater, from equall to equall, or by opposition of contraries, I will first begin with Comparison, as it is usually and specially taken.

Comparatio.

Comparatio is forme of speech, which by apt similitude sheweth ye the example brought in, is either like, unlike or contrarie: like things are compared among themselves, unlike from the lesse to the greater in amplifying, and from the greater to the lesse in diminishing, and contraries by opposing one against another.

1. Comparison of like things, as Camillus by his vertue did drive away the Barbarians and set up againe the Romane Empire, being sore opprest, and almost brought to utter destructions: even so Laurentius Valla restored the Latine tongue to the former puritie, which through the ignorance of the Barbarians was corrupted, suppressed, and almost quite extinct: As James and Jambres withstood Moses, so do these resist the truth, men of corrupt mindes reprobate concerning the faith.2. Tim.3.8.

2 Comparison of unlike things: Brutus put his sons to death, for that they conspired treason: Manlius punished his sonne for his vertue. Contrarie thus: Marcellus restored to the Syracusans his enemies their ornaments: Verres tooke away the same from his friends and companions. The whole is not only compared with the whole but also the parts be compared one with another. Cicero for Milo. Did that most noble man Scipio (being a private person) slay Tiberius Gracchus: not much corrupting the common wealth? and shal we being Consuls suffer Catiline, that would willingly destroy all the world with sword and fire?

Here Catiline is compared to Gracchus: the state of the common wealth to the whole world: a mean corrupting to slaughter, fire, and destruction, and a private person to the Consuls. Mat. 6.

3 From the lesse to the greater: "Wherefore if God so clothe the grasse of the field which is to day, and to morrow is cast into the Oven: shall he not do much more for you, O ye of little faith?" Mat 6.

"If they have called the maister of the house Beelzebub, how much more them of his houshold?" Mat.10.25.

"For if the blood of Bulles and of Goates, and the ashes of an Heifer sprinkling them that are uncleane, sanctifieth as touching the purifying of the flesh: how much more shal the blood of Christ which through the eternal spirit offered up himselfe without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead workes to serve the living God?" Heb 9.13.14.

4 From the greater to the lesse: "If God spared not the Angels that had sinned but cast them downe into hell, and delivered them into chaines of darknesse to be kept unto damnation, neither spared the old world, & c. much lesse will he spare the wicked which walke after the flesh in the lusts of uncleannesse? & c." 2.Pet.2.4.

If the righteous scarcely be saved, where shall the ungodlie and sinner appeare? If the law of God doth not justifie, much lesse man traditions.

If the shepheard be not able to resist the wolfe, much lesse are the sheepe able: If the mightie mountaines be not able to stand against the wrath of God, much lesse man, which is the image of weaknesse.

The use of this figure.

This forme of speech of mightie force and power both to move by example, & to persuade by reason, for the partes of the comparison being brought together, their likenesse or unlikenesse, their equalitie or inequalitie is as plainly discerned, as things manifold uses.

which are fixed and judged by the ballance. The use hereof is verie great and mightie in whatsoever cause it handleth, whether it be in praising or dispraising accusing, reprehending confirming, confuting, moving affection, perswading, or in anie other like: and no one forme of speech more apt and excellent to amplifie.

The Caution.

1. Unequall for equall.

In desiring to make a like or equal comparison, we must take heed that the partes be not unlike or unequall. Secondly, in 2. Perverse position.

making comparison from the greater to the lesse, we had need to forsee, that we put not a lesse for a greater: and so likewise in comparing from the lesse to the greater, which sometime falleth so out through ignorance and want of knowledge in the things compared. Lastly, it is behovefull to take heed that our comparisons be not so applied as they may move offence in the hearers, for there is an old saying and a true, that comparisons be odious, which is still verified either by the folly of the speaker, or pride of the hearer.

Similitudo.

Similitudo, is a forme of speech by which the Orator compareth one thing with the other by a similitude fit to his purpose Cicero: Even as the light of a candle, is opprest with the brightnesse of the Sunne, so the estimation of corporall things must needs be darkened, drowned, and destroyed by the glorie and greatnesse of vertue. As in dangerous sayling the helme is not committed to him that is richest or noblest in birth, but to him that hath the best knowledge in guiding the ship: even so is it requisite and behovefull not to give the principalitie of government to him that is of more wealth then others, or of nobler blood, but to him that excelleth other men in wisdom and loyaltie.

It is even Judges, as if you should give a sharpe sword to a 3



litle childe, or to a feeble olde man, who by his owne strength can hurt no mans person, but yet if he come to a naked mans bodie, he may be the sharpnesse of the point and wight of the weapon wound it: even so was the consulship as a sword given to weake and fearful men, who could never by their own might, have bene able to do so much as pricke a man, but being armed with the name of the honourable Empire, they have cruelly murdered the common wealth.

As if maketh no matter whether you laie a sicke man in a bed<sup>4</sup> Sense.

made of plaine wood, or in a bed gilt and garnished with gold, for whither soever you remove him, he carrieth his disease with him: even so is it all one whether the mind which is sicke with insaciabie avarice, be placed in riches or in povertie, for while the disease hang still upon it, it findeth no rest.

As the lion become sometime a prairie to smal birds, and as thin rust consumes thicke yron, lo is there nothing so sure, what is<sup>5</sup> Quint.

not subject to his inferiour.

The use of this figure.

The use of Similitudes is verie great, yelding both profite<sup>1</sup> Many uses.

and pleasure, profit by their perspicuitie, and pleasure by<sup>2</sup> The value of similitudes.

their proportion. They serve to many and sundry endes, as to praise, dispraise, teach, to exhort, move, perswade, and to many other such like effects: of all formes of speech, they are best conceived, most praised, and longest remembered.

The Caution.

The principal care in making similitudes, ought to be in foreseeing<sup>1</sup> Unlike.

that the things compared, be not unlike in that part<sup>2</sup> Unknowne.

wherein they be compared.

Secondly, that they be not straunge and unknowne, by the one there is an absurditie, by the other obscuritie.

Dissimilitudo.

Dissimilitudo, is a forme of speech which compareth diverse things in a diverse qualitie.

An example of the Prophet Esay: "The ox hath knowne his owner, and the asse his maisters cribbe: but Israel hath not knowne, my people hath taken no heed." Esay.1.3.

Another of Jeremy: "The storke in the aire knoweth his appointed time, the turtle dove, the swallow and the crane, consider the time of their travell, but my people will not know the time of the Lords punishment." Jerem.8.7.

Another of our Saviour Christ: "The foxes have holes, and the fowles of the aire have nestes, but the sonne of man hath not where to laie his head." Luc.9.58.

The use of this figure.

Mightie in amplification.

This forme of speech is of great use and utilitie in amplification, and it is verie convenient for praise or dispraise, reprehension and confutation.

The Caution.

The grace of this figure how impaired.

The grace of a dissimilitude is much impaired, when the unlikenesse is verie little, or when the parts are straunge, or unaptly compared.

Antithesis.

Antithesis, a figure which Quintilian calleth contention, and it is a proper coupling together of contraries, and that either in words that be contrarie, or in contrarie sentences.

1 In contrary words: He is gone but yet by a gainfull remove, from painfull labour to quiet rest, from unquiet desires to happie contentment, from sorrow to joy, and from transitory time to immortalitie.

2 An example of Cicero: And may you then preferre the unknowne before the knowne, the wicked before the just, strangers before neighbours, the covetous before the contented, hirelings before free helpers, the prophane before the religious, the most malicious enemies to this Empire and honour, before vertuous companions, and faithfull Citizens?

3 So well sighted were the eyes of his minde, that by them he saw life in death, an exaltation in falling, florie in shame, victory in destruction, a kingdome in bondage: and a glorious light in the midst of darknesse.

4 In contrary sentences: Art thou rich? then robbe not the poore: if thou beest strong, tread not the weake under thy feete: if wise, beguile not the simple: if publike by authoritie, oppresse not him that is private.

Another: What is more odious then labour to the idle, fasting to the glutton, want to the covetous, shame to the proude, & good lawes to the wicked.

The use of this figure.

This is a most excellent ornament of eloquence, serving most<sup>1</sup> Varietie.

aptly to amplification, it graceth and bewtifieth the Oration<sup>2</sup> Perspicuitie.

with pleasant varietie, and giveth singular perspicuitie and light<sup>3</sup> To amplifie.

by the opposition, it is so generall that it may serve to amplifie and garnish any grave and weightie cause.

The Caution.

In the use of this exornation, it behoveth to moderate the number<sup>1</sup> Excesse in number.

of comparisons, lest they growe to too great a multitude, which bewrayeth affectation, a fault which ought to be shunned.

Secondly, to provide that we impaire not the beautie and<sup>2</sup> Diverse in stead of contraries.

strength of this figure by opposing things differing, in stead of contraries.

Syncrisis.

Syncrisis, is a comparison of contrary things, & diverse persons in one sentence.

An example of the holy scripture: "Behold my servants shall eate, and you shall suffer hunger, behold my servants shall drinke, and you shall abide thirst, behold my servants shall rejoyce and you shall be put to shame, behold my servants shall be glad through joy of heart, & you shall cry through sorrow of heart, and waile through contrition of spirit." Esa.65.13.14.

Another of the penitent theefe hanging on the crosse, saying thus: “We are indeed righteously here, for we receive things worthie of that we have done, but this man hath done nothing amisse.” Luc.23.41.

Here in this example the guiltie is opposed against the just, and injurie against equitie.

Another: The suttie commit the fault, and the simple beare the blame.

Many of Salomons Proverbes are compounded and garnished with this exornation: as these and many mo such like: “Wise women uphold their house, but a foolish woman pulleth it downe.” Prov.14.1.

A wise sonne maketh a glad father, but an indiscreet sonne is a heavinesse to his mother.

“The curse of ye Lord is in the house of the ungodly, but he blesseth the dwellings of the rightuous.” Prov.10.1.

“The same use and Caution may serve to this figure, which do pertaine to Antithesis last observed.”

Enthimema.

Enimema, is a forme of speech which Quintillian enterpreteth a comment, forasmuch as it may wel be called the whole action & sentence of the minde, & it is as Cicero saith, when the sentence concluded consisteth of contraries thus: Our elders made warre, not onely that they might be free, but also that they might rule: but thou thinkest warre may be left off, that we might be made bondslaves to serve.

Another: If great wealth bring cares, and povertie wretched miserie, then the meane between these two extremities is the greatest happinesse.

Another: They which may do me good, wil not, and they whcih are willing, cannot, therefore my distresse remaineth.

The use of this figure.

This exornation may be applied to diverse ends, but most specially to confirme, or confute.

The Caution.

In the use of this figure it behoveth to have this care, that the premises be true, wherupon a right conclusion may be inferred.

Intersepugnantia.

Intersepugnantia, is a forme of speech by which the Orator reproveth his adversarie, or some other person of manifest unconstancie, open hypocrisie, or insolent arrogancie. Cicero for Roscius: IN which cause seemest to me, to be unconstant and foolish that wouldest both hurt a man and also commend him, and both call him an honest man, and also a varlet.

Thou therefore which theachest another, teachest not thy selfe: “thou that preachest a man should not steale, yet thou stealest: thou that saist that a man should not commit adultery, yet thou breakest wedlocke: thou abhorrest images, and yet robbest God of his honour. Thou makest boast of the law, and through breaking the law dishonourest God.” Rom.2.

Another of James the Apostle: “Out of one mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing, my brethren these things ought not so to be: doth a fountaine send forth at one place sweet water and bitter?” Jac.3.10.

The use of this figure.

This figure pertaineth properly to reprehension, as to repressThe use manifold.

boldnesse in the rude, pride in the arrogant, secutitie in the hipocrite, and unconstancie in the unwise.

The Caution.

The opposed partes both true.

The chiefe and principall regard in the Caution of this figure is, to looke that the partes opposed and repugnant be both true, otherwise the reprehender deserveth reprehension.

Antimetabole.

Antimetabole, is a forme of speech which inverteth a sentence by the contrary, thus: It behoveth thee to eate that thou maist live, and not to live that thou maist eate.

Another of the holy scripture: "Neither was the man created for the womans sake, but the woman for the mans sake." 1 Cor.11.

Another: "The children ought not to laie up for their parents, but the parents for their children." 2 Cor. 2

An example of Cicero: Of eloquent men Crassus is counted the most learned Lawyer, and of Lawyers, Scaevola most eloquent.

The use of this figure.

Sundry uses.

The use hereof serveth properlie to praise, dispraise, to distinguish, but most commonly to confute by the inversion of the sentence.

The Caution.

False inversion.

In using this forme of speech, it is requisite and behoveful that the sentence inversed be not false, or that it be not perversely put contrary to the truth & meaning of the speaker through the fault of memorie.

Peristasis.

Peristasis, a forme of speech by which the Orator amplifieth by circumstance, and circumstances are either of a person or of a thing, a person hath these: Parentage, nation, Countrie, kinde, age, education, discipline, habite of bodie, fortune, condition, nature of the minde, studie, foredeeds, name, & c.

1. Parentage: Thou ar of a noble blood, and hast thou made thy selfe a companion of most lewd men.

2. Nation: art not thou worthie of blame being an Englishman borne to despise the practice of shooting, knowing that it hath been of long time the principall cause of English glory?

3. Countrey: To be borne in Crete and to hate the vice of lying is praise worthy. To be borne in Asia among Turkes and to favoure and imbrace Christian religion, amplifieth the vertue of that man.

4. Kinde: Boldnesse, unchast speech, manlike apparell and gesture are all unseemely in women, and woman kind.

5. Age: Lying, lightnesse and lust are three evils intollerable in youth, how much more in gray heads and old age?

6. Education: To be well brought up, and vertuously trained in youth, and after to digresse and become wicked as did Nero, amplifieth the fault and increaseth the shame.

7. Discipline: A Judge to corrupt lawes and wrest judgement, a professor of divinitie to teach errors and maintaine heresies, a Phisition to destroy life by the abuse of Phisicke, a Captaine to forsake his Prince, and take part with the enemie: all these are great offences in any sort of men, but yet far greater, when the profession and the transgression be compared together.

8. Habite of bodie: God hath indued thee with a bewtiful fairnesse, and why dost thou live in so foule manner, and blemish that which he hath bewtified?

Thou hast a lustie and strong bodie, art thou not ashamed to beg thy bread?

Thou art a tall and mightie man, why art thou then fearefull to fight for thy countrey?

Little David slew great Golia, which was wonderfull.

9. Condition: Being a servant and to strike his maister, is he not worthy to be punished? How dare you being a private person resist your magistrate? a rich man to steale, a poore man to be proud, are offences much encreased when their condition or estate is considered.

10. The nature of the mind: God hath given you a valiant heart, and shall carefull thoughts overcome you? you have had alwaies a constant mind, and shall trifles quench your old frendship?

11. Studie: You studie the law which is the maintenance of right, with what face or conscience can you offer this wrong?

12. Foredeedes: When a man hath in his youth and former part of his time been vertuous, well geven, liberall and pittifull, valiant and hardie, and now to fall from all vertue to all vice, to become hard, cruell, cowardly, slouthfull and carelesse, amplifieth greatly these crimes by which those excellent vertues are oppressed.

13. You counselled them to take this ungracious enterprise in hand, and therefore your punishment is like to be thereafter.

By his counsell the armie was directed, the Cittie beseiged, won and conquered, the greater is therefore the fame of his wisdom.

14. Name: Is thy name Salomon, and hast no more wisdom? doest thou feare to be a souldier, and thy name Alexander?

Circumstances of things.

1 Cause: Judas was the cause of betraying Christ, therefore he had the more sin.

2. Place: They bought and sold in the temple the house of praier, and therefore they were reputed theeves, and the temple called their denne.

3. Time: In the time of praier to be exercised in wicked works, lewd wordes, or wanton behaviour is offensive to good men, and cursed before God. To abuse the tune of peace with tumults and sedition, is an heinous offence.

4. Occasion: To watch the oportunitie of darkenesse to do mischief betokeneth a pretended purpose, to use the helpe of solitudes as Cain did, when he slew Abel his brother, doth take away all excuse of ignorance and pretence of infirmitie.

5. Instrument, to slay with a dag or privie weapon, to murder by poisoning or by strangling doth argue a deepe and cursed malice of the murderer.

The use of this figure.

Sundry uses.

The use of circumstances is verie profitable for amplifying, extenuating, for expressing plainely, for proving & confirming.

The Caution.

The most necessarie admonition concerning the use of circumstances Too long stay in circumstances maketh the oration barren.

is to take heede of long and tedious stay in them, as about who, what, when, where, how, and such like, which by, prolixitie is wont to make the oration barren.

Auxesis.

Auxesis is a forme of speech by which the Orator amplifieth by putting a greater word for a lesse, as to call a proude man Lucifer, a dronkard a swine, an angrie man mad, a covetous man a cutthroate: In praising, as to call an honest man a Saint, a faire Virgin an Angell, good musicke heavenly harmonie.

This figure is chiefly set forth by tropes of words, forasmuch as they paint out things by similitudes, and make them more By Hyperbole.

evident by setting images before the eies, as when we call a craftie fellow a Foxe, a favenous person a cormorant, a patient man Job, but chieflie by Hyperbole, which maketh a large and most ample comparison.

The use of this figure.

The use hereof helpeth mightily to expresse a matter which requireth either great praise, or dispraise, and it is oftentimes in great and grievous complaints, signifying the greatnesse and excesse of suffering, examples whereof are found in the complaints of holy men, but chieflie in Job, David, and Jeremie.

The Caution.

The true use hereof is required in great causes, and not to amplifie everie small matter and foolish trifle, which is a vanity To amplifie smal matters.

to be shunned, for that common custome to amplifie small things, is more fit for a common liar, then meete for a grave and modest Orator.

Meiosis.

Meiosis contrary to Auxesis when a lesse word is put for a greater, to make the thing appeare lesse then it is, or verie litle, as to call a learned Doctor a prettie scholler, a great wound a scratch, a flat fall a foile, a raging railer a testie fellow: as Auxesis doth magnifie and lift up, so doth this diminish and pul downe: the other of small thnges, maketh great matters, so this of great matters maketh but trifles.

1. To extenuate.

The use hereof serveth to sundry effectes, to excuse by extenuation, also to remove despaire, and plant hope, as doth the2. To excuse.

Phisition in comforting his despairing patient, by calling his3. To comfort by extenuation.

disease a matter of no danger, no cause of any feare, an obstruction easily remedied, an inflammation quickly quenched, whereby the Phisition doth much relieve and lighten the heavie spirits of his feeble Patient, by decreasing the causes and diminishing the danger.

The Caution.

He that regardeth his credite must take heede that aswell in l. To exceed.

augmenting as in decreasing he respecteth the truth, and diligently observe the Poets warning, vt ne quid nimis: in diminishing regard ought to be had, that in coveting too great a decrease, the speaker fall not into that fault of speech, which is usually called Tapinosis, that is when the dignitie or majestie of a high matter is much defaced by the basenesse of a word, as to call the Ocean a streame, or the Thames a brooke, a foughten field a fray, great wisdom prettie witte, and Oration a tale, or as if one should say to a King: may it please your mastership: To this is opposed Bomphiologia, which giveth high titles to base persons, and great praises to small deserts. There is another faultie tearme of speech, called Paradiastole, which in this place may well be mentioned, for that it also opposeth the truth by false tearmes, and wrong names, as in calling dronkennesse good fellowship, insatiable avarice good husbandrie, craft and deceit wisdom and pollicie.

This vice of speech is a fit instrument of excuse serving to selfe-love, partiall favour, blinde affection, and a shamelesse person, which for the better maintenance of wickednesse useth to cover vices with the mantles of vertues.

Incrementum.

Incrementum is a form of speech, which by degrees ascendeth to the top of some thing or rather above the top, that is, when we make our saying grow, & increase by an orderly placing of wordes making the latter word alwaies exceede the former in the force of signification, contrarie to the naturall order fo thinges, for that ever putteth the worthiest, and weighiest words first, but this placeth them alwaies last, as in this example Terence.

: O my Parmeno the beginnger, the enterpriser, performer and accomplisher of all my pleasures.

Another: Neither silver, gold, nor precious stones might be compared to her vertues.

There was never yet a noble Captaine, Prince, king or Emperour, whose honorable fame and renoune hath spred far & wide, and also long continued, that may over match this worthie man in vertue or honour.

The use of this figure.

This figure is both apt to bewtifie the speech and to amplifie the matter for in forme it is neere to Articulus, and in force to comparison, and it as it were the Orators scaling ladder, by which he climeth to the top of high comparison: neither is it unlike to fire whose propertie is alwaies to ascend as big as matter can carie it.

The Caution.

In this figure order must be diligently observed, that the stronger may follow the weaker, & the more worthie the lesse worthie otherwise the signification shal not encrease, which this figure doth especially respect, but become a Congeries which respecteth not the increase of matter but multitude of wordes.

Anthypophora.

Anthypophora, when we grant to an objection, bringing in another thing which maketh the same objection tollerable, Cicero: I confesse i tooke that thing upon me, peradventure a matter of great importance, and also dangerous unto me: yet notwithstanding a cause worthie, for which I was bound to straine the strength of my age & diligence.

Another: I grant there is in it great labours, and many perils, yet by painful travel and valiant adventures therein shal ensue immortal glorie.

I cannot denie but the way to learning and wisdom is long and painful, the ascent steapie and slipperie, the season darke and mistie, false turnings many, beside stops, and many other kindes of discouragements: yet by labour and constancie once attained, it bringeth with it a plentiful harvest, I meane both of profit and pleasure.

The use of this figure.

1. To moderate.

The propertie of this figure is to moderate extremities, and to 2. To arbitrate.

arbitrate between comparative contentions.

The Caution.

A Speciall regard ought to be had that the latter clause or part 1. The later not weaker then the former.

of the sentence be not weaker then the former, for if it be, then the former part remaineth single in it selfe, and the oration is made verie weake and feeble.

Synaecosis.

Synaecosis is a figure which teacheth to conjoine diverse things or contraries, and to repugne common opinion with reason, thus: The covetous & the prodigall are both alike in fault, for neither of them knoweth to use their wealth aright, for they both abuse it, and both get shame by it.

Fluttonous feasting, and starving famine are all one, for both weaken the bodie, procure sicknesse, and cause death.

The use of this figure.

The proper use hereof serveth to couple contrarie evils together To waite contaries and condemne them both.

, & to condemne them both by shewing a reason, which is taken from their unities in working and consent in some effect.

The Caution.

In using this figure it is needfull to foresee and be sure wherein they consent, that one and the same reason may condemne them both.

Dirimens copulatio.

Dirimens copulatio, when we bring forth one sentence with an exception before it, and immediately joyne another after it that seemeth greater: Cicero in his oration in which he gave the Romane people thanks for his returne; You have (saith he) not onely taken away my calamitie, but also seeme to augment my dignitie.

“Wherefore you must needs obey, not onely for feare of vengeance, but aslo for conscience sake.” Rom.13.

“Behold, I have not laboured for my selfe onely, but for all them that seeke wisdom.” Eccle.24.39.

The use of this figure.

This exornation hath some affinitie with incrementum, for To encrease and amplify.

that they both increase the signification by placing the manner first, and the worthier last: but yet they have their difference. Incrementum increaseth by degrees of words, this by sentences: that by wordes of like nature onely, this both by like wordes and by diverse things.

The Caution.

Heed ought to be taken that the latter sentence be not weaker<sup>1</sup>. The latter sentence weaker then the former.



or lesse worthie then the former, which is a necessarie point to be regarded: for it were absurd to say, he is not onely a tirant, but also verie troublesome, or to make the latter the same that the former is, as to say he is not onely idle, but also<sup>2</sup>. To repeat the same.

he loveth to sit still and do nothing, then to speake thus: it were better to sit still and say nothing.

Correctio.

Correctio, is a figure which taketh away that that is said, and putteth a more meet word in the place, whereof there be two kindes, the one is when a word is corrected before it is said.

An example of Cicero in his 7. action against Verres: We have here brought before you Judges, to have your judgement, not a theefe, but a violent robber, not an adulterer, but a breaker of all chastitie, not a spoiler of church goods, but a rankeemie to al godly religion, not a quarelling ruffin, but a most cruell murderer.

An example of the holy Scripture: "You declare that you are ye epistie of Christ ministred by us, and written not with inke, but wit the sprite of the living God, not in table of stone, but in the fleshly table of the heart." 2. Cor. 3.3.

Correction after the saying, Paul to the Romanes: By what law of workes, nay, by what law of faith?

To the Ephesians: "But after you have knowen God, nay rather are knowen of God." Ephes. 4.

For this thy shamfull and most cursed fact, what shall I call thee, a wretch, nay a beast, a beast, nay a poisonnouse serpent, yet none of these are fit enough for thee, a devil, thou art both in respect of thy malice which thou doest possesse, and of the sundry mischiefes which thou doest daily commit.

The use of this figure.

1. To amplify.

This figure also doth effectually amplifie by the orderly encrease,<sup>2</sup>. To retaine attention.

but chiefly, by casting by mightie wordes, and by<sup>3</sup>. To cause expectation.

putting mightier in their roomes, aslo it maintaineth attention, for while ye hearer vieweth the going out of one word, he straight expecteth the comming in of another.

The Caution.

1. To reject the better & place the meaner a follie.

Concerning both the first forme of Correction, and also the second, it behoueth that the latter wordes be mightier then the former, for to reject ye mightier and place the weaker betokeneth want of discretion in the Orator, or to put needlesse & fond wordes to be corrected is a signe of follie.

Metania.

Metania is comprehended under Correction, and it is saith Rufinianus a description of things by reprehension, thus: He sheweth himself a man amongst his enemies, nay a lyon But of other Authours it is taken for a forme of speech by which the Orator repenting himselfe of some word or saying past, by fault of memorie, or want of due consideration, craveth leve to resume it, and to recite it, and to place a fitter word in stead thereof. Hereupon it is called Poenitentia Dicit, which repentance is many waies signified, and the leave to call words back is diversly expressed, according to the pleasure and devise of the Orator.

Sometime the Orator blameth himselfe, as doth Cicero in his Oration for Milo: We are fooles that do presume to compare Drusus Africanus, Pompeius, and our selves with Clodius.

The use of this figure.

The use of this figure serveth the Orator, when either through, 1. To correct errors of speech.

rashnesse of affection, weaknesse of memorie, or imperfection of speech, he hath said some thing amisse, to resume it, and amend<sup>2</sup>. To expresse more largely.

it, or under pretence of misliking, to take occasion to expresse his minde more largely.

The Caution.

It behoueth the Orator to take heede that he utter no heinous,<sup>1</sup>. Words of offence.

wicked, and slanderous words, with entent to correct them, for a word of offence is like a wilde bird which hath escaped thy hand and cannot be called againe.

Paramologia.

Paramologia, of some called Paralogia, it is when the speaker granteth many things to his adversary worthie of commendation, and at the length bringeth in some notable crime, which oppreseth and quencheth all that was granted before. Cicero for Flaccus: Notwithstanding this I say concerning the whole nation of the Greekes, I grant unto them learning, I grant unto them the knowledge of many Artes, I take not from them the comely grace of speech, fine wittes, singular eloquence. And futhermore, if they challenge unto themselves any other thing, I will not deny it them, yet religion and faith that nation never favoured, what vertue, what authoritie, what waight there is of all this matter, they know not.

Also it is by this gifure when the speaker in his conclusion bringeth in that whcih was not looked for, or that which is contrary, or at least farre distant from the premises. As for example, Salomon rehearseth the partes of his felicitie, he mentioneth his riches, possessions, sumptuous buildings & pleasures: but suddenly he concludeth that all this is but vanitie and vexation of spirit. This conclusion commeth unlooked for, and verie unlike to have ensued such premises, the expectation tendeth rather to heare what felicitie followed all this wealth and great possession: and not what vanitie or vexation of sprit.

The like example of this manner of speaking is in the 21. of Job, where he first describeth the prosperitie of the wicked, and then concludeth that suddenly they go downe to the grave.

The use of this figure.

The utilitie of this figure, consiseth chiefly in confuting and removing the opinion of the hearer from some liking or error<sup>To confute by detraction.</sup>

deeply rooted in his minde and affection, which the Orator confuteth by a conclusion suddenly inferred, for which respect it may be compared to the practice of undermining, which as it is hardly perceived till it hath wrought sudden subversion, so this figure maketh no shew of the purpose till it concludeth.

The Caution.

1. To grant the greater.

It is a necessarie poynt to foresee that we graunt not the greater, and infer the lesse, or being in but one evil thing, to subvert<sup>2</sup>. To inferre the lesse.

and overwhelme many good: or to inferre small faultes, to disgrace & drowne great vertues: for it were to kindle that which we cannot quench, or plant that we cannot pull by, and briefly to confirme that which we desire to confute.

Metabasis.

Metabasis, is a forme of speech by which the Orator in a few words sheweth what hath been alreadie said, and also what shalbe said next, and that diverse waies.

1 From the equall: The matters which you have alreadie heard, were wonderfull, and those that you shall heare, are no lesse marvellous.

2 From the unequal: I have declared unto you many of his commendable deserts, yet wil I tell you of many mo, and farre more excellent.

3 From the like: I have hitherto made mention of his noble enterprises in France, and now I will rehearse his worthie actes done neare to Rome.

4 From the contrary thus: As I have spoken of his great adversitie and miserie, so will I now speake of his happy prosperitie, which at length ensued, as the bright day doth the darke night, and warme sommer cold winter.

5 By prevention or occupation: Peradventure you think me long in the threatenings of the law, I will now passe to the sweet promises of the Gospell.

6 By reprehention: I have staied too long in lamentable matters, I wil now make mention of some pleasant reports.

7 From consequents: You have bene tolde how he promised, and now I will tell you how he performed: you have heard how greevously those cities offended, and it resteth now to heare how justly they were punished.

The use of this figure.

This exomation is profitable in two respects it both putteth in 1. To put in minde.

what hath been said, & also prepareth the hearer to the rest following. 2. To prepare attention.

The Caution.

The greatest care and regard in the use of this figure, ought to 1 Long repetitions are tedious and irksome.

be in observing these pointes. First, to be brief in the rehearsal of the matter already said, and likewise of that which shall next follow. Secondly, to provide that the matter which followeth be neither of lesse importance nor lesse plausible then the 2 Less matters following, quench attention.

matter going before, for a long rehearsall becommeth tedious, and warieth the hearers, and the promise of a matter of lesse importance or lesse pleasant quencheth attention and turneth away expectation.

Aedela.

Medela, when seeing the offences of our friends, or of them whom we defend, to be so great that we cannot honestly defend them, or so manifest that we cannot well deny them, we seeke to heale them with platures of good words and pleasing pseech: When there was a greater luxuritie and ryot objected against Caelius, then Cicero durst defend, and more evident then he could deny: not withstanding he did extenuate the fault with gentle words, and as much as he could pacified the judges, who were vehemently kindled against him, he said that those things were partly the vices of times rather then of the man, he contended that soem thing ought to be yelded to age, he opposeth against the offence a hope of future regard and diligence. And also as a remedie against new sprung envy, by the acts and enterprises which now Caelius tooke upon him, he applieth his own expettation of Caelius modestie and honest behaviour for the time to come.

Paul to Philemon.

The Apostle Paul giveth a verie good example of this figure in his Epistle to Philemon, where he useth sundry reasons & diverse meanes to salve and cure the fault of Onesimus, and to appease and pacifie the displeasure of

Philemon: which example may be a very good president for the use for this figure, both in respect of the forme, and also of the equitie & lawfulness of the effect, which are two points necessarie to be observed in all formes of speech.

The use of this figure.

Diverse uses.

This figure or forme of speech pertaineth properly to extenuate offences, to excuse infirmities, to appease displeasure, and reconcile friends offended.

The Caution.

It behoveth the vertuous Orator to regard these necessarie observations in Caution, that he never defend things unlawfull, nor denieth matter evident, nor excuse offences that be wilful, nor extenuate transgressions that be great, otherwise he shal appeare both impudent and wicked: notwithstanding which of all these faults will not blind affection, selfelove, evil conscience, and corrupted indies take in hand, and either subtilly worke, or audaciously performe.

Exuscitatio.

Exuscitatio, is when the speaker being much moved with some vehement affection in himselfe, doth shew it by the utterance of his speech, and thereby moveth the mindes of his hearers, and it is used when persons or matters do require either great praises, or dispraises. In praises<sup>1</sup> Cicero

thus: What man is he? be he never so envious, never so malicious, never so ambitious of honour, but must needes commend this man, and acknowledge him to be most vertuous, most learned, most wise, who for the safegard of his country, the defence of his citie, and the riches of the common wealth, did most willingly put and yeeld himselfe to great and cruell dangers, whose learning was proved in defending, whose wisdom was wondered at, in accomplishing so dangerous an enterprise. In dispraising<sup>2</sup> Cicero.

thus: Who is of so carelesse a minde, that seeing these things can hold his peace and let them passe? you put my father to death before he was condemned, and being so put to death, you registred him among condemned men, you thrust me out of mine owne house by violence, you possessed my patrimony, what will you more? came you not to the seate of judgement as you do now, to put to death or at least to condemne Sextus Roscius?

The use of this figure.

This figure is verie generall, and may serve to manie and Diverse uses.

sundrie purposes, but chieflie to praise or dispraise, it maie bee used to accuse, reprehend, to defende, and justifie.

The Caution.

Not to be hot & vehement without cause.

Forasmuch as this forme of speech is alwaies vehement, it si not meete to be used but in causes necessarily requiring vehemencie. For it is a cleare signe of folly to be hotte, vehement, and clamorous in a clame cause, or small matter.

Collectio.

Under the name of Collectio, I do place all those figures, which because of thier forme may be called Collectives. In respect that either they leave the sense to be collected by the hearer or do tend to the collection of proofes and conclusions, by their formes expressed: of which the one part do expresse the Antecedent, leaving the Consequent to be collected The other by shewing reasons do expresse both.

Emphasis.

Emphasis, is a forme of speech which signifieth that which it doth not expresse, the signification whereof, is understood either by the maner of the pronuntiation, or by the nature of the words themselves. By the pronuntiation thus: Darest thou presume to praise him? That is, (Indoctus peritiffimum) as much as to say: Is ignorance fit to commend learning, or folly meet to praise wisdom?

Another: Wilt thou beleewe a Cretian? whereby is signified, not simply a man borne in Crete, but any other dissembler, after the nature and disposition of that nation.

An example of holy Job: "I will say to corruption thou art my father, and to the worme thou art my mother and my sister." Job 17.14. By which saying, Job signifieth that his hope in father and mother, in sister, and in all worldly matters should cease, & that the wormes of the grave should be in their stead.

Another example in the answer of Achab to Benadab king of Syria. "Tel him (saith he) Let not him that putteth on his harnesse boast himselfe, as be that putteth it off" 1. Reg 10.11.: signifying hereby, how litle he feared Benadabs threatening, and how much he despised his arrogant and rash presumption: and that there were as great cause why Benadab should feare to be vanquished, as hope to win the victorie.

Another of Esay: "They shall break their swords into mattocks, and their speares to make sithes." Esay 2.4. By this saying the Prophet signifieth the sweet peace that should come with Christ.

Salomon useth an excellent Empasis, where he giveth us warning that we should not speake or thinke evill of the king in our privie chamber. For saith he: "A bird of the aire shall betraie thy voice, and with her feather shal she bewray thy words." Eccle.10.19.

The use of this figure.

This figure is very pleasant & apt to amplifie, for under an1 It is pleasant.

artificall shadow, it pretendeth the image of things to the view of mans consideration: & it serveth to admonition, reprehension, 2 It hath diverse uses.

comiseration, and commination.

The Caution.

As an Emphasis is a singular figure of wit, so is it a necessary point of wisdom to use it to hearers of capacitie able to conceive and understand the sense and meaning thereof. For this figure speaketh as it were with a voice far distant: the sensible hearing and understanding wherof requireth a diligent listning and attention, which a carlesse mind doth not esteeme, nor a dul sense able to comprehend. Secondly, it is necessary to provide that this forme of speech fall not into the fault of deep obscuritie, by too dark a shadow, as by the strangenesse of the word, or unlikenesse of the thing, or unaptnesse of the application.

Syllogismus.

Syllogismus, is a forme of speech by which the Orator amplifieth a matter by conjecture, that is, by expressing some signes or circumstances of a matter, which circumstances be of three sorts, either going before it, annexed with it, or following after it.

Circumstances going before. An example of the holy scriptures: "As the Lord God liveth before whom I stand, there shall be neither dew nor raine these yeares, but according to my word." 1. Reg. 17. 1. Here by the great drought, Elias signifieth the great hunger and dearth following the drought.

"Seven daies hence will I cause it to raine upon the earth fortie daies and fortie nights" Gen.7.4., wherby the Lord gave to understand what a mightie floud should follow.

2 Circumstances annexed: Virgill speaking of Poliphemus, saith he held a pine tree in his hand to stay himselfe, and walked through the sea: by this we conjecture what a great bodie he had.

1 Sam. 17.6.7.

The huge stature and great strength of Goliath is signified by the weight of his brigandine & speare head, and by the monstrous bignesse of his speare staffe compared to a weavers beame.

“Foelix trembled” Act.14.16., which did plainly betoken his inward horror, at the hearing of Gods judgements.

“And he went forth and wept bitterly” Mat.26.75.: By Peters bitter weeping, we gather how effectually he was touched with repentance by the motion of Gods spirit.

Circumstances following after: David is described sorrowfully bewailing the death of his sonne Absolon, by which is collected how dearly he loved him, notwithstanding his evil inclination.

The use of this figure.

This figure is a verie commendable ornament of eloquence, and is a meet forme of speech to amplifie any great or excellent matter. For by this figure the Orator speaketh to his hearer a far off, giving some signe or token to the reason of the hearer, whereby his whole meaning may easily be gathered.

The Caution.

In using this figure, it is requisite and necessary to signifie out meaning by such circumstances as may best amplifie the matter, and most clearly signifie our meaning: otherwise we shall speake in the clowdes without profit.

Noema.

Noema is a forme of speech by which the speaker signifieth something so primly that the hearer must be faine to seeke out the meaning, either by sharpnesse of wit, or long consideration. Hortentius said, that he was never made friends with his mother and his sister: meaning that there was never any debate or contention between them.

Quintilian in his 8 booke and 5. chapter bringeth in an example of a certaine woman, who having a brother whom she dearly loved, and had verie oft by giftes and hire, withdrawen him from the dangerous exercise of sword play: and seeing that neither by the perswasion of her love, nor by the allurement of her giftes her desire might take effect, while he was a sleepe she cut off his thombe: which injurie when with great furie he fought to revenge, Worthy of a hand without maime. See Mat. 19, 39.

she thus signified her minde. O brother (saith she) thou art well worthie of a perfect hand without maime, understanding that it were not amisse, that such a one should meet with his own destruction, that did so oft seeke it with his owne will.

The use of this figure.

The use hereof onely to conceale the sense from the common capacitie of the hearers: and to make it private to the wiser sort, who by a deepe consideration of the saying, are best able to finde out the meaning.

The Caution.

This figure ought to be used verie seldome, and then not without great cause, considering the deepe obscuritie of it, which is opposed to perspicuitie, the principall vertue of an Orator.

Metastasis.

Metastasis is a forme of speech by which we turne back those thinges that are objected against us, to them which laid them to us: When Antony charged Cicero that he was the cause of civill war raised betweene Pompeius and Caesar, Cicero rebounded the same accusation againe to Antony, saing: Thou Marcus Antony, thou I say gavest to Caesar (willing to turne all upside downe) cause to make war against thy countrey.

When Ahab likewise charged Eha, that it was he which troubled all Israel, nay saith Eha it is not I that trouble Israel, but thou and thy fathers house, in that you have forsaken the commandements of the Lord, and thou hast followed Baal.

The use of this figure.

To confute.

The use of this figure serveeth both to repell objections, and To accuse.

also to reply by accusations, and all at one time. This figure by the violence of his rebound driveth the edge of his enemies sword upon his enemies head, or as it were, taking up his enemies arrowe fendeth it backe from whence it came.

The Caution.

This figure is of little force without a reason annexed to the objection returned, for to denie the one, and to affirme the other without shewing reason of that is said, is a verie feeble manner of confutation or accusation, and is more meete for children and fooles then for men of understanding and wisdom.

Brachiepia.

Brachiepia is a forme of speech, by which the matter is brieflie told with no more words then those that be necessaarie: or when the Orator by brevitie cutteth off the expectation of the hearers.

An example: Pompeius prepared for war in winter, began it in the spring, and furnished it in sommer.

Another: As he passed by, he tooke Lemnum: then he left a garison at Tharsus: after that he got a cittie in Bithinia, driven from thence into Hespontus, straight way wan Abidus. Cicero for Manlius: How speedilie Pompeius being Captain failed with vehemencie of war, who entred into Cilicia, spied out Africa from thence came with his Navie into Sardinia. The like brevitie Simo useth in Terence: The corps (saith he) goeth before, we follow after, we come to the grave, it is put into the fire, a lamentation is made.

The use of this figure.

Brevitie comprehended in few words maketh a quick dispatch of many thinges, wherefore it is to be used either when matters need no long speech, or when time requireth speed, or the hearers such as few wordes may instruct.

The Caution.

In coveting brevitie, it is necessaarie to avoide extremitie, for too much hast leaveth the Oration manie times obscure and unperfect, as may be seene in their workes which did too much affect this forme whereby they fell into obscuritie.

Procatalepsis.

Procatalepsis is a forme of speech by which the Orator perceiving aforehand what might be objected against him, and hurt him, doth confute it before it be spoken, or thus: when the Orator putteth forth the same objection against himselfe, which he doth thinke his adversarie would, and then refelleth it by a reason, whereby he doth providently prevent him. Cicero: as if some Judge or commiissioner might say unto me, thou mightest have contended with a lighter action, thou mightest have come to thy right by a more easie and profitable way: wherefore either change

thine action, or resist me not as Judge: or if he do prescribe after what sort I ought to sue for my right, to which objection he maketh this answer. Notwithstanding he seemeth either more fearfull then is reason a Judge should be: or else he dareth not judge that which is committed to him. Likewise against Verres, Cicero saith, that he knoweth some men will marvell, seeing so many yeares he defended many, and hurt none, he doth now come to accuse Verres, then he doth shew them that this accusation against Verres is a defence of their fellowes.

An example of Paul: "Thou wilt say then unto me, why then blameth he us yet? for who hath been able to resist his wil? But O man who art thou which disputest with God? shall the pot say to the potter, why madest thou me on this fashion?" Rom.9.

Another: "Some man will say, how arise the dead? with what bodies shall they come? thou foole, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die." 1.Cor.15.

The use of this figure.

This forme of speech doth properlie belong to confutation, & is 1. To confute.

also an ornament which greatly enricheth the oration with a 2. It causeth attention & expectation.

new encrease of matter, & occupieth the mind of the hearer aswel with the consideration of the objection going before, as with attention and expectation of the answer following.

The Caution.

1. Curious and vaine objections.

The principall pointes and partes of warning in the use of this figure are these: First to take heede of curious and vaine objections. Secondly of weake and insufficient answers: for it is an2. Weake answers.

easier matter to move hard objections, then to make sufficient solutions: and the Orator committeth a great absurditie when he maketh an objection which after he is not able to answer: wherby he sheweth his adversaries strength, and his owne weaknesse.

Aetiologia.

Aetiologia is a forme of speech by which the Orator joineth reason or cause to a proposition uttered, Cicero: There be no wiles more privie then these which be hid in dissimulation of dutie, and in custome of acquaintance, for thou maist easilie by taking heede shun an open enimie: but this hid, inward and familiar evill, doth not onely appeare, but also opresse, before thou shalt be able to foresee and espie it. Cicero for Archia: Looke what wit or eloquence I have, Judges, Archia may justly challenge it to himselfe: for he was the first and principall, that caused mee to follow these manner of studies.

An example of the Prophet Amos, "thus saith the Lord: For three and foure wickednesses of Edom, I will not spare him, because he persecuted his brother with the sword, bare hatred very long, and so kept indignation alwaies by him." Amos.1.

Another: "He brought me forth into a place of libertie, he brought me forth even because he had a favor unto me." Psal.18.

Another: "So that they are not without excuse, because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankfull, & c." Rom.1.

The use of this figure.

This figure is usuall in all good Authors, and is of great1. To confirm.



strength in speech, for that the sentence said, hath alwaies<sup>2</sup>. To confute.

the reason joined unto it as an authenticke seale to an evidence: and it serveth to confirmation and confutation.

The Caution.

The speaker in the use of this figure ought to be sure that the reason or cause ought to be sufficient.

reason or cause which he joineth to the proposition be good & sufficient, lest he weaken that which he should confirme, and disgrace that which he should bewtifie.

Apodioxis.

Apodioxis, when the Orator rejecteth the objection or argument of his adversaries as thinges needlesse, absurde, false, or impertinent to the purpose, as proceeding from follie, or framed by malice, or invented by subiltie. Cicero for Milo: What should Milo hate Clodius the flower of his glorie?

Another: And would any wise man ever have so said? were not ignorance the cause of this opinion, follie could not be the frute.

To the Sadduces captiously enquiring of Christ, concerning the state of marriage in the resurrection, he answered: you do erre, not knowing the Scriptures, neither the power of God: by which answere he rejecteth their captious objection, by noting their ignorance.

The use of this figure.

This forme of speech is proper to reject vaine and fond argumentsTo reject.

of an adversarie: namely such as are unworthie of answere.

The Caution.

To reject necessarie objections or true arguments repugnethNot to reject true arguments.

veritie, and to reject them with derision or scorningly opposeth modestie, both which ought for the love of verity and charityNot to deride the truth.

evermore to be shunned.

Expeditio.

Expeditio, when many reasons being reckoned by which som thing may be doen or not done, one reason is left which the Orator standeth unto & concludeth upon, and the other are taken away, thus: Seeing this ground was mine, thou must needs shew, that either thou diddest possesse it being void, or made it thine by use, or bought it, or else that it came to thee by heritage: Thou couldest not possesse it voide when I was in possession: also thou canst not make it thine by use: Thou hast not to shew that thou diddest buy it, it could not come to thee by inheritance, and I alive: it followeth then that thou wouldest put me from mine owne ground, before I be dead.

Another example: Knowing that almightie God hath in his hand all thinges that we neede, how shall we come by them? we can take nothing from him by force, for he is most strong and mightie: nor get any thing from him by fraud, for he is most wise and provident: if we challenge any thing of him by law, he will prove that he oweth us nothing, wherefore it followeth that either he must give them, or else we must go without them.

The use of this figure.

This figure serveth onely to prove some thing by a band of manie reasons.

The Caution.

No reason omitted.

It is the dutie of the speaker to regard the truth of his reasons, and the necessitie of the consequent, and that he omit no reason which may reprove his conclusion.

Paradigma.

Paradigma is the same which the Latines called Exemplum, and we in English an example, and in Rhetoricke it is called the rehearsall of a deede or saying past and applying of it to our purpose, whereof there be two kindes, the one true which is taken from Chronicles & Histories of credit, and it is of great force to moove, perswade, and enflame men with the love of vertue, and also most mightie to deterre and dissuade them from vice: It is also used not onely to confirme matters, but even to augment, enrich, bewtifie, and garnish them with much comelinesse.

Examples which are usually applied in these respects, be either like, unlike, or contrarie, and therefore they are used commonly in a comparative forme, and being aptly compared, and fitly applied, they present to the view and contemplation of our minde, the true of lively Image of time past, for by them it is that we know and see what was done long before our birth, not onely at home, but also in countries far distant from us, for by histories and memorials of deedes done and saying uttered, which are the fountaines from whence we take our examples: we behold ancient deedes and sayings of antiquitie, not as past but as present, Princes, Patriarchs, Prophets, tirants wise men and fooles, holie and wicked, not as dead, but as living, ruling, teaching, doing or speaking, everie one following the inclination of his will, either directed by godly wisdom, or seduced by ignorance, and malice.

These are they whom wee diligently looke upon with the eies of our mindes, and also deeply considering both what they were, what they did, what they received, and what they suffered: if they were Kinges how they ruled and governed, if Patriarches how they lived, if wisemen what they said, if fooles, what they committed, if godly what they reaped, and also if wicked, how and in what manner they were punished, whereby wee do plainly appeareth, that there is a most just justice in GOD, by whose wisdom, love, favour and mercie good men are protected, advanced, and made happie: and contrariwise, the evill and wicked by his judgement and power are justly punished.

These and other such like frutes we reape by the benefit of examples, and therefore their use in doctrine is to be greatly commended, so be it, that they be aptly applied and truely expressed, for they instruct plainly, move mightily, & perswade effectually. Finallie, their use is generall, for they are in their natures and severall properties apt to enrich, garnish, confirme and amplifie any matter or cause be it never so great, so grave, or so excellent. Thus much for the use and commendation of examples.

The Caution.

In the use of examples there are diverse and necessarie observations to be diligently regarded.

First, that a good example be not ill applied, as to a false purpose and wrong end.

Secondly, that we make not publicke examples of private actions.

Thirdly, that we alledge not an ill example of a good man to confirm sin, as to alledge the bigamie of Jacob, the adulterie of David, and the crimes of other holy men to confirme the like sinnes.

Fourthly, that we confirme not holy Scriptures by prophane examples.

Fifthly, that we use not reverend examples unreverently, nor such as be grave in light matters, nor contrariwise light and wanton examples in reverend, and grave causes.

Sixthly, the extraordinary examples of extraordinarie persons are not to commended to imitation.

The other kind of example is fained by Poets and inventors of fables for delectations sake, & those fained examples are taken from Poets inventions, and from the devises of Apologies, and fables attributed to brute creatures, as to beastes, birds, fishes, bees, antes, and creeping wormes, also to trees, hearbs, fountains, meadowes, mountaines and vallies, in like maner to the Sunne, Moone, and Starres.

This kinde bringeth a marvellous delectation to the hearers, but especially to the simpler sort, yet being wittilie invented, and aptly applied, they are not onely allowed of wise men, but also are much commended: the use whereof ought to be verie rare, namely in great and grave causes.

The Caution.

Fained examples and Apologies, ought to be used verie seldome, and then not without some fit occasion.

Secondly, regard ought to be had, that they be not alledged in the forme and countenance of true histories, whereby the truth is violated, and the simple and silly hearer seduced.

Thirdly, that they be not applied in the stead and place of true examples, to confirme grave and serious causes.

Fourthly, it is necessarie that discretion be used in their choice, that they be not unfit, foolish, unchast, or any way undecent, all which are in wisdom and vertue to be avoided.

Gnome.

Gnome, otherwise called Sententia, is a saying pertaining to the maners and common practises of men, which declareth by an apt brevitie, what in this our life ought to be done, or left undone. First it is to be observed, that everie sentence is not a figure, but that onely which is notable, worthie of memory, and approved by the judgement and consent of all men, which being such a one, maketh by the excellency therof the Oration not onely beautifull and comely, but also grave, puissant, and full of majestie, whereof there be sundry kindes.

The first a Sentence universall, which containeth no certaine person or thing: As evill gotten goods are evill spent: evill will never said well: envy is a punishment in it selfe.

The second is a single sentence, as, a Citie in sedition cannot be safe, the contented man is verie rich, necessitie hath no law.

The third is a double sentence: Flattery getteth friendship, and truth hatred: And old sore is soone hurt, and a testie man soone angrie.

In all worldly matter something ever lacketh, and nothing long endureth.

The beginning of everie action is easilie seene, but the sequele is uncertaine.

The fourth is a sentence without shewing a reason: Yoong men ought to reverence their elders: Silence doth well beseeme women kinde. The hastie man never wanteth wo.

The fifth, a sentence rendering a reason: He that doth evill, hateth the light, lest his deeds should be repoved.

It is good to live so, that the rehearsall of our lives may not make us ashamed.

Cast not too much away with thy hands, lest thou be forced to seeke it with thy feet.

The first, is a sentence consisting of contraries: By concord small thinges encrease, by discord great riches are soone consumed.

A guiltie conscience is alwaies afraid but he that hath done no evil liveth in quiet. Better is a messe of pottage with love, then a fat oxe with evill will. Salomon is much delighted with this kinde of sentence: for many of his proverbes be compounded of contrary sentences

The seventh, is a sentence of diverse things, as: Death is not to be feared, but the way and passage to death.

Error and repentance, are the companions of rashnesse.

The eighth, a sentence shewing what doth happen in life, as: Pride goeth before, and shame commeth after. Prodigalitie is the mother of povertie. To day a king, to morrow dead: Life and death are in the hands of the toong, mans nature is covetous of newes, we court after things forbidden, and loath those which are commanded.

The ninth is a pure sentence, not mixt with any figure, as: It is good to be merry and wise. He is happie which taketh warning by other mens harmes.

The covetous man wanteth as well that which he had, as that which he hath not.

The tenth, is a sentence of equitie: Do as thou wouldst be done to. He that is mercilesse shall of mercy misse.

The eleventh is a figured sentence, whereof there be as many kindes, as there by figures: If it be figured, it beareth the name of the figure wherewith it is joyned.

The Caution.

Now in a sentence heede must be taken, that it be not false, strange, too long, or light, without pith or importance. Secondly, that they be not too oft used, and too thin sprinkled in our speech, for that which is lawfull for Philosophers, is not granted to Orators, because Orators are the handlers of matters, and Philosophers the instructors of life.

The use of this figure.

The use of sentences is marvellous great in morall Philosophie, and also verie profitable, and pleasant in the Art of Rhetoricke: yet are sentences verie sparingly sprinkled in the Orations of the most eloquent Orators, and that onely in consideration of their singular beautie and brightnesse: for excellent sentences ought to be esteemed as precious pearles and costly jewels in princely vestures, and as the most glorious lightes in the firmament: all which as they are most excellent in beautie and glorie, so are they most rare by creation and nature.

Epexegesis.

Epexegesis, is an added interpretation: that is, when the Orator doth interprete a word or sentence going before by another word or sentence comming after in this manner: "When shall be opened the righteous judgement of God, which will reward everie man according to his deeds." Rom That is to say, praise, honour, and immortalitie to them which continue in well doing, and seeke immortalitie: but unto them that are rebels, and do not obey the truth, but follow unrighteousnesse, shall come indignation, wrath, tribulation, & c. "I know that in me" Rom., that is to say, in my flesh dwelleth no good thing.

The use of this figure.

This figure is evermore used when the speaker is desirous to make his meaning most plaine & manifest, supposing it needfull for the better explanation therof, to adde a lightsom enterpretation, whereby darke senses are well declared, and the hearer well instructed.

The Caution.

There be two most needfull observations herein to be regarded, the one, that the interpretation be a true declaration of the sense, and in no part false, the other, that it may give light, and manifest the word or sentence which it

expoundeth, and not obscure it, as some enterpreters now and then do, who through ignorance and want of art, make their interpretations darker then the text, whereby it commeth to passe, that there is called a most darke eclips of bright doctrine, through the interposition of ignorance, which is well resembled in a sore eye, which being tormented and darkened with a pin and a webbe, causeth the other also to become dimme and halfe blinde.

Propositio.

Propositio, which comprehendeth in few words, the summe of the matter whereof we presently entend to speake.

Cicero: I have now to speake of the excellent and singular vertues of Pompeius. There was no cause why Nevius should demand of the Pretor, that he might possesse the goods of Quintius by an injunction. Cicero against Verres. It is necessary to speake concerning our contention, that you may have what to follow in defending your accuser. Cicero against Catiline: And because the decree of the Senate is not yet written, I will shew you as much thereof as I can call to remembrance. Also, before I begin to speake of the common wealth, I will complaine a litle of the injuries yesterday done by Anthony.

The use of this figure.

This figure doth much beautifie the Oration, so that it it be apt and well applied. Now in a proposition there are three things to be considered.

First that it absolutely containeth whatsoever pertaineth to the cause.

Secondly that it be well divided.

Lastly, that it be disposed in an order, most meete for the same cause: for by this meanes the Oration shall not be confounded, with too great an heape of matters, while the hearer hath some certaine thing whereupon he may occupie his minde, both what to remember and what to expect. And likewise the speaker shall not need to doubt which way to go, when the matter is plaine before his face.

The Caution.

The Caution of this figure is sufficiently exprest in the use.

Expolitio.

Expolitio, when we abide still in one place, and yet seeme to speake diverse things, many times repeating one sentence but yet with other words, sentences, exornations, and figures: it differeth saith Malancton, from Smonunia, forasmuch as that repeateth a sentence or thing onely with changed words: but this both with like wordes, like sentences, and like things, having also many exornations to the garnishing thereof. Cornificius teacheth that of this figure, there be two kindes, the one when we rehearse againe the verie same thing, but not after the same manner, for there is nothing more wearisome, and that may sooner bring satietie and irksomenesse to the hearer, then Tautologia, which is a wearisome repetition of all Tautologia, what it is.

one word. But tarrying still in one place, we do varie one thing or sentence diverse maner of waies, and entreat of it with sundry fashions of speech. This first kind is three maner of waies varied.

The first by shift and change of words, which is called Sinonimia, whereof hath bene said.

Secondly by altering of pronounciation, that is to say, when the Orator doth occupie or repeat the same wordes and sentences with a certaine alteration and change of his voice and gesture. Sextus Roscius is convicted that he slew his father. Now this is said with a plaine pronounciation: Did Sextus Roscius slay his father? with an interrogation, which is full of marvelling: and likewise that which the Orator hath uttered in hot and vehement speech, he may repeat again with coole and quiet words.

Thirdly by alteration of the handling or entreating, as when the Orator conveyeth his speech either to Prosopopeia, Sermocinatio, Exusciatio, or to any other such like figure. Cicero when he had reckoned up many mischievous deedes of Catiline, and many of his wicked doinges practiced against the common wealth, and had accused him most greivously in the Senate, he commanded him to get out of the Citie, he changeth the handling of his sentence, and translateth his speech to Prosopopeia: whereby he faineth the country chiding with Catiline, and rehearseth in order all his ungracious, mischeevous, and unluckie deedes, enerpised against it, accusing him sore, and willing him to depart out of it. There hath saith he, no abhominable or wicked deede bene heard or seene these many yeares but through thee: no naughtie factes without thee: thou onely hast slaine many Citizens, and never yet punished: thou hast vexed and robbed thy fellowes, and nothing said unto thee: thou hast not only bene able to neglect lawes and statutes, but also to overthrow them and breake them in peeces, with much more following.

The second kinde of expolition.

The second kinde of expolition is, when we speake one thing with many changes, which as some Authours do teach, consisteth of seven parts: and what these parts be, this example now following doth shewe. Whereby the Authour to Herenius teacheth verie plainly the whole reason of publishing, thus: A wise man will shunne no perill for the common wealth. Therefore as oft times it commeth to passe, that when he which will not die for the common wealth, doth of necessitie die with it. And because all commodities are received of the country, no discommoditie ought to be esteemed great or greivous for the country, wherefore they do unwisely which shun ye perill which must needs be bidden for the country: for neither can they avoyd the discommodities, and against their own Cittie they are found unthankfull. But they which with their own perill do willingly resist the perils of their country, are judged wise men, for that they both render that honour to the common wealth which they owe unto it, and had also rather die for many, than with many.

For it is a verie unreasonable thing to restore life received of nature, to nature when she compelleth, and not to give it to thy country when she craveth it: forasmuch as thou hast by thy countrey preserved it, and when thou maist with great vertue and honour die for thy ocuntry, to choose rather to live by dishonour and cowardnesse, and where as thou canst be content to put thy selfe in daunger for thy friends parents, and the rest of thy kinsfolk, to be unwilling to enter into danger for the common wealth, in which both this and that most reverende name of countrey is contained. Therefore as he is worthie to be contemned, which in failing had rather save himselfe then the shippe, so is he worthie to be balmed, which in jeopardie of the common wealth provideth more for his private safetie then for the common preservation. From a broken ship many have escaped from the shipwrack of the ocuntry no man can well escape: which me thinke Decius did well perceive, who as it is reported, bending himselfe to die for the safetie of his souldiers, ranne into the middest of his enemies, whereby he let his life go, but lost it not: for with a thing of smal value, he redeeme a thing of great price: he gave his life, he gained his countrey: he parted with his life, he obtained glory: which published with high praise, the elder it waxeth, the more & more it shall shine.

Now forasmuch as it is shewed by reason, and proved by example, that we ought to venture our lives for the common wealth, those men are to judged wise, which shun no perill for the safetie of their country.

Now albeit the Author hath given this example, yet an Orator is not alwaies so straitly bound, as to observe everie point hereof: but hath a larger libertie to use it, as it may seeme best unto him.

The use of this figure.

The vertue of this figure is great and well worthie to bee reckoned and esteemed among the most principall ornaments of eloquence, both in respect of the great copie of words, and matter, and also of the diversitie of proofes and pleasant varietie: the use of it is verie generall and fit for any great and weightie cause.

The Caution.

In using exposition it is verie necessarie to avoid Tautologies, to which the use of this exornation is much subject which may be easily prevented by preparation, and the furniture of other figure.

And also it behoveth him that shall use this figure to provide aforehand both the platforme and the matter, lest his reasons and proofes be to seeke, or his examples unreadie, or his similitudes unprepared, or his conclusion in the wilderness God knoweth where.

Scemaismus.

Scemaismus, when the Orator propoundeth his meaning by a circuite of speech, wherein he would have ye understoode by a certaine suspicion which he doth not speake, and that for 3. special causes.

1. For safetie sake: As when it is undecent to be speake directly and openly.

2. For modestie and good manners sake: As when it is undecent to be spoken plainly.

3. For delectation sake and grace of the hearer, as when it may bring greater delight under the figurative shadow, then by the plaine report and open shew.

1. If some good man for the love of justice and pittie of his countrey should take upon him to reprehend a tirant, and to remove him from his crueltie, to an equitie and mildnesse of government, he should venture upon a verie dangerous enterprise, more likelie to loose his life, then obtaine his purpose, as often experience hath proved: Except the manner and forme of his handling the cause be with the greater wisdom premeditated, and the more circumspectly delivered. For Kinges and tirants which are mightie, are not wont, or can hardly heare their faultes and wickednesse, which they commit with patient mindes, but rather kindled with displeasure: goe not so soon in hand, to amend their errors, as to revenge his advertisement: And therefore he that should take this dangerous enterprise in hand must doo it with aThis was wel observed of Nathan.

cunning shadow of speech, and not in the sight of the Sunne, I meane not openly and plainlie: for the naked truth doth often offend in a naked tale.2. Samuel. 12.

The Orators speech may be shadowed two manner of waies, either by reprovng another person, in whom the same evils are, or were in, while he lived: or by commending such persons in whom the contraries are. If a man should in the respect of reprehension speake to Dionysius the king of Sicilia, hee might reprove the crueltie of Phalaris, and by an artificall description and reprehension of that creltie and tirannie in Phalaris, he may make a most bright and resplendent glasse wherein Dionysius must needes behold himselfe and his deformed tirannie.

Or if a man shall commend and highly praise those Princes and Kinges which have done the contrarie, I meane, which have goverened by wisdom, equitie, moderation and mercie. An evill man hearing the praises, and glorious fame of others, is moved in mind, and begins to covet commendation and praise, and seeing it cannot be obtained onely by desire, hee enclineth to the meanes by which he may deserve it.

For modesties sake, thus: whose mother is delighted with daily mariages, signifying hereby her unchast life.

The holy Scripture in this respect hath many examples, and chaste Phrases, which ought to be presidents to us as oft as we have occasion to expresse or signifie matters which are bashfull & undecent to be plainly told.

Adam knew Eve his wife which conceived and bare Cain.

Thou shalt not be excellent because thou wentest up to thy fathers bed. Salomon observeth most seemly the chastitie of speech, where he saith. Let her breastes alwaies satisfie thee, and hold ever content with her love. And in the next verse: Why shouldest thou unbrace the bosome of a stranger?

Herein nature it selfe also seemeth to prescribe this dutie, that those thinges, which she hideth, mans owne reverence ought to keepe secret.

3. To delight the hearer by the grace of shadowed speech is very usuall among pleasant wittes and apt conceites: and therefore I judge it needlesse to exemplifie this part. Concerning the use and caution of this figure there is alreadie sufficiently said.

Parenthesis.

Parenthesis is a form of speec which setteth a sentence a sunder by the interposition of another, or thus: When a sentence is cast betweene the speech before it be all ended, which although it giveth some strength, yet being taken away, it leaveth the same speech perfect enough.

An example of Esay: At that time all vineyardes, (though there were a thousand vines in one, & sold for a thousand silverlings) shalbe turned into briers and thornes.

Another of the Apostle Paul: They are the ministers of Christ (I speake as a foole) I am more, & c.

The use of this figure.

A Parenthesis is often put in, when the speaker supposing that the hearer may demaund a reason, or make an objection to that which he saith, preventeth him by an interposition expressed before the sentence be all ended, so that hereby it may appeare that a Parenthesis serveth to confirme the saying by the interposition of a reason, and to confute the objection by the timely prevention of an answer: Also where the sentence may seeme darke or doubtfull, it putteth in a short annotation or exposition to give light and to resolve the doubt.

The Caution.

Parentheses if they be verie long they cause obscuritie of the sense, and sometime confusion of former and matter, in so much that the speaker forgetting the former part of ye sentence knoweth not what the latter should be Also a needlesse interposition is like unprofitable household stuffe that filleth roome but doth no service: or like to the Missletoe, which albeit it standeth in the tree, and liveth by his juice, yet is neither of the like nature, nor beareth the like frute.

The Garden of Eloquence (1593). Henry Peachum. Delmar, New York 12054. Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, Inc. 1977.

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## 5. Germany: An Augsburg Sittenlehre on Eloquence

Hÿe nach volgen güt nützlich lere und underweysung in teütsch beschriben / auß den parabolon und beÿsprüchen Salomonis / Auch auß Kathone / Tulio / und auß andern lerern und Poeten gezogen. Darinne ein iunger mensch underricht wirdet / wÿe er sich in erberkeÿt und gûten siten gegen got und dem menschen halten sol. Zû dem ersten.

Quid optimum et pessimum sit in homine.

EIn junger fraget einen heÿdenischen meister der hieß Seneca / was das peÿt und das pöseset und auch dz scherppfest schwert wer an dem menschen. Er antwort und sprach / Das ist die zung / wann also erkennet man den menschen an seiner zungen / als einen hafan an dem klang ob er ganz oder zerprochen seÿ / also [3v] klingt er herwider / also erkenn den menschen an der red / wann die zung dz wort außspricht durch den mund / Der mund ist ein öffnung und ein pot des gemütes oder des sinnes / wann es ist pesser underweilen schweigen denn reden wann vil von red wegen verdorben sind / Aber von schweÿgen niemant / wann der ist der aller krenckest mensch an im selber der seyn geprechen und torheit nit verschweigen mag / und darumb die kleffigkeit kempfft und krieget wider die verschwigenheit und spricht also Loquacitas contra taciturnitatem. &c.

Der thût nit unrecht der vil redt und gûte nûcze ding redt. Aber der selten redt und redt unnûcze ding und verlaßene vergebne wort der ist schuldig einer missetat. Verschwigenheit antwort / wer nit wol reden kan der schweig und seÿ ein piderman / Wz du allein hörest dz verschweÿg als du sein nie gehört habest [4r] Schweÿgen hat mich nie gerauen / aber reden hat mich oft gerauen / wann sich güt rede zû dem ersten an dem anfang offt erheben zû güt und enden sich zû übel / Der zû vil redt der mag on lüge / on müssige wort und on sünd nit gesein / Darumb spricht Katho / Die erst tuge[n]t und weißheÿt ist meistern und zämen die zungen / Thû nach dem natürlichen ebenbild des Hanen / der schlecht sich dreÿstund mit den flügeln ee das er krät.

In loquela sex considera.

Also betracht weißlichen Sechs ding in deinem mût ee dz du redest / Zû dem ersten schecz und sûch in dir selber wer du seÿest an dir selber. Zû dem andern mal / gedenck was du reden wilt Zum dritten / nymm war mit wem du reden wilt. Zum vierden betracht die ursach warumb du reden wilt. Zum [4v] fünfften fürtracht dÿe weÿse / in welcher maß und wie du reden wilt. Zum sechsten Merck die zeit zû reden oder zû schweÿgen.

Sex consilia in loquela considera

Wilt du für weiß gehalten werden so betracht ordenlich die sechs räte. Der erst rat ee dz du redest oder antwort gebest / So merck eben wer redet / ob man dir zûspreche oder einen andern. Jst dz es einem andern angeet so vermisch dich nit darein / und verantwort nit dz dich nit berürt / wann es ist ein missetat der sich fremder krieg underwindet und dz sein nit außrichten mag. Der ander rat / so dich die red antrifft / ee das du antwortest / gedenck in deinem mût ob du zornig seÿest und beÿ dir selber nit so schweÿg / wann der zorn verhindert dz gemüt dz es die warheÿt nit erkennen mag / noch vernemen weÿßlich das [5r] recht. Der dritt rat / wer den andern leren wil oder straffen / der weiß und ler sich selber vor und wz du straffen wilt dz thû selber nit / Es ist ein schand dem lerer so in sein eÿgen laster strafft / wann wer gûts / raten / reden und lernen wil / und pöÿ würcken und tûn / der übersagt sich selber. Der vierde rat / Pist du wol beÿ deinen sinnen und kanst wol reden so antwort deinem nechsten / Kanst du nit reden so schleüß deinen mund zû dz du nit aufgesagen werdest in deinen worten und schmach leydest. Der fünfft rat / betracht den anfang und dz end der rede und der wort wz nucz oder schaden mag bringen. Der sechst rate Red nit dz dich gereüen mag / und dz du es widersprechen müssest oder widerliegen / wann dz zû einem mal gesprochen ist dz mag man nit widersprechen dz es nit gesprochen seÿ / Das wort würt leycht und lindlich gesprochen [5v] und hart widerzogen / An ungewissen und zweÿffelhaftigen dingen ist pesser schweÿgen dann antworten. wann dz recht ist lauter und klar an im selbs an dem liecht. aber der zweiffel bedarff bedewten. und darumb waran du zweÿffel hast dz thû nit.

Secundum consilium loquela considera

Das ander stuck / wann du reden wilt so gedenck ee du redest wz du reden wilt. war oder gelogen. und vor aller meÿnung oder fürsacz sol vorgeen und fûrgesetzt werden die warheÿt. und vor allem tûn hab ee gûten

weisen rat. wann es ist ein pöse gewonheÿt der da verschmecht die warheit und weisen rat. wann der gerecht redt wz zû reden ist. und verschweÿgt dz zû schweigen ist / und vermischet nit dz war under dz gelogen. wann als unzimlicher ist zû [6r] reden wider die warheÿt. Also ist unzimlich zû thûn wider die warheÿt / und sag die das sÿ zû glauben seÿ. dz sÿ nit üppig und zû einer lüg gescheczter werde / darumb üppige verlaßne red on nucz vermeÿd und verschweig / sÿ seÿen redlich oder unredlich. Item prüff dein red ob sÿ seÿ redlich oder unredlich / bescheiden oder unbescheiden. Item deine wort süllen seÿn gütig und süß. wann gûte wort die machen freünd und senfften den freündt und wäÿchen in. Item linde wort prechen und vertreiben zorn Aber herte wort machen und enzünden zoren und ungestümikeÿt. Item schöne und zÿmliche wort sprich / und hüt dich vor newen pösen verlaßnen unzimlichen sprichworten das auß der weÿs ist. Item red nicht verholne wort die unverstentlich sind und ungemeyn den sinnen und zweÿffelhaftige wort sunder die klar und offenbar sind Es ist pesser [6v] zû verschweÿgen das / das nyemandt versteet dann zû offenbaren. Item red nit betrogenlichen das man dich durch argkwon nicht hasse. und hüt dich vor dro rede das dein veind gen dir nit bewegt werden. dz du dein veind erpittest mit worten und wercken. desselben pist du auch von im wartende. Item ist das dir unpillichs und unrecht beschicht von dem sterckern und gewaltigern. so ist pesser mit schweÿgen in vermeÿden und fliehen denn mit red überwinden. tem red nit spöttlich noch schimpfflich von freünden noch von veÿnden wann der geleydiget freündt würd hart zornig. Aber des veÿndes zoren kommt zû scheltworten und zû schleglen

#### Consilium Commune.

Item ich gib dir den gemeinen rate Dein rede seÿ nuczpar und nit üppig / bescheÿden [7r] süß und lind / waich und nit hert. schön und nicht betrogen oder zweifelhaftig / nit hinderlistig / nicht spöttlich noch hoffertig / nicht müssig noch verlassen red die wider gût siten sind / und nit ungelaulich rede.

#### Tercium Consilium considera

Auff das dritt hab mercken gegen wem und mit wem du reden wilt ob er freünt oder veind seÿ. ist es ein freünd / so red süßlich mit dem freünd frölich und in geheÿm / dz auß dem freünde nicht werde ein veind / und daz die geheÿm müg beÿ im beleiben. Deinen heÿmlichen rate halt mit dir selber. und dein geheÿm offenbar nit einem ÿegklichen freünd wz du wilt verschwigen haben Deinen sin sag weder freünden noch veinden. jst es eÿn missetat so vahet er dich auff oder er spottet dein / darumb laß es beÿ dir begraben sein / es ist sicherer beÿ [7v] dir verschwÿgen den dz du einen andern pitest dz er es verschweÿge. Wilt du von heimlichen dingen rat habe. die heÿmlicheÿt offenbar nür dem aller bewertisten getreÿsten und aller heimlichsten freünd. den erwel auß tausenten einen Item den treÿen arczet deines gelaubens leg für deinen geprechen und siechtum deÿnes leibes. und mit deinem veind red lüczel. und offenbar im nit dein heimlikeÿt. und deinen versünten veinde traw nicht zû wol. wann der dunst des hasses reücht in dem herzen des veindes wo dz feür lang leyt da reücht es gern. Dem alten veind getraw nicht. wann wo im gefellet die stund und die stat. er wirdet nit gesetiget und benügt in nit an deÿnem plûte. so du einen andern magst haben so geselle dich [nit] zû deinem veinde. Den unerkannten meid und den arckwenigen als den veind piß [8r] du in erkennest. Item gen allen leüten halt dich weÿßlich mit wenig worten und wercken das du nit vermerckt werdest.

Item dem unerkannten weggeferten sag dein geheÿm und geschafft oder gefert nit. Tregt er ein lanczen. so gee beÿ im an der rechten seiten Item aber merck gegen wem du redest. ob er weÿß oder unweÿß seÿ Und ist er unweÿß so verschmecht er dein red. wann ist das der weÿß mit dem toren zürnet oder krieget. oder schimpffet oder lachet. da vindet er kein rû oder frid. denn du redest dz er gern höret. Item red lüczel gen dem spöttigen. wann ir red ist als ein vergifftiges geschoß. das fleüch und ir geselschafft meid als den strick. daz sÿ dich nit verpinden und verknüpfen Item straf [8v] den spotter nit und den kriegischen dz er dich nit hasse. Straff den weisen und demütigen die haben für gût. Straffest du aben den toren so erküeckest du ungedult / und die entspringet auß hoffart Item mit dem kleffigen hab lüczel red / wann der erkucket trugenheit und poßheit. Item hab mit den toren und unweisen keinen rat / sÿ können anders nit geraten nür dz in wol gefelt / wann der hundert pilt nach seiner weÿs und art. Item hab mit dem zornigen pösen keinen rat wann er nit weißheit hat. So man mit dem pösen ÿe mer rates pfliget und hat / so er ÿe pöser würt Als wenn man ÿe mer holcz an dz fewr leget so es ÿe vester prynnet. Item / Sag dein heimlikeÿt nit truncken und kleffigen leüten weiben noch kinden noch unweisen / wann sÿ selten verschweigen mügen. Unverschwigenheÿt ist ein grosser geprech an dem menschen. [9r]

Quartum consilium. Loquele considera

Auff dz vierd merck warumb du reden wilt. da merck den anfang und dz end. Item du solt an sach nichcz reden  
Eintweder red nützlich ding durch götlich ere oder durch menschlichen gemach oder frides willen / oder  
durch notturfft deinem nechsten zû nucz und eren willen

Quintum consilium considera.

Auff das fünfft merck was du reden solt und in welcher weis und maß du dein red fürbringen solt das man sÿ von dir  
weißlich aufneme. Halt rechte weiß und maß in worten und wercken das ist ein gûte schöne tugent und ist  
löblich Item es ist zû wissen dz fünfferley weÿs ist außzesprechen die red an der fürlegung. Die erst weis  
dz sich beweg die zung [9v] und stymm mit dem wort / Der leyb rür und beweg sich meßlichen und on  
kechiczen geleich und lindtlich und klerlich und teütigklich volbring ein yegklich wort nit zû laut noch zû  
still in mitler maß / Die ander weiß mit frölichem auffsehenden anplick / zû stat yegklichs wort bring für.  
Eins sprich schlechtigklichen / und das ander weißlich / und gewar dz es war seÿ und nit gelogen. wann  
wilt du zû eren kommen so fleiß dich all zeit der warheÿt. Die dritt weiß / das ein yegklich wort seÿ lustig /  
schön und czierlich zû hören / wenn du von grossen schweren dingen redest. dz sprich auß ernstlichen und  
wol gewegen und wol gezieret und mercklichen / besunder so du von hohen dingen redest. Die vierd  
weißheit so du schlechtigklich und gemechlich / Da mische nicht under hoche [10r] und scharpffe wort. Die  
fünfft weis. ob du icht außsprichst das zû loben oder zû schelten seÿ da halt maß und mittel erberlichen und  
lob meßlichen dz du geschelten mügest und schilt noch meßlicher überiges lob. Item überigs schelten ist  
argwenig und wirdig zû straffen / Item lob also den außwendigen das du nit leydest den gegenwurtigen.  
Item halt die maß dz du mit der red nit zû schnell seÿest noch zû seümig. Für die rechten sitlichen weÿs.  
Halt dich zû dem außsprechen das du deine wort herwider mügest rechtfertigen. Als Katho spricht. Es ward  
nye pesser list denn der seiner zungen meister ist Darumb verschewß dich nicht zû pald mit worten. Item /  
und wer da zû hand und schnelle die sinne der wort versteet und treglich verantwort und urteilet der [10v]  
urteÿlt recht und nützlischen / und betracht sich gemechlich dz ist sicherheÿt / wann wer schnell antwort  
und urteilt dz gereüet offt und ist ein missetat. Item dem weisen zÿmt zû haben langen und stillen rat /  
wann schneller und weÿter rat gerätt gar selten zû dem pesten. Dreü ding zerstören den menschen / der  
weiß ist / dz ist schnell und behender rat / und der zornig rat / geitikeÿt und überige begirde. Item wes du  
über ein worden pist nach rat dz zû thûn ist dz thû drat und schnell / und dz waltet gelück. Schweÿg nit zû  
lang / und red nit zû vil / Hör vil und verantwort lüczel Socrates spricht. So gefaldest du manigen so du dz  
pest tûst mit wenig red / Gûte red ist ein anfang der freüntschafft / darumb deine wort süllen sein / erber /  
frölich / lauter klar und einfeltig / schon zû einander gesaczt wol gemütigklich. doch on gelechter und  
ge[11r]schreÿ sitigklichen und lindigklichen außgesprochen / und süßlichen mit gûter weise / zÿl und stat  
und stund.

Sextum consilium.

Der sechst rat ist das du der rechten zeÿt solt warten zû reden / wann der weiß der schweÿget piß zû der rechten  
stund und zeit Aber der unweÿß wartet nit der rechten zeÿt Es ist ein zeÿt zû schweigen und ein zeÿt zû  
reden zû notturfft / Item wa dein red nit genem ist da man dich nit gern hört da vergeüß nit deine wort und  
ubernymm dich nit deiner weißheÿt. Als hofiern / singen und ander seÿtenspil dz dem betrübten und  
traurigen ein leid ist / Also ist sprechen und sagen da man es nit hören und mercken wil / Zû gleicher  
weise als wenn man eÿnen schalaffenden weckt auß einem trawm / Darumb wer ee antwort ee das er die  
red recht vernymmt und ver[11v]hört der ist ein tor gescheczet / und ist wirdig einer schand und gespött /  
Als ein alt gesprochen wort ist / man bedarff den toren keÿn schellen an den hals hencken dabey man in  
erkenne / dann sein zung macht in wol kuntper und offenbar / darumb ee dz du für gericht kommest so  
gedenck ob du recht habest. und dz recht volrecken mügest / und ee du reden wilt so lere vor reden.  
Litteras facere.

wilt du brÿeff und potschafft schreiben so ticht also / und secz zû dem ersten deinen grûß und willig dienst. Zû dem  
andern die maÿnung Zû dem dritten / sag dein notturfft. Zû dem vierden / secz dein begerung und pet Zû  
dem fünfften secz dein beschliessung wz du vermainest an dem ende.

Ambasicum ducere.

Item wilt du pot sein oder aber herrliche potschafft werben / so halt dich also. Zû dem [12r] ersten / wart stat und  
zeÿt und sag den darzû du gesant pist deÿner herrschafft grûß. Zû dem andern enpfilhe dich und dÿe mit dir

poten seÿen / den darzû du gesant pist in huld und in genade. Zû dem dritten / Sag dein potschafft als sÿ dir bevolhen ist Zû dem vierden mal. Man und weise mit worten das du behabest dz dein herrschafft begert oder vodert. Zû dem fünfften mal. Gib dÿe weÿs bedeutung und weg wie dz müg gesein oder geschehen das deÿn herrschafft maint gewert werden. Zû dem sechsten mal. So erzeig mit ebenpilden ob es anders geschehen ist ein sölchs / und erfarn hat geschehene ding / also und also. Zû dem sibenden mal / so sol er mit rechter bescheidenheit laÿten / füren / steüren bewaren und weÿsen also / dz sein potschafft krafft und fürgang hab.

Advocatus.

[12v] Item wilt du als eÿn fürspreche ÿemant des rechten helfen weltlich oder geistlich. Zû dem ersten sihe an dz geschriben recht waz das sage zû deinen sachen. Zû dem andern / leg für dein sach. Zû dem dritten / Nymm war wie es die geschriben recht außlegen und bedeüten Zû dem vierden. Sûch sölch ebenbild und so getane ding in dem rechten / wie sÿ darüber urteil sagen Zû dem fünfften. betracht wz wider dich müg gesein in dem rechten. Gedenck dÿe widerwertikeÿt die dich jrre und widertreÿbe Zû dem sechsten. Sûch endung und beschließung deiner sach dz du wissest hinwider sagen wz du erworben habest. Also haben nun ein ende die rete von der rede da übe dich jnn mit worten und mit wercken / wann übung und gewonheÿt überwindet dÿ natur und den list und aller meister geseze und lerer. Da[13r]von ist es ein unweißheÿt und ist unzimlich einen gelerten mann so er sich bekümert mit krieg und sich nit übet in tugenden.

## 6. Milton. *Areopagitica*.

John Milton

*Areopagitica*. A Speech For The Liberty Of Unlicensed Printing To The Parliament Of England

This is true liberty, when free-born men,  
Having to advise the public, may speak free,  
Which he who can, and will, deserves high praise;  
Who neither can, nor will, may hold his peace:  
What can be juster in a state than this?

Euripid. *Hicetid*.

They, who to states and governors of the Commonwealth direct their speech, High Court of Parliament, or, wanting such access in a private condition, write that which they foresee may advance the public good; I suppose them, as at the beginning of no mean endeavour, not a little altered and moved inwardly in their minds: some with doubt of what will be the success, others with fear of what will be the censure; some with hope, others with confidence of what they have to speak. And me perhaps each of these dispositions, as the subject was whereon I entered, may have at other times variously affected; and likely might in these foremost expressions now also disclose which of them swayed most, but that the very attempt of this address thus made, and the thought of whom it hath recourse to, hath got the power within me to a passion, far more welcome than incidental to a preface.

Which though I stay not to confess ere any ask, I shall be blameless, if it be no other than the joy and gratulation which it brings to all who wish and promote their country's liberty; whereof this whole discourse proposed will be a certain testimony, if not a trophy. For this is not the liberty which we can hope, that no grievance ever should arise in the Commonwealth—that let no man in this world expect; but when complaints are freely heard, deeply considered and speedily reformed, then is the utmost bound of civil liberty attained that wise men look for. To which if I now manifest by the very sound of this which I shall utter, that we are already in good part arrived, and yet from such a steep disadvantage of tyranny and superstition grounded into our principles as was beyond the manhood of a Roman recovery, it will be attributed first, as is most due, to the strong assistance of God our deliverer, next to your faithful guidance and undaunted wisdom, Lords and Commons of England. Neither is it in God's esteem the diminution of his glory, when honourable things are spoken of good men and worthy magistrates; which if I now first should begin to do, after so fair a progress of your laudable deeds, and such a long obligation upon the whole realm to your indefatigable virtues, I might be justly reckoned among the tardiest, and the unwillingest of them that praise ye.

Nevertheless there being three principal things, without which all praising is but courtship and flattery: First, when that only is praised which is solidly worth praise: next, when greatest likelihoods are brought that such things are truly and really in those persons to whom they are ascribed: the other, when he who praises, by showing that such his actual persuasion is of whom he writes, can demonstrate that he flatters not; the former two of these I have heretofore endeavoured, rescuing the employment from him who went about to impair your merits with a trivial and malignant encomium; the latter as belonging chiefly to mine own acquittal, that whom I so extolled I did not flatter, hath been reserved opportunely to this occasion.

For he who freely magnifies what hath been nobly done, and fears not to declare as freely what might be done better, gives ye the best covenant of his fidelity; and that his loyalest affection and his hope waits on your proceedings. His highest praising is not flattery, and his plainest advice is a kind of praising. For though I should affirm and hold by argument, that it would fare better with truth, with learning and the Commonwealth, if one of your published Orders, which I should name, were called in; yet at the same time it could not but much redound to the lustre of your mild and equal government, whenas private persons are hereby animated to think ye better pleased

with public advice, than other states have been delighted heretofore with public flattery. And men will then see what difference there is between the magnanimity of a triennial Parliament, and that jealous haughtiness of prelates and cabin counsellors that usurped of late, whenas they shall observe ye in the midst of your victories and successes more gently brooking written exceptions against a voted Order than other courts, which had produced nothing worth memory but the weak ostentation of wealth, would have endured the least signified dislike at any sudden proclamation.

If I should thus far presume upon the meek demeanour of your civil and gentle greatness, Lords and Commons, as what your published Order hath directly said, that to gainsay, I might defend myself with ease, if any should accuse me of being new or insolent, did they but know how much better I find ye esteem it to imitate the old and elegant humanity of Greece, than the barbaric pride of a Hunnish and Norwegian stateliness. And out of those ages, to whose polite wisdom and letters we owe that we are not yet Goths and Jutlanders, I could name him who from his private house wrote that discourse to the Parliament of Athens, that persuades them to change the form of democracy which was then established. Such honour was done in those days to men who professed the study of wisdom and eloquence, not only in their own country, but in other lands, that cities and signiories heard them gladly, and with great respect, if they had aught in public to admonish the state. Thus did Dion Prusaeus, a stranger and a private orator, counsel the Rhodians against a former edict; and I abound with other like examples, which to set here would be superfluous.

But if from the industry of a life wholly dedicated to studious labours, and those natural endowments haply not the worst for two and fifty degrees of northern latitude, so much must be derogated, as to count me not equal to any of those who had this privilege, I would obtain to be thought not so inferior, as yourselves are superior to the most of them who received their counsel: and how far you excel them, be assured, Lords and Commons, there can no greater testimony appear, than when your prudent spirit acknowledges and obeys the voice of reason from what quarter soever it be heard speaking; and renders ye as willing to repeal any Act of your own setting forth, as any set forth by your predecessors.

If ye be thus resolved, as it were injury to think ye were not, I know not what should withhold me from presenting ye with a fit instance wherein to show both that love of truth which ye eminently profess, and that uprightness of your judgment which is not wont to be partial to yourselves; by judging over again that Order which ye have ordained to regulate printing:—that no book, pamphlet, or paper shall be henceforth printed, unless the same be first approved and licensed by such, or at least one of such, as shall be thereto appointed. For that part which preserves justly every man's copy to himself, or provides for the poor, I touch not, only wish they be not made pretences to abuse and persecute honest and painful men, who offend not in either of these particulars. But that other clause of licensing books, which we thought had died with his brother quadragesimal and matrimonial when the prelates expired, I shall now attend with such a homily, as shall lay before ye, first the inventors of it to be those whom ye will be loath to own; next what is to be thought in general of reading, whatever sort the books be; and that this Order avails nothing to the suppressing of scandalous, seditious, and libellous books, which were mainly intended to be suppressed. Last, that it will be primely to the discouragement of all learning, and the stop of truth, not only by disexercising and blunting our abilities in what we know already, but by hindering and cropping the discovery that might be yet further made both in religious and civil wisdom.

I deny not, but that it is of greatest concernment in the Church and Commonwealth, to have a vigilant eye how books demean themselves as well as men; and thereafter to confine, imprison, and do sharpest justice on them as malefactors. For books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are; nay, they do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them. I know they are as lively, and as vigorously productive, as those fabulous dragon's teeth; and being sown up and down, may chance to spring up armed men. And yet, on the other hand, unless wariness be used, as good almost kill a man as kill a good book. Who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he who destroys a good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were in the eye. Many a man lives a burden to the earth; but a good book is the precious life-blood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life. 'Tis true, no age can restore a life, whereof perhaps there is no great loss; and revolutions of ages do not oft recover the loss of a rejected truth, for the want of which whole nations fare the worse.

We should be wary therefore what persecution we raise against the living labours of public men, how we spill that seasoned life of man, preserved and stored up in books; since we see a kind of homicide may be thus committed, sometimes a martyrdom, and if it extend to the whole impression, a kind of massacre; whereof the execution ends not in the slaying of an elemental life, but strikes at that ethereal and fifth essence, the breath of reason itself, slays an immortality rather than a life. But lest I should be condemned of introducing license, while I oppose licensing, I refuse not the pains to be so much historical, as will serve to show what hath been done by ancient and famous commonwealths against this disorder, till the very time that this project of licensing crept out of the Inquisition, was caught up by our prelates, and hath caught some of our presbyters.

In Athens, where books and wits were ever busier than in any other part of Greece, I find but only two sorts of writings which the magistrate cared to take notice of; those either blasphemous and atheistical, or libellous. Thus the books of Protagoras were by the judges of Areopagus commanded to be burnt, and himself banished the territory for a discourse begun with his confessing not to know WHETHER THERE WERE GODS, OR WHETHER NOT. And against defaming, it was decreed that none should be traduced by name, as was the manner of *Vetus Comoedia*, whereby we may guess how they censured libelling. And this course was quick enough, as Cicero writes, to quell both the desperate wits of other atheists, and the open way of defaming, as the event showed. Of other sects and opinions, though tending to voluptuousness, and the denying of divine Providence, they took no heed.

Therefore we do not read that either Epicurus, or that libertine school of Cyrene, or what the Cynic impudence uttered, was ever questioned by the laws. Neither is it recorded that the writings of those old comedians were suppressed, though the acting of them were forbid; and that Plato commended the reading of Aristophanes, the loosest of them all, to his royal scholar Dionysius, is commonly known, and may be excused, if holy Chrysostom, as is reported, nightly studied so much the same author and had the art to cleanse a scurrilous vehemence into the style of a rousing sermon.

That other leading city of Greece, Lacedaemon, considering that Lycurgus their lawgiver was so addicted to elegant learning, as to have been the first that brought out of Ionia the scattered works of Homer, and sent the poet Thales from Crete to prepare and mollify the Spartan surliness with his smooth songs and odes, the better to plant among them law and civility, it is to be wondered how museless and unbookish they were, minding nought but the feats of war. There needed no licensing of books among them, for they disliked all but their own laconic apophthegms, and took a slight occasion to chase Archilochus out of their city, perhaps for composing in a higher strain than their own soldierly ballads and roundels could reach to. Or if it were for his broad verses, they were not therein so cautious but they were as dissolute in their promiscuous conversing; whence Euripides affirms in *Andromache*, that their women were all unchaste. Thus much may give us light after what sort of books were prohibited among the Greeks.

The Romans also, for many ages trained up only to a military roughness resembling most the Lacedaemonian guise, knew of learning little but what their twelve Tables, and the Pontific College with their augurs and flamens taught them in religion and law; so unacquainted with other learning, that when Carneades and Critolaus, with the Stoic Diogenes, coming ambassadors to Rome, took thereby occasion to give the city a taste of their philosophy, they were suspected for seducers by no less a man than Cato the Censor, who moved it in the Senate to dismiss them speedily, and to banish all such Attic babblers out of Italy. But Scipio and others of the noblest senators withstood him and his old Sabine austerity; honoured and admired the men; and the censor himself at last, in his old age, fell to the study of that whereof before he was so scrupulous. And yet at the same time Naevius and Plautus, the first Latin comedians, had filled the city with all the borrowed scenes of Menander and Philemon. Then began to be considered there also what was to be done to libellous books and authors; for Naevius was quickly cast into prison for his unbridled pen, and released by the tribunes upon his recantation; we read also that libels were burnt, and the makers punished by Augustus. The like severity, no doubt, was used, if aught were impiously written against their esteemed gods. Except in these two points, how the world went in books, the magistrate kept no reckoning.

And therefore Lucretius without impeachment versifies his Epicurism to Memmius, and had the honour to be set forth the second time by Cicero, so great a father of the Commonwealth; although himself disputes against that opinion in his own writings. Nor was the satirical sharpness or naked plainness of Lucilius, or Catullus, or Flaccus,

by any order prohibited. And for matters of state, the story of Titus Livius, though it extolled that part which Pompey held, was not therefore suppressed by Octavius Caesar of the other faction. But that Naso was by him banished in his old age, for the wanton poems of his youth, was but a mere covert of state over some secret cause: and besides, the books were neither banished nor called in. From hence we shall meet with little else but tyranny in the Roman empire, that we may not marvel, if not so often bad as good books were silenced. I shall therefore deem to have been large enough, in producing what among the ancients was punishable to write; save only which, all other arguments were free to treat on.

By this time the emperors were become Christians, whose discipline in this point I do not find to have been more severe than what was formerly in practice. The books of those whom they took to be grand heretics were examined, refuted, and condemned in the general Councils; and not till then were prohibited, or burnt, by authority of the emperor. As for the writings of heathen authors, unless they were plain invectives against Christianity, as those of Porphyrius and Proclus, they met with no interdict that can be cited, till about the year 400, in a Carthaginian Council, wherein bishops themselves were forbid to read the books of Gentiles, but heresies they might read: while others long before them, on the contrary, scrupled more the books of heretics than of Gentiles. And that the primitive Councils and bishops were wont only to declare what books were not commendable, passing no further, but leaving it to each one's conscience to read or to lay by, till after the year 800, is observed already by Padre Paolo, the great unmasker of the Trentine Council.

After which time the Popes of Rome, engrossing what they pleased of political rule into their own hands, extended their dominion over men's eyes, as they had before over their judgments, burning and prohibiting to be read what they fancied not; yet sparing in their censures, and the books not many which they so dealt with: till Martin V., by his bull, not only prohibited, but was the first that excommunicated the reading of heretical books; for about that time Wickliffe and Huss, growing terrible, were they who first drove the Papal Court to a stricter policy of prohibiting. Which course Leo X. and his successors followed, until the Council of Trent and the Spanish Inquisition engendering together brought forth, or perfected, those Catalogues and expurging Indexes, that rake through the entrails of many an old good author, with a violation worse than any could be offered to his tomb. Nor did they stay in matters heretical, but any subject that was not to their palate, they either condemned in a Prohibition, or had it straight into the new purgatory of an index.

To fill up the measure of encroachment, their last invention was to ordain that no book, pamphlet, or paper should be printed (as if St. Peter had bequeathed them the keys of the press also out of Paradise) unless it were approved and licensed under the hands of two or three glutton friars. For example:

Let the Chancellor Cini be pleased to see if in this present work be contained aught that may withstand the printing.

VINCENT RABBATTA, Vicar of Florence.

I have seen this present work, and find nothing athwart the Catholic faith and good manners: in witness whereof I have given, etc.

NICOLO GINI, Chancellor of Florence.

Attending the precedent relation, it is allowed that this present work of Davanzati may be printed.

VINCENT RABBATTA, etc.



It may be printed, July 15.

FRIAR SIMON MOMPEI D'AMELIA,  
Chancellor of the Holy Office in Florence.

Sure they have a conceit, if he of the bottomless pit had not long since broke prison, that this quadruple exorcism would bar him down. I fear their next design will be to get into their custody the licensing of that which they say Claudius intended, but went not through with. Vouchsafe to see another of their forms, the Roman stamp:

Imprimatur, If it seem good to the reverend Master of the  
Holy Palace.

BELCASTRO, Vicegerent.

Imprimatur, Friar Nicolo Rodolphi, Master of the Holy Palace.

Sometimes five Imprimaturs are seen together dialogue-wise in the piazza of one title-page, complimenting and ducking each to other with their shaven reverences, whether the author, who stands by in perplexity at the foot of his epistle, shall to the press or to the sponge. These are the pretty responsories, these are the dear antiphonies, that so bewitched of late our prelates and their chaplains with the goodly echo they made; and besotted us to the gay imitation of a lordly Imprimatur, one from Lambeth House, another from the west end of Paul's; so apishly Romanizing, that the word of command still was set down in Latin; as if the learned grammatical pen that wrote it would cast no ink without Latin; or perhaps, as they thought, because no vulgar tongue was worthy to express the pure conceit of an Imprimatur, but rather, as I hope, for that our English, the language of men ever famous and foremost in the achievements of liberty, will not easily find servile letters enow to spell such a dictatory presumption English.

And thus ye have the inventors and the original of book-licensing ripped up and drawn as lineally as any pedigree. We have it not, that can be heard of, from any ancient state, or polity or church; nor by any statute left us by our ancestors elder or later; nor from the modern custom of any reformed city or church abroad, but from the most anti-christian council and the most tyrannous inquisition that ever inquired. Till then books were ever as freely admitted into the world as any other birth; the issue of the brain was no more stifled than the issue of the womb: no envious Juno sat cross-legged over the nativity of any man's intellectual offspring; but if it proved a monster, who denies, but that it was justly burnt, or sunk into the sea? But that a book, in worse condition than a peccant soul, should be to stand before a jury ere it be born to the world, and undergo yet in darkness the judgment of Radamanth and his colleagues, ere it can pass the ferry backward into light, was never heard before, till that mysterious iniquity, provoked and troubled at the first entrance of Reformation, sought out new limbos and new hells wherein they might include our books also within the number of their damned. And this was the rare morsel so officiously snatched up, and so ill-favouredly imitated by our inquisiturient bishops, and the attendant minorites their chaplains. That ye like not now these most certain authors of this licensing order, and that all sinister intention was far distant from your thoughts, when ye were importuned the passing it, all men who know the integrity of your actions, and how ye honour truth, will clear ye readily.

But some will say, what though the inventors were bad, the thing for all that may be good? It may so; yet if that thing be no such deep invention, but obvious, and easy for any man to light on, and yet best and wisest commonwealths through all ages and occasions have forborne to use it, and falsest seducers and oppressors of men were the first who took it up, and to no other purpose but to obstruct and hinder the first approach of Reformation; I am of those who believe it will be a harder alchemy than Lullius ever knew, to sublimate any good use out of such an invention. Yet this only is what I request to gain from this reason, that it may be held a dangerous and suspicious fruit, as certainly it deserves, for the tree that bore it, until I can dissect one by one the properties it has. But I have first to finish, as was propounded, what is to be thought in general of reading books, whatever sort they be, and whether be more the benefit or the harm that thence proceeds.

Not to insist upon the examples of Moses, Daniel, and Paul, who were skilful in all the learning of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Greeks, which could not probably be without reading their books of all sorts; in Paul especially, who thought it no defilement to insert into Holy Scripture the sentences of three Greek poets, and one of them a tragedian; the question was notwithstanding sometimes controverted among the primitive doctors, but with great odds on that side which affirmed it both lawful and profitable; as was then evidently perceived, when Julian the Apostate and subtlest enemy to our faith made a decree forbidding Christians the study of heathen learning: for, said he, they wound us with our own weapons, and with our own arts and sciences they overcome us. And indeed the Christians were put so to their shifts by this crafty means, and so much in danger to decline into all ignorance, that the two Apollinarii were fain, as a man may say, to coin all the seven liberal sciences out of the Bible, reducing it into divers forms of orations, poems, dialogues, even to the calculating of a new Christian grammar. But, saith the historian Socrates, the providence of God provided better than the industry of Apollinarius and his son, by taking away that illiterate law with the life of him who devised it. So great an injury they then held it to be deprived of Hellenic learning; and thought it a persecution more undermining, and secretly decaying the Church, than the open cruelty of Decius or Diocletian.

And perhaps it was the same politic drift that the devil whipped St. Jerome in a lenten dream, for reading Cicero; or else it was a phantasm bred by the fever which had then seized him. For had an angel been his discipliner, unless it were for dwelling too much upon Ciceronianisms, and had chastised the reading, not the vanity, it had been plainly partial; first to correct him for grave Cicero, and not for scurril Plautus, whom he confesses to have been reading, not long before; next to correct him only, and let so many more ancient fathers wax old in those pleasant and florid studies without the lash of such a tutoring apparition; insomuch that Basil teaches how some good use may be made of Margites, a sportful poem, not now extant, writ by Homer; and why not then of Morgante, an Italian romance much to the same purpose?

But if it be agreed we shall be tried by visions, there is a vision recorded by Eusebius, far ancients than this tale of Jerome, to the nun Eustochium, and, besides, has nothing of a fever in it. Dionysius Alexandrinus was about the year 240 a person of great name in the Church for piety and learning, who had went to avail himself much against heretics by being conversant in their books; until a certain presbyter laid it scrupulously to his conscience, how he durst venture himself among those defiling volumes. The worthy man, loath to give offence, fell into a new debate with himself what was to be thought; when suddenly a vision sent from God (it is his own epistle that so avers it) confirmed him in these words: READ ANY BOOKS WHATEVER COME TO THY HANDS, FOR THOU ART SUFFICIENT BOTH TO JUDGE ARIGHT AND TO EXAMINE EACH MATTER. To this revelation he assented the sooner, as he confesses, because it was answerable to that of the Apostle to the Thessalonians, PROVE ALL THINGS, HOLD FAST THAT WHICH IS GOOD. And he might have added another remarkable saying of the same author: TO THE PURE, ALL THINGS ARE PURE; not only meats and drinks, but all kind of knowledge whether of good or evil; the knowledge cannot defile, nor consequently the books, if the will and conscience be not defiled.

For books are as meats and viands are; some of good, some of evil substance; and yet God, in that unapocryphal vision, said without exception, RISE, PETER, KILL AND EAT, leaving the choice to each man's discretion. Wholesome meats to a vitiated stomach differ little or nothing from unwholesome; and best books to a naughty mind are not unapplicable to occasions of evil. Bad meats will scarce breed good nourishment in the healthiest concoction; but herein the difference is of bad books, that they to a discreet and judicious reader serve in many respects to discover, to confute, to forewarn, and to illustrate. Whereof what better witness can ye expect I should produce, than one of your own now sitting in Parliament, the chief of learned men reputed in this land, Mr. Selden; whose volume of natural and national laws proves, not only by great authorities brought together, but by exquisite reasons and theorems almost mathematically demonstrative, that all opinions, yea errors, known, read, and collated, are of main service and assistance toward the speedy attainment of what is truest. I conceive, therefore, that when God did enlarge the universal diet of man's body, saving ever the rules of temperance, he then also, as before, left arbitrary the dieting and repasting of our minds; as wherein every mature man might have to exercise his own leading capacity.

How great a virtue is temperance, how much of moment through the whole life of man! Yet God commits the managing so great a trust, without particular law or prescription, wholly to the demeanour of every grown man. And therefore when he himself tabled the Jews from heaven, that omer, which was every man's daily portion of manna, is computed to have been more than might have well sufficed the heartiest feeder thrice as many meals. For those actions which enter into a man, rather than issue out of him, and therefore defile not, God uses not to captivate under a perpetual childhood of prescription, but trusts him with the gift of reason to be his own chooser; there were but little work left for preaching, if law and compulsion should grow so fast upon those things which heretofore were governed only by exhortation. Solomon informs us, that much reading is a weariness to the flesh; but neither he nor other inspired author tells us that such or such reading is unlawful: yet certainly had God thought good to limit us herein, it had been much more expedient to have told us what was unlawful than what was wearisome. As for the burning of those Ephesian books by St. Paul's converts; 'tis replied the books were magic, the Syriac so renders them. It was a private act, a voluntary act, and leaves us to a voluntary imitation: the men in remorse burnt those books which were their own; the magistrate by this example is not appointed; these men practised the books, another might perhaps have read them in some sort usefully.

Good and evil we know in the field of this world grow up together almost inseparably; and the knowledge of good is so involved and interwoven with the knowledge of evil, and in so many cunning resemblances hardly to be discerned, that those confused seeds which were imposed upon Psyche as an incessant labour to cull out, and sort asunder, were not more intermixed. It was from out the rind of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of good and evil, as two twins cleaving together, leaped forth into the world. And perhaps this is that doom which Adam fell into of knowing good and evil, that is to say of knowing good by evil. As therefore the state of man now is; what wisdom can there be to choose, what continence to forbear without the knowledge of evil? He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true warfaring Christian.

I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather; that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary. That virtue therefore which is but a youngling in the contemplation of evil, and knows not the utmost that vice promises to her followers, and rejects it, is but a blank virtue, not a pure; her whiteness is but an excremental whiteness. Which was the reason why our sage and serious poet Spenser, whom I dare be known to think a better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas, describing true temperance under the person of Guion, brings him in with his palmer through the cave of Mammon, and the bower of earthly bliss, that he might see and know, and yet abstain. Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely, and with less danger, scout into the regions of sin and falsity than by reading all manner of tractates and hearing all manner of reason? And this is the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously read.

But of the harm that may result hence three kinds are usually reckoned. First, is feared the infection that may spread; but then all human learning and controversy in religious points must remove out of the world, yea the Bible itself; for that oftentimes relates blasphemy not nicely, it describes the carnal sense of wicked men not unelegantly, it brings in holiest men passionately murmuring against Providence through all the arguments of Epicurus: in other great disputes it answers dubiously and darkly to the common reader. And ask a Talmudist what ails the modesty of his marginal Keri, that Moses and all the prophets cannot persuade him to pronounce the textual Chetiv. For these causes we all know the Bible itself put by the Papist must be next removed, as Clement of Alexandria, and that Eusebian book of Evangelic preparation, transmitting our ears through a hoard of heathenish obscenities to receive the Gospel. Who finds not that Irenaeus, Epiphanius, Jerome, and others discover more heresies than they well confute, and that oft for heresy which is the truer opinion?

Nor boots it to say for these, and all the heathen writers of greatest infection, if it must be thought so, with whom is bound up the life of human learning, that they writ in an unknown tongue, so long as we are sure those languages are known as well to the worst of men, who are both most able and most diligent to instil the poison they suck, first into the courts of princes, acquainting them with the choicest delights and criticisms of sin. As perhaps did that Petronius

whom Nero called his Arbiter, the master of his revels; and the notorious ribald of Arezzo, dreaded and yet dear to the Italian courtiers. I name not him for posterity's sake, whom Henry VIII. named in merriment his vicar of hell. By which compendious way all the contagion that foreign books can infuse will find a passage to the people far easier and shorter than an Indian voyage, though it could be sailed either by the north of Cataio eastward, or of Canada westward, while our Spanish licensing gags the English press never so severely.

But on the other side that infection which is from books of controversy in religion is more doubtful and dangerous to the learned than to the ignorant; and yet those books must be permitted untouched by the licenser. It will be hard to instance where any ignorant man hath been ever seduced by papistical book in English, unless it were commended and expounded to him by some of that clergy: and indeed all such tractates, whether false or true, are as the prophecy of Isaiah was to the eunuch, not to be UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT A GUIDE. But of our priests and doctors how many have been corrupted by studying the comments of Jesuits and Sorbonists, and how fast they could transfuse that corruption into the people, our experience is both late and sad. It is not forgot, since the acute and distinct Arminius was perverted merely by the perusing of a nameless discourse written at Delft, which at first he took in hand to confute.

Seeing, therefore, that those books, and those in great abundance, which are likeliest to taint both life and doctrine, cannot be suppressed without the fall of learning and of all ability in disputation, and that these books of either sort are most and soonest catching to the learned, from whom to the common people whatever is heretical or dissolute may quickly be conveyed, and that evil manners are as perfectly learnt without books a thousand other ways which cannot be stopped, and evil doctrine not with books can propagate, except a teacher guide, which he might also do without writing, and so beyond prohibiting, I am not able to unfold, how this cautelous enterprise of licensing can be exempted from the number of vain and impossible attempts. And he who were pleasantly disposed could not well avoid to liken it to the exploit of that gallant man who thought to pound up the crows by shutting his park gate.

Besides another inconvenience, if learned men be the first receivers out of books and dispreaders both of vice and error, how shall the licensers themselves be confided in, unless we can confer upon them, or they assume to themselves above all others in the land, the grace of infallibility and uncorruptedness? And again, if it be true that a wise man, like a good refiner, can gather gold out of the drossiest volume, and that a fool will be a fool with the best book, yea or without book; there is no reason that we should deprive a wise man of any advantage to his wisdom, while we seek to restrain from a fool, that which being restrained will be no hindrance to his folly. For if there should be so much exactness always used to keep that from him which is unfit for his reading, we should in the judgment of Aristotle not only, but of Solomon and of our Saviour, not vouchsafe him good precepts, and by consequence not willingly admit him to good books; as being certain that a wise man will make better use of an idle pamphlet, than a fool will do of sacred Scripture.

'Tis next alleged we must not expose ourselves to temptations without necessity, and next to that, not employ our time in vain things. To both these objections one answer will serve, out of the grounds already laid, that to all men such books are not temptations, nor vanities, but useful drugs and materials wherewith to temper and compose effective and strong medicines, which man's life cannot want. The rest, as children and childish men, who have not the art to qualify and prepare these working minerals, well may be exhorted to forbear, but hindered forcibly they cannot be by all the licensing that Sainted Inquisition could ever yet contrive. Which is what I promised to deliver next: that this order of licensing conduces nothing to the end for which it was framed; and hath almost prevented me by being clear already while thus much hath been explaining. See the ingenuity of Truth, who, when she gets a free and willing hand, opens herself faster than the pace of method and discourse can overtake her.

It was the task which I began with, to show that no nation, or well-instituted state, if they valued books at all, did ever use this way of licensing; and it might be answered, that this is a piece of prudence lately discovered. To which I return, that as it was a thing slight and obvious to think on, so if it had been difficult to find out, there wanted not among them long since who suggested such a course; which they not following, leave us a pattern of their judgment that it was not the rest knowing, but the not approving, which was the cause of their not using it.

Plato, a man of high authority, indeed, but least of all for his Commonwealth, in the book of his Laws, which no city ever yet received, fed his fancy by making many edicts to his airy burgomasters, which they who otherwise admire him wish had been rather buried and excused in the genial cups of an Academic night sitting. By which laws he seems to tolerate no kind of learning but by unalterable decree, consisting most of practical traditions, to the attainment whereof a library of smaller bulk than his own Dialogues would be abundant. And there also enacts, that no poet should so much as read to any private man what he had written, until the judges and law-keepers had seen it, and allowed it. But that Plato meant this law peculiarly to that commonwealth which he had imagined, and to no other, is evident. Why was he not else a lawgiver to himself, but a transgressor, and to be expelled by his own magistrates; both for the wanton epigrams and dialogues which he made, and his perpetual reading of Sophron Mimus and Aristophanes, books of grossest infamy, and also for commending the latter of them, though he were the malicious libeller of his chief friends, to be read by the tyrant Dionysius, who had little need of such trash to spend his time on? But that he knew this licensing of poems had reference and dependence to many other provisos there set down in his fancied republic, which in this world could have no place: and so neither he himself, nor any magistrate or city, ever imitated that course, which, taken apart from those other collateral injunctions, must needs be vain and fruitless. For if they fell upon one kind of strictness, unless their care were equal to regulate all other things of like aptness to corrupt the mind, that single endeavour they knew would be but a fond labour; to shut and fortify one gate against corruption, and be necessitated to leave others round about wide open.

If we think to regulate printing, thereby to rectify manners, we must regulate all recreation and pastimes, all that is delightful to man. No music must be heard, no song be set or sung, but what is grave and Doric. There must be licensing dancers, that no gesture, motion, or deportment be taught our youth but what by their allowance shall be thought honest; for such Plato was provided of. It will ask more than the work of twenty licensers to examine all the lutes, the violins, and the guitars in every house; they must not be suffered to prattle as they do, but must be licensed what they may say. And who shall silence all the airs and madrigals that whisper softness in chambers? The windows also, and the balconies must be thought on; there are shrewd books, with dangerous frontispieces, set to sale; who shall prohibit them, shall twenty licensers? The villages also must have their visitors to inquire what lectures the bagpipe and the rebeck reads, even to the ballatry and the gamut of every municipal fiddler, for these are the countryman's Arcadias, and his Monte Mayors.

Next, what more national corruption, for which England hears ill abroad, than household gluttony: who shall be the rectors of our daily rioting? And what shall be done to inhibit the multitudes that frequent those houses where drunkenness is sold and harboured? Our garments also should be referred to the licensing of some more sober workmasters to see them cut into a less wanton garb. Who shall regulate all the mixed conversation of our youth, male and female together, as is the fashion of this country? Who shall still appoint what shall be discoursed, what presumed, and no further? Lastly, who shall forbid and separate all idle resort, all evil company? These things will be, and must be; but how they shall be least hurtful, how least enticing, herein consists the grave and governing wisdom of a state.

To sequester out of the world into Atlantic and Utopian polities, which never can be drawn into use, will not mend our condition; but to ordain wisely as in this world of evil, in the midst whereof God hath placed us unavoidably. Nor is it Plato's licensing of books will do this, which necessarily pulls along with it so many other kinds of licensing, as will make us all both ridiculous and weary, and yet frustrate; but those unwritten, or at least unconstraining, laws of virtuous education, religious and civil nurture, which Plato there mentions as the bonds and ligaments of the commonwealth, the pillars and the sustainers of every written statute; these they be which will bear chief sway in such matters as these, when all licensing will be easily eluded. Impunity and remissness, for certain, are the bane of a commonwealth; but here the great art lies, to discern in what the law is to bid restraint and punishment, and in what things persuasion only is to work.

If every action, which is good or evil in man at ripe years, were to be under pittance and prescription and compulsion, what were virtue but a name, what praise could be then due to well-doing, what gramercy to be sober, just, or continent? Many there be that complain of divine Providence for suffering Adam to transgress; foolish tongues! When God gave him reason, he gave him freedom to choose, for reason is but choosing; he had been else a mere artificial Adam, such an Adam as he is in the motions. We ourselves esteem not of that obedience, or love, or

gift, which is of force: God therefore left him free, set before him a provoking object, ever almost in his eyes; herein consisted his merit, herein the right of his reward, the praise of his abstinence. Wherefore did he create passions within us, pleasures round about us, but that these rightly tempered are the very ingredients of virtue?

They are not skilful considerers of human things, who imagine to remove sin by removing the matter of sin; for, besides that it is a huge heap increasing under the very act of diminishing, though some part of it may for a time be withdrawn from some persons, it cannot from all, in such a universal thing as books are; and when this is done, yet the sin remains entire. Though ye take from a covetous man all his treasure, he has yet one jewel left, ye cannot bereave him of his covetousness. Banish all objects of lust, shut up all youth into the severest discipline that can be exercised in any hermitage, ye cannot make them chaste, that came not hither so; such great care and wisdom is required to the right managing of this point. Suppose we could expel sin by this means; look how much we thus expel of sin, so much we expel of virtue: for the matter of them both is the same; remove that, and ye remove them both alike.

This justifies the high providence of God, who, though he command us temperance, justice, continence, yet pours out before us, even to a profuseness, all desirable things, and gives us minds that can wander beyond all limit and satiety. Why should we then affect a rigour contrary to the manner of God and of nature, by abridging or scanting those means, which books freely permitted are, both to the trial of virtue and the exercise of truth? It would be better done, to learn that the law must needs be frivolous, which goes to restrain things, uncertainly and yet equally working to good and to evil. And were I the chooser, a dream of well-doing should be preferred before many times as much the forcible hindrance of evil-doing. For God sure esteems the growth and completing of one virtuous person more than the restraint of ten vicious.

And albeit whatever thing we hear or see, sitting, walking, travelling, or conversing, may be fitly called our book, and is of the same effect that writings are, yet grant the thing to be prohibited were only books, it appears that this Order hitherto is far insufficient to the end which it intends. Do we not see, not once or oftener, but weekly, that continued court-libel against the Parliament and City, printed, as the wet sheets can witness, and dispersed among us, for all that licensing can do? Yet this is the prime service a man would think, wherein this Order should give proof of itself. If it were executed, you'll say. But certain, if execution be remiss or blindfold now, and in this particular, what will it be hereafter and in other books? If then the Order shall not be vain and frustrate, behold a new labour, Lords and Commons, ye must repeal and proscribe all scandalous and unlicensed books already printed and divulged; after ye have drawn them up into a list, that all may know which are condemned, and which not; and ordain that no foreign books be delivered out of custody, till they have been read over. This office will require the whole time of not a few overseers, and those no vulgar men. There be also books which are partly useful and excellent, partly culpable and pernicious; this work will ask as many more officials, to make expurgations and expunctions, that the commonwealth of learning be not damnified. In fine, when the multitude of books increase upon their hands, ye must be fain to catalogue all those printers who are found frequently offending, and forbid the importation of their whole suspected typography. In a word, that this your Order may be exact and not deficient, ye must reform it perfectly according to the model of Trent and Seville, which I know ye abhor to do.

Yet though ye should condescend to this, which God forbid, the Order still would be but fruitless and defective to that end whereto ye meant it. If to prevent sects and schisms, who is so unread or so uncatechized in story, that hath not heard of many sects refusing books as a hindrance, and preserving their doctrine unmixed for many ages, only by unwritten traditions? The Christian faith, for that was once a schism, is not unknown to have spread all over Asia, ere any Gospel or Epistle was seen in writing. If the amendment of manners be aimed at, look into Italy and Spain, whether those places be one scruple the better, the honester, the wiser, the chaster, since all the inquisitional rigour that hath been executed upon books.

Another reason, whereby to make it plain that this Order will miss the end it seeks, consider by the quality which ought to be in every licenser. It cannot be denied but that he who is made judge to sit upon the birth or death of books, whether they may be wafted into this world or not, had need to be a man above the common measure, both studious, learned, and judicious; there may be else no mean mistakes in the censure of what is passable or not; which is also no mean injury. If he be of such worth as behoves him, there cannot be a more tedious and displeasing

journey-work, a greater loss of time levied upon his head, than to be made the perpetual reader of unchosen books and pamphlets, oftentimes huge volumes. There is no book that is acceptable unless at certain seasons; but to be enjoined the reading of that at all times, and in a hand scarce legible, whereof three pages would not down at any time in the fairest print, is an imposition which I cannot believe how he that values time and his own studies, or is but of a sensible nostril, should be able to endure. In this one thing I crave leave of the present licensers to be pardoned for so thinking; who doubtless took this office up, looking on it through their obedience to the Parliament, whose command perhaps made all things seem easy and unlaborious to them; but that this short trial hath wearied them out already, their own expressions and excuses to them who make so many journeys to solicit their licence are testimony enough. Seeing therefore those who now possess the employment by all evident signs wish themselves well rid of it; and that no man of worth, none that is not a plain unthrift of his own hours, is ever likely to succeed them, except he mean to put himself to the salary of a press corrector; we may easily foresee what kind of licensers we are to expect hereafter, either ignorant, imperious, and remiss, or basely pecuniary. This is what I had to show, wherein this Order cannot conduce to that end whereof it bears the intention.

I lastly proceed from the no good it can do, to the manifest hurt it causes, in being first the greatest discouragement and affront that can be offered to learning, and to learned men.

It was the complaint and lamentation of prelates, upon every least breath of a motion to remove pluralities, and distribute more equally Church revenues, that then all learning would be for ever dashed and discouraged. But as for that opinion, I never found cause to think that the tenth part of learning stood or fell with the clergy: nor could I ever but hold it for a sordid and unworthy speech of any churchman who had a competency left him. If therefore ye be loath to dishearten utterly and discontent, not the mercenary crew of false pretenders to learning, but the free and ingenuous sort of such as evidently were born to study, and love learning for itself, not for lucre or any other end but the service of God and of truth, and perhaps that lasting fame and perpetuity of praise which God and good men have consented shall be the reward of those whose published labours advance the good of mankind; then know that, so far to distrust the judgment and the honesty of one who hath but a common repute in learning, and never yet offended, as not to count him fit to print his mind without a tutor and examiner, lest he should drop a schism, or something of corruption, is the greatest displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him.

What advantage is it to be a man, over it is to be a boy at school, if we have only escaped the ferula to come under the fescue of an Imprimatur; if serious and elaborate writings, as if they were no more than the theme of a grammar-lad under his pedagogue, must not be uttered without the cursory eyes of a temporizing and extemporizing licenser? He who is not trusted with his own actions, his drift not being known to be evil, and standing to the hazard of law and penalty, has no great argument to think himself reputed in the Commonwealth wherein he was born for other than a fool or a foreigner. When a man writes to the world, he summons up all his reason and deliberation to assist him; he searches, meditates, is industrious, and likely consults and confers with his judicious friends; after all which done he takes himself to be informed in what he writes, as well as any that writ before him. If, in this the most consummate act of his fidelity and ripeness, no years, no industry, no former proof of his abilities can bring him to that state of maturity, as not to be still mistrusted and suspected, unless he carry all his considerate diligence, all his midnight watchings and expense of Palladian oil, to the hasty view of an unleisured licenser, perhaps much his younger, perhaps his inferior in judgment, perhaps one who never knew the labour of bookwriting, and if he be not repulsed or slighted, must appear in print like a puny with his guardian, and his censor's hand on the back of his title to be his bail and surety that he is no idiot or seducer, it cannot be but a dishonour and derogation to the author, to the book, to the privilege and dignity of learning.

And what if the author shall be one so copious of fancy, as to have many things well worth the adding come into his mind after licensing, while the book is yet under the press, which not seldom happens to the best and diligentest writers; and that perhaps a dozen times in one book? The printer dares not go beyond his licensed copy; so often then must the author trudge to his leave-giver, that those his new insertions may be viewed; and many a jaunt will be made, ere that licenser, for it must be the same man, can either be found, or found at leisure; meanwhile either the press must stand still, which is no small damage, or the author lose his accuratest thoughts, and send the book forth worse than he had made it, which to a diligent writer is the greatest melancholy and vexation that can befall.

And how can a man teach with authority, which is the life of teaching; how can he be a doctor in his book as he ought to be, or else had better be silent, whenas all he teaches, all he delivers, is but under the tuition, under the correction of his patriarchal licenser to blot or alter what precisely accords not with the hidebound humour which he calls his judgment? When every acute reader, upon the first sight of a pedantic licence, will be ready with these like words to ding the book a quoit's distance from him: I hate a pupil teacher, I endure not an instructor that comes to me under the wardship of an overseeing fist. I know nothing of the licenser, but that I have his own hand here for his arrogance; who shall warrant me his judgment? The State, sir, replies the stationer, but has a quick return: The State shall be my governors, but not my critics; they may be mistaken in the choice of a licenser, as easily as this licenser may be mistaken in an author; this is some common stuff; and he might add from Sir Francis Bacon, THAT SUCH AUTHORIZED BOOKS ARE BUT THE LANGUAGE OF THE TIMES. For though a licenser should happen to be judicious more than ordinary, which will be a great jeopardy of the next succession, yet his very office and his commission enjoins him to let pass nothing but what is vulgarly received already.

Nay, which is more lamentable, if the work of any deceased author, though never so famous in his lifetime and even to this day, come to their hands for licence to be printed, or reprinted, if there be found in his book one sentence of a venturous edge, uttered in the height of zeal (and who knows whether it might not be the dictate of a divine spirit?) yet not suiting with every low decrepit humour of their own, though it were Knox himself, the reformer of a kingdom, that spake it, they will not pardon him their dash: the sense of that great man shall to all posterity be lost, for the fearfulness or the presumptuous rashness of a perfunctory licenser. And to what an author this violence hath been lately done, and in what book of greatest consequence to be faithfully published, I could now instance, but shall forbear till a more convenient season.

Yet if these things be not resented seriously and timely by them who have the remedy in their power, but that such iron-moulds as these shall have authority to gnaw out the choicest periods of exquisitest books, and to commit such a treacherous fraud against the orphan remainders of worthiest men after death, the more sorrow will belong to that hapless race of men, whose misfortune it is to have understanding. Henceforth let no man care to learn, or care to be more than worldly-wise; for certainly in higher matters to be ignorant and slothful, to be a common steadfast dunce, will be the only pleasant life, and only in request.

And it is a particular disesteem of every knowing person alive, and most injurious to the written labours and monuments of the dead, so to me it seems an undervaluing and vilifying of the whole nation. I cannot set so light by all the invention, the art, the wit, the grave and solid judgment which is in England, as that it can be comprehended in any twenty capacities how good soever, much less that it should not pass except their superintendence be over it, except it be sifted and strained with their strainers, that it should be uncurrent without their manual stamp. Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized and traded in by tickets and statutes and standards. We must not think to make a staple commodity of all the knowledge in the land, to mark and licence it like our broadcloth and our woolpacks. What is it but a servitude like that imposed by the Philistines, not to be allowed the sharpening of our own axes and coulthers, but we must repair from all quarters to twenty licensing forges? Had anyone written and divulged erroneous things and scandalous to honest life, misusing and forfeiting the esteem had of his reason among men, if after conviction this only censure were adjudged him that he should never henceforth write but what were first examined by an appointed officer, whose hand should be annexed to pass his credit for him that now he might be safely read; it could not be apprehended less than a disgraceful punishment. Whence to include the whole nation, and those that never yet thus offended, under such a diffident and suspectful prohibition, may plainly be understood what a disparagement it is. So much the more, whenas debtors and delinquents may walk abroad without a keeper, but unoffensive books must not stir forth without a visible jailer in their title.

Nor is it to the common people less than a reproach; for if we be so jealous over them, as that we dare not trust them with an English pamphlet, what do we but censure them for a giddy, vicious, and ungrounded people; in such a sick and weak state of faith and discretion, as to be able to take nothing down but through the pipe of a licenser? That this is care or love of them, we cannot pretend, whenas, in those popish places where the laity are most hated and despised, the same strictness is used over them. Wisdom we cannot call it, because it stops but one breach of licence,



nor that neither: whenas those corruptions, which it seeks to prevent, break in faster at other doors which cannot be shut.

And in conclusion it reflects to the disrepute of our ministers also, of whose labours we should hope better, and of the proficiency which their flock reaps by them, than that after all this light of the Gospel which is, and is to be, and all this continual preaching, they should still be frequented with such an unprincipled, unedified and laic rabble, as that the whiff of every new pamphlet should stagger them out of their catechism and Christian walking. This may have much reason to discourage the ministers when such a low conceit is had of all their exhortations, and the benefiting of their hearers, as that they are not thought fit to be turned loose to three sheets of paper without a licenser; that all the sermons, all the lectures preached, printed, vented in such numbers, and such volumes, as have now well nigh made all other books unsaleable, should not be armour enough against one single Enchiridion, without the castle of St. Angelo of an Imprimatur.

And lest some should persuade ye, Lords and Commons, that these arguments of learned men's discouragement at this your Order are mere flourishes, and not real, I could recount what I have seen and heard in other countries, where this kind of inquisition tyrannizes; when I have sat among their learned men, for that honour I had, and been counted happy to be born in such a place of philosophic freedom, as they supposed England was, while themselves did nothing but bemoan the servile condition into which learning amongst them was brought; that this was it which had damped the glory of Italian wits; that nothing had been there written now these many years but flattery and fustian. There it was that I found and visited the famous Galileo, grown old, a prisoner to the Inquisition, for thinking in astronomy otherwise than the Franciscan and Dominican licensers thought. And though I knew that England then was groaning loudest under the prelatical yoke, nevertheless I took it as a pledge of future happiness, that other nations were so persuaded of her liberty. Yet was it beyond my hope that those worthies were then breathing in her air, who should be her leaders to such a deliverance, as shall never be forgotten by any revolution of time that this world hath to finish. When that was once begun, it was as little in my fear that what words of complaint I heard among learned men of other parts uttered against the Inquisition, the same I should hear by as learned men at home, uttered in time of Parliament against an order of licensing; and that so generally that, when I had disclosed myself a companion of their discontent, I might say, if without envy, that he whom an honest quaestorship had endeared to the Sicilians was not more by them importuned against Verres, than the favourable opinion which I had among many who honour ye, and are known and respected by ye, loaded me with entreaties and persuasions, that I would not despair to lay together that which just reason should bring into my mind, toward the removal of an undeserved thralldom upon learning. That this is not therefore the disburdening of a particular fancy, but the common grievance of all those who had prepared their minds and studies above the vulgar pitch to advance truth in others, and from others to entertain it, thus much may satisfy.

And in their name I shall for neither friend nor foe conceal what the general murmur is; that if it come to inquisitioning again and licensing, and that we are so timorous of ourselves, and so suspicious of all men, as to fear each book and the shaking of every leaf, before we know what the contents are; if some who but of late were little better than silenced from preaching shall come now to silence us from reading, except what they please, it cannot be guessed what is intended by some but a second tyranny over learning: and will soon put it out of controversy, that bishops and presbyters are the same to us, both name and thing. That those evils of prelaty, which before from five or six and twenty sees were distributively charged upon the whole people, will now light wholly upon learning, is not obscure to us: whenas now the pastor of a small unlearned parish on the sudden shall be exalted archbishop over a large diocese of books, and yet not remove, but keep his other cure too, a mystical pluralist. He who but of late cried down the sole ordination of every novice Bachelor of Art, and denied sole jurisdiction over the simplest parishioner, shall now at home in his private chair assume both these over worthiest and excellentest books and ablest authors that write them.

This is not, ye Covenants and Protestations that we have made! this is not to put down prelaty; this is but to chop an episcopacy; this is but to translate the Palace Metropolitan from one kind of dominion into another; this is but an old canonical sleight of commuting our penance. To startle thus betimes at a mere unlicensed pamphlet will after a while be afraid of every conventicle, and a while after will make a conventicle of every Christian meeting. But I am certain that a State governed by the rules of justice and fortitude, or a Church built and founded upon the rock of

faith and true knowledge, cannot be so pusillanimous. While things are yet not constituted in religion, that freedom of writing should be restrained by a discipline imitated from the prelates and learnt by them from the Inquisition, to shut us up all again into the breast of a licenser, must needs give cause of doubt and discouragement to all learned and religious men.

Who cannot but discern the fineness of this politic drift, and who are the contrivers; that while bishops were to be baited down, then all presses might be open; it was the people's birthright and privilege in time of Parliament, it was the breaking forth of light. But now, the bishops abrogated and voided out of the Church, as if our Reformation sought no more but to make room for others into their seats under another name, the episcopal arts begin to bud again, the cruse of truth must run no more oil, liberty of printing must be enthralled again under a prelatical commission of twenty, the privilege of the people nullified, and, which is worse, the freedom of learning must groan again, and to her old fetters: all this the Parliament yet sitting. Although their own late arguments and defences against the prelates might remember them, that this obstructing violence meets for the most part with an event utterly opposite to the end which it drives at: instead of suppressing sects and schisms, it raises them and invests them with a reputation. The punishing of wits enhances their authority, saith the Viscount St. Albans; and a forbidden writing is thought to be a certain spark of truth that flies up in the faces of them who seek to tread it out. This Order, therefore, may prove a nursing-mother to sects, but I shall easily show how it will be a step-dame to Truth: and first by disabling us to the maintenance of what is known already.

Well knows he who uses to consider, that our faith and knowledge thrives by exercise, as well as our limbs and complexion. Truth is compared in Scripture to a streaming fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetual progression, they sicken into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition. A man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only because his pastor says so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes his heresy.

There is not any burden that some would gladlier post off to another than the charge and care of their religion. There be—who knows not that there be?—of Protestants and professors who live and die in as arrant an implicit faith as any lay Papist of Loretto. A wealthy man, addicted to his pleasure and to his profits, finds religion to be a traffic so entangled, and of so many piddling accounts, that of all mysteries he cannot skill to keep a stock going upon that trade. What should he do? fain he would have the name to be religious, fain he would bear up with his neighbours in that. What does he therefore, but resolves to give over toiling, and to find himself out some factor, to whose care and credit he may commit the whole managing of his religious affairs; some divine of note and estimation that must be. To him he adheres, resigns the whole warehouse of his religion, with all the locks and keys, into his custody; and indeed makes the very person of that man his religion; esteems his associating with him a sufficient evidence and commendatory of his own piety. So that a man may say his religion is now no more within himself, but is become a dividual movable, and goes and comes near him, according as that good man frequents the house. He entertains him, gives him gifts, feasts him, lodges him; his religion comes home at night, prays, is liberally supped, and sumptuously laid to sleep; rises, is saluted, and after the malmsey, or some well-spiced brewage, and better breakfasted than he whose morning appetite would have gladly fed on green figs between Bethany and Jerusalem, his religion walks abroad at eight, and leaves his kind entertainer in the shop trading all day without his religion.

Another sort there be who, when they hear that all things shall be ordered, all things regulated and settled, nothing written but what passes through the custom-house of certain publicans that have the tonnaging and poundaging of all free-spoken truth, will straight give themselves up into your hands, make 'em and cut 'em out what religion ye please: there be delights, there be recreations and jolly pastimes that will fetch the day about from sun to sun, and rock the tedious year as in a delightful dream. What need they torture their heads with that which others have taken so strictly and so unalterably into their own purveying? These are the fruits which a dull ease and cessation of our knowledge will bring forth among the people. How goodly and how to be wished were such an obedient unanimity as this, what a fine conformity would it starch us all into! Doubtless a staunch and solid piece of framework, as any January could freeze together.

Nor much better will be the consequence even among the clergy themselves. It is no new thing never heard of before, for a parochial minister, who has his reward and is at his Hercules' pillars in a warm benefice, to be easily

inclinable, if he have nothing else that may rouse up his studies, to finish his circuit in an English Concordance and a topic folio, the gatherings and savings of a sober graduateship, a Harmony and a Catena; treading the constant round of certain common doctrinal heads, attended with their uses, motives, marks, and means, out of which, as out of an alphabet, or sol-fa, by forming and transforming, joining and disjoining variously, a little bookcraft, and two hours' meditation, might furnish him unspeakably to the performance of more than a weekly charge of sermoneering: not to reckon up the infinite helps of interlinearies, breviaries, synopses, and other loitering gear. But as for the multitude of sermons ready printed and piled up, on every text that is not difficult, our London trading St. Thomas in his vestry, and add to boot St. Martin and St. Hugh, have not within their hallowed limits more vendible ware of all sorts ready made: so that penury he never need fear of pulpit provision, having where so plentifully to refresh his magazine. But if his rear and flanks be not impaled, if his back door be not secured by the rigid licenser, but that a bold book may now and then issue forth and give the assault to some of his old collections in their trenches, it will concern him then to keep waking, to stand in watch, to set good guards and sentinels about his received opinions, to walk the round and counter-round with his fellow inspectors, fearing lest any of his flock be seduced, who also then would be better instructed, better exercised and disciplined. And God send that the fear of this diligence, which must then be used, do not make us affect the laziness of a licensing Church.

For if we be sure we are in the right, and do not hold the truth guiltily, which becomes not, if we ourselves condemn not our own weak and frivolous teaching, and the people for an untaught and irreligious gadding rout, what can be more fair than when a man judicious, learned, and of a conscience, for aught we know, as good as theirs that taught us what we know, shall not privily from house to house, which is more dangerous, but openly by writing publish to the world what his opinion is, what his reasons, and wherefore that which is now thought cannot be sound? Christ urged it as wherewith to justify himself, that he preached in public; yet writing is more public than preaching; and more easy to refutation, if need be, there being so many whose business and profession merely it is to be the champions of truth; which if they neglect, what can be imputed but their sloth, or inability?

Thus much we are hindered and disinured by this course of licensing, toward the true knowledge of what we seem to know. For how much it hurts and hinders the licensers themselves in the calling of their ministry, more than any secular employment, if they will discharge that office as they ought, so that of necessity they must neglect either the one duty or the other, I insist not, because it is a particular, but leave it to their own conscience, how they will decide it there.

There is yet behind of what I purposed to lay open, the incredible loss and detriment that this plot of licensing puts us to; more than if some enemy at sea should stop up all our havens and ports and creeks, it hinders and retards the importation of our richest merchandise, truth; nay, it was first established and put in practice by Antichristian malice and mystery on set purpose to extinguish, if it were possible, the light of Reformation, and to settle falsehood; little differing from that policy wherewith the Turk upholds his Alcoran, by the prohibition of printing. 'Tis not denied, but gladly confessed, we are to send our thanks and vows to Heaven louder than most of nations, for that great measure of truth which we enjoy, especially in those main points between us and the Pope, with his appurtenances the prelates: but he who thinks we are to pitch our tent here, and have attained the utmost prospect of reformation that the mortal glass wherein we contemplate can show us, till we come to beatific vision, that man by this very opinion declares that he is yet far short of truth.

Truth indeed came once into the world with her divine Master, and was a perfect shape most glorious to look on: but when he ascended, and his Apostles after him were laid asleep, then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers, who, as that story goes of the Egyptian Typhon with his conspirators, how they dealt with the good Osiris, took the virgin Truth, hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to the four winds. From that time ever since, the sad friends of Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangled body of Osiris, went up and down gathering up limb by limb, still as they could find them. We have not yet found them all, Lords and Commons, nor ever shall do, till her Master's second coming; he shall bring together every joint and member, and shall mould them into an immortal feature of loveliness and perfection. Suffer not these licensing prohibitions to stand at every place of opportunity, forbidding and disturbing them that continue seeking, that continue to do our obsequies to the torn body of our martyred saint.

We boast our light; but if we look not wisely on the sun itself, it smites us into darkness. Who can discern those planets that are oft combust, and those stars of brightest magnitude that rise and set with the sun, until the opposite motion of their orbs bring them to such a place in the firmament, where they may be seen evening or morning? The light which we have gained was given us, not to be ever staring on, but by it to discover onward things more remote from our knowledge. It is not the unfrocking of a priest, the unmitring of a bishop, and the removing him from off the presbyterian shoulders, that will make us a happy nation. No, if other things as great in the Church, and in the rule of life both economical and political, be not looked into and reformed, we have looked so long upon the blaze that Zuinglius and Calvin hath beacons up to us, that we are stark blind. There be who perpetually complain of schisms and sects, and make it such a calamity that any man dissents from their maxims. 'Tis their own pride and ignorance which causes the disturbing, who neither will hear with meekness, nor can convince; yet all must be suppressed which is not found in their Syntagma. They are the troublers, they are the dividers of unity, who neglect and permit not others to unite those dissevered pieces which are yet wanting to the body of Truth. To be still searching what we know not by what we know, still closing up truth to truth as we find it (for all her body is homogeneal and proportional), this is the golden rule in theology as well as in arithmetic, and makes up the best harmony in a Church; not the forced and outward union of cold, and neutral, and inwardly divided minds.

Lords and Commons of England! consider what nation it is whereof ye are, and whereof ye are the governors: a nation not slow and dull, but of a quick, ingenious and piercing spirit, acute to invent, subtle and sinewy to discourse, not beneath the reach of any point the highest that human capacity can soar to. Therefore the studies of learning in her deepest sciences have been so ancient and so eminent among us, that writers of good antiquity and ablest judgment have been persuaded that even the school of Pythagoras and the Persian wisdom took beginning from the old philosophy of this island. And that wise and civil Roman, Julius Agricola, who governed once here for Caesar, preferred the natural wits of Britain before the laboured studies of the French. Nor is it for nothing that the grave and frugal Transylvanian sends out yearly from as far as the mountainous borders of Russia, and beyond the Hercynian wilderness, not their youth, but their staid men, to learn our language and our theologic arts.

Yet that which is above all this, the favour and the love of Heaven, we have great argument to think in a peculiar manner propitious and propending towards us. Why else was this nation chosen before any other, that out of her, as out of Sion, should be proclaimed and sounded forth the first tidings and trumpet of Reformation to all Europe? And had it not been the obstinate perverseness of our prelates against the divine and admirable spirit of Wickliff, to suppress him as a schismatic and innovator, perhaps neither the Bohemian Huns and Jerome, no nor the name of Luther or of Calvin, had been ever known: the glory of reforming all our neighbours had been completely ours. But now, as our obdurate clergy have with violence demeaned the matter, we are become hitherto the latest and the backwardest scholars, of whom God offered to have made us the teachers. Now once again by all concurrence of signs, and by the general instinct of holy and devout men, as they daily and solemnly express their thoughts, God is decreeing to begin some new and great period in his Church, even to the reforming of Reformation itself: what does he then but reveal himself to his servants, and as his manner is, first to his Englishmen? I say, as his manner is, first to us, though we mark not the method of his counsels, and are unworthy.

Behold now this vast city: a city of refuge, the mansion house of liberty, encompassed and surrounded with his protection; the shop of war hath not there more anvils and hammers waking, to fashion out the plates and instruments of armed justice in defence of beleaguered truth, than there be pens and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas wherewith to present, as with their homage and their fealty, the approaching Reformation: others as fast reading, trying all things, assenting to the force of reason and convincement. What could a man require more from a nation so pliant and so prone to seek after knowledge? What wants there to such a towardly and pregnant soil, but wise and faithful labourers, to make a knowing people, a nation of prophets, of sages, and of worthies? We reckon more than five months yet to harvest; there need not be five weeks; had we but eyes to lift up, the fields are white already.

Where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making. Under these fantastic terrors of sect and schism, we wrong the earnest and zealous thirst after knowledge and understanding which God hath stirred up in this city. What some lament of, we rather should rejoice at, should rather praise this pious forwardness among men, to reassume the ill-

deputed care of their religion into their own hands again. A little generous prudence, a little forbearance of one another, and some grain of charity might win all these diligences to join, and unite in one general and brotherly search after truth; could we but forgo this prelatical tradition of crowding free consciences and Christian liberties into canons and precepts of men. I doubt not, if some great and worthy stranger should come among us, wise to discern the mould and temper of a people, and how to govern it, observing the high hopes and aims, the diligent alacrity of our extended thoughts and reasonings in the pursuance of truth and freedom, but that he would cry out as Pyrrhus did, admiring the Roman docility and courage: If such were my Epirots, I would not despair the greatest design that could be attempted, to make a Church or kingdom happy.

Yet these are the men cried out against for schismatics and sectaries; as if, while the temple of the Lord was building, some cutting, some squaring the marble, others hewing the cedars, there should be a sort of irrational men who could not consider there must be many schisms and many dissections made in the quarry and in the timber, ere the house of God can be built. And when every stone is laid artfully together, it cannot be united into a continuity, it can but be contiguous in this world; neither can every piece of the building be of one form; nay rather the perfection consists in this, that, out of many moderate varieties and brotherly dissimilarities that are not vastly disproportional, arises the goodly and the graceful symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure.

Let us therefore be more considerate builders, more wise in spiritual architecture, when great reformation is expected. For now the time seems come, wherein Moses the great prophet may sit in heaven rejoicing to see that memorable and glorious wish of his fulfilled, when not only our seventy elders, but all the Lord's people, are become prophets. No marvel then though some men, and some good men too perhaps, but young in goodness, as Joshua then was, envy them. They fret, and out of their own weakness are in agony, lest these divisions and subdivisions will undo us. The adversary again applauds, and waits the hour: when they have branched themselves out, saith he, small enough into parties and partitions, then will be our time. Fool! he sees not the firm root, out of which we all grow, though into branches: nor will beware until he see our small divided maniples cutting through at every angle of his ill-united and unwieldy brigade. And that we are to hope better of all these supposed sects and schisms, and that we shall not need that solicitude, honest perhaps, though over-timorous, of them that vex in this behalf, but shall laugh in the end at those malicious applauders of our differences, I have these reasons to persuade me.

First, when a city shall be as it were besieged and blocked about, her navigable river infested, inroads and incursions round, defiance and battle oft rumoured to be marching up even to her walls and suburb trenches, that then the people, or the greater part, more than at other times, wholly taken up with the study of highest and most important matters to be reformed, should be disputing, reasoning, reading, inventing, discoursing, even to a rarity and admiration, things not before discoursed or written of, argues first a singular goodwill, contentedness and confidence in your prudent foresight and safe government, Lords and Commons; and from thence derives itself to a gallant bravery and well-grounded contempt of their enemies, as if there were no small number of as great spirits among us, as his was, who when Rome was nigh besieged by Hannibal, being in the city, bought that piece of ground at no cheap rate, whereon Hannibal himself encamped his own regiment.

Next, it is a lively and cheerful presage of our happy success and victory. For as in a body, when the blood is fresh, the spirits pure and vigorous, not only to vital but to rational faculties, and those in the acutest and the pertest operations of wit and subtlety, it argues in what good plight and constitution the body is; so when the cheerfulness of the people is so sprightly up, as that it has not only wherewith to guard well its own freedom and safety, but to spare, and to bestow upon the solidest and sublimest points of controversy and new invention, it betokens us not degenerated, nor drooping to a fatal decay, but casting off the old and wrinkled skin of corruption to outlive these pangs and wax young again, entering the glorious ways of truth and prosperous virtue, destined to become great and honourable in these latter ages. Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks: methinks I see her as an eagle mewing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam; purging and unscaling her long-abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance; while the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with those also that love the twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she means, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sects and schisms.

What would ye do then? should ye suppress all this flowery crop of knowledge and new light sprung up and yet springing daily in this city? Should ye set an oligarchy of twenty engrossers over it, to bring a famine upon our minds again, when we shall know nothing but what is measured to us by their bushel? Believe it, Lords and Commons, they who counsel ye to such a suppressing do as good as bid ye suppress yourselves; and I will soon show how. If it be desired to know the immediate cause of all this free writing and free speaking, there cannot be assigned a truer than your own mild and free and humane government. It is the liberty, Lords and Commons, which your own valorous and happy counsels have purchased us, liberty which is the nurse of all great wits; this is that which hath rarefied and enlightened our spirits like the influence of heaven; this is that which hath enfranchised, enlarged and lifted up our apprehensions, degrees above themselves.

Ye cannot make us now less capable, less knowing, less eagerly pursuing of the truth, unless ye first make yourselves, that made us so, less the lovers, less the founders of our true liberty. We can grow ignorant again, brutish, formal and slavish, as ye found us; but you then must first become that which ye cannot be, oppressive, arbitrary and tyrannous, as they were from whom ye have freed us. That our hearts are now more capacious, our thoughts more erected to the search and expectation of greatest and exactest things, is the issue of your own virtue propagated in us; ye cannot suppress that, unless ye reinforce an abrogated and merciless law, that fathers may dispatch at will their own children. And who shall then stick closest to ye, and excite others? not he who takes up arms for coat and conduct, and his four nobles of Danegelt. Although I dispraise not the defence of just immunities, yet love my peace better, if that were all. Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties.

What would be best advised, then, if it be found so hurtful and so unequal to suppress opinions for the newness or the unsuitableness to a customary acceptance, will not be my task to say. I only shall repeat what I have learned from one of your own honourable number, a right noble and pious lord, who, had he not sacrificed his life and fortunes to the Church and Commonwealth, we had not now missed and bewailed a worthy and undoubted patron of this argument. Ye know him, I am sure; yet I for honour's sake, and may it be eternal to him, shall name him, the Lord Brook. He writing of episcopacy, and by the way treating of sects and schisms, left ye his vote, or rather now the last words of his dying charge, which I know will ever be of dear and honoured regard with ye, so full of meekness and breathing charity, that next to his last testament, who bequeathed love and peace to his disciples, I cannot call to mind where I have read or heard words more mild and peaceful. He there exhorts us to hear with patience and humility those, however they be miscalled, that desire to live purely, in such a use of God's ordinances, as the best guidance of their conscience gives them, and to tolerate them, though in some disconformity to ourselves. The book itself will tell us more at large, being published to the world, and dedicated to the Parliament by him who, both for his life and for his death, deserves that what advice he left be not laid by without perusal.

And now the time in special is, by privilege to write and speak what may help to the further discussing of matters in agitation. The temple of Janus with his two controversial faces might now not insignificantly be set open. And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter? Her confuting is the best and surest suppressing. He who hears what praying there is for light and clearer knowledge to be sent down among us, would think of other matters to be constituted beyond the discipline of Geneva, framed and fabricked already to our hands. Yet when the new light which we beg for shines in upon us, there be who envy and oppose, if it come not first in at their casements. What a collusion is this, whenas we are exhorted by the wise man to use diligence, to seek for wisdom as for hidden treasures early and late, that another order shall enjoin us to know nothing but by statute? When a man hath been labouring the hardest labour in the deep mines of knowledge, hath furnished out his findings in all their equipage: drawn forth his reasons as it were a battle ranged: scattered and defeated all objections in his way; calls out his adversary into the plain, offers him the advantage of wind and sun, if he please, only that he may try the matter by dint of argument: for his opponents then to skulk, to lay ambushments, to keep a narrow bridge of licensing where the challenger should pass, though it be valour enough in soldiership, is but weakness and cowardice in the wars of Truth.

For who knows not that Truth is strong, next to the Almighty? She needs no policies, nor stratagems, nor licensings to make her victorious; those are the shifts and the defences that error uses against her power. Give her but room, and do not bind her when she sleeps, for then she speaks not true, as the old Proteus did, who spake oracles only when he was caught and bound, but then rather she turns herself into all shapes, except her own, and perhaps tunes her voice according to the time, as Micaiah did before Ahab, until she be adjured into her own likeness. Yet is it not impossible that she may have more shapes than one. What else is all that rank of things indifferent, wherein Truth may be on this side or on the other, without being unlike herself? What but a vain shadow else is the abolition of those ordinances, that hand-writing nailed to the cross? What great purchase is this Christian liberty which Paul so often boasts of? His doctrine is, that he who eats or eats not, regards a day or regards it not, may do either to the Lord. How many other things might be tolerated in peace, and left to conscience, had we but charity, and were it not the chief stronghold of our hypocrisy to be ever judging one another?

I fear yet this iron yoke of outward conformity hath left a slavish print upon our necks; the ghost of a linen decency yet haunts us. We stumble and are impatient at the least dividing of one visible congregation from another, though it be not in fundamentals; and through our forwardness to suppress, and our backwardness to recover any enthralled piece of truth out of the gripe of custom, we care not to keep truth separated from truth, which is the fiercest rent and disunion of all. We do not see that, while we still affect by all means a rigid external formality, we may as soon fall again into a gross conforming stupidity, a stark and dead congealment of wood and hay and stubble, forced and frozen together, which is more to the sudden degenerating of a Church than many subdichotomies of petty schisms.

Not that I can think well of every light separation, or that all in a Church is to be expected gold and silver and precious stones: it is not possible for man to sever the wheat from the tares, the good fish from the other fry; that must be the Angels' ministry at the end of mortal things. Yet if all cannot be of one mind—as who looks they should be?—this doubtless is more wholesome, more prudent, and more Christian, that many be tolerated, rather than all compelled. I mean not tolerated popery, and open superstition, which, as it extirpates all religions and civil supremacies, so itself should be extirpate, provided first that all charitable and compassionate means be used to win and regain the weak and the misled: that also which is impious or evil absolutely either against faith or manners no law can possibly permit, that intends not to unlaw itself: but those neighbouring differences, or rather indifferences, are what I speak of, whether in some point of doctrine or of discipline, which, though they may be many, yet need not interrupt THE UNITY OF SPIRIT, if we could but find among us THE BOND OF PEACE.

In the meanwhile if any one would write, and bring his helpful hand to the slow-moving Reformation which we labour under, if Truth have spoken to him before others, or but seemed at least to speak, who hath so bejesuited us that we should trouble that man with asking license to do so worthy a deed? and not consider this, that if it come to prohibiting, there is not aught more likely to be prohibited than truth itself; whose first appearance to our eyes, bleared and dimmed with prejudice and custom, is more unsightly and unpalatable than many errors, even as the person is of many a great man slight and contemptuous to see to. And what do they tell us vainly of new opinions, when this very opinion of theirs, that none must be heard but whom they like, is the worst and newest opinion of all others; and is the chief cause why sects and schisms do so much abound, and true knowledge is kept at distance from us; besides yet a greater danger which is in it.

For when God shakes a kingdom with strong and healthful commotions to a general reforming, 'tis not untrue that many sectaries and false teachers are then busiest in seducing; but yet more true it is, that God then raises to his own work men of rare abilities, and more than common industry, not only to look back and revise what hath been taught heretofore, but to gain further and go on some new enlightened steps in the discovery of truth. For such is the order of God's enlightening his Church, to dispense and deal out by degrees his beam, so as our earthly eyes may best sustain it.

Neither is God appointed and confined, where and out of what place these his chosen shall be first heard to speak; for he sees not as man sees, chooses not as man chooses, lest we should devote ourselves again to set places, and assemblies, and outward callings of men; planting our faith one while in the old Convocation house, and another while in the Chapel at Westminster; when all the faith and religion that shall be there canonized is not sufficient without plain convincement, and the charity of patient instruction to supple the least bruise of conscience, to edify

the meanest Christian, who desires to walk in the Spirit, and not in the letter of human trust, for all the number of voices that can be there made; no, though Harry VII himself there, with all his liege tombs about him, should lend them voices from the dead, to swell their number.

And if the men be erroneous who appear to be the leading schismatics, what withholds us but our sloth, our self-will, and distrust in the right cause, that we do not give them gentle meetings and gentle dismissions, that we debate not and examine the matter thoroughly with liberal and frequent audience; if not for their sakes, yet for our own? seeing no man who hath tasted learning, but will confess the many ways of profiting by those who, not contented with stale receipts, are able to manage and set forth new positions to the world. And were they but as the dust and cinders of our feet, so long as in that notion they may yet serve to polish and brighten the armoury of Truth, even for that respect they were not utterly to be cast away. But if they be of those whom God hath fitted for the special use of these times with eminent and ample gifts, and those perhaps neither among the priests nor among the Pharisees, and we in the haste of a precipitant zeal shall make no distinction, but resolve to stop their mouths, because we fear they come with new and dangerous opinions, as we commonly forejudge them ere we understand them; no less than woe to us, while, thinking thus to defend the Gospel, we are found the persecutors.

There have been not a few since the beginning of this Parliament, both of the presbytery and others, who by their unlicensed books, to the contempt of an Imprimatur, first broke that triple ice clung about our hearts, and taught the people to see day: I hope that none of those were the persuaders to renew upon us this bondage which they themselves have wrought so much good by contemning. But if neither the check that Moses gave to young Joshua, nor the countermand which our Saviour gave to young John, who was so ready to prohibit those whom he thought unlicensed, be not enough to admonish our elders how unacceptable to God their testy mood of prohibiting is; if neither their own remembrance what evil hath abounded in the Church by this set of licensing, and what good they themselves have begun by transgressing it, be not enough, but that they will persuade and execute the most Dominican part of the Inquisition over us, and are already with one foot in the stirrup so active at suppressing, it would be no unequal distribution in the first place to suppress the suppressors themselves: whom the change of their condition hath puffed up, more than their late experience of harder times hath made wise.

And as for regulating the press, let no man think to have the honour of advising ye better than yourselves have done in that Order published next before this, "that no book be printed, unless the printer's and the author's name, or at least the printer's, be registered." Those which otherwise come forth, if they be found mischievous and libellous, the fire and the executioner will be the timeliest and the most effectual remedy that man's prevention can use. For this authentic Spanish policy of licensing books, if I have said aught, will prove the most unlicensed book itself within a short while; and was the immediate image of a Star Chamber decree to that purpose made in those very times when that Court did the rest of those her pious works, for which she is now fallen from the stars with Lucifer. Whereby ye may guess what kind of state prudence, what love of the people, what care of religion or good manners there was at the contriving, although with singular hypocrisy it pretended to bind books to their good behaviour. And how it got the upper hand of your precedent Order so well constituted before, if we may believe those men whose profession gives them cause to inquire most, it may be doubted there was in it the fraud of some old patentees and monopolizers in the trade of bookselling; who under pretence of the poor in their Company not to be defrauded, and the just retaining of each man his several copy, which God forbid should be gainsaid, brought divers glossing colours to the House, which were indeed but colours, and serving to no end except it be to exercise a superiority over their neighbours; men who do not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is indebted, that they should be made other men's vassals. Another end is thought was aimed at by some of them in procuring by petition this Order, that, having power in their hands, malignant books might the easier scape abroad, as the event shows.

But of these sophisms and elenchs of merchandise I skill not. This I know, that errors in a good government and in a bad are equally almost incident; for what magistrate may not be misinformed, and much the sooner, if liberty of printing be reduced into the power of a few? But to redress willingly and speedily what hath been erred, and in highest authority to esteem a plain advertisement more than others have done a sumptuous bride, is a virtue (honoured Lords and Commons) answerable to your highest actions, and whereof none can participate but greatest and wisest men.





## Chapter 5

### 1. Thomas Hobbes. *Brief of the Art of Rhetorick*

*Brief of the Art of Rhetorick; Containing in substance all that Aristotle hath written in his three books on that subject. By Thomas Hobbes*

#### **Book I.**

1. That Rhetorick is an Art consisting not only in moving the Passions of the Judge; but chiefly in Proofs. And that this Art is Profitable.
2. The Definition of Rhetorick.
3. Of the several kinds of Orations: and of the Principles of Rhetorick.
4. Of the Subject of Deliberatives: and the Abilities that are required of him that will deliberate of Business of State.
5. Of the Ends which the Orator in Deliberatives, propoundeth, whereby to exhort, or dehort.
6. Of the Colours or common Opinions concerning Good and Evil.
7. Of the Colours, or common Opinions concerning Good and Evil, comparatively.
8. Of the several Kinds of Governments.
9. Of the Colours of Honourable and Dishonourable.
10. Of Accusation and Defence, with the Definition of Injury.
11. Of the Colours, or Common Opinions concerning Pleasure.
12. Presumptions of Injury drawn from the Persons that do it: or Common Opinions concerning the Aptitude of Persons to do Injury.
13. Presumptions of Injury drawn from the Persons that suffer, and from the Matter of the Injury.
14. Of those Things which are necessary to be Known for the Definition of Just and Unjust.
15. Of the Colours or Common Opinions concerning Injuries comparatively.
16. Of Proofs Inartificial.

#### **Book II.**

1. The Introduction.
2. Of Anger.
3. Of Reconciling, or Pacifying Anger.
4. Of Love and Friends.
5. Of Enmity and Hatred.
6. Of Fear.
7. Of Assurance.
8. Of Shame.
9. Of Grace, or Favour.
10. Of Pity, or Compassion.
11. Of Indignation.
12. Of Envy.
13. Of Emulation.
14. Of the Manners of Youth.
15. Of the Manners of Old Men.

16. Of the Manners of Middle-aged Men.
17. Of the Manners of the Nobility.
18. Of the Manners of the Rich.
19. Of the Manners of Men in Power, and of such as prosper.
20. Common Places or Principles concerning what May be Done, what Has been Done, and what Shall be Done; or of Fact Possible, Past, and Future. Also of Great and Little.
21. Of Example, Similitude, and Fables.
22. Of a Sentence.
23. Of the Invention of Enthymemes.
24. Of the Places of Enthymemes Ostensive.
25. Of the Places of Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility.
26. Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes.
27. Of the Wayes to answer the Arguments of the Adversary.
28. Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places. Enthymemes by which arguments are answered, are the same with those by which the Matter in question is proved, or disproved. Objections are not Enthymemes.

**Book III.**

*Note: In Book III, Hobbes omits Aristotle's 8th chapter on "Rhythm." The number of each subsequent chapter is thus one less than the corresponding chapter in Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric.*

1. Of the Original of Elocution and Pronuntiation.
2. Of the Choice of Words and Epithets.
3. Of the Things that make an Oration Flat.
4. Of a Similitude.
5. Of the Purity of Language.
6. Of the Amplitude and Tenuity of Language.
7. Of the Convenience or Decency of Elocution.
8. Of two Sorts of Stiles.
9. Of those Things that grace an Oration, and make it delightful.
10. In what Manner an Oration is graced by the Things aforesaid.
11. Of the Difference between the Stile to be used in Writing, and the Stile to be used in Pleading.
12. Of the Parts of an Oration, and their Order.
13. Of the Proeme.
14. Places of Crimination, and Purgation.
15. Of the Narration.
16. Of Proof, or Confirmation, and Refutation.
17. Of Interrogations, Answers, and Jests.
18. Of the Peroration.

2. Carlyle, Thomas. *Latter-Day Pamphlets*

No. V. STUMP-ORATOR. [May 1, 1850.]

It lies deep in our habits, confirmed by all manner of educational and other arrangements for several centuries back, to consider human talent as best of all evincing itself by the faculty of eloquent speech. Our earliest schoolmasters teach us, as the one gift of culture they have, the art of spelling and pronouncing, the rules of correct speech; rhetorics, logics follow, sublime mysteries of grammar, whereby we may not only speak but write. And onward to the last of our schoolmasters in the highest university, it is still intrinsically grammar, under various figures grammar. To speak in various languages, on various things, but on all of them to speak, and appropriately deliver ourselves by tongue or pen,—this is the sublime goal towards which all manner of beneficent preceptors and learned professors, from the lowest hornbook upwards, are continually urging and guiding us. Preceptor or professor, looking over his miraculous seedplot, seminary as he well calls it, or crop of young human souls, watches with attentive view one organ of his delightful little seedlings growing to be men,—the tongue. He hopes we shall all get to speak yet, if it please Heaven. "Some of you shall be book-writers, eloquent review-writers, and astonish mankind, my young friends: others in white neckcloths shall do sermons by Blair and Lindley Murray, nay by Jeremy Taylor and judicious Hooker, and be priests to guide men heavenward by skilfully brandished handkerchief and the torch of rhetoric. For others there is Parliament and the election beer-barrel, and a course that leads men very high indeed; these shall shake the senate-house, the Morning Newspapers, shake the very spheres, and by dexterous wagging of the tongue disenthral mankind, and lead our afflicted country and us on the way we are to go. The way if not where noble deeds are done, yet where noble words are spoken,—leading us if not to the real Home of the Gods, at least to something which shall more or less deceptively resemble it!"

So fares it with the son of Adam, in these bewildered epochs; so, from the first opening of his eyes in this world, to his last closing of them, and departure hence. Speak, speak, oh speak;—if thou have any faculty, speak it, or thou diest and it is no faculty! So in universities, and all manner of dames' and other schools, of the very highest class as of the very lowest; and Society at large, when we enter there, confirms with all its brilliant review-articles, successful publications, intellectual tea-circles, literary gazettes, parliamentary eloquences, the grand lesson we had. Other lesson in fact we have none, in these times. If there be a human talent, let it get into the tongue, and make melody with that organ. The talent that can say nothing for itself, what is it? Nothing; or a thing that can do mere drudgeries, and at best make money by railways.

All this is deep-rooted in our habits, in our social, educational and other arrangements; and all this, when we look at it impartially, is astonishing. Directly in the teeth of all this it may be asserted that speaking is by no means the chief faculty a human being can attain to; that his excellence therein is by no means the best test of his general human excellence, or availability in this world; nay that, unless we look well, it is liable to become the very worst test ever devised for said availability. The matter extends very far, down to the very roots of the world, whither the British reader cannot conveniently follow me just now; but I will venture to assert the three following things, and invite him to consider well what truth he can gradually find in them:—

First, that excellent speech, even speech really excellent, is not, and never was, the chief test of human faculty, or the measure of a man's ability, for any true function whatsoever; on the contrary, that excellent silence needed always to accompany excellent speech, and was and is a much rarer and more difficult gift.

Secondly, that really excellent speech—which I, being possessed of the Hebrew Bible or Book, as well as of other books in my own and foreign languages, and having occasionally heard a wise man's word among the crowd of unwise, do almost unspeakably esteem, as a human gift—is terribly apt to get confounded with its counterfeit, sham-excellent speech! And furthermore, that if really excellent human speech is among the best of human things, then sham-excellent ditto deserves to be ranked with the very worst. False speech,—capable of becoming, as some one has said, the falsest and basest of all human things:—put the case, one were listening to that as to the truest and noblest! Which, little as we are conscious of it, I take to be the sad lot of many excellent souls among us just now. So many as admire parliamentary eloquence, divine popular literature, and such like, are dreadfully liable to it just

now: and whole nations and generations seem as if getting themselves asphyxiated, constitutionally into their last sleep, by means of it just now!

For alas, much as we worship speech on all hands, here is a third assertion which a man may venture to make, and invite considerate men to reflect upon: That in these times, and for several generations back, there has been, strictly considered, no really excellent speech at all, but sham-excellent merely; that is to say, false or quasi-false speech getting itself admired and worshipped, instead of detested and suppressed. A truly alarming predicament; and not the less so if we find it a quite pleasant one for the time being, and welcome the advent of asphyxia, as we would that of comfortable natural sleep;—as, in so many senses, we are doing! Surly judges there have been who did not much admire the "Bible of Modern Literature," or anything you could distil from it, in contrast with the ancient Bibles; and found that in the matter of speaking, our far best excellence, where that could be obtained, was excellent silence, which means endurance and exertion, and good work with lips closed; and that our tolerablest speech was of the nature of honest commonplace introduced where indispensable, which only set up for being brief and true, and could not be mistaken for excellent.

These are hard sayings for many a British reader, unconscious of any damage, nay joyfully conscious to himself of much profit, from that side of his possessions. Surely on this side, if on no other, matters stood not ill with him? The ingenuous arts had softened his manners; the parliamentary eloquences supplied him with a succedaneum for government, the popular literatures with the finer sensibilities of the heart: surely on this windward side of things the British reader was not ill off?—Unhappy British reader!

In fact, the spiritual detriment we unconsciously suffer, in every province of our affairs, from this our prostrate respect to power of speech is incalculable. For indeed it is the natural consummation of an epoch such as ours. Given a general insincerity of mind for several generations, you will certainly find the Talker established in the place of honor; and the Doer, hidden in the obscure crowd, with activity lamed, or working sorrowfully forward on paths unworthy of him. All men are devoutly prostrate, worshipping the eloquent talker; and no man knows what a scandalous idol he is. Out of whom in the mildest manner, like comfortable natural rest, comes mere asphyxia and death everlasting! Probably there is not in Nature a more distracted phantasm than your commonplace eloquent speaker, as he is found on platforms, in parliaments, on Kentucky stumps, at tavern-dinners, in windy, empty, insincere times like ours. The "excellent Stump-orator," as our admiring Yankee friends define him, he who in any occurrent set of circumstances can start forth, mount upon his "stump," his rostrum, tribune, place in parliament, or other ready elevation, and pour forth from him his appropriate "excellent speech," his interpretation of the said circumstances, in such manner as poor windy mortals round him shall cry bravo to,—he is not an artist I can much admire, as matters go! Alas, he is in general merely the windiest mortal of them all; and is admired for being so, into the bargain. Not a windy blockhead there who kept silent but is better off than this excellent stump-orator. Better off, for a great many reasons; for this reason, were there no other: the silent one is not admired; the silent suspects, perhaps partly admits, that he is a kind of blockhead, from which salutary self-knowledge the excellent stump-orator is debarred. A mouthpiece of Chaos to poor benighted mortals that lend ear to him as to a voice from Cosmos, this excellent stump-orator fills me with amazement. Not empty these musical wind-utterances of his; they are big with prophecy; they announce, too audibly to me, that the end of many things is drawing nigh!

Let the British reader consider it a little; he too is not a little interested in it. Nay he, and the European reader in general, but he chiefly in these days, will require to consider it a great deal,—and to take important steps in consequence by and by, if I mistake not. And in the mean while, sunk as he himself is in that bad element, and like a jaundiced man struggling to discriminate yellow colors,—he will have to meditate long before he in any measure get the immense meanings of the thing brought home to him; and discern, with astonishment, alarm, and almost terror and despair, towards what fatal issues, in our Collective Wisdom and elsewhere, this notion of talent meaning eloquent speech, so obstinately entertained this long while, has been leading us! Whosoever shall look well into origins and issues, will find this of eloquence and the part it now plays in our affairs, to be one of the gravest phenomena; and the excellent stump-orator of these days to be not only a ridiculous but still more a highly tragical personage. While the many listen to him, the few are used to pass rapidly, with some gust of scornful laughter, some growl of impatient malediction; but he deserves from this latter class a much more serious attention.

In the old Ages, when Universities and Schools were first instituted, this function of the schoolmaster, to teach mere speaking, was the natural one. In those healthy times, guided by silent instincts and the monition of Nature, men had from of old been used to teach themselves what it was essential to learn, by the one sure method of learning anything, practical apprenticeship to it. This was the rule for all classes; as it now is the rule, unluckily, for only one class. The Working Man as yet sought only to know his craft; and educated himself sufficiently by ploughing and hammering, under the conditions given, and in fit relation to the persons given: a course of education, then as now and ever, really opulent in manful culture and instruction to him; teaching him many solid virtues, and most indubitably useful knowledges; developing in him valuable faculties not a few both to do and to endure,—among which the faculty of elaborate grammatical utterance, seeing he had so little of extraordinary to utter, or to learn from spoken or written utterances, was not bargained for; the grammar of Nature, which he learned from his mother, being still amply sufficient for him. This was, as it still is, the grand education of the Working Man.

As for the Priest, though his trade was clearly of a reading and speaking nature, he knew also in those veracious times that grammar, if needful, was by no means the one thing needful, or the chief thing. By far the chief thing needful, and indeed the one thing then as now, was, That there should be in him the feeling and the practice of reverence to God and to men; that in his life's core there should dwell, spoken or silent, a ray of pious wisdom fit for illuminating dark human destinies;—not so much that he should possess the art of speech, as that he should have something to speak! And for that latter requisite the Priest also trained himself by apprenticeship, by actual attempt to practise, by manifold long-continued trial, of a devout and painful nature, such as his superiors prescribed to him. This, when once judged satisfactory, procured him ordination; and his grammar-learning, in the good times of priesthood, was very much of a parergon with him, as indeed in all times it is intrinsically quite insignificant in comparison.

The young Noble again, for whom grammar schoolmasters were first hired and high seminaries founded, he too without these, or above and over these, had from immemorial time been used to learn his business by apprenticeship. The young Noble, before the schoolmaster as after him, went apprentice to some elder noble; entered himself as page with some distinguished earl or duke; and here, serving upwards from step to step, under wise monition, learned his chivalries, his practice of arms and of courtesies, his baronial duties and manners, and what it would beseem him to do and to be in the world,—by practical attempt of his own, and example of one whose life was a daily concrete pattern for him. To such a one, already filled with intellectual substance, and possessing what we may call the practical gold-bullion of human culture, it was an obvious improvement that he should be taught to speak it out of him on occasion; that he should carry a spiritual banknote producible on demand for what of "gold-bullion" he had, not so negotiable otherwise, stored in the cellars of his mind. A man, with wisdom, insight and heroic worth already acquired for him, naturally demanded of the schoolmaster this one new faculty, the faculty of uttering in fit words what he had. A valuable superaddition of faculty:—and yet we are to remember it was scarcely a new faculty; it was but the tangible sign of what other faculties the man had in the silent state: and many a rugged inarticulate chief of men, I can believe, was most enviably "educated," who had not a Book on his premises; whose signature, a true sign-manual, was the stamp of his iron hand duly inked and clapt upon the parchment; and whose speech in Parliament, like the growl of lions, did indeed convey his meaning, but would have torn Lindley Murray's nerves to pieces! To such a one the schoolmaster adjusted himself very naturally in that manner; as a man wanted for teaching grammatical utterance; the thing to utter being already there. The thing to utter, here was the grand point! And perhaps this is the reason why among earnest nations, as among the Romans for example, the craft of the schoolmaster was held in little regard; for indeed as mere teacher of grammar, of ciphering on the abacus and such like, how did he differ much from the dancing-master or fencing-master, or deserve much regard?—Such was the rule in the ancient healthy times.

Can it be doubtful that this is still the rule of human education; that the human creature needs first of all to be educated not that he may speak, but that he may have something weighty and valuable to say! If speech is the bank-note of an inward capital of culture, of insight and noble human worth, then speech is precious, and the art of speech shall be honored. But if there is no inward capital; if speech represent no real culture of the mind, but an imaginary culture; no bullion, but the fatal and now almost hopeless deficit of such? Alas, alas, said bank-note is then a forged one; passing freely current in the market; but bringing damages to the receiver, to the payer, and to all the world, which are in sad truth infallible, and of amount incalculable. Few think of it at present; but the truth remains forever so. In parliaments and other loud assemblages, your eloquent talk, disunited from Nature and her facts, is taken as

wisdom and the correct image of said facts: but Nature well knows what it is, Nature will not have it as such, and will reject your forged note one day, with huge costs. The foolish traders in the market pass freely, nothing doubting, and rejoice in the dexterous execution of the piece: and so it circulates from hand to hand, and from class to class; gravitating ever downwards towards the practical class; till at last it reaches some poor working hand, who can pass it no farther, but must take it to the bank to get bread with it, and there the answer is, "Unhappy caitiff, this note is forged. It does not mean performance and reality, in parliaments and elsewhere, for thy behoof; it means fallacious semblance of performance; and thou, poor dupe, art thrown into the stocks on offering it here!"

Alas, alas, looking abroad over Irish difficulties, Mosaic sweating-establishments, French barricades, and an anarchic Europe, is it not as if all the populations of the world were rising or had risen into incendiary madness;—unable longer to endure such an avalanche of forgeries, and of penalties in consequence, as had accumulated upon them? The speaker is "excellent;" the notes he does are beautiful? Beautifully fit for the market, yes; he is an excellent artist in his business;—and the more excellent he is, the more is my desire to lay him by the heels, and fling him into the treadmill, that I might save the poor sweating tailors, French Sansculottes, and Irish Sanspotatoes from bearing the smart!

For the smart must be borne; some one must bear it, as sure as God lives. Every word of man is either a note or a forged note:—have these eternal skies forgotten to be in earnest, think you, because men go grinning like enchanted apes? Foolish souls, this now as of old is the unalterable law of your existence. If you know the truth and do it, the Universe itself seconds you, bears you on to sure victory everywhere:—and, observe, to sure defeat everywhere if you do not do the truth. And alas, if you know only the eloquent fallacious semblance of the truth, what chance is there of your ever doing it? You will do something very different from it, I think!—He who well considers, will find this same "art of speech," as we moderns have it, to be a truly astonishing product of the Ages; and the longer he considers it, the more astonishing and alarming. I reckon it the saddest of all the curses that now lie heavy on us. With horror and amazement, one perceives that this much-celebrated "art," so diligently practised in all corners of the world just now, is the chief destroyer of whatever good is born to us (softly, swiftly shutting up all nascent good, as if under exhausted glass receivers, there to choke and die); and the grand parent manufactory of evil to us,—as it were, the last finishing and varnishing workshop of all the Devil's ware that circulates under the sun. No Devil's sham is fit for the market till it have been polished and enamelled here; this is the general assaying-house for such, where the artists examine and answer, "Fit for the market; not fit!" Words will not express what mischiefs the misuse of words has done, and is doing, in these heavy-laden generations.

Do you want a man not to practise what he believes, then encourage him to keep often speaking it in words. Every time he speaks it, the tendency to do it will grow less. His empty speech of what he believes, will be a weariness and an affliction to the wise man. But do you wish his empty speech of what he believes, to become farther an insincere speech of what he does not believe? Celebrate to him his gift of speech; assure him that he shall rise in Parliament by means of it, and achieve great things without any performance; that eloquent speech, whether performed or not, is admirable. My friends, eloquent unperformed speech, in Parliament or elsewhere, is horrible! The eloquent man that delivers, in Parliament or elsewhere, a beautiful speech, and will perform nothing of it, but leaves it as if already performed,—what can you make of that man? He has enrolled himself among the Ignis Fatui and Children of the Wind; means to serve, as beautifully illuminated Chinese Lantern, in that corps henceforth. I think, the serviceable thing you could do to that man, if permissible, would be a severe one: To clip off a bit of his eloquent tongue by way of penance and warning; another bit, if he again spoke without performing; and so again, till you had clipt the whole tongue away from him,—and were delivered, you and he, from at least one miserable mockery: "There, eloquent friend, see now in silence if there be any redeeming deed in thee; of blasphemous wind-eloquence, at least, we shall have no more!" How many pretty men have gone this road, escorted by the beautifullest marching music from all the "public organs;" and have found at last that it ended—where? It is the broad road, that leads direct to Limbo and the Kingdom of the Inane. Gifted men, and once valiant nations, and as it were the whole world with one accord, are marching thither, in melodious triumph, all the drums and hautboys giving out their cheerfulest Ca-ira. It is the universal humor of the world just now. My friends, I am very sure you will arrive, unless you halt!—

Considered as the last finish of education, or of human culture, worth and acquirement, the art of speech is noble, and even divine; it is like the kindling of a Heaven's light to show us what a glorious world exists, and has perfected itself, in a man. But if no world exist in the man; if nothing but continents of empty vapor, of greedy self-conceits,

common-place hearsays, and indistinct loomings of a sordid chaos exist in him, what will be the use of "light" to show us that? Better a thousand times that such a man do not speak; but keep his empty vapor and his sordid chaos to himself, hidden to the utmost from all beholders. To look on that, can be good for no human beholder; to look away from that, must be good. And if, by delusive semblances of rhetoric, logic, first-class degrees, and the aid of elocution-masters and parliamentary reporters, the poor proprietor of said chaos should be led to persuade himself, and get others persuaded,—which it is the nature of his sad task to do, and which, in certain eras of the world, it is fatally possible to do,—that this is a cosmos which he owns; that he, being so perfect in tongue-exercise and full of college-honors, is an "educated" man, and pearl of great price in his generation; that round him, and his parliament emulously listening to him, as round some divine apple of gold set in a picture of silver, all the world should gather to adore: what is likely to become of him and the gathering world? An apple of Sodom set in the clusters of Gomorrah: that, little as he suspects it, is the definition of the poor chaotically eloquent man, with his emulous parliament and miserable adoring world!—Considered as the whole of education, or human culture, which it now is in our modern manners; all apprenticeship except to mere handicraft having fallen obsolete, and the "educated man" being with us emphatically and exclusively the man that can speak well with tongue or pen, and astonish men by the quantities of speech he has heard ("tremendous reader," "walking encyclopaedia," and such like),—the Art of Speech is probably definable in that case as the short summary of all the Black Arts put together.

But the Schoolmaster is secondary, an effect rather than a cause in this matter: what the Schoolmaster with his universities shall manage or attempt to teach will be ruled by what the Society with its practical industries is continually demanding that men should learn. We spoke once of vital lungs for Society: and in fact this question always rises as the alpha and omega of social questions, What methods the Society has of summoning aloft into the high places, for its help and governance, the wisdom that is born to it in all places, and of course is born chiefly in the more populous or lower places? For this, if you will consider it, expresses the ultimate available result, and net sum-total, of all the efforts, struggles and confused activities that go on in the Society; and determines whether they are true and wise efforts, certain to be victorious, or false and foolish, certain to be futile, and to fall captive and caitiff. How do men rise in your Society? In all Societies, Turkey included, and I suppose Dahomey included, men do rise; but the question of questions always is, What kind of men? Men of noble gifts, or men of ignoble? It is the one or the other; and a life-and-death inquiry which! For in all places and all times, little as you may heed it, Nature most silently but most inexorably demands that it be the one and not the other. And you need not try to palm an ignoble sham upon her, and call it noble; for she is a judge. And her penalties, as quiet as she looks, are terrible: amounting to world-earthquakes, to anarchy and death everlasting; and admit of no appeal!—

Surely England still flatters herself that she has lungs; that she can still breathe a little? Or is it that the poor creature, driven into mere blind industrialisms; and as it were, gone pearl-diving this long while many fathoms deep, and tearing up the oyster-beds so as never creature did before, hardly knows,—so busy in the belly of the oyster chaos, where is no thought of "breathing,"—whether she has lungs or not? Nations of a robust habit, and fine deep chest, can sometimes take in a deal of breath before diving; and live long, in the muddy deeps, without new breath: but they too come to need it at last, and will die if they cannot get it!

To the gifted soul that is born in England, what is the career, then, that will carry him, amid noble Olympic dust, up to the immortal gods? For his country's sake, that it may not lose the service he was born capable of doing it; for his own sake, that his life be not choked and perverted, and his light from Heaven be not changed into lightning from the Other Place,—it is essential that there be such a career. The country that can offer no career in that case, is a doomed country; nay it is already a dead country: it has secured the ban of Heaven upon it; will not have Heaven's light, will have the Other Place's lightning; and may consider itself as appointed to expire, in frightful coughings of street musketry or otherwise, on a set day, and to be in the eye of law dead. In no country is there not some career, inviting to it either the noble Hero, or the tough Greek of the Lower Empire: which of the two do your careers invite? There is no question more important. The kind of careers you offer in countries still living, determines with perfect exactness the kind of the life that is in them,—whether it is natural blessed life, or galvanic accursed ditto, and likewise what degree of strength is in the same.

Our English careers to born genius are twofold. There is the silent or unlearned career of the Industrialisms, which are very many among us; and there is the articulate or learned career of the three professions, Medicine, Law (under which we may include Politics), and the Church. Your born genius, therefore, will first have to ask himself, Whether



he can hold his tongue or cannot? True, all human talent, especially all deep talent, is a talent to do, and is intrinsically of silent nature; inaudible, like the Sphere Harmonies and Eternal Melodies, of which it is an incarnated fraction. All real talent, I fancy, would much rather, if it listened only to Nature's monitions, express itself in rhythmic facts than in melodious words, which latter at best, where they are good for anything, are only a feeble echo and shadow or foreshadow of the former. But talents differ much in this of power to be silent; and circumstances, of position, opportunity and such like, modify them still more;—and Nature's monitions, oftenest quite drowned in foreign hearsays, are by no means the only ones listened to in deciding!—The Industrialisms are all of silent nature; and some of them are heroic and eminently human; others, again, we may call unheroic, not eminently human: beaverish rather, but still honest; some are even vulpine, altogether inhuman and dishonest. Your born genius must make his choice.

If a soul is born with divine intelligence, and has its lips touched with hallowed fire, in consecration for high enterprises under the sun, this young soul will find the question asked of him by England every hour and moment: "Canst thou turn thy human intelligence into the beaver sort, and make honest contrivance, and accumulation of capital by it? If so, do it; and avoid the vulpine kind, which I don't recommend. Honest triumphs in engineering and machinery await thee; scrip awaits thee, commercial successes, kingship in the counting-room, on the stock-exchange;—thou shalt be the envy of surrounding flunkies, and collect into a heap more gold than a dray-horse can draw."—"Gold, so much gold?" answers the ingenuous soul, with visions of the envy of surrounding flunkies dawning on him; and in very many cases decides that he will contract himself into beaverism, and with such a horse-draught of gold, emblem of a never-imagined success in beaver heroism, strike the surrounding flunkies yellow.

This is our common course; this is in some sort open to every creature, what we call the beaver career; perhaps more open in England, taking in America too, than it ever was in any country before. And, truly, good consequences follow out of it: who can be blind to them? Half of a most excellent and opulent result is realized to us in this way; baleful only when it sets up (as too often now) for being the whole result. A half-result which will be blessed and heavenly so soon as the other half is had,—namely wisdom to guide the first half. Let us honor all honest human power of contrivance in its degree. The beaver intellect, so long as it steadfastly refuses to be vulpine, and answers the tempter pointing out short routes to it with an honest "No, no," is truly respectable to me; and many a highflying speaker and singer whom I have known, has appeared to me much less of a developed man than certain of my mill-owning, agricultural, commercial, mechanical, or otherwise industrial friends, who have held their peace all their days and gone on in the silent state. If a man can keep his intellect silent, and make it even into honest beaverism, several very manful moralities, in danger of wreck on other courses, may comport well with that, and give it a genuine and partly human character; and I will tell him, in these days he may do far worse with himself and his intellect than change it into beaverism, and make honest money with it. If indeed he could become a heroic industrial, and have a life "eminently human"! But that is not easy at present. Probably some ninety-nine out of every hundred of our gifted souls, who have to seek a career for themselves, go this beaver road. Whereby the first half-result, national wealth namely, is plentifully realized; and only the second half, or wisdom to guide it, is dreadfully behindhand.

But now if the gifted soul be not of taciturn nature, be of vivid, impatient, rapidly productive nature, and aspire much to give itself sensible utterance,—I find that, in this case, the field it has in England is narrow to an extreme; is perhaps narrower than ever offered itself, for the like object, in this world before. Parliament, Church, Law: let the young vivid soul turn whither he will for a career, he finds among variable conditions one condition invariable, and extremely surprising. That the proof of excellence is to be done by the tongue. For heroism that will not speak, but only act, there is no account kept:—The English Nation does not need that silent kind, then, but only the talking kind? Most astonishing. Of all the organs a man has, there is none held in account, it would appear, but the tongue he uses for talking. Premiership, woolsack, mitre, and quasi-crown: all is attainable if you can talk with due ability. Everywhere your proof-shot is to be a well-fired volley of talk. Contrive to talk well, you will get to Heaven, the modern Heaven of the English. Do not talk well, only work well, and heroically hold your peace, you have no chance whatever to get thither; with your utmost industry you may get to Threadneedle Street, and accumulate more gold than a dray-horse can draw. Is not this a very wonderful arrangement?

I have heard of races done by mortals tied in sacks; of human competitors, high aspirants, climbing heavenward on the soaped pole; seizing the soaped pig; and clutching with cleft fist, at full gallop, the fated goose tied aloft by its

foot;—which feats do prove agility, toughness and other useful faculties in man: but this of dexterous talk is probably as strange a competition as any. And the question rises, Whether certain of these other feats, or perhaps an alternation of all of them, relieved now and then by a bout of grinning through the collar, might not be profitably substituted for the solitary proof-feat of talk, now getting rather monotonous by its long continuance? Alas, Mr. Bull, I do find it is all little other than a proof of toughness, which is a quality I respect, with more or less expenditure of falsity and astucity superadded, which I entirely condemn. Toughness plus astucity:—perhaps a simple wooden mast set up in Palace-Yard, well soaped and duly presided over, might be the honester method? Such a method as this by trial of talk, for filling your chief offices in Church and State, was perhaps never heard of in the solar system before. You are quite used to it, my poor friend; and nearly dead by the consequences of it: but in the other Planets, as in other epochs of your own Planet it would have done had you proposed it, the thing awakens incredulous amazement, world-wide Olympic laughter, which ends in tempestuous hootings, in tears and horror! My friend, if you can, as heretofore this good while, find nobody to take care of your affairs but the expertest talker, it is all over with your affairs and you. Talk never yet could guide any man's or nation's affairs; nor will it yours, except towards the Limbus Patrum, where all talk, except a very select kind of it, lodges at last.

Medicine, guarded too by preliminary impediments, and frightful medusa-heads of quackery, which deter many generous souls from entering, is of the half-articulate professions, and does not much invite the ardent kinds of ambition. The intellect required for medicine might be wholly human, and indeed should by all rules be,—the profession of the Human Healer being radically a sacred one and connected with the highest priesthoods, or rather being itself the outcome and acme of all priesthoods, and divinest conquests of intellect here below. As will appear one day, when men take off their old monastic and ecclesiastic spectacles, and look with eyes again! In essence the Physician's task is always heroic, eminently human: but in practice most unluckily at present we find it too become in good part beaverish; yielding a money-result alone. And what of it is not beaverish,—does not that too go mainly to ingenious talking, publishing of yourself, ingratiating of yourself; a partly human exercise or waste of intellect, and alas a partly vulpine ditto;—making the once sacred [Gr.] 'Iatros, or Human Healer, more impossible for us than ever!

Angry basilisks watch at the gates of Law and Church just now; and strike a sad damp into the nobler of the young aspirants. Hard bonds are offered you to sign; as it were, a solemn engagement to constitute yourself an impostor, before ever entering; to declare your belief in incredibilities,—your determination, in short, to take Chaos for Cosmos, and Satan for the Lord of things, if he come with money in his pockets, and horsehair and bombazine decently wrapt about him. Fatal preliminaries, which deter many an ingenuous young soul, and send him back from the threshold, and I hope will deter ever more. But if you do enter, the condition is well known: "Talk; who can talk best here? His shall be the mouth of gold, and the purse of gold; and with my [Gr.] mitra (once the head-dress of unfortunate females, I am told) shall his sacred temples be begirt."

Ingenuous souls, unless forced to it, do now much shudder at the threshold of both these careers, and not a few desperately turn back into the wilderness rather, to front a very rude fortune, and be devoured by wild beasts as is likeliest. But as to Parliament, again, and its eligibility if attainable, there is yet no question anywhere; the ingenuous soul, if possessed of money-capital enough, is predestined by the parental and all manner of monitors to that career of talk; and accepts it with alacrity and clearness of heart, doubtful only whether he shall be able to make a speech. Courage, my brave young fellow. If you can climb a soaped pole of any kind, you will certainly be able to make a speech. All mortals have a tongue; and carry on some jumble, if not of thought, yet of stuff which they could talk. The weakest of animals has got a cry in it, and can give voice before dying. If you are tough enough, bent upon it desperately enough, I engage you shall make a speech;—but whether that will be the way to Heaven for you, I do not engage.

These, then, are our two careers for genius: mute Industrialism, which can seldom become very human, but remains beaverish mainly: and the three Professions named learned,—that is to say, able to talk. For the heroic or higher kinds of human intellect, in the silent state, there is not the smallest inquiry anywhere; apparently a thing not wanted in this country at present. What the supply may be, I cannot inform M'Crouty; but the market-demand, he may himself see, is nil. These are our three professions that require human intellect in part or whole, not able to do with mere beaverish; and such a part does the gift of talk play in one and all of them. Whatsoever is not beaverish seems to go forth in the shape of talk. To such length is human intellect wasted or suppressed in this world!

If the young aspirant is not rich enough for Parliament, and is deterred by the basilisks or otherwise from entering on Law or Church, and cannot altogether reduce his human intellect to the beaverish condition, or satisfy himself with the prospect of making money,—what becomes of him in such case, which is naturally the case of very many, and ever of more? In such case there remains but one outlet for him, and notably enough that too is a talking one: the outlet of Literature, of trying to write Books. Since, owing to preliminary basilisks, want of cash, or superiority to cash, he cannot mount aloft by eloquent talking, let him try it by dexterous eloquent writing. Here happily, having three fingers, and capital to buy a quire of paper, he can try it to all lengths and in spite of all mortals: in this career there is happily no public impediment that can turn him back; nothing but private starvation—which is itself a finis or kind of goal—can pretend to hinder a British man from prosecuting Literature to the very utmost, and wringing the final secret from her: "A talent is in thee; No talent is in thee." To the British subject who fancies genius may be lodged in him, this liberty remains; and truly it is, if well computed, almost the only one he has.

A crowded portal this of Literature, accordingly! The haven of expatriated spiritualisms, and alas also of expatriated vanities and prurient imbecilities: here do the windy aspirations, foiled activities, foolish ambitions, and frustrate human energies reduced to the vocable condition, fly as to the one refuge left; and the Republic of Letters increases in population at a faster rate than even the Republic of America. The strangest regiment in her Majesty's service, this of the Soldiers of Literature:—would your Lordship much like to march through Coventry with them? The immortal gods are there (quite irre recognizable under these disguises), and also the lowest broken valets;—an extremely miscellaneous regiment. In fact the regiment, superficially viewed, looks like an immeasurable motley flood of discharged play-actors, funambulists, false prophets, drunken ballad-singers; and marches not as a regiment, but as a boundless canaille,—without drill, uniform, captaincy or billet; with huge over-proportion of drummers; you would say, a regiment gone wholly to the drum, with hardly a good musket to be seen in it,—more a canaille than a regiment. Canaille of all the loud-sounding levities, and general winnowings of Chaos, marching through the world in a most ominous manner; proclaiming, audibly if you have ears: "Twelfth hour of the Night; ancient graves yawning; pale clammy Puseyisms screeching in their winding-sheets; owls busy in the City regions; many goblins abroad! Awake ye living; dream no more; arise to judgment! Chaos and Gehenna are broken loose; the Devil with his Bedlams must be flung in chains again, and the Last of the Days is about to dawn!" Such is Literature to the reflective soul at this moment.

But what now concerns us most is the circumstance that here too the demand is, Vocables, still vocables. In all appointed courses of activity and paved careers for human genius, and in this unpaved, unappointed, broadest career of Literature, broad way that leadeth to destruction for so many, the one duty laid upon you is still, Talk, talk. Talk well with pen or tongue, and it shall be well with you; do not talk well, it shall be ill with you. To wag the tongue with dexterous acceptability, there is for human worth and faculty, in our England of the Nineteenth Century, that one method of emergence and no other. Silence, you would say, means annihilation for the Englishman of the Nineteenth Century. The worth that has not spoken itself, is not; or is potentially only, and as if it were not. Vox is the God of this Universe. If you have human intellect, it avails nothing unless you either make it into beaverism, or talk with it. Make it into beaverism, and gather money; or else make talk with it, and gather what you can. Such is everywhere the demand for talk among us: to which, of course, the supply is proportionate.

From dinners up to woolsacks and divine mitres, here in England, much may be gathered by talk; without talk, of the human sort nothing. Is Society become wholly a bag of wind, then, ballasted by guineas? Are our interests in it as a sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal?—In Army or Navy, when unhappily we have war on hand, there is, almost against our will, some kind of demand for certain of the silent talents. But in peace, that too passes into mere demand of the ostentations, of the pipeclays and the blank cartridges; and,—except that Naval men are occasionally, on long voyages, forced to hold their tongue, and converse with the dumb elements, and illimitable oceans, that moan and rave there without you and within you, which is a great advantage to the Naval man,—our poor United Services have to make conversational windbags and ostentational paper-lanterns of themselves, or do worse, even as the others.

My friends, must I assert, then, what surely all men know, though all men seem to have forgotten it, That in the learned professions as in the unlearned, and in human things throughout, in every place and in every time, the true function of intellect is not that of talking, but of understanding and discerning with a view to performing! An intellect may easily talk too much, and perform too little. Gradually, if it get into the noxious habit of talk, there will

less and less performance come of it, talk being so delightfully handy in comparison with work; and at last there will no work, or thought of work, be got from it at all. Talk, except as the preparation for work, is worth almost nothing;—sometimes it is worth infinitely less than nothing; and becomes, little conscious of playing such a fatal part, the general summary of pretentious nothingnesses, and the chief of all the curses the Posterity of Adam are liable to in this sublunary world! Would you discover the Atropos of Human Virtue; the sure Destroyer, "by painless extinction," of Human Veracities, Performances, and Capabilities to perform or to be veracious,—it is this, you have it here.

Unwise talk is matchless in un wisdom. Unwise work, if it but persist, is everywhere struggling towards correction, and restoration to health; for it is still in contact with Nature, and all Nature incessantly contradicts it, and will heal it or annihilate it: not so with unwise talk, which addresses itself, regardless of veridical Nature, to the universal suffrages; and can if it be dexterous, find harbor there till all the suffrages are bankrupt and gone to Houndsditch, Nature not interfering with her protest till then. False speech, definable as the acme of unwise speech, is capable, as we already said, of becoming the falsest of all things. Falsest of all things:—and whither will the general deluge of that, in Parliament and Synagogue, in Book and Broadside, carry you and your affairs, my friend, when once they are embarked on it as now?

Parliament, Parliamentum, is by express appointment the Talking Apparatus; yet not in Parliament either is the essential function, by any means, talk. Not to speak your opinion well, but to have a good and just opinion worth speaking,—for every Parliament, as for every man, this latter is the point. Contrive to have a true opinion, you will get it told in some way, better or worse; and it will be a blessing to all creatures. Have a false opinion, and tell it with the tongue of Angels, what can that profit? The better you tell it, the worse it will be!

In Parliament and out of Parliament, and everywhere in this Universe, your one salvation is, That you can discern with just insight, and follow with noble valor, what the law of the case before you is, what the appointment of the Maker in regard to it has been. Get this out of one man, you are saved; fail to get this out of the most August Parliament wrapt in the sheepskins of a thousand years, you are lost,—your Parliament, and you, and all your sheepskins are lost. Beautiful talk is by no means the most pressing want in Parliament! We have had some reasonable modicum of talk in Parliament! What talk has done for us in Parliament, and is now doing, the dullest of us at length begins to see!

Much has been said of Parliament's breeding men to business; of the training an Official Man gets in this school of argument and talk. He is here inured to patience, tolerance; sees what is what in the Nation and in the Nation's Government attains official knowledge, official courtesy and manners—in short, is polished at all points into official articulation, and here better than elsewhere qualifies himself to be a Governor of men. So it is said.—Doubtless, I think, he will see and suffer much in Parliament, and inure himself to several things;—he will, with what eyes he has, gradually see Parliament itself, for one thing; what a high-soaring, helplessly floundering, ever-babbling yet inarticulate dark dumb Entity it is (certainly one of the strangest under the sun just now): which doubtless, if he have in view to get measures voted there one day, will be an important acquisition for him. But as to breeding himself for a Doer of Work, much more for a King, or Chief of Doers, here in this element of talk; as to that I confess the fatalest doubts, or rather, alas, I have no doubt! Alas, it is our fatalest misery just now, not easily alterable, and yet urgently requiring to be altered, That no British man can attain to be a Statesman, or Chief of Workers, till he has first proved himself a Chief of Talkers: which mode of trial for a Worker, is it not precisely, of all the trials you could set him upon, the falsest and unfairest?

Nay, I doubt much you are not likely ever to meet the fittest material for a Statesman, or Chief of Workers, in such an element as that. Your Potential Chief of Workers, will he come there at all, to try whether he can talk? Your poor tenpound franchisers and electoral world generally, in love with eloquent talk, are they the likeliest to discern what man it is that has worlds of silent work in him? No. Or is such a man, even if born in the due rank for it, the likeliest to present himself, and court their most sweet voices? Again, no.

The Age that admires talk so much can have little discernment for inarticulate work, or for anything that is deep and genuine. Nobody, or hardly anybody, having in himself an earnest sense for truth, how can anybody recognize an inarticulate Veracity, or Nature-fact of any kind; a Human Doer especially, who is the most complex, profound, and

inarticulate of all Nature's Facts? Nobody can recognize him: till once he is patented, get some public stamp of authenticity, and has been articulately proclaimed, and asserted to be a Doer. To the worshipper of talk, such a one is a sealed book. An excellent human soul, direct from Heaven,—how shall any excellence of man become recognizable to this unfortunate? Not except by announcing and placarding itself as excellent,—which, I reckon, it above other things will probably be in no great haste to do.

Wisdom, the divine message which every soul of man brings into this world; the divine prophecy of what the new man has got the new and peculiar capability to do, is intrinsically of silent nature. It cannot at once, or completely at all, be read off in words; for it is written in abstruse facts, of endowment, position, desire, opportunity, granted to the man;—interprets itself in presentiments, vague struggles, passionate endeavors and is only legible in whole when his work is done. Not by the noble monitions of Nature, but by the ignoble, is a man much tempted to publish the secret of his soul in words. Words, if he have a secret, will be forever inadequate to it. Words do but disturb the real answer of fact which could be given to it; disturb, obstruct, and will in the end abolish, and render impossible, said answer. No grand Doer in this world can be a copious speaker about his doings. William the Silent spoke himself best in a country liberated; Oliver Cromwell did not shine in rhetoric; Goethe, when he had but a book in view, found that he must say nothing even of that, if it was to succeed with him.

Then as to politeness, and breeding to business. An official man must be bred to business; of course he must: and not for essence only, but even for the manners of office he requires breeding. Besides his intrinsic faculty, whatever that may be, he must be cautious, vigilant, discreet,—above all things, he must be reticent, patient, polite. Certain of these qualities are by nature imposed upon men of station; and they are trained from birth to some exercise of them: this constitutes their one intrinsic qualification for office;—this is their one advantage in the New Downing Street projected for this New Era; and it will not go for much in that Institution. One advantage, or temporary advantage; against which there are so many counterbalances. It is the indispensable preliminary for office, but by no means the complete outfit,—a miserable outfit where there is nothing farther.

Will your Lordship give me leave to say that, practically, the intrinsic qualities will presuppose these preliminaries too, but by no means vice versa. That, on the whole, if you have got the intrinsic qualities, you have got everything, and the preliminaries will prove attainable; but that if you have got only the preliminaries, you have yet got nothing. A man of real dignity will not find it impossible to bear himself in a dignified manner; a man of real understanding and insight will get to know, as the fruit of his very first study, what the laws of his situation are, and will conform to these. Rough old Samuel Johnson, blustering Boreas and rugged Arctic Bear as he often was, defined himself, justly withal, as a polite man: a noble manful attitude of soul is his; a clear, true and loyal sense of what others are, and what he himself is, shines through the rugged coating of him; comes out as grave deep rhythmus when his King honors him, and he will not "bandy compliments with his King;"—is traceable too in his indignant trampling down of the Chesterfield patronages, tailor-made insolences, and contradictions of sinners; which may be called his revolutionary movements, hard and peremptory by the law of them; these could not be soft like his constitutional ones, when men and kings took him for somewhat like the thing he was. Given a noble man, I think your Lordship may expect by and by a polite man. No "politer" man was to be found in Britain than the rustic Robert Burns: high duchesses were captivated with the chivalrous ways of the man; recognized that here was the true chivalry, and divine nobleness of bearing,—as indeed they well might, now when the Peasant God and Norse Thor had come down among them again! Chivalry this, if not as they do chivalry in Drury Lane or West-End drawing-rooms, yet as they do it in Valhalla and the General Assembly of the Gods.

For indeed, who invented chivalry, politeness, or anything that is noble and melodious and beautiful among us, except precisely the like of Johnson and of Burns? The select few who in the generations of this world were wise and valiant, they, in spite of all the tremendous majority of blockheads and slothful belly-worshippers, and noisy ugly persons, have devised whatsoever is noble in the manners of man to man. I expect they will learn to be polite, your Lordship, when you give them a chance!—Nor is it as a school of human culture, for this or for any other grace or gift, that Parliament will be found first-rate or indispensable. As experience in the river is indispensable to the ferryman, so is knowledge of his Parliament to the British Peel or Chatham;—so was knowledge of the OEil-de-Boeuf to the French Choiseul. Where and how said river, whether Parliament with Wilkeses, or OEil-de-Boeuf with

Pompadours, can be waded, boated, swum; how the miscellaneous cargoes, "measures" so called, can be got across it, according to their kinds, and landed alive on the hither side as facts:—we have all of us our ferries in this world; and must know the river and its ways, or get drowned some day! In that sense, practice in Parliament is indispensable to the British Statesman; but not in any other sense.

A school, too, of manners and of several other things, the Parliament will doubtless be to the aspirant Statesman; a school better or worse;—as the OEil-de-Boeuf likewise was, and as all scenes where men work or live are sure to be. Especially where many men work together, the very rubbing against one another will grind and polish off their angularities into roundness, into "politeness" after a sort; and the official man, place him how you may, will never want for schooling, of extremely various kinds. A first-rate school one cannot call this Parliament for him;—I fear to say what rate at present! In so far as it teaches him vigilance, patience, courage, toughness of lungs or of soul, and skill in any kind of swimming, it is a good school. In so far as it forces him to speak where Nature orders silence; and even, lest all the world should learn his secret (which often enough would kill his secret, and little profit the world), forces him to speak falsities, vague ambiguities, and the froth-dialect usual in Parliaments in these times, it may be considered one of the worst schools ever devised by man; and, I think, may almost challenge the OEil-de-Boeuf to match it in badness.

Parliament will train your men to the manners required of a statesman; but in a much less degree to the intrinsic functions of one. To these latter, it is capable of mistreating as nothing else can. Parliament will train you to talk; and above all things to hear, with patience, unlimited quantities of foolish talk. To tell a good story for yourself, and to make it appear that you have done your work: this, especially in constitutional countries, is something;—and yet in all countries, constitutional ones too, it is intrinsically nothing, probably even less. For it is not the function of any mortal, in Downing Street or elsewhere here below, to wag the tongue of him, and make it appear that he has done work; but to wag some quite other organs of him, and to do work; there is no danger of his work's appearing by and by. Such an accomplishment, even in constitutional countries, I grieve to say, may become much less than nothing. Have you at all computed how much less? The human creature who has once given way to satisfying himself with "appearances," to seeking his salvation in "appearances," the moral life of such human creature is rapidly bleeding out of him. Depend upon it, Beelzebub, Satan, or however you may name the too authentic Genius of Eternal Death, has got that human creature in his claws. By and by you will have a dead parliamentary bagpipe, and your living man fled away without return!

Such parliamentary bagpipes I myself have heard play tunes, much to the satisfaction of the people. Every tune lies within their compass; and their mind (for they still call it mind) is ready as a hurdy-gurdy on turning of the handle: "My Lords, this question now before the House"—Ye Heavens, O ye divine Silences, was there in the womb of Chaos, then, such a product, liable to be evoked by human art, as that same? While the galleries were all applausive of heart, and the Fourth Estate looked with eyes enlightened, as if you had touched its lips with a staff dipped in honey,—I have sat with reflections too ghastly to be uttered. A poor human creature and learned friend, once possessed of many fine gifts, possessed of intellect, veracity, and manful conviction on a variety of objects, has he now lost all that;—converted all that into a glistening phosphorescence which can show itself on the outside; while within, all is dead, chaotic, dark; a painted sepulchre full of dead-men's bones! Discernment, knowledge, intellect, in the human sense of the words, this man has now none. His opinion you do not ask on any matter: on the matter he has no opinion, judgment, or insight; only on what may be said about the matter, how it may be argued of, what tune may be played upon it to enlighten the eyes of the Fourth Estate.

Such a soul, though to the eye he still keeps tumbling about in the Parliamentary element, and makes "motions," and passes bills, for aught I know,—are we to define him as a living one, or as a dead? Partridge the Almanac-Maker, whose "Publications" still regularly appear, is known to be dead! The dog that was drowned last summer, and that floats up and down the Thames with ebb and flood ever since,—is it not dead? Alas, in the hot months, you meet here and there such a floating dog; and at length, if you often use the river steamers, get to know him by sight. "There he is again, still astir there in his quasi-stygian element!" you dejectedly exclaim (perhaps reading your

Morning Newspaper at the moment); and reflect, with a painful oppression of nose and imagination, on certain completed professors of parliamentary eloquence in modern times. Dead long since, but not resting; daily doing motions in that Westminster region still,—daily from Vauxhall to Blackfriars, and back again; and cannot get away at all! Daily (from Newspaper or river steamer) you may see him at some point of his fated course, hovering in the eddies, stranded in the ooze, or rapidly progressing with flood or ebb; and daily the odor of him is getting more intolerable: daily the condition of him appeals more tragically to gods and men.

Nature admits no lie; most men profess to be aware of this, but few in any measure lay it to heart. Except in the departments of mere material manipulation, it seems to be taken practically as if this grand truth were merely a polite flourish of rhetoric. What is a lie? The question is worth asking, once and away, by the practical English mind.

A voluntary spoken divergence from the fact as it stands, as it has occurred and will proceed to develop itself: this clearly, if adopted by any man, will so far forth mislead him in all practical dealing with the fact; till he cast that statement out of him, and reject it as an unclean poisonous thing, he can have no success in dealing with the fact. If such spoken divergence from the truth be involuntary, we lament it as a misfortune; and are entitled, at least the speaker of it is, to lament it extremely as the most palpable of all misfortunes, as the indubitablest losing of his way, and turning aside from the goal instead of pressing towards it, in the race set before him. If the divergence is voluntary,—there superadds itself to our sorrow a just indignation: we call the voluntary spoken divergence a lie, and justly abhor it as the essence of human treason and baseness, the desertion of a man to the Enemy of men against himself and his brethren. A lost deserter; who has gone over to the Enemy, called Satan; and cannot but be lost in the adventure! Such is every liar with the tongue; and such in all nations is he, at all epochs, considered. Men pull his nose, and kick him out of doors; and by peremptory expressive methods signify that they can and will have no trade with him. Such is spoken divergence from the fact; so fares it with the practiser of that sad art.

But have we well considered a divergence in thought from what is the fact? Have we considered the man whose very thought is a lie to him and to us! He too is a frightful man; repeating about this Universe on every hand what is not, and driven to repeat it; the sure herald of ruin to all that follow him, that know with his knowledge! And would you learn how to get a mendacious thought, there is no surer recipe than carrying a loose tongue. The lying thought, you already either have it, or will soon get it by that method. He who lies with his very tongue, he clearly enough has long ceased to think truly in his mind. Does he, in any sense, "think"? All his thoughts and imaginations, if they extend beyond mere beaverisms, astucities and sensualisms, are false, incomplete, perverse, untrue even to himself. He has become a false mirror of this Universe; not a small mirror only, but a crooked, bedimmed and utterly deranged one. But all loose tongues too are akin to lying ones; are insincere at the best, and go rattling with little meaning; the thought lying languid at a great distance behind them, if thought there be behind them at all. Gradually there will be none or little! How can the thought of such a man, what he calls thought, be other than false?

Alas, the palpable liar with his tongue does at least know that he is lying, and has or might have some faint vestige of remorse and chance of amendment; but the impalpable liar, whose tongue articulates mere accepted commonplaces, cants and babblement, which means only, "Admire me, call me an excellent stump-orator!"—of him what hope is there? His thought, what thought he had, lies dormant, inspired only to invent vocables and plausibilities; while the tongue goes so glib, the thought is absent, gone a wool-gathering; getting itself drugged with the applaudive "Hear, hear!"—what will become of such a man? His idle thought has run all to seed, and grown false and the giver of falsities; the inner light of his mind is gone out; all his light is mere putridity and phosphorescence henceforth. Whosoever is in quest of ruin, let him with assurance follow that man; he or no one is on the right road to it.

Good Heavens, from the wisest Thought of a man to the actual truth of a Thing as it lies in Nature, there is, one would suppose, a sufficient interval! Consider it,—and what other intervals we introduce! The faithfulest, most glowing word of a man is but an imperfect image of the thought, such as it is, that dwells within him; his best word will never but with error convey his thought to other minds: and then between his poor thought and Nature's Fact, which is the Thought of the Eternal, there may be supposed to lie some discrepancies, some shortcomings! Speak your sincerest, think your wisest, there is still a great gulf between you and the fact. And now, do not speak your sincerest, and what will inevitably follow out of that, do not think your wisest, but think only your plausiblest, your

showiest for parliamentary purposes, where will you land with that guidance?—I invite the British Parliament, and all the Parliamentary and other Electors of Great Britain, to reflect on this till they have well understood it; and then to ask, each of himself, What probably the horoscopes of the British Parliament, at this epoch of World-History, may be?—

Fail, by any sin or any misfortune, to discover what the truth of the fact is, you are lost so far as that fact goes! If your thought do not image truly but do image falsely the fact, you will vainly try to work upon the fact. The fact will not obey you, the fact will silently resist you; and ever, with silent invincibility, will go on resisting you, till you do get to image it truly instead of falsely. No help for you whatever, except in attaining to a true image of the fact. Needless to vote a false image true; vote it, revote it by overwhelming majorities, by jubilant unanimities and universalities; read it thrice or three hundred times, pass acts of parliament upon it till the Statute-book can hold no more,—it helps not a whit: the thing is not so, the thing is otherwise than so; and Adam's whole Posterity, voting daily on it till the world finish, will not alter it a jot. Can the sublimest sanhedrim, constitutional parliament, or other Collective Wisdom of the world, persuade fire not to burn, sulphuric acid to be sweet milk, or the Moon to become green cheese? The fact is much the reverse:—and even the Constitutional British Parliament abstains from such arduous attempts as these latter in the voting line; and leaves the multiplication-table, the chemical, mechanical and other qualities of material substances to take their own course; being aware that voting and perorating, and reporting in Hansard, will not in the least alter any of these. Which is indisputably wise of the British Parliament.

Unfortunately the British Parliament does not, at present, quite know that all manner of things and relations of things, spiritual equally with material, all manner of qualities, entities, existences whatsoever, in this strange visible and invisible Universe, are equally inflexible of nature; that, they will, one and all, with precisely the same obstinacy, continue to obey their own law, not our law; deaf as the adder to all charm of parliamentary eloquence, and of voting never so often repeated; silently, but inflexibly and forevermore, declining to change themselves, even as sulphuric acid declines to become sweet milk, though you vote so to the end of the world. This, it sometimes seems to me, is not quite sufficiently laid hold of by the British and other Parliaments just at present. Which surely is a great misfortune to said Parliaments! For, it would appear, the grand point, after all constitutional improvements, and such wagging of wigs in Westminster as there has been, is precisely what it was before any constitution was yet heard of, or the first official wig had budded out of nothing: namely, to ascertain what the truth of your question, in Nature, really is! Verily so. In this time and place, as in all past and in all future times and places. To-day in St. Stephen's, where constitutional, philanthropical, and other great things lie in the mortar-kit; even as on the Plain of Shinar long ago, where a certain Tower, likewise of a very philanthropic nature, indeed one of the desirablest towers I ever heard of, was to be built,—but couldn't! My friends, I do not laugh; truly I am more inclined to weep.

Get, by six hundred and fifty-eight votes, or by no vote at all, by the silent intimation of your own eyesight and understanding given you direct out of Heaven, and more sacred to you than anything earthly, and than all things earthly,—a correct image of the fact in question, as God and Nature have made it: that is the one thing needful; with that it shall be well with you in whatsoever you have to do with said fact. Get, by the sublimest constitutional methods, belauded by all the world, an incorrect image of the fact: so shall it be other than well with you; so shall you have laud from able editors and vociferous masses of mistaken human creatures; and from the Nature's Fact, continuing quite silently the same as it was, contradiction, and that only. What else? Will Nature change, or sulphuric acid become sweet milk, for the noise of vociferous blockheads? Surely not. Nature, I assure you, has not the smallest intention of doing so.

On the contrary, Nature keeps silently a most exact Savings-bank, and official register correct to the most evanescent item, Debtor and Creditor, in respect to one and all of us; silently marks down, Creditor by such and such an unseen act of veracity and heroism; Debtor to such a loud blustery blunder, twenty-seven million strong or one unit strong, and to all acts and words and thoughts executed in consequence of that,—Debtor, Debtor, Debtor, day after day, rigorously as Fate (for this is Fate that is writing); and at the end of the account you will have it all to pay, my friend; there is the rub! Not the infinitesimalest fraction of a farthing but will be found marked there, for you and against you; and with the due rate of interest you will have to pay it, neatly, completely, as sure as you are alive. You will have to pay it even in money if you live:—and, poor slave, do you think there is no payment but in money? There is a payment which Nature rigorously exacts of men, and also of Nations, and this I think when her wrath is sternest, in the shape of dooming you to possess money. To possess it; to have your bloated vanities



fostered into monstrosity by it, your foul passions blown into explosion by it, your heart and perhaps your very stomach ruined with intoxication by it; your poor life and all its manful activities stunned into frenzy and comatose sleep by it,—in one word, as the old Prophets said, your soul forever lost by it. Your soul; so that, through the Eternities, you shall have no soul, or manful trace of ever having had a soul; but only, for certain fleeting moments, shall have had a money-bag, and have given soul and heart and (frightfuler still) stomach itself in fatal exchange for the same. You wretched mortal, stumbling about in a God's Temple, and thinking it a brutal Cookery-shop! Nature, when her scorn of a slave is divinest, and blazes like the blinding lightning against his slavehood, often enough flings him a bag of money, silently saying: "That! Away; thy doom is that!"—

For no man, and for no body or biggest multitude of men, has Nature favor, if they part company with her facts and her. Excellent stump-orator; eloquent parliamentary dead-dog, making motions, passing bills; reported in the Morning Newspapers, and reputed the "best speaker going"? From the Universe of Fact he has turned himself away; he is gone into partnership with the Universe of Phantasm; finds it profitablest to deal in forged notes, while the foolish shopkeepers will accept them. Nature for such a man, and for Nations that follow such, has her patibulary forks, and prisons of death everlasting:—dost thou doubt it? Unhappy mortal, Nature otherwise were herself a Chaos and no Cosmos. Nature was not made by an Impostor; not she, I think, rife as they are!—In fact, by money or otherwise, to the uttermost fraction of a calculable and incalculable value, we have, each one of us, to settle the exact balance in the above-said Savings-bank, or official register kept by Nature: Creditor by the quantity of veracities we have done, Debtor by the quantity of falsities and errors; there is not, by any conceivable device, the faintest hope of escape from that issue for one of us, nor for all of us.

This used to be a well-known fact; and daily still, in certain edifices, steeple-houses, joss-houses, temples sacred or other, everywhere spread over the world, we hear some dim mumblement of an assertion that such is still, what it was always and will forever be, the fact: but meseems it has terribly fallen out of memory nevertheless; and, from Dan to Beersheba, one in vain looks out for a man that really in his heart believes it. In his heart he believes, as we perceive, that scrip will yield dividends: but that Heaven too has an office of account, and unerringly marks down, against us or for us, whatsoever thing we do or say or think, and treasures up the same in regard to every creature,—this I do not so well perceive that he believes. Poor blockhead, no: he reckons that all payment is in money, or approximately representable by money; finds money go a strange course; disbelieves the parson and his Day of Judgment; discerns not that there is any judgment except in the small or big debt court; and lives (for the present) on that strange footing in this Universe. The unhappy mortal, what is the use of his "civilizations" and his "useful knowledges," if he have forgotten that beginning of human knowledge; the earliest perception of the awakened human soul in this world; the first dictate of Heaven's inspiration to all men? I cannot account him a man any more; but only a kind of human beaver, who has acquired the art of ciphering. He lives without rushing hourly towards suicide, because his soul, with all its noble aspirations and imaginations, is sunk at the bottom of his stomach, and lies torpid there, unaspiring, unimagining, unconsidering, as if it were the vital principle of a mere four-footed beaver. A soul of a man, appointed for spinning cotton and making money, or, alas, for merely shooting grouse and gathering rent; to whom Eternity and Immortality, and all human Noblenesses and divine Facts that did not tell upon the stock-exchange, were meaningless fables, empty as the inarticulate wind. He will recover out of that persuasion one day, or be ground to powder, I believe!—

To such a pass, by our beaverisms and our mammonisms; by canting of "prevenient grace" everywhere, and so boarding and lodging our poor souls upon supervenient moonshine everywhere, for centuries long; by our sordid stupidities and our idle babblings; through faith in the divine Stump-orator, and Constitutional Palaver, or august Sanhedrim of Orators,—have men and Nations been reduced, in this sad epoch! I cannot call them happy Nations; I must call them Nations like to perish; Nations that will either begin to recover, or else soon die. Recovery is to be hoped;—yes, since there is in Nature an Almighty Beneficence, and His voice, divinely terrible, can be heard in the world-whirlwind now, even as from of old and forevermore. Recovery, or else destruction and annihilation, is very certain; and the crisis, too, comes rapidly on: but by Stump-Orator and Constitutional Palaver, however perfected, my hopes of recovery have long vanished. Not by them, I should imagine, but by something far the reverse of them, shall we return to truth and God!—

I tell you, the ignoble intellect cannot think the truth, even within its own limits, and when it seriously tries! And of the ignoble intellect that does not seriously try, and has even reached the "ignobleness" of seriously trying the

reverse, and of lying with its very tongue, what are we to expect? It is frightful to consider. Sincere wise speech is but an imperfect corollary, and insignificant outer manifestation, of sincere wise thought. He whose very tongue utters falsities, what has his heart long been doing? The thought of his heart is not its wisest, not even its wisest; it is its foolishness;—and even of that we have a false and foolish copy. And it is Nature's Fact, or the Thought of the Eternal, which we want to arrive at in regard to the matter,—which if we do not arrive at, we shall not save the matter, we shall drive the matter into shipwreck!

The practice of modern Parliaments, with reporters sitting among them, and twenty-seven millions mostly fools listening to them, fills me with amazement. In regard to no thing, or fact as God and Nature have made it, can you get so much as the real thought of any honorable head,—even so far as it, the said honorable head, still has capacity of thought. What the honorable gentleman's wisest thought is or would have been, had he led from birth a life of piety and earnest veracity and heroic virtue, you, and he himself poor deep-sunk creature, vainly conjecture as from immense dim distances far in the rear of what he is led to say. And again, far in the rear of what his thought is,—surely long infinitudes beyond all he could ever think,—lies the Thought of God Almighty, the Image itself of the Fact, the thing you are in quest of, and must find or do worse! Even his, the honorable gentleman's, actual bewildered, falsified, vague surmise or quasi-thought, even this is not given you; but only some falsified copy of this, such as he fancies may suit the reporters and twenty-seven millions mostly fools. And upon that latter you are to act;—with what success, do you expect? That is the thought you are to take for the Thought of the Eternal Mind, —that double-distilled falsity of a blockheadism from one who is false even as a blockhead!

Do I make myself plain to Mr. Peter's understanding? Perhaps it will surprise him less that parliamentary eloquence excites more wonder than admiration in me; that the fate of countries governed by that sublime alchemy does not appear the hopefulest just now. Not by that method, I should apprehend, will the Heavens be scaled and the Earth vanquished; not by that, but by another.

A benevolent man once proposed to me, but without pointing out the methods how, this plan of reform for our benighted world: To cut from one generation, whether the current one or the next, all the tongues away, prohibiting Literature too; and appoint at least one generation to pass its life in silence. "There, thou one blessed generation, from the vain jargon of babble thou art beneficently freed. Whatsoever of truth, traditionary or original, thy own god-given intellect shall point out to thee as true, that thou wilt go and do. In doing of it there will be a verdict for thee; if a verdict of True, thou wilt hold by it, and ever again do it; if of Untrue, thou wilt never try it more, but be eternally delivered from it. To do aught because the vain hearsays order thee, and the big clamors of the sanhedrim of fools, is not thy lot,—what worlds of misery are spared thee! Nature's voice heard in thy own inner being, and the sacred Commandment of thy Maker: these shall be thy guidances, thou happy tongueless generation. What is good and beautiful thou shalt know; not merely what is said to be so. Not to talk of thy doings, and become the envy of surrounding flunkies, but to taste of the fruit of thy doings themselves, is thine. What the Eternal Laws will sanction for thee, do; what the Froth Gospels and multitudinous long-eared Hearsays never so loudly bid, all this is already chaff for thee,—drifting rapidly along, thou knowest whitherward, on the eternal winds."

Good Heavens, if such a plan were practicable, how the chaff might be winnowed out of every man, and out of all human things; and ninety-nine hundredths of our whole big Universe, spiritual and practical, might blow itself away, as mere torrents of chaff whole trade-winds of chaff, many miles deep, rushing continually with the voice of whirlwinds towards a certain FIRE, which knows how to deal with it! Ninety-nine hundredths blown away; all the lies blown away, and some skeleton of a spiritual and practical Universe left standing for us which were true: O Heavens, is it forever impossible, then? By a generation that had no tongue it really might be done; but not so easily by one that had. Tongues, platforms, parliaments, and fourth-estates; unfettered presses, periodical and stationary literatures: we are nearly all gone to tongue, I think; and our fate is very questionable.

Truly, it is little known at present, and ought forthwith to become better known, what ruin to all nobleness and fruitfulness and blessedness in the genius of a poor mortal you generally bring about, by ordering him to speak, to do all things with a view to their being seen! Few good and fruitful things ever were done, or could be done, on those terms. Silence, silence; and be distant ye profane, with your jargonings and superficial babblements, when a man has anything to do! Eye-service,—dost thou know what that is, poor England?—eye-service is all the man can do in these sad circumstances; grows to be all he has the idea of doing, of his or any other man's ever doing, or ever

having done, in any circumstances. Sad, enough. Alas, it is our saddest woe of all;—too sad for being spoken of at present, while all or nearly all men consider it an imaginary sorrow on my part!

Let the young English soul, in whatever logic-shop and nonsense-verse establishment of an Eton, Oxford, Edinburgh, Halle, Salamanca, or other High Finishing-School, he may be getting his young idea taught how to speak and spout, and print sermons and review-articles, and thereby show himself and fond patrons that it is an idea,—lay this solemnly to heart; this is my deepest counsel to him! The idea you have once spoken, if it even were an idea, is no longer yours; it is gone from you, so much life and virtue is gone, and the vital circulations of your self and your destiny and activity are henceforth deprived of it. If you could not get it spoken, if you could still constrain it into silence, so much the richer are you. Better keep your idea while you can: let it still circulate in your blood, and there fructify; inarticulately inciting you to good activities; giving to your whole spiritual life a ruddier health. When the time does come for speaking it, you will speak it all the more concisely, the more expressively, appropriately; and if such a time should never come, have you not already acted it, and uttered it as no words can? Think of this, my young friend; for there is nothing truer, nothing more forgotten in these shabby gold-laced days. Incontinence is half of all the sins of man. And among the many kinds of that base vice, I know none baser, or at present half so fell and fatal, as that same Incontinence of Tongue. "Public speaking," "parliamentary eloquence:" it is a Moloch, before whom young souls are made to pass through the fire. They enter, weeping or rejoicing, fond parents consecrating them to the red-hot Idol, as to the Highest God: and they come out spiritually dead. Dead enough; to live thenceforth a galvanic life of mere Stump-Oratory; screeching and gibbering, words without wisdom, without veracity, without conviction more than skin-deep. A divine gift, that? It is a thing admired by the vulgar, and rewarded with seats in the Cabinet and other preciosities; but to the wise, it is a thing not admirable, not adorable; unmelodious rather, and ghastly and bodeful, as the speech of sheeted spectres in the streets at midnight!

Be not a Public Orator, thou brave young British man, thou that art now growing to be something: not a Stump-Orator, if thou canst help it. Appeal not to the vulgar, with its long ears and its seats in the Cabinet; not by spoken words to the vulgar; hate the profane vulgar, and bid it begone. Appeal by silent work, by silent suffering if there be no work, to the gods, who have nobler than seats in the Cabinet for thee! Talent for Literature, thou hast such a talent? Believe it not, be slow to believe it! To speak, or to write, Nature did not peremptorily order thee; but to work she did. And know this: there never was a talent even for real Literature, not to speak of talents lost and damned in doing sham Literature, but was primarily a talent for something infinitely better of the silent kind. Of Literature, in all ways, be shy rather than otherwise, at present! There where thou art, work, work; whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it,—with the hand of a man, not of a phantasm; be that thy unnoticed blessedness and exceeding great reward. Thy words, let them be few, and well-ordered. Love silence rather than speech in these tragic days, when, for very speaking, the voice of man has fallen inarticulate to man; and hearts, in this loud babbling, sit dark and dumb towards one another. Witty,—above all, oh be not witty: none of us is bound to be witty, under penalties; to be wise and true we all are, under the terriblest penalties!

Brave young friend, dear to me, and known too in a sense, though never seen, nor to be seen by me,—you are, what I am not, in the happy case to learn to be something and to do something, instead of eloquently talking about what has been and was done and may be! The old are what they are, and will not alter; our hope is in you. England's hope, and the world's, is that there may once more be millions such, instead of units as now. Macte; i fausto pede. And may future generations, acquainted again with the silences, and once more cognizant of what is noble and faithful and divine, look back on us with pity and incredulous astonishment!

Italicized text is represented in the etext with underscores thusly. Greek text has been transliterated into English, with notation "[Gr.]" appended to it. Otherwise the etext has been left as it was in the printed text. Footnotes have been embedded directly into the text, with the notation [Footnote: ...].

### 3. USA: J. H. Gardiner. *The Making of Arguments*

#### Preface

The object of this book is to lay out a course in the writing of arguments which shall be simple enough for classes which give only a part of the year to the work, and yet comprehensive enough for special classes in the subject. It is especially aimed at the interests and needs of the student body as a whole, however, rather than at those of students who are doing advanced work in argumentation. Though few men have either the capacity or the need to become highly trained specialists in the making of arguments, all men need some knowledge of the art. Experience at Harvard has shown that pretty much the entire freshman class will work with enthusiasm on a single argument; and they get from this work a training in exact thought and a discipline that they get from no other kind of writing. Accordingly I have laid out this book in order to start students as soon as possible on the same kind of arguments that they are likely to make in practical life. I have striven throughout to keep in mind the interests and needs of these average individuals, who in the aggregate will tread such a variety of paths in their passage through the world. Not many of them will get to Congress, there to make great orations on the settlement of the tariff, and the large majority of them will not go into the law; and even of the lawyers many will have little concern with the elaborate piecing together of circumstantial evidence into the basis for a verdict. But all of them will sooner or later need the power of coming to close quarters with more or less complicated questions, in which they must bring over to their views men of varying prepossessions and practical interests; and all of them all their lives will need the power of seeing through to the heart of such questions, and of grasping what is essential, though it be separated by a hair's breadth from the inessential that must be cast to one side. It is for this training of the powers of thought that a course in the making of arguments is profitable, even when pursued for so short a time as can be given to it in most schools and colleges. In laying out the book I have had these three purposes in mind: first, that the student shall without waste of time be set to exploring his subject and running down the exact issues on which his question will turn; second, that as he collects his material he shall be led on to consider what part of it is good evidence for his purpose, and how to test his reasoning from the facts; third, that with his material gathered and culled and his plan settled he shall turn his attention to presenting it in the most effective way possible for the particular occasion. Throughout I have tried to lay stress on the making of arguments, not as an end in themselves, and to fit certain more or less arbitrary formulas, but as the practical kind of appeal that every young man is already making to his fellows on matters that interest him, and that he will make more and more in earnest as he gets out into the world. The tendency of some of the books to treat argumentation, especially in the form of debating, as a new variety of sport, with rules as elaborate and technical as those of football, turns away from the subject a good many young men to whom the training in itself would be highly valuable. The future of the subject will be closely dependent on the success of teachers in keeping it flexible and in intimate touch with real affairs. I have made some suggestions looking towards this end in Appendix II. My obligations to earlier workers in the field will be obvious to all who know the subject. In especial, I, like all other writers on the subject, have built on foundations laid by Professor George Pierce Baker, of Harvard University. For permission to use the articles from *The Outlook* I am indebted to the courtesy of the editors of that journal; for the article on "The Transmission of Yellow Fever by Mosquitoes," to the kindness of General Sternberg, and of the editor of *The Popular Science Monthly*.

J.H. Gardiner

#### Chapter I

##### What we Argue About, And Why

1. What Argument is. When we argue we write or speak with an active purpose of making other people take our view of a case; that is the only essential difference between argument and other modes of writing. Between exposition and argument there is no certain line. In Professor Lamont's excellent little book, "Specimens of Exposition," there are two examples which might be used in this book as examples of argument; in one of them, Huxley's essay on "The Physical Basis of Life," Huxley himself toward the end uses the words, "as I have endeavored to prove to you"; and Matthew Arnold's essay on "Wordsworth" is an elaborate effort to prove that Wordsworth is the greatest English poet after Shakespeare and Milton. Or, to take quite different examples, in any question of law where judges of the court disagree, as in the Income Tax Case, or in the Insular cases which decided the status of Porto Rico and the Philippines, both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinions of the judges are

argumentative in form; though the majority opinion, at any rate, is in theory an exposition of the law. The real difference between argument and exposition lies in the difference of attitude toward the subject in hand: when we are explaining we tacitly assume that there is only one view to be taken of the subject; when we argue we recognize that other people look on it differently. And the differences in form are only those which are necessary to throw the critical points of an argument into high relief and to warm the feelings of the readers.

2. Conviction and Persuasion. This active purpose of making other people take your view of the case in hand, then, is the distinguishing essence of argument. To accomplish this purpose you have two tools or weapons, or perhaps one should say two sides to the same weapon, conviction and persuasion. In an argument you aim in the first place to make clear to your audience that your view of the case is the truer or sounder, or your proposal the more expedient; and in most arguments you aim also so to touch the practical or moral feelings of your readers as to make them more or less warm partisans of your view. If you are trying to make some one see that the shape of the hills in New England is due to glacial action, you never think of his feelings; here any attempt at persuading him, as distinguished from convincing him, would be an impertinence. On the other hand, it would be a waste of breath to convince a man that the rascals ought to be turned out, if he will not on election day take the trouble to go out and vote; unless you have effectively stirred his feelings as well as convinced his reason you have gained nothing. In the latter case your argument would be almost wholly persuasive, in the former almost wholly a matter of convincing. These two sides of argument correspond to two great faculties of the human mind, thought and feeling, and to the two ways in which, under the guidance of thought and feeling, mankind reacts to experience. As we pass through life our actions and our interest in the people and things we meet are fixed in the first place by the spontaneous movements of feeling, and in the second place, and constantly more so as we grow older, by our reasoning powers. Even the most intentionally dry of philosophers has his prejudices, perhaps against competitive sports or against efficiency as a chief test of good citizenship; and after childhood the most wayward of artists has some general principles to guide him along his primrose path. The actions of all men are the resultant of these two forces of feeling and reason. Since in most cases where we are arguing we have an eye to influencing action, we must keep both the forces in mind as possible means to our end.

3. Argument neither Contentiousness nor Dispute. Argument is not contentiousness, nor is it the good-natured and sociable disputation in which we occupy a good deal of time with our friends. The difference is that in neither contentiousness nor in kindly dispute do we expect, or intend, to get anywhere. There are many political speeches whose only object is to make things uncomfortable for the other side, and some speeches in college or school debates intended merely to trip up the other side; and neither type helps to clear up the subjects it deals with. On the other hand, we spend many a pleasant evening arguing whether science is more important in education than literature, or whether it is better to spend the summer at the seashore or in the mountains, or similar subjects, where we know that everybody will stand at the end just where he stood at the beginning. Here our real purpose is not to change any one's views so much as it is to exchange thoughts and likings with some one we know and care for. The purpose of argument, as we shall understand the word here, is to convince or persuade some one.

4. Arguments and the Audience. In argument, therefore, far more than in other kinds of writing, one must keep the audience definitely in mind. "Persuade" and "convince" for our purposes are active verbs, and in most cases their objects have an important effect on their significance. An argument on a given subject that will have a cogent force with one set of people, will not touch, and may even repel, another. To take a simple example: an argument in defense of the present game of football would change considerably in proportions and in tone according as it was addressed to undergraduates, to a faculty, or to a ministers' conference. Huxley's argument on evolution (p. 233), which was delivered to a popular audience, has more illustrations and is less compressed in reasoning than if it had been delivered to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Not only theoretically, but in practice, arguments must vary in both form and substance with the audiences to which they are addressed. An argument shot into the void is not likely to bring down much game.

5. Profitable Subjects for Arguments. To get the best results from practice in writing arguments, you must choose your subjects with care and sagacity. Some classes of subjects are of small value. Questions which rest on differences of taste or temperament from their very nature can never be brought to a decision. The question whether one game is better than another--football better than baseball, for example--is not arguable, for in the end one side settles down to saying, "But I like baseball best," and you stick there. Closely akin is such a question as, Was Alexander Pope a poet; for in the word "poet" one includes many purely emotional factors which touch one person and not another. Matthew Arnold made a brave attempt to prove that Wordsworth stood third in excellence in the long line of English poets, and his essay is a notable piece of argument; but the very statement of his thesis, that Wordsworth "left a body of poetical work superior in power, in interest, in the qualities which give enduring freshness, to that which any of the others has left," shows the vanity of the attempt. To take a

single word--"interest"--from his proposition: what is the use of arguing with me, if Wordsworth happened to bore me, as he does not, that I ought to find him interesting. All I could do would be humbly to admit my deficiency, and go as cheerfully as might be to Burns or Coleridge or Byron. Almost all questions of criticism labor under this difficulty, that in the end they are questions of taste. You or I were so made in the beginning that the so-called romantic school or the so-called classical school seems to us to have reached the pinnacle of art; and all the argument in the world cannot make us over again in this respect. Every question which in the end involves questions of aesthetic taste is as futile to argue as questions of the palate. Other questions are impracticable because of vagueness. Such questions as, Should a practical man read poetry, Are lawyers a useful class in the community, Are the American people deteriorating, furnish excellent material for lively and witty talk, but no one expects them to lead to any conclusion, and they are therefore valueless as a basis for the rigorous and muscular training which an argument ought to give. There are many questions of this sort which serve admirably for the friendly dispute which makes up so much of our daily life with our friends, but which dissolve when we try to pin them down. Some questions which cannot be profitably argued when phrased in general terms become more practicable when they are applied to a definite class or to a single person. Such questions as, Is it better to go to a small college or a large one, Is it better to live in the country or in the city, Is it wise to go into farming, all lead nowhere if they are argued in this general form. But if they are applied to a single person, they change character: in this specific form they not only are arguable, but they constantly are argued out with direct and practical results, and even for a small and strictly defined class of persons they may provide good material for a formal argument. For example, the question, "Is it better for a boy of good intellectual ability and capacity for making friends, who lives in a small country town, to go to a small college or a large," provides moderately good material for an argument on either side; though even here the limiting phrases are none too definite. In a debate on such a subject it would be easy for the two sides to pass each other by without ever coming to a direct issue, because of differing understanding of the terms. On the whole it seems wiser not to take risks with such questions, but to choose from those which will unquestionably give you the training for which you are seeking. Roughly speaking, subjects for an argument which are sure to be profitable may be divided into three classes: (1) those for which the material is drawn from personal experience; (2) those for which the material is provided by reading; and (3) those which combine the first two. Of these there can be no question that the last are the most profitable. Of the first class we may take for an example such a question as, Should interscholastic athletics be maintained in---- school? Here is a question on which some parents and teachers at any rate will disagree with most boys, and a question which must be settled one way or the other. The material for the discussion must come from the personal knowledge of those who make the arguments, reenforced by what information and opinion they can collect from teachers and townspeople. In Chapter II we shall come to a consideration of possible sources for material for these and other arguments. There is much to be said for the practice gained by hunting up pertinent material for arguments of this sort; but they tend to run over into irreconcilable differences of opinion, in which an argument is of no practical value. The second class of subjects, those for which the material is drawn wholly from reading, is the most common in intercollegiate and interscholastic debates. Should the United States army canteen be restored, Should the Chinese be excluded from the Philippines, Should the United States establish a parcels post, are all subjects with which the ordinary student in high school or college can have little personal acquaintance. The sources for arguments on such subjects are to be found in books, magazines, and official reports. The good you will get from arguments on such subjects lies largely in finding out how to look up material. The difficulty with them lies in their size and their complexity. When it is remembered that a column of an ordinary newspaper has somewhere about fifteen hundred words, and that an editorial article such as on page 268, which is thirty-eight hundred words long, is in these days of hurry apt to be repellent, because of its length, and on the other hand that a theme of fifteen hundred words seems to the ordinary undergraduate a weighty undertaking, the nature of this difficulty becomes clear. To put it another way, speeches on public subjects of great importance are apt to be at least an hour long, and not infrequently more, and in an hour one easily speaks six or seven thousand words, so that fifteen hundred words would not fill a fifteen-minute speech. This difficulty is met in debates by the longer time allowed, for each side ordinarily has an hour; but even then there can be no pretense of a thorough treatment. The ordinary written argument of a student in school or college can therefore do very little with large public questions. The danger is that a short argument on a large question may breed in one an easy content with a superficial and parrotlike discussion of the subject. Discussions of large and abstract principles are necessary, but they are best left to the time of life when one has a comprehensive and intimate knowledge of the whole mass of facts concerned. By far the best kind of subject, as has been said, is that which will combine some personal acquaintance with the facts and the possibility of some research for material. Many such subjects may be found in

the larger educational questions when applied to your own school or college. Should the elective system be maintained at Harvard College, Should the University of Illinois require Latin for the A.B. degree, Should fraternities be abolished in---High School, Should manual training be introduced in---High School, are all questions of this sort. A short list of similar questions is printed at the end of this section, which it is hoped will prove suggestive. For discussing these questions you will find considerable printed material in educational and other magazines, in reports of presidents of colleges and school committees, and other such places, which will give you practice in hunting up facts and opinions and in weighing their value. At the same time training of your judgment will follow when you apply the theories and opinions you find in these sources to local conditions. Moreover, such questions will give you practice in getting material in the raw, as it were, by making up tables of statistics from catalogues, by getting facts by personal interview, and in other ways, which will be considered in Chapter II. Finally, such subjects are much more likely to be of a size that you can bring to a head in the space and the time allowed to the average student, and they may have some immediate and practical effect in determining a question in which your own school or college has an interest. Arguments on such subjects are therefore less likely to be "academic" discussions, in the sense of having no bearing on any real conditions. When every college and school has plenty of such subjects continually under debate, there seems to be no reason for going farther and faring worse. The main thing is to get a subject which will carry you back to facts, and one in which you will be able to test your own reasoning.

6. Suggestions of Subjects for Practice. Many of the subjects in the list below will need some adaptation to fit them to local conditions; and these will undoubtedly suggest many others of a similar nature. Other subjects of immediate and local interest may be drawn from the current newspapers; and the larger, perennial ones like prohibition, woman suffrage, immigration laws, are always at the disposal of those who have the time and the courage for the amount of reading they involve. The distinction between a subject and the proposition to be argued will be made in Chapter II.

#### Suggestions for Subjects of Arguments

##### To Be Adapted to Local and Present Conditions

1. Admission to this college should be by examination only.
2. The entrance requirements of this college set a good standard for a public high-school course.
3. Admission to this college should be by certificate from the candidate's school, such as is now accepted at--- College.
4. The standards for admission to this college or to the State University should be raised.
5. The standard for graduating from this college should be raised.
6. Attendance at chapel exercises should be made voluntary.
7. The numbers of students in this college should be limited by raising the standard for admission.
8. A reading knowledge of French or of German, to be tested by an oral examination, should be substituted for the present requirements for entrance in those languages.
9. No list of books should be prescribed for the entrance examination in English.
10. Freshmen should be required to be within bounds by eleven o'clock at night.
11. Freshmen should not be elected to college societies.

12. Students who have attained distinction in their studies should be treated as graduate students are, in respect to attendance and leave of absence.
13. Arrangements should be made by which the work done on college papers should count toward the degree.
14. The honor system in examinations should be introduced into this college.
15. The course of study in this college should be made wholly elective.
16. Coeducation should be maintained in this college.
17. Secret societies should be prohibited in----High School.
18. The business course in----High School should be given up.
19. Compulsory military drill should be introduced into----School (or, into this college).
20. Greek should be given up in----School.
21. All students in----School, whether in the business course or not, should be required to study Latin.
22. Athletics have had a detrimental effect on the studies of those who have taken part in them.
- 23.----School should engage in athletic contests with two other schools only.
24. The school committee in----should be reduced to five members.
25. The school committee in----is at present too large for efficient direction of the schools.
26. The principal of the high school in----should report directly to the school committee and not to the superintendent of schools.
27. This city should assign a sum equal to----mills of the whole tax rate to the support of the public schools.
28. The high school of this city should have a single session each day, instead of two.
29. This city should substitute a commission government on the general model of that in Des Moines, Iowa, for the present system.
30. The commission form of government has proved its superiority to government by a mayor and two legislative boards.
31. This city should elect its municipal officers by preferential voting.
32. This city should establish playgrounds in the crowded parts of the city, notably in Wards----and----.
33. Boys should be allowed to play ball in unfrequented streets.
34. This city should set apart----mills on the tax rate each year for building permanent roads.
35. The laws and regulations governing the inspection and the sale of milk should be made more stringent.
36. This city should buy and run the waterworks.



37. This city should build future extensions of the street railway system and lease them to the highest bidder.
38. This city should buy and operate the street railway system.
38. The street railway company in this city should be required to pave and care for all the streets through which it runs.
40. A committee of business men should be appointed by the mayor to conduct negotiations for bringing new industries to the city.
41. This city should establish municipal gymnasiums.
42. This city would be benefited by the consolidation of the two street railway systems.
43. This state should adopt a ballot law similar to that of Massachusetts.
44. This state should adopt the "short ballot."
45. This state should tax forest lands according to the product rather than the assessed value of the land.
46. The present rules of football are satisfactory.
47. This college should make "soccer" football one of its major sports.
48. Unnecessary talking by the players should be forbidden in games of baseball.
49. Coaching from the side lines should be forbidden in baseball.
50. "Summer baseball" should be regarded as a breach of amateur standing.
51. An intercollegiate committee of graduates should be formed with power to absolve college athletes from technical and minor breaches of the amateur rules.
52. This college should make an effort to return to amateur coaching by proposing agreements to that effect with its principal rivals.
53. This university should not allow students with degrees from other institutions to play on its athletic teams.
54. The managers of the principal athletic teams in this college should be elected by the students at large.
55. The expenses of athletic teams at this college should be considerably reduced.

7. The Two Kinds of Arguments. With the subject you are going to argue on chosen, it will be wise to come to closer quarters with the process of arguing. A large part of the good results you will get from practice in writing arguments will be the strengthening of your powers of exact and keen thought; I shall therefore in the following sections try to go somewhat below the surface of the process, and see just what any given kind of argument aims to do, and how it accomplishes its aim by its appeal to special faculties and interests of the mind. I shall also consider briefly the larger bearings of a few of the commoner and more important types of argument, as the ordinary citizen meets them in daily life.

We may divide arguments roughly into two classes, according as the proposition they maintain takes the form, "This is true," or the form, "This ought to be done." The former we will call, for the sake of brevity, arguments of fact, the latter arguments of policy. Of the two classes the former is addressed principally to the reason, the faculty by which we arrange the facts of the universe (whether small or great) as they come to us, and so make them intelligible. You believe that the man who brought back your dog for a reward stole the dog, because that view fits best with the facts you know about him and the disappearance of the dog; we accept the theory of evolution because, as Huxley points out at the beginning of his essay (see pp. 233, 235), it provides a place for all the facts that have been collected about the world of plants and animals and makes of them all a consistent and harmonious system. In Chapter III we shall come to a further consideration of the workings of this faculty so far as it affects the making of arguments. Arguments of policy, on the other hand, which argue what ought to be done, make their appeal in the main to the moral, practical, Or aesthetic interests of the audience. These interests have their ultimate roots in the deep-seated mass of inherited temperamental motives and forces which may be summed up here in the conveniently vague term "feeling." These motives and forces, it will be noticed, lie outside the field of reason, and are in the main recalcitrant to it. When you argue that it is "right" that rich men should endow the schools and colleges of this country, you would find it impossible to explain in detail just what you mean by "right"; your belief rises from feelings, partly inherited, partly drawn in with the air of the country, which make you positive of your assertion even when you can least give reasons for it. So our practical interests turn in the end on what we want and do not want, and are therefore molded by our temperament and tastes, which are obviously matters of feeling. Our aesthetic interests, which include our preferences in all the fields of art and literature and things beautiful or ugly in daily life, even more obviously go back to feeling. Now in practical life our will to do anything is latent until some part of this great body of feeling is stirred; therefore arguments of policy, which aim to show that something ought to be done, cannot neglect feeling. You may convince me never so thoroughly that I ought to vote the Republican or the Democratic ticket, yet I shall sit still on election day if you do not touch my feelings of moral right or practical expediency. The moving cause of action is feeling, though the feeling is often modified, or even transformed, by reasoning. We shall come back to the nature of feeling in Chapter V, when we get to the subject of persuasion. An important practical difference between arguments of fact and arguments of policy lies in the different form and degree of certitude to which they lead. At the end of arguments of fact it is possible to say, if enough evidence can be had, "This is undeniably true." In these arguments we can use the word "proof" in its strict sense. In arguments of policy on the other hand, where the question is worth arguing, we know in many cases that in the end there will be men who are as wise and as upright as ourselves who will continue to disagree. In such cases it is obvious that we can use the word "proof" only loosely; and we speak of right or of expediency rather than of truth. This distinction is worth bearing in mind, for it leads to soberness and a seemly modesty in controversy. It is only in barber-shop politics and sophomore debating clubs that a decision of a question of policy takes its place among the eternal verities. 8. Arguments of Fact. Among the commonest and most important varieties of arguments of fact are those made before juries in courts of law. It is a fundamental principle of the common law under which we live that questions of fact shall be decided by twelve men chosen by lot from the community, and that questions of the law that shall be applied to these facts shall be decided by the judges. Accordingly in criminal trials the facts concerning the crime and the actions and whereabouts of the accused are subjects of argument by the counsel. If the prisoner is attempting to establish an alibi, and the evidence is meager or conflicting, his counsel and the prosecuting officer must each make arguments before the jury on the real meaning of the evidence. In civil cases likewise, all disputed questions of fact go ordinarily to a jury, and are the subject of arguments by the opposing lawyers. Did the defendant guarantee the goods he sold the plaintiff? Was undue influence exerted on the testator? Did the accident happen through the negligence of the railroad officials? In such cases and the countless others that congest the lists of the lower courts arguments of fact must be made. Other common arguments of fact are those in historical questions, whether in recent or in ancient history. Macaulay's admirable skeleton argument (p. 155) that Philip Francis wrote the *Junius Letters*, which so grievously incensed the English government about the time of the American Revolution, is an example of an argument of this sort; the part of Lincoln's Cooper Institute Address which deals with the views of the founders of the nation on the subject of the control of slavery in the territories is another. Another question concerning facts is that which a few years ago stirred classical archaeologists, whether the Greek theater had a raised stage or not. In all such cases the question is as to facts which at one time, at any rate, could have been settled

absolutely. The reason why an argument about them becomes necessary is that the evidence which could finally settle the questions has disappeared with the persons who possessed it, or has been dissipated by time. Students of history and literature have to deal with many such questions of fact. A somewhat different kind of question of fact, and one often extremely difficult to settle, is that which concerns not a single, uncomplicated fact, but a broad condition of affairs. Examples of such questions are whether woman suffrage has improved political conditions in Colorado and other states, whether the introduction of manual training in a certain high school has improved the intelligence and serviceableness of its graduates, whether political corruption is decreasing in American cities. The difficulty that faces an argument in such cases as these is not the loss of the evidence, but rather that it consists of a multitude of little facts, and that the selection of these details is singularly subject to bias and partisan feeling. These questions of a broad state of affairs are like questions of policy in that in the end their settlement depends thus largely on temperamental and practical prepossessions. Still another and very important variety of arguments of fact, which are often conveniently described as arguments of theory, includes large scientific questions, such, for example, as the origin of our present species of plants and animals, or the ultimate constitution of matter, or the cause of yellow fever. In such arguments we start out with many facts, already gained through observation and experiment, which need the assumption of some other fact or facts attained through reasoning from the others, to make them fit together into a coherent and intelligible system. Every important new discovery in science makes necessary arguments of this sort. When the minute forms of life that the layman lumps together under the name "germs" were discovered there was a host of arguments to explain their manner of life and the way some of them cause disease and others carry on functions beneficent to mankind. A notable example of the arguments concerning this kind of fact is that at page 251 concerning the cause of yellow fever; and another is Huxley's argument on evolution (p. 233), where he points out that "the question is a question of historical fact." The element of uncertainty in the settlement of such questions is due to the facts being too large or too minute for human observation, or to their ranging through great ages of time so that we must be contented with overwhelming probability rather than with absolute proof. Furthermore the facts that are established in arguments of this sort may have to be modified by new discoveries: for many generations it was held to be a fact that malaria was caused by a miasma; now we know that it is caused by a germ, which is carried by mosquitoes. Arguments of this type tend to go through a curious cycle: they begin their life as arguments, recognized as such; then becoming the accepted explanation of the facts which are known, for a longer or shorter time they flourish as statements of the truth; and then with the uncovering of new facts they crumble away or are transformed into new and larger theories. Darwin's great theory of the origin of species has passed through two of these stages. He spoke of it as an argument, and for a few years it was assailed with fierce counterarguments; we now hold it to be a masterful explanation of an enormous body of facts. When it will pass on to the next stage we cannot foresee; but chemists and physicists darkly hint at the possibility of the evolution of inorganic as well as organic substances. In arguments of fact, it will be noticed, there is little or no element of persuasion, for we deal with such matters almost wholly through our understanding and reason. Huxley, in his argument on evolution, which was addressed to a popular audience, was careful to choose examples that would be familiar; but his treatment of the subject was strictly expository in tone. In some arguments of this sort, which touch on the great forces of the universe and on the nature of the world of life of which we are an infinitesimal part, the tone of the discourse will take on warmth and eloquence; just as Webster in the White Murder Case, dealing with an issue of life and death, let the natural eloquence which always smoldered in his speech, burn up into a clear glow. But both Huxley and Webster would have held any studied appeal to emotion to be an impertinence. In ordinary life most of us make fewer arguments of fact than of policy. It is only a small minority of our young men who become lawyers, and of them many do not practice before juries. Nor do any large number of men become scholars or men of science or public men, who have to deal with questions of historical fact or to make arguments of fact on large states of affairs. On the other hand, all of us have to weigh and estimate arguments of fact pretty constantly. Sooner or later most men serve on juries; and all students have to read historical and economical arguments. We shall therefore give some space in Chapter III to considering the principles of reasoning by which we arrive at and test conclusions as to the existence of facts, and the truth of assertions about them. 9. Arguments of Policy. When we turn from arguments of fact to arguments of policy it will be noticed that there is a change in the phraseology that we use: we no longer say that the assertions we maintain or meet are true or not true, but that the proposals are right or expedient or wrong or inexpedient; for now we are talking about what should or should not be done. We say, naturally and correctly, that it is or is not true that woman suffrage has improved political conditions in Colorado but it would be a misuse of words to say that it is true or not true that woman suffrage should be adopted in Ohio; and still more so to use the word "false," which has an inseparable tinge of moral obliquity. In

questions of policy that turn on expediency, and in some, as we shall see directly, that turn on moral issues, we know beforehand that in the end some men who know the subject as well as we do and whose judgment is as good and whose standards are as high, will still disagree. There are certain large temperamental lines which have always divided mankind: some men are born conservative minded, some radical minded: the former must needs find things as they are on the whole good, the latter must needs see vividly how they can be improved. To the scientific temperament the artistic temperament is unstable and irrational, as the former is dry and ungenerous to the latter. Such broad and recognized types, with a few others like them, ramify into a multitude of ephemeral parties and classes,--racial, political, social, literary, scholarly,--and most of the arguments in the world can be followed back to these essential and irremovable differences of character. Individual practical questions, however, cross and recross these lines, and in such cases arguments have much practical effect in crystallizing opinion and judgment; for in a complicated case it is often extremely hard to see the real bearing of a proposed policy, and a good argument comes as a guide from the gods to the puzzled and wavering. But though to be effective in practical affairs one has to be positive, yet that is not saying that one must believe that the other side are fools or knaves. Some such confusion of thought in the minds of some reformers, both eminent and obscure, accounts for the wake of bitterness which often follows the progress of reform. Modesty and toleration are as important as positiveness to the man who is to make a mark in the world. Arguments of policy are of endless variety, for we are all of us making them all the time, from the morning hour in which we argue with ourselves, so often ineffectually, that we really ought to get up when the clock strikes, to the arguments about choosing a profession or helping to start a movement for universal peace. It would be a weariness to the flesh to attempt a classification of them that should pretend to be exhaustive; but there are certain major groups of human motive which will be a good basis for a rough, but convenient, sorting out of the commoner kinds of arguments of policy. In practical affairs we ask first if there is any principle of right or wrong involved, then what is best for the practical interests of ourselves and other people, and in a few cases, when these other considerations are irrelevant, what course is dictated by our ideas of fitness and beauty. I will briefly discuss a few of the main types of the argument of policy, grouping them according as they appeal chiefly to the sense of right and wrong, to practical interests, or to aesthetic interests. There are many arguments outside of sermons which turn on questions of right and wrong. Questions of individual personal conduct we had better not get into; but every community, whether large or small, has often to face questions in which moral right and wrong are essentially involved. In this country the whole question of dealing with the sale of alcoholic drinks is recognized as such. The supporters of state prohibition declare that it is morally wrong to sanction a trade out of which springs so much misery; the supporters of local option and high license, admitting and fighting against all this misery and crime, declare that it is morally wrong to shut one's eyes to the uncontrolled sales and the political corruption under state-wide prohibition. The strongest arguments for limiting by law the hours of labor for women and children have always been based on moral principles; and all arguments for political reform hark back to the Ten Commandments. One has the strongest of all arguments if he can establish a moral right and wrong in the question. The difficulty comes in establishing the right and wrong, for there are many cases where equally good people are fighting dead against each other. The question of prohibition, as we have just seen, is one of those cases; the slavery question was a still more striking one. From before the Revolution the feeling that slavery was morally wrong slowly but steadily gained ground in the North, until from 1850 it became more and more a dominant and passionate conviction. Yet in the South, which, as we must now admit, bred as many men and women of high devotion to the right, this view had only scattered followers. On both sides tradition and environment molded the moral principle. In arguing, therefore, one must not be too swift in calling on heaven to witness to the right; we must recognize that mortal vision is weak, and that some of the people whom we are fighting are borne on by principles as sincerely held to be righteous as our own. Nevertheless, a man must always hold to that which to him seems right, and fight hard against the wrong, tolerantly and with charity, but with unclouded purpose. In politics there are still in this country many occasions when the only argument possible is based on moral right. The debauching of public servants by favors or bribes, whether open or indirect, injustice of all sorts, putting men who are mentally or morally unfit into public office, oppression of the poor or unjust bleeding of the rich, stirring up class or race hatred, are all evils from which good citizens must help to save the republic; and wherever such evils are found the moral argument is the only argument worthy of a decent citizen. By far the most numerous of arguments of policy, however, are those which do not rise above the level of practical interests. The line between these and arguments of moral right is not always easy to draw, for in the tangle of life and character right and advantage often run together. The tariff question is a case in point. Primarily it turns on the practical material advantage of a nation; but inevitably in the settling of individual schedules the way opens for one industry or branch of business to fatten at the expense of another, and so we run

into the question of the square deal and the golden rule. In general, however, the great questions on which political parties divide are questions of practical expediency. Shall we, as a nation, be more comfortable and more prosperous if the powers of the federal government are strengthened and extended? Shall we have better local government under the old-fashioned form of city government, or under some form of commission government? Should we have more business and more profitable business if we had free trade with the Dominion of Canada? Shall we be better off under the Republican or the Democratic party? All these are questions in which there is little concern with right and wrong: they turn on the very practical matter of direct material advantage. In some of these cases most men vote on one side or the other largely through long habit; but there constantly arise, especially in local matters, questions which cross the usual lines of political division, so that one, willingly or unwillingly, must take the trouble of thinking out a decision for himself. Not infrequently one is a good deal puzzled to decide on which side to range himself, for the issues may be complex; then one reads the arguments or goes to meetings until one side or the other seems to present the most and the most important advantages. When one is thus puzzled, an argument which is clear and easy to understand, and which makes its points in such a way that they can be readily carried in mind and passed on to the next person one meets, has a wonderful power of winning one to its side. The arguments of policy which, after political arguments, are the most common, are those on questions of law. As we have seen a few pages back, such arguments are settled by the judges, while questions of fact are left to the jury. In the White Murder Case, in which Daniel Webster made a famous argument, it was a question of fact for the jury whether the defendant Knapp was in Brown Street at the time of the murder, and whether he was there for the purpose of aiding and abetting Crowninshield, the actual murderer; the question whether his presence outside the house would make him liable as a principal in the crime was a question of law. This distinction between questions of fact and questions of law is one of the foundation principles of the common law. From the very beginning of the jury system, when the jury consisted of neighbors who found their verdict from their own knowledge of the case, to the present day when they are required carefully to purge their minds of any personal knowledge of the case, the common law has always held that in the long run questions of fact can best be settled by average men, drawn by lot from the community. Questions of law, on the other hand, need learning and special training in legal reasoning, for the common law depends on continuity and consistency of decision; and a new case must be decided by the principles which have governed like cases in the past. Nevertheless, these principles, which are now embodied in an enormous mass of decisions by courts all over the English-speaking world, are in essence a working out into minute discriminations of certain large principles, which in turn are merely the embodiment of the practical rules under which the Anglo-Saxon race has found it safest and most convenient to live together. They settle in each case what, in view of the interests of the community as a whole and in the long run, and not merely for the parties now at issue, is the most convenient and the justest thing to do. Mr. Justice Holmes, of the Supreme Court of the United States, wrote before his appointment to that bench: "In substance the growth of the law is legislative. And this in a deeper sense than that what the courts declare to have always been the law is in fact new. It is legislative in its grounds. The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret roots from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean of course considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned. Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under our practices and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis." In some cases it is obvious that the question of law is a question of policy, as in the so-called "political decisions" of the United States Supreme Court. Such were the decisions formulated by Chief Justice Marshall on constitutional questions, which made our government what it is. The difference between "the strict construction" of the Constitution and the "free construction" was due to a difference of temperament which has always tended to mark the two great political parties of the country. So with the Insular cases, which determined the status of the distant possessions of the United States, and which split the Supreme Court into so many pieces: the question whether the Constitution applied in all its fullness to Porto Rico and the Philippines was essentially a political question, though of the largest sort, and therefore a question of policy. Finally, there are the arguments of policy which deal with matters of taste and aesthetic preference. The difficulty with these arguments is that they do deal with questions of taste, and so fall under the ancient and incontrovertible maxim, *de gustibus non est disputandum*. Artists of all varieties and some critics are given to talking as if preferences in color, in shape, in styles of music, were absolutely right and wrong, and as if they partook in some way of the nature of moral questions; but any one who has observed for even twenty years knows that what the architects of twenty years ago declared the only true style of art is now scoffed at by them and their successors as hopelessly false. The cavalike

forms of the Byzantine or Romanesque which superseded the wooden Gothic have in turn given way to Renaissance classic in its various forms, which now in turn seem on the point of slipping into the rococo classical of the *École des Beaux Arts*. In painting, the violent and spotty impressionism of twenty years ago is paling into the study of the cool and quiet lights of the Dutchmen of the great period. And at each stage there are strenuous arguments that the ideas of that particular live years are the only hope for the preservation of the art concerned. The essential difficulty with all such arguments is that the aesthetic interests to which they appeal are personal, and depend on personal preferences. Most of us in such matters, having no special knowledge, and liking some variety of differing styles, modestly give way to the authority of any one who makes a profession of the art. In the laying out of a park a landscape architect may prefer single trees and open spaces, where the neighbors and abutters prefer a grove. In the long run his taste is no better than theirs, though he may argue as if they were ignorant and uncultivated because they disagree with him. In all such cases, unless there is some consideration of practical expediency, such as letting the southwest wind blow through in summer, arguments can do little except to make and keep everybody angry. Their chief value is to make us see things which perhaps we had not thought of. In practice these three kinds of arguments, which turn on moral, practical, and aesthetic considerations, tend to be much mingled. The human mind is very complex, and our various interests and preferences are inseparably tangled. The treacheries of self-analysis are proverbial, and are only less dangerous than trying to make out the motives of other people. Accordingly we must expect to find that it is sometimes hard to distinguish between moral and aesthetic motives and practical, for the morality and the taste of a given people always in part grow out of the slow crystallizing of practical expediencies, and notions of morality change with the advance of civilization. Furthermore, one must never forget that an argument of policy which does not involve and rest on subsidiary questions of fact is rare; and the questions of fact must be settled before we can go on with the argument of policy. Before this country can intelligently make up its mind about the protective tariff, and whether a certain rate of duty should be imposed on a given article, a very complex body of facts dealing with the cost of production both here and abroad must be settled, and this can be done only by men highly trained in the principles of business and political economy. Before one could vote intelligently on the introduction of a commission form of government into the town he lives in he must know the facts about the places in which it has already been tried. It is not too much to say that there is no disputed question of policy into which there does not enter the necessity of looking up and settling pertinent facts. On the other hand, there are some cases of questions of fact in which our practical interests deeply affect the view which we take of the facts. In all the discussions of the last few years about federal supervision and control of the railroads it has been hard to get at the facts because of the conflicting statements about them by equally honest and well-informed men. Where there is an honest difference of interest, as in every case of a bargain, the opposite sides cannot see the facts in the same way: what is critically significant to the railroad manager seems of no great consequence to the shipper; and the railroad manager does not see the fixed laws of trade which make it impossible for the shipper to pay higher freight rates and add them to the price of his goods. It is not in human nature to see the whole cogency of facts that make for the other side. In all arguments, therefore, it must be remembered that we are; constantly swinging backward and forward from matters of fact to matters of policy. In practice no hard-and-fast line separates the various classes and types; in the arguments of real life we mingle them naturally and unconsciously. Yet the distinction between the two main classes is a real one, and if one has never thought it out, one may go at an argument with a blurred notion of what he is attempting to do. Since argument after school and college is an eminently practical matter, vagueness of aim is risky. It is the man who sees exactly what he is trying to do, and knows exactly what he can accomplish, who is likely to make his point. The chief value of writing arguments for practice is in cultivating a keen eye for the essential. To write a good argument means, as we shall see, that the student shall first conscientiously take the question, apart so as to know exactly the issues involved and the unavoidable points of difference, and then after searching the sources for information, he shall scrutinize the facts and the reasoning both on his own side and on the other. If he does this work without shirking the hard thinking he will get an illuminating perception of the obscurities and ambiguities which lurk in words, and will come to see that clear reasoning is almost wholly a matter of sharper discrimination for unobserved distinctions.

#### Exercises

1. Find an example which might be thought of either as an argument or an exposition, and explain why you think it one or the other.

2. Find examples in current magazines or newspapers of an argument in which conviction is the chief element, and one in which persuasion counts most.
3. Give three examples from your talk within the last week of a discussion which was not argument as we use the term here.
4. Show how, in the case of some current subject of discussion, the arguments would differ in substance and tone for three possible audiences.
5. Find three examples each of questions of fact and questions of policy from current newspapers or magazines.
6. Find three examples of questions of fact in law cases, not more than one of them from a criminal case.
7. Find three examples of questions of fact in history or literature.
8. Find three questions of a large state of affairs from current political discussions. 9. Find three examples of questions of fact in science.
10. Find from the history of the last fifty years three examples of questions which turned on moral right.
11. Give three examples of questions of expediency which you have heard argued within the last week.
12. Give an example from recent decisions of the courts which seems to you to have turned on a question of policy.
13. Give two examples of questions of aesthetic taste which you have recently heard argued.
14. In an actual case which has been or which might be argued, show how both classes of argument and more than one of the types within them enter naturally into the discussion.
15. Name three subjects which you have lately discussed which would not be profitable subjects for a formal argument.
16. Name five good subjects for an argument in which you would draw chiefly from your personal experience.
17. Name five subjects in which you would get the material from reading.
18. Name five subjects which would combine your own experience with reading.
19. Find how many words to the page you write on the paper you would use for a written argument. Count the number of words in a page of this book; in the column of the editorial page of a newspaper.

## Chapter II

### Planning the Argument

10. Preparations for the Argument. When you have chosen the subject for your argument there is still much to do before you are ready to write it out. In the first place, you must find out by search and reading what is to be said both for and against the view you are supporting; in the second place, with the facts in mind you must analyze both them and the question to see just what is the point that you are arguing; then, in the third place, you must arrange the material you are going to use so that it will be most effective for your purpose. Each of these steps I shall consider in turn in this chapter. As a practical convenience, each student should start a notebook, in which he can keep together all the notes he makes in the course of his preparations for writing the argument. Number the pages of the notebook, and leave the first two pages blank for a table of contents. A box of cards, such as will be described on page 31, will

serve as well as a notebook, and in some ways is more convenient. From time to time, in the course of the chapter I shall mention points that should be entered. For the sake of convenience in exposition I shall use as an example the preparations for an argument in favor of introducing the commission form of government into an imaginary city, Wytown; and each of the directions for the use of the notebook I shall illustrate by entries appropriate to this argument. The argument, let us suppose, is addressed to the citizens of the place, who know the general facts relating to the city and its government. In creating this imaginary city, let us give it about eight thousand inhabitants, and suppose that it is of small area, and that the inhabitants are chiefly operatives in a number of large shoe factories, of American descent, though foreign-born citizens and their offspring are beginning to gain on the others. And further, let us suppose that this imaginary city of Wytown now has a city government with a mayor of limited powers, a small board of aldermen, and a larger city council. The other necessary facts will appear in the introduction to the brief.

11. Reading for the Argument. The first step in preparing for an argument is to find out what has been already written on the general subject, and what facts are available for your purpose. For this purpose you must go to the best library that is within convenient reach. Just how to look for material there I shall discuss a few pages further on; here I shall make some more general suggestions about reading and taking notes. Almost always it pays to give two or three hours to some preliminary reading that will make you see the general scope of the subject, and the points on which there is disagreement. An article in a good encyclopedia or one in a magazine may serve the purpose; or in some cases you can go to the opening chapter or two of a book. If you have already discussed the subject with other people this preliminary reading may not be necessary; but if you start in to read on a new subject without some general idea of its scope you may waste time through not knowing your way and so following false leads. In your reading do not rest satisfied with consulting authorities on your own side only. We shall presently see how important it is to be prepared to meet arguments on the other side; and unless you have read something on that side, you will not know what points you ought to deal with in your refutation. In that event you may leave undisturbed in the minds of your readers points which have all the more significance from your having ignored them. One of the first reasons for wide reading in preparation for an argument is to assure yourself that you have a competent knowledge of the other side as well as of your own. In using your sources keep clearly and constantly in mind the difference between fact and opinion. The opinions of a great scholar and of a farseeing statesman may be based on fact; but not being fact they contain some element of inference, which is never as certain. When we come to the next chapter we shall consider this difference more closely. In the meantime it is worth while to urge the importance of cultivating scruples on the subject and a keen eye for the intrusion of human, and therefore fallible, opinion into statements of fact. A trustworthy author states the facts as facts, with the authorities for them specifically cited; and where he builds his own opinions on the facts he leaves no doubt as to where fact ends and opinion begins. The power to estimate a book or an article on a cursory inspection is of great practical value. The table of contents in a book, and sometimes the index, will give a good idea of its scope; and samples of a few pages at a time, especially on critical points, which can be chosen by means of the index, will show its general attitude and tone. The index, if properly made, will furnish a sure guide to its relevance for the purpose in hand. Half an hour spent in this way, with attention concentrated, will in most cases settle whether the book is worth reading through. An article can be "sized up" in much the same way: if it is at all well written the first paragraphs will give a pretty definite idea of the subject and the scope of the article; and the beginnings, and often the ends, of the paragraphs will show the course which the thought follows. Though such skimming cannot be relied on for a real knowledge of the subject, it is invaluable as a guide for this preliminary reading.

12. Taking Notes. In reading for your argument, as for all scholarly reading, form early your habits of taking thorough and serviceable notes. Nothing is more tantalizing than to remember that you once ran across a highly important fact and then not be able to recall the place in which it is to be found. One of the most convenient ways to take notes for an argument is to write each fact or quotation on a separate card. Cards convenient for the purpose can be had at any college stationer or library-supply bureau. If you use them, have an ample supply of them, so that you will not have to put more than one fact on each. Leave space for a heading at the top which will refer to a specific subheading of your brief, when that is ready. Always add an exact reference to the source--title, name of author, and, in case of a book, place and date of publication, so that if you want more material you can find it without loss of time, and, what is more important, so that you can fortify your use of it by a reference in a footnote. When you find a passage that you think will be worth quoting in the original words, quote with scrupulous and literal accuracy:



apart from the authority you gain by so doing, you have no right to make any one else say words he did not say. If you leave out part of the passage, show the omission by dots; and in such a case, if you have to supply words of your own, as for example a noun in place of a pronoun, use square brackets, thus []. On the following page are examples of a convenient form of such notes.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Result in des Moines

The streets have been kept cleaner than ever before for \$35,000. The rates for electric lights have been reduced from \$90 to \$65. Gas rates have dropped again from \$22 to \$17. Water rates have dropped from 30¢ to 20¢ per 1000 gal. The disreputable district has been cleaned up and bond sharks driven out of business. The Des Moines Plan of City Government, *\_World's Work\_*, Vol. XVIII, P. 11533.

#### President Eliot's Views

"Now city business is almost wholly administrative and executive and very little concerned with large plans and far-reaching legislation. There is no occasion for two legislative bodies, or even one, in the government of a city.... Now and then a question arises which the will of the whole people properly expressed may best settle; but for the prompt and conclusive expression of that will the initiative and referendum are now well-recognized means." C. W. Eliot, *City Government by Fewer Men*, *\_World's Work\_*, Vol. XIV p. 9419.

In making notes, whether for an argument or for general college work, it is convenient, unless you know shorthand, to have a system of signs and abbreviations and of contractions for common words. The simpler shorthand symbols can be pressed into service; and one can follow the practice of stenography, which was also that of the ancient Hebrew writing, of leaving out vowels, for there are few words that cannot be recognized at a glance from their consonants. If you use this system at lectures you can soon come surprisingly near to a verbatim report which will preserve something more than bare facts. In your reading for material do not cultivate habits of economy or parsimony. You should always have a considerable amount of good fact left over, for unless you know a good deal of the region on the outskirts of your argument you will feel cramped and uncertain within it. The effect of having something in reserve is a powerful, though an intangible, asset in an argument; and, on the other hand, the man who has emptied his magazine is in a risky situation. 13. Sources for Facts. In the main, there are two kinds of sources for facts, sources in which the facts have already been collected and digested, and sources where they are still scattered and must be brought together and grouped by the investigator. Obviously there is no sharp or permanent distinction between these two classes. Let us first run through some of the books which are commonly available as sources of either kind, and then come back to the use of them. To find material in books and magazines there are certain well-known guides. To look up books go first to the catalogue of the nearest library. Here in most cases you will find some sort of subject catalogue, in which the subjects are arranged alphabetically; and if you can use the alphabet readily, as by no means all college students can, you can soon get a list of the books that are there available on the subject. On many subjects there are bibliographies, or lists of books, such as those published by the Library of Congress; these will be found in every large library. For articles in magazines and weekly journals, which on most current questions have fresh information, besides a great deal of valuable material on older questions, go to Poole's "Index to Periodical Literature," which is an index both by title and subject to the articles in important English and American magazines from 1802 to 1906, and to "The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature," which began in 1901 and includes more magazines, and which is brought up to date every month. For other material the works listed below will be serviceable; they are the best known of the reference books, and some of them will be found in all libraries and all of them in large libraries. The books on this list by no means exhaust the number of good books of their own kind; they are good examples, and others will ordinarily be found on the same shelves with them.

Journal  
Journalistic Exercise

## Exercises

1. Name those of the sources on pages 34-36, which are available to you.

Report to the class on the scope and character of each of them. (The report on different sources can be divided among the class.) 2. Name some sources for facts relating to your own school or college; to your own town or city; to your own state. 3. Report on the following, in not more than one hundred words, naming the source from which you got your information: the situation and government of the Fiji Islands; Circe; the author of "A man's a man for a' that"; Becky Sharp; the age of President Taft and the offices he has held; the early career of James Madison; the American amateur record in the half-mile run; the family name of Lord Salisbury, and a brief account of his career; the salary of the mayor of New York; the island of Guam: some of the important measures passed by Congress in the session of 1910-1911. (This exercise a teacher can vary indefinitely by turning over the pages of reference books which his class can reach; or the students can be set to making exercises for each other.) 14. Bibliography. Before starting in earnest on the reading for your argument, begin a bibliography, that is, a list of the books and articles and speeches which will help you. This bibliography should be entered in your notebook, and it is convenient to allow space enough there to keep the different kinds of sources separate. In making your bibliography you will use some of the sources which have just been described, especially "Poole's Index," and "The Reader's Guide," and the subject catalogue of the library. Make your entries so full that you can go at once to the source; it is poor economy to save a minute on copying down a title, and then waste ten or fifteen in going back to the source from which you got it. On large subjects the number of books and articles is far beyond the possibilities of most courses in argumentation, and here you must exercise your judgment in choosing the most important. The name of the author is on the whole a safe guide: if you find an article or a book by President Eliot on an educational subject, or one by President Hadley on economics, or one by President Jordan on zoology, or one by any of them on university policy, you will know at once that you cannot afford to neglect it. As you go on with your reading you will soon find who are authorities on special subjects by noting who are quoted in text and footnotes. If the subject happens to be one of those on which a bibliography has been issued either by the Library of Congress or from some other source, the making of your own bibliography will reduce itself to a selection from this list. Keep your bibliography as a practical aid to you in a very practical task. Do not swell it from mere love of accumulation, as you might collect stamps. The making of exhaustive bibliographies is work for advanced scholarship or for assistant librarians. For the practical purposes of making an argument a very moderate number of titles beyond those you can actually use will give you sufficient background. Notebook. Enter in your notebook the titles of books, articles, or speeches which bear on your subject, and which you are likely to be able to read. Illustration. Bibliography for an argument on introducing commission government of the Des Moines type into Wytown.

## The People of Hayti and a Plan of Emigration

Be Prince Saunders

Respected Gentlemen and Friends:

At a period so momentous as the present, when the friends of abolition and emancipation, as well as those whom observation and experience might teach us to beware to whom we should apply the endearing appellations, are professedly concerned for the establishment of an Asylum for those Free Persons of Color, who may be disposed to remove to it, and for such persons as shall hereafter be emancipated from slavery, a careful examination of this subject is imposed upon us. So large a number of abolitionists, convened from different sections of the country, is at all times and under any circumstances, an interesting spectacle to the eye of the philanthropist, how doubly delightful then is it, to me, whose interests and feelings so largely partake in the object you have in view, to behold this convention engaged in solemn deliberation upon those subjects employed to promote the improvement of the condition of the African race. \* \* \* \* \* Assembled as this convention is, for the promotion and extension of its beneficent and humane views and principles, I would respectfully beg leave to lay before it a few remarks upon the character, condition, and wants of the afflicted and divided people of Hayti, as they, and that island, may be connected with plans for the emigration of the free people of color of the United States. God in the mysterious operation of his providence has seen fit to permit the most astonishing changes to transpire upon that naturally beautiful and (as to soil and productions) astonishingly luxuriant island. The abominable principles, both of action

and belief, which pervaded France during the long series of vicissitudes which until recently she has experienced, extended to Hayti, or Santo Domingo have undoubtedly had an extensive influence upon the character, sentiments, and feelings of all descriptions of its present inhabitants. This magnificent and extensive island which has by travellers and historians been often denominated the "paradise of the New World," seems from its situation, extent, climate, and fertility peculiarly suited to become an object of interest and attention to the many distinguished and enlightened philanthropists whom God has been graciously pleased to inspire with a zeal for the promotion of the best interests of the descendants of Africa. The recent proceedings in several of the slave States toward the free population of color in those States seem to render it highly probable that that oppressed class of the community will soon be obliged to flee to the free States for protection. If the two rival Governments of Hayti were consolidated into one well-balanced pacific power, there are many hundred of the free people in the New England and Middle States who would be glad to repair there immediately to settle, and believing that the period has arrived, when many zealous friends to abolition and emancipation are of opinion that it is time for them to act in relation to an asylum for such persons as shall be emancipated from slavery, or for such portion of the free colored population at present existing in the United States, as shall feel disposed to emigrate, and being aware that the authorities of Hayti are themselves desirous of receiving emigrants from this country, are among the considerations which have induced me to lay this subject before the convention. The present spirit of rivalry which exists between the two chiefs in the French part of the island, and the consequent belligerent aspect and character of the country, may at first sight appear somewhat discouraging to the beneficent views and labors of the friends of peace; but these I am inclined to think are by no means to be considered as insurmountable barriers against the benevolent exertions of those Christian philanthropists whose sincere and hearty desire it is to reunite and pacify them. There seems to be no probability of their ever being reconciled to each other without the philanthropic interposition and mediation of those who have the welfare of the African race at heart. And where, in the whole circle of practical Christian philanthropy and active beneficence, is there so ample a field for the exertion of those heaven-born virtues as in that hitherto distracted region? In those unhappy divisions which exist in Hayti is strikingly exemplified the saying which is written in the sacred oracles, "that when men forsake the true worship and service of the only true God, and bow down to images of silver, and gold, and four-footed beasts and creeping things, and become contentious with each other," says the inspired writer, "in such a state of things trust ye not a friend, put ye not confidence in a guide; keep the doors of thy mouth from her that lieth in thy bosom; for there the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother, the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law, and a man's enemies shall be those of his own house." Had the venerable prophet in the foregoing predictions alluded expressly and entirely to the actual moral, political, and above all, to the religious character and condition of the Haytians, he could scarcely have given a more correct description of it. For there is scarcely a family whose members are not separated from each other, and arrayed under the banners of the rival chiefs, in virtual hostility against each other. In many instances the husband is with Henry, and the wife and children with Boyer, and there are other instances in which the heads of the family are with Boyer, and the other members with Henry. Let it be distinctly remembered, that these divided and distressed individuals are not permitted to hold any intercourse with each other; so that it is only when some very extraordinary occurrence transpires, that persons in the different sections of the country receive any kind of information from their nearest relatives and friends. "Blessed are the peacemakers," is the language of that celestial law-giver, who taught as never man taught; and his religion uniformly assures the obedient recipients of his spirit, that they shall be rewarded according to the extent, fidelity, and sincerity of their works of piety and beneficence. And if, according to the magnitude of the object in all its political, benevolent, humane, and Christian relations, the quantum of recompense is to be awarded and appraised to the just, to how large a share of the benediction of our blessed Savior to the promoters of peace shall those be authorized to expect who may be made the instruments of the pacification and reunion of the Haytian people? Surely the blessings of thousands who are, as it were, ready to perish, must inevitably come upon them. When I reflect that it was in this city that the first abolition society that was formed in the world was established, I am strongly encouraged to hope, that here also there may originate a plan, which shall be the means of restoring many of our fellow beings to the embraces of their families and friends, and place that whole country upon the basis of unanimity and perpetual peace. If the American Convention should in their wisdom think it expedient to adopt measures for attempting to affect a pacification of the Haytians, it is most heartily believed, that their benevolent views would be hailed and concurred in with alacrity and delight by the English philanthropists. It is moreover believed that a concern so stupendous in its relations, and bearing upon the cause of universal abolition and emancipation, and to the consequent improvement and elevation of the African race, would tend to awaken an active and a universally deep and active interest in the minds of that

numerous host of abolitionists in Great Britain, whom we trust have the best interests of the descendants of Africa deeply at heart.

Toussant L'Ouvert and the Haytian Revolutions  
By James Mccune

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Whilst the orgies of the French revolution thrust forward a being whose path was by rivers of blood, the horrors of Santo Domingo produced one who was pre-eminently a peacemaker--TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE.

In estimating the character of Toussaint L'Ouverture, regard must be paid, not to the enlightened age in which he lived, but to the rank in society from which he sprang--a rank which must be classed with a remote and elementary age of mankind.

Born forty-seven years before the commencement of the revolt, he had reached the prime of manhood, a slave, with a soul uncontaminated by the degradation which surrounded him. Living in a state of society where worse than polygamy was actually urged, we find him at this period faithful to one wife--the wife of his youth--and the father of an interesting family. Linked with such tender ties, and enlightened with some degree of education, which his indulgent master, M. Bayou, had given him, he fulfilled, up to the moment of the revolt, the duties of a Christian man in slavery. At the time of the insurrection--in which he took no part--he continued in the peaceable discharge of his duties as coachman; and when the insurgents approached the estate whereon he lived, he accomplished the flight of M. Bayou, whose kind treatment (part of this kindness was teaching this slave to read and write) he repaid by forwarding to him produce for his maintenance while in exile in these United States. Having thus faithfully acquitted himself as a slave, he turned towards the higher destinies which awaited him as a freeman. With a mind stored with patient reflection upon the biographies of men, the most eminent in civil and military affairs; and deeply versed in the history of the most remarkable revolutions that had yet occurred amongst mankind, he entered the army of the insurgents under Jean François. This chief rapidly promoted him to the offices of physician to the forces, aid-de-camp, and colonel. Jean François, in alliance with the Spaniards, maintained war at this time for the cause of royalty. Whilst serving under this chief, Toussaint beheld another civil war agitating the French colony. On one side, the French Commissioners, who had acknowledged the emancipation of the slaves, maintained war for the Republic; on the other side, the old noblesse, or planters, fought under the royal banner, having called in the aid of the British forces in order to re-establish slavery and the ancient regime. In this conflict, unmindful of their solemn oaths against the decree of the 15th of May, 1791, the whites of both parties, including the planters, hesitated not to fight in the same ranks, shoulder to shoulder, with the blacks. Caste was forgotten in the struggle for principles! At this juncture Jean François, accompanied by his principal officers, and possessed of all the honors and emoluments of a captain-general in the service of his Catholic Majesty, retired to Spain, leaving Toussaint at liberty to choose his party. Almost immediately joining that standard which acknowledged and battled for equal rights to all men, he soon rendered signal service to the Commissioners, by driving the Spaniards from the northern, and by holding the British at bay in the eastern part of the island. For these services he was raised to the rank of general by the French commander at Porte-aux-Paix, General Laveaux, a promotion which he soon repaid by saving that veteran's life under the following circumstances: Villate, a mulatto general, envious of the honors bestowed on Toussaint, treacherously imprisoned General Laveaux in Cape François. Immediately upon hearing this fact, Toussaint hastened to the Cape at the head of 10,000 men and liberated his benefactor. And, at the very moment of his liberation, a commission arrived from France appointing General Laveaux Governor of the Colony; his first official act was to proclaim Toussaint his lieutenant. "This is the black," said Laveaux, "predicted by Raynal, and who is destined to avenge the outrages committed against his whole race." A remark soon verified, for on his attainment of the supreme power, Toussaint avenged those injuries--by forgiveness! As an acknowledgment for his eminent services against the British, and against the mulattoes, who, inflamed with all the bitterness of caste, had maintained a sanguinary war under their great leader Rigaud, in the southern part of the colony, the Commissioners invested Toussaint with the office and dignity of general-in-chief of Santo Domingo. >>From that moment began the full development of the vast and versatile genius of this extraordinary man. Standing amid the terrible, because hostile, fragments of two revolutions, harassed by the rapacious greed of commissioners upon commissioners, who,

successively dispatched from France, hid beneath a republican exterior a longing after the spoils; with an army in the field accustomed by five years' experience to all the license of civil war, Toussaint, with a giant hand, seized the reins of government, reduced these conflicting elements to harmony and order, and raised the colony to nearly its former prosperity, his lofty intellect always delighting to effect its object rather by the tangled mazes of diplomacy than by the strong arm of physical force, yet maintaining a steadfast and unimpeached adherence to truth, his word, and his honor. General Maitland, commander of the British forces, finding the reduction of the island to be utterly hopeless, signed a treaty with Toussaint for the evacuation of all the posts which he held. "Toussaint then paid him a visit, and was received with military honors. After partaking of a grand entertainment, he was presented by General Maitland, in the name of His Majesty, with a splendid service of plate, and put in possession of the government-house which had been built and furnished by the English." \* \* \* \* \* Buonaparte, on becoming First Consul, sent out the confirmation of Toussaint as commander-in-chief, who, with views infinitely beyond the short-sighted and selfish vision of the Commissioners, proclaimed a general amnesty to the planters who had fled during the revolutions, earnestly invited their return to the possession of their estates, and, with a delicate regard to their feelings, decreed that the epithet "emigrant" should not be applied to them. Many of the planters accepted the invitation, and returned to the peaceful possession of their estates. In regard to the army of Toussaint, General Lacroix, one of the planters who returned, affirms "that never was a European army subjected to a more rigid discipline than that which was observed by the troops of Toussaint." Yet this army was converted by the commander-in-chief into industrious laborers, by the simple expedient of paying them for their labor. "When he restored many of the planters to their estates, there was no restoration of their former property in human beings. No human being was to be bought or sold. Severe tasks, flagellations, and scanty food were no longer to be endured. The planters were obliged to employ their laborers on the footing of hired servants." "And under this system," says Lacroix, "the colony advanced, as if by enchantment towards its ancient splendor; cultivation was extended with such rapidity that every day made its progress more perceptible. All appeared to be happy, and regarded Toussaint as their guardian angel. In making a tour of the island, he was hailed by the blacks with universal joy, nor was he less a favorite of the whites." Toussaint, having effected a bloodless conquest of the Spanish territory, had now become commander of the entire island. Performing all the executive duties, he made laws to suit the exigency of the times. His Egeria was temperance accompanied with a constant activity of body and mind. The best proof of the entire success of his government is contained in the comparative views of the exports of the island, before the revolutions, and during the administration of Toussaint. Bear in mind that, "before the revolution there were 450,000 slave laborers working with a capital in the shape of buildings, mills, fixtures, and implements, which had been accumulating during a century. Under Toussaint there were 290,000 free laborers, many of them just from the army or the mountains, working on plantations that had undergone the devastation of insurrection and a seven years' war." \* \* \* \* \* In consequence of the almost entire cessation of official communication with France, and for other reasons equally good, Toussaint thought it necessary for the public welfare to frame a new constitution for the government of the island. With the aid of M. Pascal, Abbe Moliere, and Marinit, he drew up a constitution, and submitted the same to a General Assembly convened from every district, and by that assembly the constitution was adopted. It was subsequently promulgated in the name of the people. And, on the 1st of July, 1801, the island was declared to be an independent State, in which all men, without regard to complexion or creed, possessed equal rights. This proceeding was subsequently sanctioned by Napoleon Buonaparte, whilst First Consul. In a letter to Toussaint, he says, "We have conceived for you esteem, and we wish to recognize and proclaim the great services you have rendered the French people. If their colors fly on Santo Domingo, it is to you and your brave blacks that we owe it. Called by your talents and the force of circumstances to the chief command, you have terminated the civil war, put a stop to the persecutions of some ferocious men, and restored to honor the religion and the worship of God, from whom all things come. The situation in which you were placed, surrounded on all sides by enemies, and without the mother country being able to succor or sustain you, has rendered legitimate the articles of that constitution." Although Toussaint enforced the duties of religion, he entirely severed the connection between Church and State. He rigidly enforced all the duties of morality, and would not suffer in his presence even the approach to indecency of dress or manner. "Modesty," said he, "is the defense of woman." The chief, nay the idol of an army of 100,000 well-trained and acclimated troops ready to march or sail where he wist, Toussaint refrained from raising the standard of liberty in any one of the neighboring island, at a time when, had he been fired with what men term ambition, he could easily have revolutionized the entire archipelago of the west. But his thoughts were bent on conquest of another kind; he was determined to overthrow an error which designing and interested men had craftily instilled into the civilized world,—a belief in the natural inferiority of the Negro race. It was the glory and the warrantable

boast of Toussaint that he had been the instrument of demonstrating that, even with the worst odds against them, this race is entirely capable of achieving liberty and of self-government. He did more: by abolishing caste he proved the artificial nature of such distinctions, and further demonstrated that even slavery cannot unfit men for the full exercise of all the functions which belong to free citizens. "Some situations of trust were filled by free Negroes and mulattoes, who had been in respectable circumstances under the old Government; but others were occupied by Negroes, and even by Africans, who had recently emerged from the lowest condition of slavery." But the bright and happy state of things which the genius of Toussaint had almost created out of elements the most discordant was doomed to be of short duration. For the dark spirit of Napoleon, glutted, but not satiated with the glory banquet afforded at the expense of Europe and Africa, seized upon this, the most beautiful and happy of the Hesperides, as the next victim of its remorseless rapacity. With the double intention of getting rid of the republican army, and reducing back to slavery the island of Hayti, he sent out his brother-in-law, General Leclerc, with 26 ships of war and 25,000 men. Like Leonidas at Thermopylæ, or the Bruce at Bannockburn, Toussaint determined to defend from thralldom his sea-girt isle, made sacred to liberty by the baptism of blood. On the 28th of January, 1802, Leclerc arrived off the bay of Samana, from the promontory of which Toussaint, in anxious alarm, beheld for the first time in his life so large an armament. "We must all perish," said he, "all France has come to Santo Domingo!" But this despondency passed away in a moment, and then this man, who had been a kindly-treated slave, prepared to oppose to the last that system which he now considered worse than death. It is impossible, after so long a tax on your patience, to enter on a detailed narration of the conflict which ensued. The hour of trial served only to develop and ennoble the character of Toussaint, who rose, with misfortune, above the allurements of rank and wealth which were offered as the price of his submission; and the very ties of parental love he yielded to the loftier sentiment of patriotism. On the 2d of February, a division of Leclerc's army, commanded by General Rochambeau, an old planter, landed at Fort Dauphin, and ruthlessly murdered many of the inhabitants (freedmen) who, unarmed, had been led by curiosity to the beach, in order to witness the disembarkation of the troops. Christophe, one of the generals of Toussaint, commanding at Cape François, having resisted the menaces and the flattery of Leclerc, reduced that ill-fated town to ashes, and retired with his troops into the mountains, carrying with him 2,000 of the white inhabitants of the Cape, who were protected from injury during the fierce war which ensued. Having full possession of the plain of the Cape, Leclerc, with a proclamation of liberty in his hand, in March following re-established slavery with all its former cruelties. This treacherous movement thickened the ranks of Toussaint, who thenceforward so vigorously pressed his opponent, that as a last resort, Leclerc broke the shackles of the slave, and proclaimed "Liberty and equality to all the inhabitants of Santo Domingo." This proclamation terminated the conflict for the time. Christophe and Dessalines, general officers, and at length Toussaint himself, capitulated, and, giving up the command of the island to Leclerc, he retired, at the suggestion of that officer, to enjoy rest and the sweet endearments of his family circle, on one of his estates near Gonaives. At this place he had remained about one month, when, without any adequate cause, Leclerc caused him to be seized, and to be placed on board of a ship of war, in which he was conveyed to France, where, without trial or condemnation, he was imprisoned in a loathsome and unhealthy dungeon. Unaccustomed to the chill and damp of this prison-house, the aged frame of Toussaint gave way, and he died. In this meagre outline of his life I have presented simply facts, gleaned, for the most part, from the unwilling testimony of his foes, and therefore resting on good authority. The highest encomium on his character is contained in the fact that Napoleon believed that by capturing him he would be able to re-enslave Hayti; and even this encomium is, if possible, rendered higher by the circumstances which afterward transpired, which showed that his principles were so thoroughly disseminated among his brethren, that, without the presence of Toussaint, they achieved that liberty which he had taught them so rightly to estimate. The capture of Toussaint spread like wild-fire through the island, and his principal officers again took the field. A fierce and sanguinary war ensued, in which the French gratuitously inflicted the most awful cruelties on their prisoners, many of whom having been hunted with bloodhounds, were carried in ships to some distance from the shore, murdered in cold blood, and cast into the sea; their corpses were thrown by the waves back upon the beach, and filled the air with pestilence, by which the French troops perished in large numbers. Leclerc having perished by pestilence, his successor, Rochambeau, when the conquest of the island was beyond possibility, became the cruel perpetrator of these bloody deeds. Thus it will be perceived that treachery and massacre were begun on the side of the French. I place emphasis on these facts in order to endeavor to disabuse the public mind of an attempt to attribute to emancipation the acts of retaliation resorted to by the Haytians in imitation of what the enlightened French had taught them. In two daily papers of this city there were published, a year since, a series of articles entitled the "Massacres of Santo Domingo." The "massacres" are not attributable to emancipation, for we have proved otherwise in regard to the first of them. The other occurred in

1804, twelve years after the slaves had disenthralled themselves. Fearful as the latter may have been, it did not equal the atrocities previously committed on the Haytians by the French. And the massacre was restricted to the white French inhabitants, whom Dessalines, the Robespierre of the island, suspected of an attempt to bring back slavery, with the aid of a French force yet hovering in the neighborhood. And if we search for the cause of this massacre, we may trace it to the following source: Nations which are pleased to term themselves civilized have one sort of faith which they hold to one another, and another sort which they entertain towards people less advanced in refinement. The faith which they entertain towards the latter is, very often, treachery, in the vocabulary of the civilized. It was treachery towards Toussaint that caused the massacre of Santo Domingo; it was treachery towards Osceola that brought bloodhounds into Florida! General Rochambeau, with the remnant of the French army, having been reduced to the dread necessity of striving "to appease the calls of hunger by feeding on horses, mules, and the very dogs that had been employed in hunting down and devouring the Negroes," evacuated the island in the autumn of 1803, and Hayti thenceforward became an independent State. Ladies and Gentlemen, I have now laid before you a concise view of the revolutions of Hayti in the relation of cause and effect; and I trust you will now think, that, so far from being scenes of indiscriminate massacre from which we should turn our eyes in horror, these revolutions constitute an epoch worthy of the anxious study of every American citizen. Among the many lessons that may be drawn from this portion of history is one not unconnected with the present occasion. From causes to which I need not give a name, there is gradually creeping into our otherwise prosperous state the incongruous and undermining influence of caste. One of the local manifestations of this unrepublican sentiment is, that while 800 children, chiefly of foreign parents, are educated and taught trades at the expense of all the citizens, colored children are excluded from these privileges. With the view to obviate the evils of such an unreasonable proscription, a few ladies of this city, by their untiring exertions, have organized an "Asylum for Colored Orphans." Their zeal in this cause is infinitely beyond all praise of mine, for their deeds of mercy are smiled on by Him who has declared, that "Whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water, shall in no wise lose her reward." Were any further argument needed to urge them on in their blessed work, I would point out to them the revolutions of Hayti, where, in the midst of the orgies and incantations of civil war, there appeared, as a spirit of peace, the patriot, the father, the benefactor of mankind--Toussaint L'Ouverture, a freedman, who had been taught to read while in slavery!

#### 4. The Delsarte System

François Delsarte.

François Delsarte was born November 11, 1811, at Solesme, a little town of the Department of the North, in France. His father, who was a renowned physician and the author of several inventions, might have secured a fortune for his family, had he been more anxious for the morrow, but he died in a state bordering upon poverty. In 1822, François was apprenticed to a porcelain painter of Paris, but, yielding to a taste and aptitude for music, in the year 1825, he sought and obtained admission to the Conservatory as a pensioner. Here a great trial awaited him--a trial which wrecked his musical career, but was a decided gain for his genius. He had been placed in the vocal classes, and in consequence of faults in method and direction, he lost his voice. He was inconsolable, but, without making light of his sorrow, we may count that loss happy, which gave the world its first law-giver in the art of oratory. The young student refused to accept this calamity without making one final effort to retrieve it. He presented himself at the musical contest of 1829. His impaired voice rendered success impossible, but kind words from influential friends in a great measure compensated for defeat. The celebrated Nourrit said to him: "I have given you my vote for the first prize, and my children shall have no singing-master but you." "Courage," said Madame Malibran, pressing his hand. "You will one day be a great artist." But Delsarte knew that without a voice he must renounce the stage, and yielding to the inevitable, he gave up the role of the actor to assume the functions of the professor. After his own shipwreck upon a bark without pilot or compass, he summoned up courage to search into the laws of an art which had hitherto subsisted only upon caprice and personal inspiration. After several years of diligent study, he discovered and formulated the essential laws of all art; and, thanks to him, æsthetic science in our day has the same precision as mathematical science. He had numerous pupils, many of whom have become distinguished in various public careers--in the pulpit, at the bar, on the stage, and at the tribune. Madame Sontag, when she wished to interpret Gluck's music, chose Delsarte for her teacher. Rachel drew inspiration from his counsels, and he became her guardian of the sacred fire. He was urgently solicited to appear with her at the Théâtre-Français, but religious scruples led him to refuse the finest offers. Madame de Girardin (Delphine Gay), surnamed the Muse of her country, welcomed him gladly to her salon, then the rendezvous of the world of art and letters, and regretted not seeing him oftener. He was more than once invited to the literary sessions of Juilly college, and, under the spell of his diction, the pupils became animated by a new ardor for study. Monseigneur Sibour had great esteem and affection for Delsarte, and made him his frequent guest. It was in the salon of this art-loving archbishop that Delsarte achieved one of his most brilliant triumphs. All the notable men of science had gathered there, and the conversation took such a turn that Delsarte found opportunity to give, without offence, a challenge in these two lines of Racine: *\_L'onde approche, se brise, et vomit à nos yeux, Parmi des flots d'écume, un monstre furieux.\_* ("The wave draws near, it breaks, and casts before our eyes, Amid the floods of foam, a monster grim and dire.") "Please tell me the most emphatic and significant word here," said Delsarte. All reflected, sought out and then gave, each in turn, his chosen word. Every word was selected save the conjunction *\_et\_* (and). No one thought of that. Delsarte then rose, and in a calm and modest, but triumphant tone, said: "The significant, emphatic word is the only one which has escaped you. It is the conjunction *\_and\_*, whose elliptic sense leaves us in apprehension of that which is about to happen." All owned themselves vanquished, and applauded the triumphant artist. Donoso Cortés made Delsarte a chosen confidant of his ideas. One day, when the great master of oratorical diction had recited to him the *\_Dies Irae\_*, the illustrious philosopher, in an access of religious emotion, begged that this hymn might be chanted at his funeral. Delsarte promised it, and he kept his word. When invited to the court of Louis Philippe, he replied: "I am not a court buffoon." When a generous compensation was hinted at, he answered: "I do not sell my loves." When it was urged that the occasion was a birth-day fête to be given his father by the Duke of Orleans, he accepted the invitation upon three conditions, thus stated by himself: "1st. I shall be the only singer; 2d. I shall have no accompaniment but the opera chorus; 3d. I shall receive no compensation." The conditions were assented to, and Delsarte surpassed himself. The king paid him such marked attentions that M. Ingres felt constrained to say: "One might declare in truth that it is Delsarte who is king of France." Delsarte's reputation had passed the frontier. The king of Hanover committed to his instruction the greatest musical artiste of his realm, and was so gratified with her improvement that, wishing to recompense the professor, he sent him the much prized Hanoverian medal of arts and sciences, accompanied by a letter from his own royal hand. Delsarte afterwards received from the same king the cross of a Chevalier of the Guelph order. Delsarte's auditors were not the only ones to sound his praises. The learned reviews extolled his merits. Such writers as Laurentie, Riancey, Lamartine and Théophile Gautier awarded him the most



enthusiastic praise. Posterity will perpetuate his fame. M. Laurentie writes: "I heard Delsarte recite one evening 'Iphigenia's Dream,' which the audience had besought of him. The hall remained thrilled and breathless under this impaired and yet sovereign voice. All yielded in rapt astonishment to the spell. There was no prestige, no theatrical illusion. Iphigenia was a professor in a black frock coat; the orchestra was a piano, giving forth here and there an unexpected modulation. This was his whole force; yet the hall was mute, hearts beat, tears flowed from many eyes, and when the recital ended, enthusiastic shouts arose, as if Iphigenia in person had just recounted her terrors." After Delsarte had gathered so abundant a harvest of laurels, fate decided that he had lived long enough. When he had reached his sixtieth year, he was attacked by hypertrophy of the heart, which left his rich organization in ruins. He was no longer the artist of graceful, supple, expressive and harmonious movements; no longer the thinker with profound and luminous ideas. But in the midst of this physical and intellectual ruin, the Christian sentiment retained its strong, sweet energy. A believer in the sacraments which he had received in days of health, he asked for them in the hour of danger, and many times he partook of that sacrament of love whose virtue he had taught so well. Finally, after having lingered for months in a state that was neither life nor death, surrounded by his pious wife, and his weeping, praying children, he rendered his soul to God on the 20th of July, 1871. Delsarte never could be persuaded to write anything upon themes foreign to those connected with his musical and vocal work. The author of this volume desires to save from oblivion the most wonderful conception of this superior intellect: his Course of Æsthetic Oratory. He dares promise to be a faithful interpreter. If excuse be needed for undertaking a task so delicate, he replies that he addresses himself to a class of readers who will know how to appreciate his motives. The merit of Delsarte, the honor of his family, the gratification of his numerous friends, the interests of science, the claims of friendship, demand that this light should not be left under a bushel, but placed upon a candlestick--this light which has shed so brilliant a glow, and enriched the arts with a new splendor.

#### Preface.

Orators, you are called to the ministry of speech. You have fixed your choice upon the pulpit, the bar, the tribune or the stage. You will become one day, preacher, advocate, lecturer or actor; in short, you desire to embrace the orator's career. I applaud your design. You will enter upon the noblest and most glorious of vocations. Eloquence holds the first rank among the arts. While we award praise and glory to great musicians and painters, to great masters of sculpture and architecture, the prize of honor is decreed to great orators. Who can define the omnipotence of speech? With a few brief words God called the universe from nothingness; speech falling from the glowing lips of the Apostles, has changed the face of the earth. The current of opinion follows the prestige of speech, and to-day, as ever, eloquence is universal queen. We need feel no surprise that, in ancient times, the multitude uncovered as Cicero approached, and cried: "Behold the orator!" Would you have your speech bear fruit and command honor? Two qualities are needful: virtue and a knowledge of the art of oratory. Cicero has defined the orator as a good man of worth: Vir bonus, dicendi peritus. Then, above all, the orator should be a man of worth. Such a man will make it his purpose to do good; and the good is the true end of oratorical art. In truth, what is art? Art is the expression of the beautiful in ideas; it is the true. Plato says the beautiful is the splendor of the true. What is art? It is the beautiful in action. It is the good. According to St. Augustine, the beautiful is the lustre of the good. Finally, what is art? It is the beautiful in the harmonies of nature. Galen, when he had finished his work on the structure of the human body, exclaimed: "Behold this beautiful hymn to the glory of the Creator!" What, then, is the true, the beautiful, the good? We might answer, it is God. Then virtue and the glory of God should be the one end of the orator, of the good man. A true artist never denies God. Eloquence is a means, not an end. We must not love art for its own sake, that would be idolatry. Art gives wings for ascent to God. One need not pause to contemplate his wings. Art is an instrument, but not an instrument of vanity or complaisance. Truth, alas! compels us to admit that eloquence has also the melancholy power of corrupting souls. Since it is an art, it is also a power which must produce its effect for good or evil. It has been said that the fool always finds a greater fool to listen to him. We might add that the false, the ugly and the vicious have each a fibre in the human heart to serve their purpose. Then let the true orator, the good man, armed with holy eloquence, seek to paralyze the fatal influence of those orators who are apostles of falsehood and corruption. Poets are born, orators are made: nascuntur poetae, fiunt oratores. You understand why I have engraved this maxim on the title-page of my work. It contains its raison d'être, its justification. Men are poets at birth, but eloquence is an art to be taught and learned. All art presupposes rules, procedures, a mechanism, a method which must be known. We bring more or less aptitude to the study of an art, but every profession demands a period more or less prolonged. We must not count upon natural advantages; none are perfect by nature. Humanity is crippled; beauty exists only in fragments. Perfect beauty is nowhere to be found; the artist must create it by synthetic

work. You have a fine voice, but be certain it has its defects. Your articulation is vicious, and the gestures upon which you pride yourself, are, in most cases, unnatural. Do not rely upon the fire of momentary inspiration. Nothing is more deceptive. The great Garrick said: "I do not depend upon that inspiration which idle mediocrity awaits." Talma declared that he absolutely calculated all effects, leaving nothing to chance. While he recited the scene between Augustus and Cinna, he was also performing an arithmetical operation. When he said: "Take a chair, Cinna, and in everything Closely observe the law I bid you heed"-- he made his audience shudder. The orator should not even think of what he is doing. The thing should have been so much studied, that all would seem to flow of itself from the fountain. But where find this square, this intellectual compass, that traces for us with mathematical precision, that line of gestures beyond which the orator must not pass? I have sought it for a long time, but in vain. Here and there one meets with advice, sometimes good but very often bad. For example, you are told that the greater the emotion, the stronger should be the voice. Nothing is more false. In violent emotion the heart seems to fill the larynx and the voice is stifled. In all such counsels it behooves us to search out their foundation, the reason that is in them, to ask if there is a type in nature which serves as their measure. We hear a celebrated orator. We seek to recall, to imitate his inflections and gestures. We adopt his mannerisms, and that is all. We see these mannerisms everywhere, but the true type is nowhere. After much unavailing search, I at last had the good fortune to meet a genuine master of eloquence. After giving much study to the masterpieces of painting and sculpture, after observing the living man in all his moods and expressions, he has known how to sum up these details and reduce them to laws. This great artist, this unrivaled master, was the pious, the amiable, the lamented Delsarte. There certainly was pleasure and profit in hearing this master of eloquence, for he excelled in applying his principles to himself. Still from his teachings, even from the dead letter of them, breaks forth a light which reveals horizons hitherto unknown. This work might have been entitled: *Philosophy of Oratorical Art*, for one cannot treat of eloquence without entering the domain of the highest philosophy. What, in fact, is oratorical art? It is the means of expressing the phenomena of the soul by the play of the organs. It is the sum total of rules and laws resulting from the reciprocal action of mind and body. Thus man must be considered in his sensitive, intellectual and moral state, with the play of the organs corresponding to these states. Our teaching has, then, for its basis the science of the soul ministered to by the organs. This is why we present the fixed, invariable rules which have their sanction in philosophy. This can be rendered plain by an exposition of our method. The art of oratory, we repeat, is expressing mental phenomena by the play of the physical organs. It is the translation, the plastic form, the language of human nature. But man, the image of God, presents himself to us in three phases: the sensitive, intellectual and moral. Man feels, thinks and loves. He is *en rapport* with the physical world, with the spiritual world, and with God. He fulfils his course by the light of the senses, the reason, or the light of grace. We call life the sensitive state, mind the intellectual state, and soul the moral state. Neither of these three terms can be separated from the two others. They interpenetrate, interlace, correspond with and embrace each other. Thus mind supposes soul and life. Soul is at the same time mind and life. In fine, life is inherent in mind and soul. Thus these three primitive moods of the soul are distinguished by nine perfectly adequate terms. The soul being the form of the body, the body is made in the image of the soul. The human body contains three organisms to translate the triple form of the soul. The phonetic machinery, the voice, sound, inflections, are living language. The child, as yet devoid of intelligence and sentiment, conveys his emotions through cries and moans. The myologic or muscular machinery, or gesture, is the language of sentiment and emotion. When the child recognizes its mother, it begins to smile. The buccal machinery, or articulate speech, is the language of the mind. Man, neither by voice nor gesture, can express two opposite ideas on the same subject; this necessarily involves a resort to speech. Human language is composed of gesture, speech and singing. The ancient melodrama owed its excellence to a union of these three languages. Each of these organisms takes the eccentric, concentric, or normal form, according to the different moods of the soul which it is called to translate. In the sensitive state, the soul lives outside itself; it has relations with the exterior world. In the intellectual state, the soul turns back upon itself, and the organism obeys this movement. Then ensues a contraction in all the agents of the organism. This is the concentric state. In the moral or mystic state, the soul, enraptured with God, enjoys perfect tranquility and blessedness. All breathes peace, quietude, serenity. This is the normal state,--the most perfect, elevated and sublime expression of which the organism is capable. Let us not forget that by reason of a constant transition, each state borrows the form of its kindred state. Thus the normal state can take the concentric and eccentric form, and become at the same time, doubly normal; that is, normal to the highest degree. Since each state can take the form of the two others, the result is nine distinct gestures, which form that marvelous accord of nine, which we call the universal criterion. In fine, here is the grand law of organic gymnastics: The triple movement, the triple language of the organs is eccentric, concentric, or normal, according as it is the expression of life, soul or

spirit. Under the influence, the occult inspiration of this law, the great masters have enriched the world with miracles of art. Aided by this law the course followed in this work, may be easily understood. Since eloquence is composed of three languages, we divide this work into three books in which voice, gesture and speech are studied by turns. Then, applying to them the great law of art, our task is accomplished. The advantages of this method are easily understood. There is given a type of expression not taken from the individual, but from human nature synthetized. Thus the student will not have the humiliation of being the slave or ape of any particular master. He will be only himself. Those who assimilate their imperfect natures to the perfect type will become orators. *\_Fiunt Oratores.\_* Success having attended the first efforts, let the would-be orator assimilate these rules, and his power will be doubled, aye increased a hundredfold. And thus having become an orator, a man of principle, who knows how to speak well, he will aid in the triumph of religion, justice and virtue.

Part First.

Voice

Chapter I.

Preliminary Ideas--criterion of the Oratorical Art.

Let us note an incontestable fact. The science of the Art of Oratory has not yet been taught. Hitherto genius alone, and not science, has made great orators. Horace, Quintilian and Cicero among the ancients, and numerous modern writers have treated of oratory as an art. We admire their writings, but this is not science; here we seek in vain the fundamental laws whence their teachings proceed. There is no science without principles which give a reason for its facts. Hence to teach and to learn the art of oratory, it is necessary:

1. To understand the general law which controls the movements of the organs;
2. To apply this general law to the movements of each particular organ;
3. To understand the meaning of the form of each of these movements;
4. To adapt this meaning to each of the different states of the soul.


The fundamental law, whose stamp every one of these organs bears, must be kept carefully in mind. Here is the formula:

The sensitive, mental and moral state of man are rendered by the eccentric, concentric or normal form of the organism.[1]

Such is the first and greatest law. There is a second law, which proceeds from the first and is similar to it:

Each form of the organism becomes triple by borrowing the form of the two others.

It is in the application of these two laws that the entire practice of the art of oratory consists. Here, then, is a science, for we possess a criterion with which all phenomena must agree, and which none can gainsay. This criterion, composed of our double formula, we represent in a chart, whose explanation must be carefully studied. The three primitive forms or genera which affect the organs are represented by the three transverse lines.



III. Norm.    1-III    3-III    2-III  
Ecc. Norm. Norm. Norm. Conc. Norm.

I. Ecc.        1-I        3-I        2-I  
Ecc. Ecc. Norm. Ecc. Conc. Ecc.

The subdivision of the three genera into nine species is noted in the three perpendicular columns.

Under the title \_Genus\_ we shall use the Roman numerals I, III, II.

Under the title \_Species\_ we employ the Arabic figures 1, 3, 2.

I designates the eccentric form, II the concentric form, III the normal form.

The Arabic figures have the same signification.

The normal form, either in the genus or the species, we place in the middle column, because it serves as a bond of union between the two others, as the moral state is the connecting link between the intellectual and vital states. Thus the first law relative to the primitive forms of the organs is applied in the three transverse columns, and the second law relative to their compound forms is reproduced in the three vertical columns. As may be easily proven, the eccentric genus produces three species of eccentric forms, marked in the three divisions of the lower transverse column. Since the figure 1 represents the eccentric form, 1-I will designate the form of the highest degree of eccentricity, which we call \_eccentro-eccentric\_. Since the figure 3 represents the normal form, the numbers 3-I will indicate the \_normo-eccentric\_ form. Since the figure 2 designates the form which translates intelligence, the figures 2-I indicate the \_concentro-eccentric\_ form as a \_species\_. As the species proceeds from the genus, we begin by naming the species in order to bring it back to the genus. Thus, in the column of the eccentric genus the figure 1 is placed after the numbers 3 and 2, which belong to the species. We must apply the same analysis to the transverse column of the normal genus, as also to that of the concentric genus. Following a diagonal from the bottom to the top and from left to right, we meet the most expressive form of the species, whether eccentric, normal or concentric, marked by the figures 1-I, 3-III, 2-II, and by the abbreviations \_Ecc.-ecc. (Eccentro-eccentric), \_Norm.-norm. (Normo-normal), \_Conc.-conc. (Concentro-concentric). It is curious to remark how upon this diagonal the organic manifestations corresponding to the soul, that is to love, are found in the midst, to link the expressive forms of life and mind.

Delsarte's Method for Tuning Stringed Instruments Without the Aid of The Ear.  
By Hector Berlioz.

Do you hear, you pianists, guitarists, violinists, violoncellists, contra-bassists, harpists, tuners, and you, too, conductors of orchestras--without the aid of the ear! What a vast, incomparable, nay, priceless discovery, especially for the rest of us wretched listeners to pianos out of tune, to violins and 'cellos out of tune, to harps out of tune, to whole orchestras out of tune! Delsarte's invention will now make it your positive duty to cease torturing us, to cease making us sweat with agony, to cease driving us to suicide. Not only is the ear of no use in tuning instruments, but it is even dangerous to consult it; it must by no possible chance be consulted. What an advantage for those who have no ear! Hitherto, it has been just the opposite, and we forgave you the torments that you inflicted on us. But in future, if your instruments be out of tune, you will have no excuse, and we shall hand you over to public vengeance. Without the aid of the ear, mark you--aid so often useless and deceptive. Delsarte's discovery holds good only for stringed instruments, but this is much; this is an enormous gain. Hence, it follows that in orchestras directed and tuned without the aid of the ear, there will be no more discords, save between the flutes, hautboys, clarionets, bassoons, horns, cornets, trumpets, trombones, kettle-drums and bass drums. The triangle might, at a pinch, be tuned by the new method; but it is generally acknowledged that this is not necessary, just as with bells, a discord between

the triangle and the other instruments is a good thing; it is popular in all lyric theatres. And the singers, whom you do not mention, someone may ask, will it be possible to make them sing true, to put them in tune? Two or three of them are naturally in tune. Some few, by great care and exactness, may be brought very nearly into tune. But all the others were not, are not, and will not be in tune, either individually, or with each other, or with the instruments, or with the leader of the orchestra, or with the rhythm, or with the harmony, or with the accent, or with the expression, or with the pitch, or with the language, or with anything resembling precision and good sense. Delsarte has made it especially easy to tune the piano, by means of an instrument that he calls the phonopticon, which it would take too long to describe here. Suffice it to say, that it contains an index-hand that marks the exact instant when two or more strings are in perfect unison. It may be added that the invariable result is so absolutely correct, no matter who may try it or under what conditions, that the most practiced ear could not possibly attain to similar perfection. Acousticians should not fail to examine this invention at once, the use of which cannot be long in becoming universal.

## 5. Donald Lemen Clark. *Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance*

### Preface

In this essay I undertake to trace the influence of classical rhetoric on the criticisms of poetry published in England between 1553 and 1641. This influence is most readily recognized in the use by English renaissance writers on literary criticism of the terminology of classical rhetoric. But the rhetorical terminology in most cases carried with it rhetorical thinking, traces of whose influence persist in criticism of poetry to the present day. The essay is divided into two parts. Part First treats of the influence of rhetoric on the general theory of poetry within the period, and Part Second of its influence on the renaissance formulation of the purpose of poetry. This division is called for not by the logic of the material, but by history and convenience. A third phase of the influence of rhetorical terminology I have already touched on in an article on *The Requirements of a Poet*[1], where I have shown that historically the renaissance ideal of the nature and education of a poet is in part derived from classical rhetoric. No writer today, who would treat of the criticism of the renaissance, can escape his deep indebtedness to Dr. Joel Elias Spingarn, whose *Literary Criticism in the Renaissance* has so carefully traced the debt of English criticism to the Italians. In going over the ground surveyed by him and by many other scholars I have been able to add but slight gleanings of my own. In this field it is my privilege only to review and to supplement what has already been discovered. But whereas others have called attention to the classical and Italian sources for English critical ideas, I am able to show that in addition to these sources, the English critics were profoundly influenced by English mediaeval traditions. That these mediaeval traditions derived ultimately from post-classical rhetoric and that they were for the most part later discarded as less enlightened and less sound than the critical ideas of the Italian Aristotelians does not lessen their importance in the history of English literary criticism. In so far as the text of quoted classical writers is readily accessible in modern editions, I offer my readers only an English translation. For quotations difficult of access I add the Latin in a footnote. In the case of those English critics whose writings are incorporated in the *Elizabethan Critical Essays* edited by Mr. Gregory Smith, or in the *Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century*, edited by Dr. J.E. Spingarn, I have made my citations to those collections in the belief that such a practice would add to the convenience of the reader. The greatest pleasure that I derive from this writing is that of acknowledging my obligations to my friends and colleagues at Columbia University who have so generously assisted me. Professor G.P. Krapp aided me by his valuable suggestions before and after writing and generously allowed me to use several summaries which he had made of early English rhetorical treatises. Professor J.B. Fletcher helped me by his friendly and penetrating criticism of the manuscript. I am further indebted to Professor La Rue Van Hook, Dr. Mark Van Doren, Dr. S.L. Wolff, Mr. Raymond M. Weaver, and Dr. H.E. Mantz for various assistance, and to the Harvard and Columbia University Libraries for their courtesy. My greatest debt is to Professor Charles Sears Baldwin, whose constant inspiration, enlightened scholarship, and friendly encouragement made this book possible.

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#### Part One

The General Theory of Rhetoric and of Poetry

#### Chapter I

##### Introductory

By definition the renaissance was primarily a literary and scholarly movement derived from the literature of classical antiquity. Thus the historical, philosophical, pedagogical, and dramatic literatures of the renaissance cannot be accurately understood except in the light of the Greek and Roman authors whose writings inspired them. To this general rule the literary criticism of the renaissance is no exception. The interpretation of the critical terms used by the literary critics of the English renaissance must depend largely on the classical tradition. This tradition, as the labors of many scholars, especially Spingarn, have shown, reached England both directly through the publication of classical writings and to an even greater degree indirectly through the commentaries and original treatises of Italian scholars.

The indebtedness to the Italian critics is well known and has been widely discussed. Although the present study does not hope to add to what is known of the influence exerted on the literary criticism of the English renaissance by the

Italians, it does propose to show the English critics to have been more indebted than has been supposed to the mediaeval development of classical theory. For this relationship to be clear it will be necessary to review classical literary criticism and to trace its development in post-classical times and in the middle ages as well as in the Italian renaissance. Only by such an approach will it be possible to show in what form classical theory was transmitted to the English renaissance.

As the restoration of the Stuarts to the throne of England inaugurated a new period in English criticism, during which English critical theories were largely influenced by French criticism, this study will stop short of this, restricting itself to the years between the publication of Thomas Wilson's *Arte of Rhetorique* in 1553 and that of Ben Jonson's *Timber* in 1641. Throughout this period the English mediaeval tradition of classical theory was highly important, losing ground but gradually as the influence first of the rhetoric newly recovered from the classics and then of Italian criticism produced an increasingly stronger effect on English criticism. I hope to show that the English critics who formulated theories of poetry in the renaissance derived much of their critical terminology, not directly from the rediscovered classical theories of poetry, but through various channels from classical theories and practice of rhetoric. The tendency to use the terminology of rhetoric in discussing poetical theory did not originate in the English renaissance, but is largely an inheritance from classical criticism as interpreted by the middle ages. Both in England and on the continent this mediaeval tradition persisted far into the renaissance. Renaissance English writers on the theory of poetry use to an extent hitherto unexplored the terminology of rhetoric. This rhetorical terminology was derived from three sources: directly to some extent from the classical rhetorics themselves; indirectly through the influence of classical rhetoric upon the terminology of the Italian critics of poetry; and indirectly, to a considerable extent, through the mediaeval modifications of classical and post-classical rhetoric.

#### 1. The Distinction between Rhetoric and Poetic

Aristotle wrote two treatises on literary criticism: the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*. The fact that he gave separate treatment to his critical consideration of oratory and of poetry is presumptive evidence that in his mind oratory and poetry were two things, having much in common perhaps, but distinguished by fundamental differences. With less philosophical basis these fundamental differences were maintained by nearly all the classical literary critics. It is important, therefore, to review briefly what the classical writers meant by rhetoric and by poetic, and to trace the modifications which these terms underwent in post-classical times, in the middle ages, and in the renaissance, in order better to show that in the literary criticism of the English renaissance the theory of poetry contained many elements which historically derive from classical and mediaeval rhetoric. Literature--the spoken and the written word--was divided by the classical critics into philosophy, history, oratory, and poetry. Thus Aristotle, in addition to treating the theory of poetry and the theory of oratory in separate books, asserts that even though the works of philosophy and of history were composed in verse, they would still be something different from poetry.[2] Lucian severely criticises the historians whose writings are like those of the poets.[3] Quintilian advises students of rhetoric against imitating the style of the historians because it is too much like that of the poets.[4] Clearly these critical writers are insisting on some fundamental difference between the forms of communication in language--a difference which they thought their contemporaries were in some danger of ignoring.

If the number of critical writings devoted to these different forms of communication is taken as a criterion, rhetoric ranks first, poetry second, and history third. This preponderance of rhetoric may be one reason for the tendency of the critics who wrote on the theory of poetry to use much of the terminology of rhetoric, and for the ease with which a modern student can formulate the classical theory of rhetoric, as compared with the difficulty he has in formulating the theory of poetry. To the Greeks and Romans rhetoric meant the theory of oratory. As a pedagogical mechanism it endeavored to teach students to persuade an audience. The content of rhetoric included all that the ancients had learned to be of value in persuasive public speech. It taught how to work up a case by drawing valid inferences from sound evidence, how to organize this material in the most persuasive order, how to compose in clear and harmonious sentences. Thus to the Greeks and Romans rhetoric was defined by its function of discovering means to persuasion and was taught in the schools as something that every free-born man could and should learn.

In both these respects the ancients felt that poetic, the theory of poetry, was different from rhetoric. As the critical theorists believed that the poets were inspired, they endeavored less to teach men to be poets than to point out the excellences which the poets had attained. Although these critics generally, with the exceptions of Aristotle and



Eratosthenes, believed the greatest value of poetry to be in the teaching of morality, no one of them endeavored to define poetry, as they did rhetoric, by its purpose. To Aristotle, and centuries later to Plutarch, the distinguishing mark of poetry was imitation. Not until the renaissance did critics define poetry as an art of imitation endeavoring to inculcate morality. Consequently in a historical study of rhetoric and of the theory of poetry separate treatment of their nature and of their purpose is not only convenient, but historical. The present discussion, therefore, considers various critics' ideas of the nature of poetry in Part I, and then separately in Part II their ideas of its purpose. The object of this division is not to make an abstract distinction between nature and purpose. Such a distinction cannot, of course, be made. It is to approach the subject first from one point of view and then from the other because it was in fact thus approached successively, and because also the intention of the successive writers can thus be better understood.

The same essential difference between classical rhetoric and poetic appears in the content of classical poetic. Whereas classical rhetoric deals with speeches which might be delivered to convict or acquit a defendant in the law court, or to secure a certain action by the deliberative assembly, or to adorn an occasion, classical poetic deals with lyric, epic, and drama. It is a commonplace that classical literary critics paid little attention to the lyric. It is less frequently realized that they devoted almost as little space to discussion of metrics. By far the greater bulk of classical treatises on poetic is devoted to characterization and to the technic of plot construction, involving as it does narrative and dramatic unity and movement as distinct from logical unity and movement. It is important that the modern reader bear these facts in mind; for in the nineteenth century text-books of rhetoric came to include description of a kind little considered by classical rhetoricians, and narrative of an aim and scope which they excluded. Thus the modern treatise on rhetoric deals not only with what the Greeks would recognize as rhetoric, but also with what they would classify as poetic. Furthermore, narrative and dramatic technic, which the classical critics considered the most important elements in poetic, are now no longer called poetic. What the ancients discussed in treatises on poetic, is now discussed in treatises on the technique of the short-story, the technique of the drama, the technique of the novel, on the one hand, and in treatises on versification, prosody, and lyric poetry on the other. As these modern developments were unheard of during the periods under consideration in this study, and as the renaissance used the words rhetoric and poetic much more in their classical senses than we do today, it must be understood that throughout this study rhetoric will be used as meaning classical rhetoric, and poetic as meaning classical poetic.

Many modern critics have found the classical distinction between rhetoric and poetic very suggestive. In classical times imaginative and creative literature was almost universally composed in meter, with the result that the metrical form was usually thought to be distinctive of poetry. The fact that in modern times drama as well as epic and romantic fiction is usually composed in prose has made some critics dissatisfied with what to them seems to be an unsatisfactory criterion. On the one hand Wackernagel, who believes that the function of poetry is to convey ideas in concrete and sensuous images and the function of prose to inform the intellect, asserts that prose drama and didactic poetry are inartistic.[5] He thus advocates that present practise be abandoned in favor of the custom of the Greeks. On the other hand Newman, while granting that a metrical garb has in all languages been appropriated to poetry, still urges that the essence of poetry is fiction.[6] Likewise under the influence of Aristotle, Croce differentiates between the kinds of literature not because one is written in prose and the other in verse, but because one is the expression of what he calls intuitive knowledge obtained through the imagination, and the other of conceptual knowledge obtained through the intellect.[7] Similar to the distinction expressed by Croce in the words imaginative and intellectual, is that expressed by Eastman in the words poetical and practical.[8] And according to Renard, Balzac distinguishes two classes of writers: the writers of ideas and the writers of images.[9]

## 6. George W. Bain. *Wit, Humor, Reason, Rhetoric, Prose, Poetry and Story Woven into Eight Popular Lectures*

### *Platform Experience*

Though announced to lecture on Platform Experiences, it is my purpose to give you a kind of platform analysis, to tell you what I know about lecturing, lectures, oratory and orators, using personal experiences for illustration. We have about eight thousand Chautauqua days, and fifteen thousand lecture courses in this country every year, and yet comparatively few persons know the history of the platform. Many have an idea that free speech, like free air, has ever been a boon to mankind. They have no conception of what it has cost, in imprisonment, exile, blood and tears. I am indebted to "Pond's History of the Platform" for facts and illustrations in the early history of the platform in England. Two hundred years ago in our mother land, the word platform meant no more than a resting place for boxes and barrels. A religious service was simply a routine of ritual, while such a thing as a public man addressing the masses was unknown. Sir William Pitt, one of England's greatest statesman and orators, in all his public life uttered only two sentences to the public outside of Parliament. If William Jennings Bryan had lived in Pitt's day, he would have been ignored by the Prime Minister of England.

The first leaders of thought to come in contact with the people and thrill them by the power of speech were John Wesley and George Whitefield. "On a mount called Rose Hill, near Bristol, England, George Whitefield laid the foundation of the modern platform." From Rose Hill his audiences grew until on Kensington Commons thirty thousand people tried to get within reach of his captivating voice. It has been truthfully said: "At the feet of John Wesley and George Whitefield the people of England learned their first lessons in popular government." This innovation, however, met with sneers, jeers and persecution from the established conservatism of church and state, and when the platform attempted to enter the arena of politics, Parliament decided the "public clamor must end." A bill was framed forbidding any public gatherings except such as should be called by the magistrates. In advocating this bill a member of Parliament said: "The art of political discussion does not belong outside of Parliament. Men who are simply merchants, mechanics and farmers must not be allowed to publicly criticise the constitution." To this the platform made reply: "From such as we the Master selected those who were to sow the seed of living bread in the wilds of Galilee." The bill passed by an overwhelming majority. Punishment ran from fine and imprisonment to years of exile from the country, and from this time on, the battle raged between Parliament and platform. Later on we shall note the results. I am often interviewed by men, and sometimes by women, who desire to reach the platform. They say to me: "What steps did you take?"

My answer is, I never took any; I stumbled, was picked up by circumstances and pitched upon the platform. At a picnic in a grove near Winchester, Ky., in 1869, a noted temperance orator was to give an address. He failed to reach the grove on time, and I was prevailed upon to act as time-killer until his arrival. I was not entirely without experience, having belonged to a debating society in a country school. When I had spoken about thirty minutes, to my great relief, the orator of the day made his appearance. The flattering comments upon my talk induced me to accept other invitations to address temperance meetings, and before I knew what had happened, the platform was under my feet, calls were numerous and my life work was established. I suppose those who consult me are encouraged to know a mere stumble directed my course, and if so, by purpose and preparation they can surely succeed.

Some persons seem to think lecturing a very simple occupation, requiring only a glib tongue, and a good pair of lungs. Several years ago, I received a letter from a young man in which he wrote: "I heard you lecture last week. I would like to become a lecturer myself. I have no experience and very little education, but I have a very strong voice and am sure I could be heard by a large audience. I have been working in a horse-barn but am now out of a job. If I had a lecture, I think[page 237] I could make a living; besides I would get to see the country. If you will write me one I will send you two dollars." I do not know whether the young man gauged the price by the estimate of the lecture he had heard me give, or his monetary condition, but if audacity is a requisite for the platform, this young man was not entirely without qualification.

This is an extreme case, and yet there are those whose minds are storehouses of knowledge, who can no more become popular platform speakers, than could the young man, who was ready to set sail on the sea of oratory, with a lusty pair of lungs and a two dollar lecture.

Charles Spurgeon, the great London preacher, said: "I have never yet learned the art of lecturing. If you have ever seen a goose fly, you have seen Spurgeon trying to lecture." Mr. Spurgeon called lecturing an art, and why not? If the hand that paints a picture true to life and pleasing to the eye, is the hand of an artist, why is not the tongue that paints a picture true to life and pleasing to the mind's eye the tongue of an artist? It is an art to know how to get hold of an audience. There was an occasion in my experience when I had extreme necessity for the use of this art. When President Cleveland wrote his Venezuela message in which he threatened war with England, the threat was published in Toronto, Canada, on Saturday and I was announced to lecture in the large pavilion on Sunday afternoon. The message of President Cleveland had aroused the patriotic spirit of Canada. The hall was packed. It seemed to me I could see frost upon the eyebrows of every man and icicles in the ears of the women. When introduced there was a painful silence. I began by saying: "Doubtless many of you have come to hear what an American has to say about Venezuela. I must admit I am not acquainted with the merits of the question. I suppose, however, the message of our President is one of the arts of diplomacy. But I do know I speak the sentiment of the best people of my country when I say: 'May the day never dawn whose peace will be broken by signal guns of war between Great Britain and the United States.'" I said:

"When John and Jonathan forget,  
The scar of anger's wound to fret,  
And smile to think of an ancient feud,  
Which the God of nations turned to good;  
Then John and Jonathan will be,  
Abiding friends, o'er land and sea;  
In their one great purpose, the world will ken,  
Peace on earth, goodwill to men."

The great audience arose and cheered until all sense of chill had departed.

It is not only an art to get hold of an audience, but equally a matter of good taste to know when to let go. This is a qualification some have not acquired. I followed a very distinguished man several years ago and the comment was: "He was fine the first hour and a half, but the last hour he grew tiresome." In this busy age, the world wants thoughts packed into small compass. The average audience wants a preacher to put his best thoughts into a thirty-minute package. The day was, when people would sit on backless board benches and listen to a sermon of two hours; now they won't swing in a hammock and endure one of more than fifty minutes. Rev. Dr. Dewey, of Brooklyn, New York, tells of a minister who was given to reading his sermons. On one occasion when he had read about twenty minutes, he halted and said: "I have a young dog at my house that is given to chewing paper. I find he has mutilated my manuscript, which is my excuse for this short sermon." A visiting lady after service said: "Doctor, have you any more of the breed of that dog? I would like to get one for our pastor." In this age of crowded moments concentration means execution; energy means success. If you can't put fire into your sermon, put your sermon in the fire.

A few years ago when in New York City, I went to see Madame Bernhardt in her famous play, Joan of Arc. She spoke in French, an unknown tongue to me; but when she came to her defense before the court, I realized as never before the power of speech and action. She had given one-fourth of that marvelous appeal, when the great audience arose and began to cheer. Madame Bernhardt folded her arms, bowed her head and waited for silence. When order

was restored she sprang a step forward. It seemed to me every feature of her face, every finger on her hands, every gleam of eye and movement of body was an appeal to the stern tribunal. In the trembling, murmuring voice that ran like a strain of sad, sweet music through sunless gorges of grief, the great audience read her plea for mercy and wept. Some who could not restrain their emotion sobbed aloud.

When from the depths of solemn sound that same voice arose like the swell of a silver trumpet, and in clarion tones demanded justice, cheer after cheer testified to the power of the orator actress. Never was there a sob of the sea more mournful, than the voice of Sarah Bernhardt as she played upon the harp strings of pity; and never did words rush in greater storm fury from human lips, than when she demanded justice. No stop nor note nor pedal nor key in the organ of speech was left untouched by this genius in tragic art.

It would be well if every public speaker could hear Sarah Bernhardt give that defense of the Maid of Orleans. Indeed I believe if the forensic eloquence of the stage could be transferred to the pulpit greater audiences and greater rewards[page 242] would follow. If you doubt this, go read the sermons of George Whitefield or the lectures of John B. Gough and you will wonder at their success unless you take into consideration their mysterious power of delivery.

I cannot give you one sentence Madame Bernhardt uttered, but I do know the influence of that address remains with me to this day and now and then I find myself reaching out after the secret of oratory. "It is not so much what you say as how you say it," has become a proverb.

Some years ago I lectured in an Iowa village on a bitter cold evening. The rear of the hall was up on posts. When introduced there was only one inch between my shoe soles and zero, while a cold wind from a broken window struck the back of my head. It occurred to me that if I would play Bernhardt I might save a spell of pneumonia. In a few moments I was pacing the platform, swinging my arms and stamping my feet to keep up circulation. I put all the intensity, activity and personality possible into one hour and left the platform.

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Returning to the hotel a commercial traveler who had heard me a number of times said: "I congratulate you; you get younger. I never heard you put so much life into your lecture."

I replied: "Why man, I was trying to keep my feet from freezing."

He said: "I advise you to go on the platform every evening with cold feet."

John and Charles Wesley were going along a street in London when they came upon two market women engaged in a wordy war. John Wesley said: "Hold up, Charles, and let's learn how to preach. See how these women put earnestness and even eloquence into their street quarrel. Can't we be just as earnest and eloquent in dealing out the truth?" No wonder John Wesley gave such impetus to the platform. It is said what John Wesley and George Whitefield were to the religious platform, Fox and Burke became later on to the political platform. They saw the platform was fast becoming the voice of public sentiment and dared to indorse it. When Mr. Fox made his first platform address he said: "This is the first time I ever had the privilege of addressing an uncorrupted assembly." Going back into[page 244] Parliament he said: "Let's put an end to a policy that separates us from the people. Let's cut all cables, snap all chains that bind us to an unfriendly shore and enter the peaceful harbor of public confidence."

When Mr. Burke made his platform debut, he was so inspired by the enthusiasm of the people, it is said, he made the greatest speech ever made in the English language up to that time. When he appeared in Parliament next evening a leader of the government took occasion to denounce the platform as a disturber of public peace, directing his remarks to Mr. Burke. The great orator was ready with the reply: "Yes, and the firebell at midnight disturbs public peace, but it keeps you from burning in your beds." It would seem after years of fruitless effort to silence the platform, Parliament would accept it as a power for good and give it wise direction. Yet we are informed that in face of its growing popularity when Henry Hunt attempted to address an audience in a grove in England, a regiment of

cavalry charged the grove. Eleven were killed and several hundred wounded. Henry Hunt was[page 245] thrown into prison, but when released later one hundred thousand people welcomed him to the streets of London.

As well now had Parliament attempted to prevent a London fog as to prohibit platform meetings. John Bright said: "When I consider these meetings of the people, so sublime in their vastness and resolution, I see coming over the hilltops of time the dawning of a nobler and better day for my country." It is our privilege to live in the good day of which John Bright spoke. Yet while a public speaker today is in no dread of arrest or imprisonment for any decent expression of opinion, the platform is not without its hindrances; and some of these will never be cured, while babies cry, architects sacrifice acoustics to style, young people do their courting in public, janitors smother thoughts in foul air, and milliners persist in building up artistic barriers between speaker and audience.

Here let me give a bit of advice to my own sex. Gentlemen, when you purchase a new hat, no matter if a ten dollar silk, or a twenty dollar panama, do not attend a lecture, and taking a seat in front of some intelligent lady forget to remove[page 246] your hat. The lady may want to see the speaker's face, and he may need the inspiration of her countenance, while you are interfering with both. "A hint to the wise is sufficient." This hint may not be in accord with the advice of Paul, but Paul never saw a twentieth century "Merry Widow" hat. Then too, Paul was already inspired and didn't need the inspiration of human countenances. I am speaking for the uninspired, to whom an audience of hatless heads is an inspiration.

But few persons realize how a public speaker is affected by little influences. The flitting of a blind bat over a church audience on a summer evening, will mar the most fascinating flight of eloquence ever plumed from a pulpit. When Nancy Hanks broke the world's trotting record at Independence, Iowa, some years ago, her former owner, Mr. Hart Boswell, of Lexington, who raised and trained her, was asked if Nancy would ever lower that record. He replied: "Well, if the time comes that the track is just right, the atmosphere just right, the driver just right and Nancy just right, I believe she will." See the[page 247] combination. Break it anywhere and the brave little mare would fail.

Just so speakers are affected by conditions, by acoustics, atmosphere, size and temper of the audience, and the speaker's own mental and physical condition. Many a good sermon has been killed by a poor sexton. Many a grand thought has perished in foul air. Charles Spurgeon was preaching to a large audience in a mission church in London, when want of ventilation affected speaker and audience. Mr. Spurgeon said to a member of the church: "Brother, lift that window near you."

"It won't lift," replied the brother.

"Then smash the glass and I'll pay the bill to-morrow," said Spurgeon.

Suppose the great horse Uhlan should be announced to trot against his record; suppose at the appointed time, with the grandstand crowded and every condition favorable, as the great trotting wonder reached the first quarter pole, some one were to run across the track just ahead of the horse, then another and another; what kind of a record would be made? What management would allow a horse to be thus handicapped? Where is the[page 248] man who would be so inconsiderate as to thus hinder a horse? Yet when a minister has worked while the world slept, that he not only might sustain his record but gather souls into the kingdom; when the opening exercises have given sufficient time for all to be present; when the text is announced and the preacher is reaching out after the attention and sympathy of his audience some one enters the door, walks nearly the full length of the aisle; then another and then two more, each one crossing the track of the preacher and yet he is expected to keep up his record and make good. If you are a friend of your pastor be present when he announces his text; give him your attention and thus cheer him on as you would your favorite horse.

An eminent minister said: "There, I had a good thought for you, but the creaking of the new boots of that brother coming down the aisle knocked it quite out of my head." One who had heard me many times said: "Why do you do better at Ocean Grove than anywhere else I hear you?" My answer was: "Because of conditions. The great auditorium seats ten thousand,[page 249] the atmosphere is invigorated by salt sea breezes; a choir of five hundred sing the audience into a receptive mood and the speaker is borne from climax to climax on wings of applause."

I would not have you infer from this that a large audience is always necessary to success. Indeed the most successful and satisfactory address I ever made was to an audience of one. If I can make as favorable an impression upon you as I did upon that young lady I shall be gratified. In Pauling, New York, Chauncey M. Depew by his attention and applause inspired me more than the whole audience beside; while time and again have I been helped to do my best by the presence of that matchless queen of the platform, Frances E. Willard. The very opposite of greatness has had the same effect upon me. At the Pontiac, Illinois, Chautauqua after lecturing to a great audience, I was invited by the superintendent of the State Reformatory to address the inmates of the prison. At the close of a thirty minutes' talk the superintendent said: "Your address to my boys exceeded the one you gave at the Chautauqua." Why was it better? At the Chautauqua I was trying to entertain and instruct an intelligent audience. Within the grey walls of that prison I was reaching down to the very depths, endeavoring to lift up human beings, marred and scarred by sin and crime, but dear to the mothers who bore them and the Savior who died for them.

If I were a preacher in New York City and were announced to preach a sermon on home missionary work I would not go to the church by way of the mansions of the rich where children, shod in satin slippers dance and play over velvet tapestry, but by way of the slums where I would meet the children of misery, where,

"To stand at night 'mid the city's throng,

And scan the faces that pass along,

Is to read a book whose every leaf

Is a history of woe and want and grief.

As in tears of sorrow and sin and shame,

You read a story of blight and blame,

Your heart goes further than hand can reach

And you feel a sermon you cannot preach."

Whoever would prove worthy of the platform must have a message and give to it the devotion of mind, heart and conscience, no matter whether his purpose is to convince by reasoning, convert by appeal, delight by rhetoric, or cure melancholy by humor. Each has its useful influence on the platform. Some persons have an impression that the student deals in logic, while the orator simply starts his tongue to running, and goes off and leaves it to work automatically. Bishop Robert McIntyre was one of the greatest pulpit orators of his age, yet I dare say this gifted man gave as much time and thought to his famous word painting of the Chicago fire, as Joseph Cook ever gave to mining any treasure of thought he laid upon the altar of education.

I know many teachers of oratory say: "Study your subject, analyze it well, and leave words to the inspiration of the occasion." But suppose when the occasion comes, instead of inspiration one has indigestion, then what? While a speaker should not be so confined to composition that he cannot reach out after, and cage any passing bird of thought, yet as the leaf of the mulberry tree must go through the stomach of a silk-worm, before it can become silk, so climaxes should be warped and woofed into language before they can be forceful and beautiful. At the Lincoln, Nebraska, Assembly some years ago a noted humorist gave an address on the "Philosophy of Wit." He called oratory a lost art, and to prove his contention he quoted from William Jennings Bryan's famous Chicago convention speech. He said: "What would a young woman think of her lover who would say 'My darling, the crown of thorns shall never be pressed down upon your fair brow?'" The humorist expected applause but it failed to materialize, for Mr. Bryan is highly respected in his state and his oratory is a charm wherever he is heard. The speaker not only exhibited poor taste, but his wit was pointless, for when a man can go before a convention of fourteen hundred delegates and by one burst of eloquence capture the convention, secure the nomination for the presidency, and then

with the press and the leaders of his party against him go up and down the country, and from the rear of a railroad train, almost capture the White House, the day of oratory is not gone by.

Schriner, the great animal painter, painted the picture of a bony mule eating a tuft of hay. That picture sold in Petersburg, Russia, for fifteen thousand dollars, while the original mule sold for one dollar and thirty cents. If the painting of Schriner made in the price of that mule, a difference of fourteen thousand, nine hundred, ninety-eight dollars and seventy cents why is not word painting worth something? Listen, while I give you a short extract from the address of James G. Blaine at the memorial service of our martyr President Garfield. With the audience wrought up to the greatest sympathy by his tribute he said: "Surely if happiness can come from robust health, ideal domestic life and honors of the world James A. Garfield was a happy man that July morning. One moment strong, erect with promise of peaceful, useful years of life before him: The next moment wounded, bleeding, helpless.

"Through the days and weeks of agony that followed, he saw his sun slowly sinking, the plans and purposes of his life[page 254] broken and the sweetest of household ties soon to be severed. "Masterful in mortal weakness he became the center of a nation's love, and enshrined in the prayers of the Christian world.

"As the end drew near, his youthful yearning for the sea returned. The White House palace of power became a hospital of pain. He begged to be taken from its prison walls and stifling air.

"Silently, tenderly the love of a great people bore the pale sufferer to the longed-for healing of the sea. There with wan face lifted to the cooling breeze, he looked wistfully out upon the changing wonders of the ocean; its far-off sails white in the morning light; its restless waves rolling shoreward to break in the noon-day sun; the red clouds of evening arching low, kissing the blue lips of the sea, and above the serene, silent pathway to the stars. "Let us believe his dying eyes read a mystic meaning only the parting soul can know; that he heard the waves of the ebbing tide of life breaking on the far-off shore, and felt already upon his wasted brow the calm, sweet breath of heaven's morning."Place behind these utterances the rich voice and magnetic manner of the "Plumed Knight" of the platform, and you can realize what oratory means.

If you will here pardon me for going from the sublime to the ridiculous, I will show you how a bit of a school boy rhetoric may win its way over solid argument. In the country school I attended, there was a debating society. Parents as well as their sons were admitted to the society and the public was invited to the debates. On one occasion the question for debate was: "Which is the more attractive, the works of nature or the works of art?" There had been an appeal from a general debate and this time one speaker was chosen from each side. My father was chosen to represent the negative and I the affirmative. My father was a good speaker but so fond of facts he had no use for rhetoric. I had the opening address of thirty minutes, my father had forty-five minutes and I had fifteen minutes to close the debate. As father talked I wondered how he ever got hold of so many facts. He piled them up until my first address was swept[page 256] away by the triumphs of art. The only hope I had for the affirmative was in the closing fifteen minutes. Fortunately for me, the judge was a bachelor and very much in love with a golden-haired, accomplished young woman who lived in a country home very near the schoolhouse, and was then in the audience. In closing the debate I referred to father's address in a complimentary manner, and then asked the judge to be seated in imagination on a knoll nearby. On one side of that knoll I placed all my father had claimed for art, withholding nothing. On the other side was the home of this Blue Grass belle. I began a description of her home and personality. I pictured "the orchard, the meadow, the deep tangled wild-wood and every loved spot" the judge well knew. I pictured the brook that ran through the meadow into the woodland and on down the valley, singing as it ran,

"I wind about and in and out,

With here a blossom sailing;

Here and there a lusty trout,

And here and there a grey-ling."

When my time was half gone I felt I was gone too unless I could get a little nearer the heart of the judge. Opening the door art had made to shut in the flowers of a lovely family I brought out the golden-haired girl. Taking off the sun-bonnet of art, that the good-night kisses of the sinking sun might enrich her rosy cheeks and golden tresses, I sent her strolling down the winding walk hedged in by hawthorn and hyacinth to the water's brink. Here I gave her a cushion of blue-grass, and with the rising moon pouring its shimmering sheen upon the ripples at her feet, I sent her voice floating away on the evening air singing: "Roll on silver moon, guide the traveler on his way." Here the audience cheered, the judge smiled and I felt encouraged.

With but two minutes left I had the shapely fingers of nature, take out the hair-pins of art and the golden tresses fall about the snowy neck of nature. Then came the untying of the shoe-strings of art; off came the shoes and stockings of art, and the pretty feet of nature were dipping in the limpid stream. I said, "Judge, the question is, which is the more attractive, the works of nature or the works of art? With my father's picture of steam engines, stage coaches, reapers, binders, mowing machines and every known triumph of art on one side; on the other the highest type of the world's creation, a beautiful woman, the stars of nature stooping to kiss her brow, and laughing waters of nature leaping to kiss her feet; where your eyes would rest there let your decision be given."

After the debate a friend said to me: "It was that last home picture that saved you." My father who heard the remark said, "Yes, a picture of a red-headed girl washing her feet in a goose branch." I may add, I was careful after the contest not to get very near the young lady with whom I had taken such platform liberty.

Reason, rhetoric, pathos, poetry, diction, gesture, wit and humor, each has its place on the platform. While logic sounds the depths of thought, humor ripples its surface with laughing wavelets. While reason cultivates the cornfields of the mind, rhetoric beautifies the pleasure gardens.

John B. Gough was the most popular platform orator of his day. He began lecturing at from two to five dollars an evening. He grew in popularity until he was [page 259] in demand at five hundred dollars a lecture, and no one before or since more successfully used all the arts of the platform, from the comic that drew the very rabble of the streets, to flights of eloquence that captured college culture. It has been well said: "While Gough was a great preacher of righteousness, he was a whole theatre in dramatic delivery." Lecturers, like preachers, are fishers of men, and there are as many kinds of people in an average audience as there are kinds of fish in the sea. It requires variety of bait for humanity as well as for fish.

Sam Jones used slang as one kind of bait and he used to say: "It beats all how it draws." I saw this verified at Ottawa, Kansas, Chautauqua. Giving a Saturday evening lecture he baited the platform with slang, satire and humor. Sunday afternoon an hour before time for his lecture the people were hurrying to the auditorium. When presented to the great audience he said: "Record! Record! Record!" I remember the sermon as one of the sweetest and most powerful I ever heard. Its influence will not cease this side the eternal morning.

Rowland Hill, the popular London preacher, used quaint humor to draw the people, and powerful appeal to sweep them into the kingdom. It is said the fountain of laughter and fountain of tears lie very close together. My experience has been, that often the best way to the fountain of tears is by the way of the fountain of laughter. Some years ago at Ocean Grove, New Jersey, I was to lecture on the subject, "Boys and Girls, Nice and Naughty." A wealthy widow and her only son were there from New York, where the young boy had been leading a "gay life." Ocean Grove with its quiet, moral atmosphere was a dull place for this young man. He happened to read the subject for the lecture on the bulletin board, and thinking it suggestive of humor he went to hear the lecture. He had what he went for, as the lecture did deal with the fountain of laughter, but it also dealt with the fountain of tears. It swung the red lantern of danger athwart the pathway of the wayward young man. Following a story of mother love, I said: "Young man, let the cares and burdens of life press you down to the very earth, let the great waves of sorrow roll over your soul, but let no act of yours ever roll a [page 261] clod upon the coffin of her, whose image, enshrined upon the inner walls of your memory, white winters and long bright summers can never wash away."

A minister told me after, that in a young people's meeting this young man arose and said: "I attended a lecture at Ocean Grove, thinking I would have a humorous entertainment. I left the auditorium the saddest soul in the great



audience. Going down to the beach I tried to drive away the spell, but it grew upon me. I could see how I had grieved my mother, and the past came rolling up like the waves of the ocean. I shuddered as they broke on my awakened conscience and quickened memory. Behind me was an unhallowed past, and before me the brink of an awful eternity. There and then I resolved to change my course. Alone under the stars I made my resolve and then started to my mother. She was waiting for me, and said: 'My son, I wished for you at the lecture this evening. I think you would have enjoyed it.' I then told her I was determined to lead a new life and had come to seal my vow with her kiss."

That young man went to the lecture to laugh, he left to walk alone with God under the stars by the ocean deep, there to decide to lead a righteous life, and seal the vow with a loving mother's kiss. So while in my humble way I have endeavored to use the arts that entertain I have cherished the purpose to better human lives.

I have referred to the platform as being baited for humanity. Have you ever considered how it is baited to resist the forces of evil?

The day was when Satan had an attraction trust that controlled about the whole output of entertainment. The platform now is a picture gallery where is to be had all beauty in nature, from our own land to the land of the midnight sun.

In moving pictures it presents to those who never saw ship, sail or sea, the landing of a great steamer, with splashing of spray as real as if seen from the dock. To those who enjoy music it furnishes band concerts, orchestra, bell-ringing, quartettes, solos, plantation melodies, rag-time tunes and women whistlers.

The platform today beats the devil in output of entertainment. It has scoured field and forest, trained birds and dogs[page 263] to round out the program of a chautauqua.

Its breadth takes in all creeds and kinds. While it greets with waving lilies Bishop Vincent, leader of the great chautauqua movement, it cordially welcomes the priest, the Jew, the Chinaman, the negro, republican, democrat, progressive, prohibitionist, socialist and suffragist.

The platform has grown to be a great university, a musical festival, a zoological garden, an art institute, an agricultural college and a domestic science school. Do you ask has the platform any blemishes? I answer yes. All enterprises have their blemishes. The press is a potent power for good and yet many bad things get into print. Sometimes from the platform come voices without the ring of sincerity, entertainments without uplifting influence and anecdotes without respect to public decency. When attending platform entertainments one should discriminate as when eating fish, enjoy the meat and discard the bones. With good taste in selection one rarely ever need go away hungry. I am often asked: "Where do you find the most appreciative audiences?"

First, I would reply, in rural communities where the people are not surfeited with entertainment. Second, I would say, applause does not always mean appreciation. It is said "still water runs deep." In Chickering Hall, New York, one Sunday afternoon a lady sat before me whose diamonds and dress indicated wealth. A lad sat by her side. My subject was, "The Safe Side of Life for Young Men." It was a temperance address and the thought came to me; that lady is a wine drinker and she is disappointed that I am to talk temperance. She did not cheer with the audience, nor did she give any expression of face that would indicate her interest, except that she kept her eyes fixed upon the speaker. At the close she came to the platform and said: "I brought my son with me and you said what I wanted him to hear; I thank you," and with this she took my hand saying, "Again I thank you," and turning away, left a coin in my hand.

I put it in my pocket, and on returning to the hotel found she had given me a twenty dollar gold piece. That was gold standard appreciation. I am frequently asked: "What do you recall as the best introduction you ever had?" I have had all kinds, some amusing, but the one I cherish most was given by Ferd Schumacher, the deceased oatmeal king of Akron, Ohio. He came to this country from Germany. By industry and economy he accumulated enough money to engage in making oatmeal. When he had rounded up more than a million of dollars in wealth, the insurance ran out

on his great "Jumbo Mills" in Akron. The insurance company raised the rate and while he was dickering with the company, the great plant was swept away in a midnight fire. Mr. Schumacher was a very earnest temperance man and was to introduce me for the W.C.T.U. in the large armory the Sunday after the fire. It was supposed he would not be present because of the severe strain and his great loss. But prompt to the minute he entered the door, and 'mid the applause of sympathetic friends he took the platform.

In presenting the speaker he said: "Ladies and schentlemen, I must be personal for a moment while I thank the people of Akron for their sympathy. I did not know I had so many good friends. But the mill[page 266] vot vos burned vos made of stone and vood and nails and paint. We come to talk to you about a fire vot is burning up the homes, the hopes, the peace of vimen and children and the immortal souls of men; vill you please take your sympathy off of Ferd Schumacher and give it to Mr. Bain while he talks about the great fire of intemperance." I am opposed to indiscriminate immigration to this country, but if the old world has any more Ferd Schumachers desiring to come to America, may He who rules winds and waves, fill with harmless pressure the billows on which they ride and give them safe entrance into our country's haven. Many inquire of me about the lyceum platform as a profession. My answer is: "like the famed shield it has two sides." One who has a lovely home and rarely leaves it said to me: "I envy you your life-work. You get to see the country, visit the great cities, meet the best people and get fat fees for your lectures." How distance does lend enchantment to the view sometimes!

A few years ago we notified the bureaus not to make engagements away from the[page 267] railroads in the northwest during the blizzard months. A letter came saying: "Enter Wessington College, outside of Woonsocket." We supposed outside meant adjacent. Arriving at Woonsocket in a blizzard I found Wessington seventeen miles away. Wrapped in robes I made the drive, arriving about six o'clock in the evening. On arrival I was informed that smallpox had broken out in the village. The hotel had been quarantined but a room had been engaged for me in a private home. While taking my supper my hostess said: "Would you know smallpox if you were to see the symptoms?"

"Know what? Why do you ask that?" I asked.

She called attention to the face of her daughter who was serving the supper. One glance and my appetite fled, as I said: "Excuse me, please. I must get ready for my lecture," and I left the room. One hour later I stood before a vaccinated audience with visions of smallpox floating before me, and for days after I imagined I could feel it coming.

Add to this experience midnight rides on freight trains, long drives in rain, mud and storm, ten minutes for lunch at sandwich[page 268] counter, eight months of the year away from home—the only heaven one who loves his family has on earth, and you have a taste of the side my neighbor did not see.

There is, however, a bright side. Whoever can get the ear of the public from the platform, has an opportunity to sow seed, the fruit of which will be gathered by angels when he has gone to his reward. One so long on the platform as I have been, cannot fail in having experiences that gladden the heart, if he has done faithful service.

Out of hundreds I select one experience that should encourage all who labor in the Master's vineyard. I had traveled two hundred miles in a day to reach an engagement, and the last seven miles in a buggy over a miserable road. I did not reach the village until nine o'clock. Without supper and chilled by the ride, I threw off my wraps and wearily made my way through the lecture. A little later in my room at the hotel, while I was taking a lunch of bread and milk, a minister entered and said: "You seem to be very tired." When I answered, "Never more so," he replied: "I have a story to tell you[page 269] which will perhaps rest you."

Continuing he said: "Some twenty years ago, you lectured in a village where there was a state normal school. It was Sunday evening. At the hotel were three young men, and to see the girls of the college, these young men went to the lecture. One was the only son of a wealthy widow. He had not seen his mother for months. She had begged him to come home, but he was sowing his wild oats and ashamed to face his mother. That evening you made an earnest appeal to young men in the name of home and mother. The arrow went to the heart of the wild young fellow. On

returning to the hotel he said to his companions: 'Come up to my room, let's have a talk.' On entering the room he closed the door and said: 'Boys, I want to open my heart to you. I am overwhelmed with a sense of wrong-doing. I am done with the saloon, done with the gambling table, done with evil associations. I am going home to-morrow and make mother happy. Boys, let's join hands and swear off from drink and evil habits; let's honor our manhood and our mothers.'

"Now for the sequel that I think will rest you. That wild boy is now a wealthy man. I give you his name, though I would not have you call it in public. He is a Christian philanthropist, and has never broken his pledge. The second boy holds the highest office in the gift of this government in a western territory, and the third stands before you now, an humble minister of the gospel."

It did rest me. I would rather have been the humble instrument in turning those three young men to a righteous life, than to wear the brightest wreath that ever encircled a statesman's brow. For such men as Sylvester Long, Roland A. Nichols, Robert Parker Miles and Bishop Robert McIntyre to tell me my lectures helped to shape their lives, fills my soul with joy as I face the setting sun. Chance, the noted English engineer, built a thousand sea-lights, shore-lights and harbor-lights. When in old age he lay dying, a wild storm on the sea seemed to revive him by its association with his life-work. He said to the watchers: "Lift me up and let me see once more the ocean in a storm." As he looked out, the red lightning ripped open the black wardrobe of the[page 271] firmament, and he saw the salted sea driven by the fury of the hurricane into great billows of foam. Sinking back upon his pillows his last words were: "Thank God, I have been a lighthouse builder, and though the light of my life is fast fading, the beams of my lighthouse are brightening the darkness of many a sailor's night." When my life-work closes, and my platform experiences are ended, I would ask no better name than that of an humble lighthouse builder, who here and there from the shore-points of life's ocean, has sent out a friendly beam, to brighten the darkness of some brother's night.

## 7. 21<sup>st</sup> Century Lexicon Entries on Rhetoric

### "Rhetoric "in Wikipedia

(Footnotes are not mentioned. It is recommended to check the original article.)

Rhetoric is the art of using language, especially public speaking and writing, as a means to persuade. Along with logic and dialectic, rhetoric is one of the three ancient arts of discourse. From ancient Greece to the late 19th Century, it was a central part of Western education, filling the need to train public speakers and writers to move audiences to action with arguments. The very act of defining has itself been a central part of rhetoric: It appears among Aristotle's *topoi*. The word is derived from the Greek *ρητορικός* (*rhetorikos*), "oratorical", from *ρήτωρ* (*rhetor*), "public speaker", related to *ρήμα* (*rhema*), "that which is said or spoken, word, saying", from *έρω* (*ero*), which means "to speak, to say". In its broadest sense, rhetoric concerns human discourse.

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#### Rhetoric as a Civic Art

Throughout European history, rhetoric has concerned itself with persuasion in public and political settings such as assemblies and courts. Because of its associations with democratic institutions, rhetoric is commonly said to flourish in open and democratic societies with rights of free speech, free assembly, and political enfranchisement for some portion of the population.

### Rhetoric as a Course of Study

As a course of study, rhetoric trains students to speak and/or write effectively. The rhetorical curriculum is nearly as old as the rhetorical tradition itself. Over its many centuries, the curriculum has been transformed in a number of ways, but, in general, it has emphasized the study of principles and rules of composition as a means for moving audiences. In Greece, rhetoric originated in a school of pre-Socratic philosophers known as Sophists circa 600 BC. It was later taught in the Roman Empire and during the Middle Ages as one of the three original liberal arts or trivium (along with logic and grammar).

### Rhetoric as Epistemology

The relationship between rhetoric and knowledge is one of its oldest and most interesting problems. The contemporary stereotype of rhetoric as "empty speech" or "empty words" reflects a radical division of rhetoric from knowledge, a division that has had influential adherents within the rhetorical tradition, most notably Plato in ancient Athens, and Peter Ramus in 16C Renaissance Europe. It is a division that has been strongly associated with Enlightenment thinking about language.

Most rhetoricians, however, see a closer relationship between rhetoric and knowledge. Researchers in the rhetoric of science, for instance, have shown how the two are difficult to separate, and how discourse helps to create knowledge. This perspective is often called "epistemic rhetoric," where communication among interlocutors is fundamental to the creation of knowledge in communities.

Emphasizing this close relationship between discourse and knowledge, contemporary rhetoricians have been associated with a number of philosophical and social scientific theories that see language and discourse as central to, rather than in conflict with knowledge-making (See Critical Theory, Post-structuralism, Hermeneutics, Dramatism, Reflexivity).

### The Scope of Rhetoric

Contemporary studies of rhetoric address a more diverse range of domains than was the case in ancient times. While classical rhetoric trained speakers to be effective persuaders in public forums and institutions like courtrooms and assemblies, contemporary rhetoric investigates human discourse writ large. Rhetoricians have studied the discourses of a wide variety of domains, including the natural and social sciences, fine art, religion, journalism, fiction, history, cartography, and architecture, along with the more traditional domains of politics and the law.

Public relations, lobbying, law, marketing, professional and technical writing, and advertising are modern professions that employ rhetorical practitioners.

### The History of Rhetoric in Western Civilization

#### Ancient Greece

The earliest mention of oratorical skill occurs in Homer's Iliad, where heroes like Achilles, Hektor, and Odysseus were honored for their ability to advise and exhort their peers and followers (the Laos or army) in wise and appropriate action. With the rise of the democratic polis, speaking skill was adapted to the needs of the public and political life of cities in Ancient Greece, much of which revolved around the use of oratory as the medium through which political and judicial decisions were made, and through which philosophical ideas were developed and disseminated. For modern students today, it can be difficult to remember that the wide use and availability of written texts is a phenomenon that was just coming into vogue in Classical Greece. In Classical times, many of the great thinkers and political leaders performed their works before an audience, usually in the context of a competition or contest for fame, political influence, and cultural capital; in fact, many of them are known only through the texts that their students, followers, or detractors wrote down. As has already been noted, rhetor was the Greek term for orator: A rhetor was a citizen who regularly addressed juries and political assemblies and who was thus understood to have gained some knowledge about public speaking in the process, though in general facility with language was often referred to as *logôn technē*, "skill with arguments" or "verbal artistry."

Rhetoric thus evolved as an important art, one that provided the orator with the forms, means, and strategies for persuading an audience of the correctness of the orator's arguments. Today the term rhetoric can be used at times to

refer only to the form of argumentation, often with the pejorative connotation that rhetoric is a means of obscuring the truth. Classical philosophers believed quite the contrary: the skilled use of rhetoric was essential to the discovery of truths, because it provided the means of ordering and clarifying arguments.

### The Sophists

Organized thought about public speaking began in Ancient Greece. Possibly, the first study about the power of language may be attributed to the philosopher Empedocles (d. ca. 444 BC), whose theories on human knowledge would provide a basis for many future rhetoricians. The first written manual is attributed to Corax and his pupil Tisias. Their work, as well as that of many of the early rhetoricians, grew out of the courts of law; Tisias, for example, is believed to have written judicial speeches that others delivered in the courts. Teaching in oratory was popularized in the 5th century BC by itinerant teachers known as sophists, the best known of whom were Protagoras (c.481-420 BC), Gorgias (c.483-376 BC), and Isocrates (436-338 BC). The Sophists were a disparate group who travelled from city to city making public displays to attract students who were then charged a fee for their education. Their central focus was on logos or what we might broadly refer to as discourse, its functions and powers. They defined parts of speech, analyzed poetry, parsed close synonyms, invented argumentation strategies, and debated the nature of reality. They claimed to make their students "better," or, in other words, to teach virtue. They thus claimed that human "excellence" was not an accident of fate or a prerogative of noble birth, but an art or "techne" that could be taught and learned. They were thus among the first humanists. Several sophists also questioned received wisdom about the gods and the Greek culture, which they believed was taken for granted by Greeks of their time, making them among the first agnostics. For example, they argued that cultural practices were a function of convention or nomos rather than blood or birth or physis. They argued even further that morality or immorality of any action could not be judged outside of the cultural context within which it occurred. The well-known phrase, "Man is the measure of all things" arises from this belief. One of their most famous, and infamous, doctrines has to do with probability and counter arguments. They taught that every argument could be countered with an opposing argument, that an argument's effectiveness derived from how "likely" it appeared to the audience (its probability of seeming true), and that any probability argument could be countered with an inverted probability argument. Thus, if it seemed likely that a strong, poor man were guilty of robbing a rich, weak man, the strong poor man could argue, on the contrary, that this very likelihood (that he would be a suspect) makes it unlikely that he committed the crime, since he would most likely be apprehended for the crime. They also taught and were known for their ability to make the weaker (or worse) argument the stronger (or better). Aristophanes famously parodies the clever inversions that sophists were known for in his play *The Clouds*.

The word "sophistry" developed strong negative connotations in ancient Greece that continue today, but in ancient Greece sophists were nevertheless popular and well-paid professionals, widely respected for their abilities but also widely criticized for their excesses.

### Isocrates

Isocrates (436-338 BC), (not to be confused with the philosopher Socrates) like the sophists, taught public speaking as a means of human improvement, but he worked to distinguish himself from the Sophists, whom he saw as claiming far more than they could deliver. He suggested that while an art of virtue or excellence did exist, it was only one piece, and the least, in a process of self-improvement that relied much more heavily on native talent and desire, constant practice, and the imitation of good models. Isocrates believed that practice in speaking publicly about noble themes and important questions would function to improve the character of both speaker and audience while also offering the best service to a state. [16] He thus wrote his speeches as "models" for his students to imitate in the same way that poets might imitate Homer or Hesiod. His was the first permanent school in Athens and it is likely that Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum were founded in part as a response to Isocrates. Though he left no handbooks, his speeches ("Antidosis" and "Against the Sophists" are most relevant to students of rhetoric) became models of oratory (he was one of the canonical "Ten Attic Orators") and he had a marked influence on Cicero and Quintilian, and through them, on the entire educational system of the west.

Plato outlined the difference between true and false rhetoric.

Plato

Plato (427-347 BC) famously outlined the differences between true and false rhetoric in a number of dialogues, but especially the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*. Both dialogues are complex and difficult, but in both Plato disputes that the Sophistic notion that an art of persuasion, the art of the Sophists which he calls "rhetoric" (after the public speaker or *rhêtôr*), can exist independent of the art of dialectic. Plato claims that since Sophists appeal only to what seems likely or probable, rather than to what is true, they are not at all making their students and audiences "better," but simply flattering them with what they want to hear. While Plato's condemnation of rhetoric is clear in the *Gorgias*, in the *Phaedrus* he seems to suggest the possibility of a true art of rhetoric based upon the knowledge produced by dialectic, and he relies on such a dialectically informed rhetoric to appeal to the main character, Phaedrus, to take up philosophy. It is possible that in developing his own theory of knowledge, Plato coined the term "rhetoric" both to denounce what he saw as the false wisdom of the sophists, and to advance his own views on knowledge and method. Plato's animosity against the Sophists derives not only from their inflated claims to teach virtue and their reliance on appearances, but from the fact that his teacher, Socrates, was accused of being a sophist and ultimately sentenced to death for his teaching.

#### Aristotle

Plato's student Aristotle (384-322 BC) famously set forth an extended treatise on rhetoric that still repays careful study today.

In the first sentence of *The Art of Rhetoric*, Aristotle says that "rhetoric is the counterpart [literally, the antistrophe] of dialectic." As the "antistrophe" of a Greek ode responds to and is patterned after the structure of the "strophe" (they form two sections of the whole and are sung by two parts of the chorus), so the art of rhetoric follows and is structurally patterned after the art of dialectic because both are arts of discourse production. Thus, while dialectical methods are necessary to find truth in theoretical matters, rhetorical methods are required in practical matters such as adjudicating somebody's guilt or innocence when charged in a court of law, or adjudicating a prudent course of action to be taken in a deliberative assembly. For Plato and Aristotle, dialectic involves persuasion, so when Aristotle says that rhetoric is the antistrophe of dialectic, he means that rhetoric as he uses the term has a domain or scope of application that is parallel to but different from the domain or scope of application of dialectic. In Nietzsche Humanist (1998: 129), Claude Pavur explains that "[t]he Greek prefix 'anti' does not merely designate opposition, but it can also mean 'in place of.'" When Aristotle characterizes rhetoric as the antistrophe of dialectic, he no doubt means that rhetoric is used in place of dialectic when we are discussing civic issues in a court of law or in a legislative assembly. The domain of rhetoric is civic affairs and practical decision making in civic affairs, not theoretical considerations of operational definitions of terms and clarification of thought -- these, for him, are in the domain of dialectic.

Aristotle's treatise on rhetoric is an attempt to systematically describe civic rhetoric as a human art or skill (*techne*). His definition of rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion," essentially a mode of discovery, seems to limit the art to the inventional process, and Aristotle heavily emphasizes the logical aspect of this process. But the treatise in fact also discusses not only elements of style and (briefly) delivery, but also emotional appeals (*pathos*) and characterological appeals (*ethos*). He thus identifies three steps or "offices" of rhetoric--invention, arrangement, and style--and three different types of rhetorical proof:

*ethos*: how the character and credibility of a speaker can influence an audience to consider him to be believable.

Today, this is still an effective means of persuading an audience; however, shrewd, critical listeners will note whether the "expert's" actual arguments are as impressive and satisfying as his title to avoid the informal logical fallacy of an Appeal to Authority.

This could be any position in which the speaker--from being a college professor of the subject, to being an acquaintance of person who experienced the matter in question--knows about the topic.

For instance, when a magazine claims that An MIT professor predicts that the robotic era is coming in 2050, the use of big-name "MIT" (a world-renowned American university for the advanced research in math, science, and technology) establishes the "strong" credibility.

*pathos*: the use of emotional appeals to alter the audience's judgment.

This can be done through metaphor, amplification, storytelling, or presenting the topic in a way that evokes strong emotions in the audience.

*logos*: the use of reasoning, either inductive or deductive, to construct an argument.

Logos appeals include appeals to statistics, math, logic, and objectivity. For instance, when advertisements claim that their product is 37% more effective than the competition, they are making a logical appeal.

Inductive reasoning uses examples (historical, mythical, or hypothetical) to draw conclusions.

Deductive reasoning, or "enthymematic" reasoning, uses generally accepted propositions to derive specific conclusions. The term logic evolved from logos. Aristotle emphasized enthymematic reasoning as central to the process of rhetorical invention, though later rhetorical theorists placed much less emphasis on it.

Aristotle also identifies three different types or genres of civic rhetoric: forensic (also known as judicial, was concerned with determining truth or falsity of events that took place in the past, issues of guilt), deliberative (also known as political, was concerned with determining whether or not particular actions should or should not be taken in the future), and epideictic (also known as ceremonial, was concerned with praise and blame, values, right and wrong, demonstrating beauty and skill in the present).

One of the most famous of Aristotelian doctrines was the idea of topics (also referred to as common topics or commonplaces). Though the term had a wide range of application (as a memory technique or compositional exercise, for example) it most often referred to the "seats of argument"--the list of categories of thought or modes of reasoning--that a speaker could use in order to generate arguments or proofs. The topics were thus a heuristic or inventional tool designed to help speakers categorize and thus better retain and apply frequently used types of argument. For example, since we often see effects as "like" their causes, one way to invent an argument (about a future effect) is by discussing the cause (which it will be "like"). This and other rhetorical topics derive from Aristotle's belief that there are certain predictable ways in which humans (particularly non-specialists) draw conclusions from premises. Based upon and adapted from his dialectical Topics, the rhetorical topics became a central feature of later rhetorical theorizing, most famously in Cicero's work of that name.

#### Roman rhetoricians

For the Romans, oration became an important part of public life. Cicero (106-43 BC) and Quintilian (35-100 AD) were chief among Roman rhetoricians.

Cicero's *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is one of the most significant works on rhetoric and is still widely used as a reference today. It is an extensive reference on the use of rhetoric, and in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, it achieved wide publication as an advanced school text on rhetoric.

Cicero is considered one of the most significant rhetoricians of all time. His works include the early and very influential *De Inventione* (On Invention, often read alongside the *Ad Herennium* as the two basic texts of rhetorical theory throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance), *De Oratore* (a fuller statement of rhetorical principles in dialogue form), *Topics* (a rhetorical treatment of common topics, highly influential through the Renaissance), *Brutus* (a discussion of famous orators) and *Orator* (a defense of Cicero's style). Cicero also left a large body of speeches and letters which would establish the outlines of Latin eloquence and style for generations to come. It was the rediscovery of Cicero's speeches (such as the defence of Archias) and letters (to Atticus) by Italians like Petrarch that, in part, ignited the cultural innovations that we know as the Renaissance.

Quintilian's career began as a pleader in the courts of law; his reputation grew so great that Vespasian created a chair of rhetoric for him in Rome. The culmination of his life's work was the *Institutio oratoria* (or *Institutes of Oratory*), a lengthy treatise on the training of the orator in which he discusses the training of the "perfect" orator from birth to old age and, in the process, reviews the doctrines and opinions of many influential rhetoricians who preceded him.

In the *Institutes*, Quintilian organizes rhetorical study through the stages of education that an aspiring orator would undergo, beginning with the selection of a nurse. Aspects of elementary education (training in reading and writing, grammar, and literary criticism) are followed by preliminary rhetorical exercises in composition (the *progymnasmata*) that include maxims and fables, narratives and comparisons, and finally full legal or political speeches. The delivery of speeches within the context of education or for entertainment purposes became widespread and popular under the term "declamation." Rhetorical training proper was categorized under five canons that would persist for centuries in academic circles:

*Inventio* (invention) is the process that leads to the development and refinement of an argument.

Once arguments are developed, *dispositio* (disposition, or arrangement) is used to determine how it should be organized for greatest effect, usually beginning with the *exordium*.



Once the speech content is known and the structure is determined, the next steps involve *elocutio* (style) and *pronuntiatio* (presentation).

*Memoria* (memory) comes to play as the speaker recalls each of these elements during the speech.

*Actio* (delivery) is the final step as the speech is presented in a gracious and pleasing way to the audience - the Grand Style.

This work was available only in fragments in medieval times, but the discovery of a complete copy at Abbey of St. Gall in 1416 led to its emergence as one of the most influential works on rhetoric during the Renaissance.

Quintilian's work describes not just the art of rhetoric, but the formation of the perfect orator as a politically active, virtuous, publicly minded citizen. His emphasis was on the ethical application of rhetorical training, in part a reaction against the growing tendency in Roman schools toward standardization of themes and techniques. At the same time that rhetoric was becoming divorced from political decision making, rhetoric rose as a culturally vibrant and important mode of entertainment and cultural criticism in a movement known as the "second sophistic," a development which gave rise to the charge (made by Quintilian and others) that teachers were emphasizing style over substance in rhetoric.

### Rhetoric from the Medieval period to the Enlightenment

After the breakup of the western Roman Empire, the study of rhetoric continued to be central to the study of the verbal arts; but the study of the verbal arts went into decline for several centuries, followed eventually by a gradual rise in formal education, culminating in the rise of medieval universities. But rhetoric transmuted during this period into the arts of letter writing (*ars dictaminis*) and sermon writing (*ars praedicandi*). As part of the trivium, rhetoric was secondary to the study of logic, and its study was highly scholastic: students were given repetitive exercises in the creation of discourses on historical subjects (*suasoriae*) or on classic legal questions (*controversiae*).

Augustine of Hippo Although he is not commonly regarded as a rhetorician, St. Augustine (354-430) was trained in rhetoric and was at one time a professor of Latin rhetoric in Milan. After his conversion to Christianity, he became interested in using these "pagan" arts for spreading his religion. This new use of rhetoric is explored in the Fourth Book of his *De Doctrina Christiana*, which laid the foundation of what would become homiletics, the rhetoric of the sermon. Augustine begins the book by asking why "the power of eloquence, which is so efficacious in pleading either for the erroneous cause or the right", should not be used for righteous purposes (IV.3).

One early concern of the medieval Christian church was its attitude to classical rhetoric itself. Jerome (d. 420) complained, "What has Horace to do with the Psalms, Virgil with the Gospels, Cicero with the Apostles?" Augustine is also remembered for arguing for the preservation of pagan works and fostering a church tradition which led to conservation of numerous pre-Christian rhetorical writings.

Rhetoric would not regain its classical heights until the renaissance, but new writings did advance rhetorical thought. Boethius (480?-524), in his brief *Overview of the Structure of Rhetoric*, continues Aristotle's taxonomy by placing rhetoric in subordination to philosophical argument or dialectic.[17] The introduction of Arab scholarship from European relations with the Muslim empire (in particular Al-Andalus) renewed interest in Aristotle and Classical thought in general, leading to what some historians call the twelfth century renaissance. A number of medieval grammars and studies of poetry and rhetoric appeared.

Late medieval rhetorical writings include those of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225?-1274), Matthew of Vendome (*Ars Versificatoria*, 1175?), and Geoffrey of Vinsauf (*Poetria Nova*, 1200-1216). Pre-modern female rhetoricians, outside of Socrates' friend Aspasia, are rare; but medieval rhetoric produced by women either in religious orders, such as Julian of Norwich (d. 1415), or the very well-connected Christine de Pizan (1364?-1430?), did occur if not always recorded in writing.

In his 1943 Cambridge University doctoral dissertation in English, Canadian Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980) surveys the verbal arts from approximately the time of Cicero down to the time of Thomas Nashe (1567-1600?).[18] His dissertation is still noteworthy for undertaking to study the history of the verbal arts together as the trivium, even though the developments that he surveys have been studied in greater detail since he undertook his study. As noted below, McLuhan became one of the most widely publicized thinkers in the 20th century, so it is important to note his scholarly roots in the study of the history of rhetoric and dialectic.

Another interesting record of medieval rhetorical thought can be seen in the many animal debate poems popular in England and the continent during the Middle Ages, such as *The Owl and the Nightingale* (13th century) and Geoffrey Chaucer's *Parliament of Fowls* (1382?).

#### Sixteenth century

Walter J. Ong's encyclopedia article "Humanism" in the 1967 *New Catholic Encyclopedia* provides a well-informed survey of Renaissance humanism, which defined itself broadly as disfavoring medieval scholastic logic and dialectic and as favoring instead the study of classical Latin style and grammar and philology and rhetoric. (Reprinted in *Ong's Faith and Contexts* (Scholars Press, 1999; 4: 69-91).)

Desiderius Erasmus was an exponent of classical rhetoric. One influential figure in the rebirth of interest in classical rhetoric was Erasmus (c.1466-1536). His 1512 work, *De Duplici Copia Verborum et Rerum* (also known as *Copia: Foundations of the Abundant Style*), was widely published (it went through more than 150 editions throughout Europe) and became one of the basic school texts on the subject. Its treatment of rhetoric is less comprehensive than the classic works of antiquity, but provides a traditional treatment of *res-verba* (matter and form): its first book treats the subject of *elocutio*, showing the student how to use schemes and tropes; the second book covers *inventio*. Much of the emphasis is on abundance of variation (*copia* means "plenty" or "abundance", as in *copious* or *cornucopia*), so both books focus on ways to introduce the maximum amount of variety into discourse. For instance, in one section of the *De Copia*, Erasmus presents two hundred variations of the sentence "*Semper, dum vivam, tui meminero.*" Another of his works, the extremely popular *The Praise of Folly*, also had considerable influence on the teaching of rhetoric in the later sixteenth century. Its orations in favour of qualities such as madness spawned a type of exercise popular in Elizabethan grammar schools, later called *adoxography*, which required pupils to compose passages in praise of useless things.

Juan Luis Vives (1492 - 1540) also helped shape the study of rhetoric in England. A Spaniard, he was appointed in 1523 to the Lectureship of Rhetoric at Oxford by Cardinal Wolsey, and was entrusted by Henry VIII to be one of the tutors of Mary. Vives fell into disfavor when Henry VIII divorced Catherine of Aragon and left England in 1528. His best-known work was a book on education, *De Disciplinis*, published in 1531, and his writings on rhetoric included *Rhetoricae, sive De Ratione Dicendi, Libri Tres* (1533), *De Consultatione* (1533), and a rhetoric on letter writing, *De Conscribendis Epistolas* (1536).

It is likely that many well-known English writers would have been exposed to the works of Erasmus and Vives (as well as those of the Classical rhetoricians) in their schooling, which was conducted in Latin (not English) and often included some study of Greek and placed considerable emphasis on rhetoric. See, for example, T.W. Baldwin's *William Shakspeare's Small Latine and Lesse Greeke*, 2 vols. (University of Illinois Press, 1944).

The mid-1500s saw the rise of vernacular rhetorics — those written in English rather than in the Classical languages; adoption of works in English was slow, however, due to the strong orientation toward Latin and Greek. A successful early text was Thomas Wilson's *The Arte of Rhetorique* (1553), which presents a traditional treatment of rhetoric. For instance, Wilson presents the five canons of rhetoric (*Invention, Disposition, Elocutio, Memoria, and Utterance or Actio*). Other notable works included Angel Day's *The English Secretorie* (1586, 1592), George Puttenham's *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589), and Richard Rainholde's *Foundacion of Rhetorike* (1563).

During this same period, a movement began that would change the organization of the school curriculum in Protestant and especially Puritan circles and lead to rhetoric losing its central place. A French scholar, Pierre de la Ramée, in Latin *Petrus Ramus* (1515-1572), dissatisfied with what he saw as the overly broad and redundant organization of the trivium, proposed a new curriculum. In his scheme of things, the five components of rhetoric no longer lived under the common heading of rhetoric. Instead, *invention* and *disposition* were determined to fall exclusively under the heading of *dialectic*, while *style*, *delivery*, and *memory* were all that remained for rhetoric. See Walter J. Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (Harvard University Press, 1958; reissued by the University of Chicago Press, 2004, with a new foreword by Adrian Johns). Ramus, rightly accused of sodomy and erroneously of atheism, was martyred during the French Wars of Religion. His teachings, seen as inimical to Catholicism, were short-lived in France but found a fertile ground in the Netherlands, Germany and England.[19]

John Milton, English poet and rhetorician One of Ramus' French followers, Audomarus Talaeus (Omer Talon) published his rhetoric, *Institutiones Oratoriae*, in 1544. This work provided a simple presentation of rhetoric that emphasized the treatment of style, and became so popular that it was mentioned in John Brinsley's (1612) *Ludus literarius*; or *The Grammar Schoole* as being the "most used in the best schooles." Many other Ramist rhetorics followed in the next half-century, and by the 1600s, their approach became the primary method of teaching rhetoric in Protestant and especially Puritan circles. See Walter J. Ong, *Ramus and Talon Inventory* (Harvard University Press, 1958); Joseph S. Freedman, *Philosophy and the Art Europe, 1500-1700: Teaching and Texts at Schools and Universities* (Ashgate, 1999). John Milton (1608-1674) wrote a textbook in logic or dialectic in Latin based on Ramus' work, which has now been translated into English by Walter J. Ong and Charles J. Ermatinger in *The Complete Prose Works of John Milton* (Yale University Press, 1982; 8: 206-407), with a lengthy introduction by Ong (144-205). The introduction is reprinted in Ong's *Faith and Contexts* (Scholars Press, 1999; 4: 111-41).

Ramism could not exert any influence on the established Catholic schools and universities, which remained by and large stuck in Scholasticism, or on the new Catholic schools and universities founded by members of the religious orders known as the Society of Jesus or the Oratorians, as can be seen in the Jesuit curriculum (in use right up to the 19th century, across the Christian world) known as the *Ratio Studiorum* (that Claude Pavor, S.J., has recently translated into English, with the Latin text in the parallel column on each page (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2005). If the influence of Cicero and Quintilian permeates the *Ratio Studiorum*, it is through the lenses of devotion and the militancy of the Counter-Reformation. The *Ratio* was indeed imbued with a sense of the divine, of the incarnate logos, that is of rhetoric as an eloquent and humane means to reach further devotion and further action in the Christian city, which was absent from Ramist formalism. The *Ratio* is, in rhetoric, the answer to St Ignatius Loyola's practice, in devotion, of "spiritual exercises." This complex oratorical-prayer system is absent from Ramism.

#### The English Tradition in the Seventeenth Century

In New England and at Harvard College (founded 1636), Ramus and his followers dominated, as Perry Miller shows in *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (Harvard University Press, 1939). However, in England, several writers influenced the course of rhetoric during the seventeenth century, many of them carrying forward the dichotomy that had been set forth by Ramus and his followers during the preceding decades. Of greater importance is that this century saw the development of a modern, vernacular style that looked to English, rather than to Greek, Latin, or French models.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626), although not a rhetorician, contributed to the field in his writings. One of the concerns of the age was to find a suitable style for the discussion of scientific topics, which needed above all a clear exposition of facts and arguments, rather than the ornate style favored at the time. Bacon in his *The Advancement of Learning* criticized those who are preoccupied with style rather than "the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of invention, or depth of judgment." On matters of style, he proposed that the style conform to the subject matter and to the audience, that simple words be employed whenever possible, and that the style should be agreeable. See Lisa Jardine, *Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse* (Cambridge University Press, 1975).

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) also wrote on rhetoric. Along with a shortened translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Hobbes also produced a number of other works on the subject. Sharply contrarian on many subjects, Hobbes, like Bacon, also promoted a simpler and more natural style that used figures of speech sparingly.

Perhaps the most influential development in English style came out of the work of the Royal Society (founded in 1660), which in 1664 set up a committee to improve the English language. Among the committee's members were John Evelyn (1620-1706), Thomas Sprat (1635-1713), and John Dryden (1631-1700). Sprat regarded "fine speaking" as a disease, and thought that a proper style should "reject all amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style" and instead "return back to a primitive purity and shortness" (*History of the Royal Society*, 1667).

While the work of this committee never went beyond planning, John Dryden is often credited with creating and exemplifying a new and modern English style. His central tenet was that the style should be proper "to the occasion, the subject, and the persons." As such, he advocated the use of English words whenever possible instead of foreign ones, as well as vernacular, rather than Latinate, syntax. His own prose (and his poetry) became exemplars of this new style.

#### Modern Rhetoric

At the turn of the twentieth century, there was a revival of rhetorical study manifested in the establishment of departments of rhetoric and speech at academic institutions, as well as the formation of national and international professional organizations. Theorists generally agree that a significant reason for the revival of the study of rhetoric was the renewed importance of language and persuasion in the increasingly mediated environment of the twentieth century (see Linguistic turn). The rise of advertising and of mass media such as photography, telegraphy, radio, and film brought rhetoric more prominently into people's lives.

## Theorists and Theories

### Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca

Chaim Perelman was a philosopher of law, who studied, taught, and lived most of his life in Brussels. He was among the most important argumentation theorists of the twentieth century. His chief work is the *Traité de l'argumentation - la nouvelle rhétorique* (1958), with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, which was translated into English as *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (1969). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca move rhetoric from the periphery to the center of argumentation theory. Among their most influential concepts are "the universal audience," "quasi-logical argument," and "presence."

### Henry Johnstone Jr.

Henry Johnstone Jr. was an American philosopher and rhetorician known especially for his notion of the "rhetorical wedge" and his re-evaluation of the ad hominem fallacy. He was the founder and longtime editor of the journal *Philosophy and Rhetoric*.

### Kenneth Burke

Kenneth Burke was a rhetorical theorist, philosopher, and poet. Many of his works are central to modern rhetorical theory: *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1969), *A Grammar of Motives* (1945), *Language as Symbolic Action* (1966), and *Counterstatement* (1931). Among his influential concepts are "identification," "consubstantiality," and the "dramatic pentad."

### Lloyd Bitzer

Lloyd Bitzer is a rhetorician who is best known for his notion of "the rhetorical situation."

### Marshall McLuhan

Marshall McLuhan was a media theorist whose discoveries are important to the study of rhetoric. McLuhan's famous dictum "the medium is the message" highlighted the important role of the mass media in modern communication.

### I.A. Richards

I.A. Richards was a literary critic and rhetorician. His *Philosophy of Rhetoric* is an important text in modern rhetorical theory.

### Stephen Toulmin

Stephen Toulmin is a philosopher whose models of argumentation have had great influence on modern rhetorical theory. His *Uses of Argument* is an important text in modern rhetorical theory and argumentation theory.

### Methods of Analysis

#### Rhetorical Criticism

Rhetorical critics explain texts and speeches by investigating their rhetorical situation, typically placing them in a framework of speaker/audience exchange.[24] Rhetorical critics use a variety of concepts from contemporary and classical rhetoric in order to conduct their analyses. Though any text, in principle, could be the subject of a rhetorical criticism, most rhetorical critics focus on the public and professional texts and speeches that have been the primary concern of the rhetorical tradition for centuries. These kinds of texts are rhetorical because they are attempts to solve real-world problems by addressing specific audiences who have decision-making power.

Though fiction would not seem to qualify as "rhetorical" in any traditional sense, some have argued that rhetorical criticism can be used as a way to understand it. In his 1961 *Rhetoric of Fiction*, Wayne Booth makes this case, that the writer of fiction, like the rhetor, is addressing an audience in order to solve a problem. Booth writes, "the rhetoric resource available to the writer of epic, novel or short story as he tries, consciously or unconsciously, to impose his fictional word upon the reader." A number of recent critics of prose fiction and of narrative or non-narrative poems have emphasized the author's use of a variety of means- including the authorial presence or

"voice" that he or she projects- in order to engage the interest and guide the imaginative and emotional response of the reader to whom the literary work is addressed.

#### Conversation Analysis

Please help improve this section by expanding it. Further information might be found on the talk page. (September 2008)

#### Discourse Analysis

#### Argument Reconstruction

#### French Rhetoric in the Modern and Contemporary Periods

Rhetoric was part of the curriculum in Jesuit and, to a lesser extent, Oratorian colleges until the French Revolution. For Jesuits, right from the foundation, in France, of the Society, rhetoric was an integral part of the training of young men toward taking up leadership positions in the Church and in State institutions, as Marc Fumaroli has shown it in his foundational *Age de l'éloquence* (1980). The Oratorians, by contrast, reserved it a lesser place, in part due to the stress they placed on modern languages acquisition and a more sensualist philosophy (Bernard Lamy's *Rhetoric* is an excellent example of their approach). Nonetheless, in the 18th Century, rhetoric was the armature and crowning of college education, with works such as Rollin's *Treatise of Studies* achieving a wide and enduring fame across the Continent.

The French Revolution, however, turned this around. Philosophers like Condorcet, who drafted the French revolutionary chart for a people's education under the rule of reason, dismissed rhetoric as an instrument of oppression in the hands of clerics in particular. The Revolution went as far as suppressing the Bar, arguing that forensic rhetoric did disservice to a rational system of justice, by allowing fallacies and emotions to come into play. Nonetheless, as later historians of the 19th century were keen to explain, the Revolution was a high moment of eloquence and rhetorical prowess, yet, against a background of rejection of rhetoric.

Under the First Empire and its wide ranging educational reforms, imposed on or imitated across the Continent, rhetoric regained little ground. In fact instructions to the newly founded Polytechnic School, tasked with training the scientific and technical elites, made it clear that written reporting was to supersede oral reporting. Rhetoric re-entered the college curriculum in fits and starts, but never regained the prominence it enjoyed under the ancien régime, although the penultimate year of college education was known as the Class of Rhetoric. When manuals were redrafted in the mid-century, in particular after the 1848 Revolution, care was taken by writers in charge of formulating a national curriculum to distance their approach to rhetoric from that of the Church seen as an agent of conservatism and reactionary politics. By the end of the 1870s, a major change had taken place: philosophy, of the rationalist or eclectic kind, by and large Kantian, had taken over rhetoric as the true terminal stage in secondary education, (the so-called Class of Philosophy bridged college and university education). Rhetoric was then relegated to the study of literary figures of speech, a discipline later on taught as Stylistics within the French literature curriculum. More decisively, in 1890 a new standard written exercise superseded the rhetorical exercises of speech writing, letter writing and narration. The new genre, called dissertation, had been invented, in 1866, for the purpose of rational argument in the philosophy class. Typically, in a dissertation, a question is asked, such as: "Is history a sign of humanity's freedom?" The structure of a dissertation consists in an introduction that elucidates the basic definitions involved in the question as set, followed by an argument or thesis, a counter-argument or antithesis, and a resolving argument or synthesis that is not a compromise between the former but the production of a new argument, ending with a conclusion that does not sum up the points but opens onto a new problem. The dissertation design was influenced by Hegelianism. It remains today the standard of writing in the humanities.

By the beginning of the 20th century rhetoric was fast losing the remains of its former importance, to be taken out of the school curriculum altogether at the time of the Separation of State and Churches (1905) – part of the argument was indeed that rhetoric remained the last element of irrationality, driven by religious arguments, in what was perceived as inimical to Republican education. The move initiated in 1789 found its resolution in 1902 when rhetoric is expunged from all curricula. However, it must be noted that, at the same time, Aristotelian rhetoric, owing to a revival of Thomistic philosophy initiated by Rome, regained ground in what was left of Catholic education in France, in particular at the prestigious Faculty of Theology of Paris, now a private entity. Yet, for all intents and purposes, rhetoric vanished from the French scene, educational or intellectual, for some 60 years.

In the early 1960s a change began to take place, as the word rhetoric, let alone the body of knowledge it covers, started to be used again, in a modest and near confidential way. The new linguistic turn, through the rise of semiotics

as well as structural linguistics, brought to the fore a new interest in figures of speech as signs, the metaphor in particular (in the works of Roman Jakobson, Michel Charles, Gérard Genette) while famed Structuralist Roland Barthes, a classicist by training, perceived how some basic elements of rhetoric could be of use in the study of narratives, fashion and ideology. Knowledge of rhetoric was so dim in the early 1970s, that his short memoir on rhetoric was seen as highly innovative. Basic as it was, it did help rhetoric regain some currency in avant-garde circles. Psycho-analyst Jacques Lacan, his contemporary, makes references to rhetoric, in particular to the Pre-Socratics. Philosopher Jacques Derrida wrote on Voice.

However, at the same time, more profound work was taking place that, eventually, gave rise to the French school of rhetoric as it exists today.

This rhetorical revival took place on two fronts. Firstly, in the area of 17th century French studies, the mainstay of French literary education, awareness grew that rhetoric was necessary to push further the limits of knowledge, and also provide an antidote to Structuralism and its denial of historicism in culture. This was the pioneering work of Marc Fumaroli who, building on the work of classicist and Neo-Latinist Alain Michel and French scholars such as Roger Zuber, published his famed *Age de l'Eloquence* (1980), was one of the founders of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric and was eventually elevated to a chair in rhetoric at the prestigious College de France. He is the editor in chief of a monumental *History of Rhetoric in Modern Europe*. His disciples form the second generation, with rhetoricians such as Françoise Waquet, Delphine Denis both of the Sorbonne, or Philippe-Joseph Salazar[3] until recently at Derrida's College international de philosophie. Secondly, in the area of Classical studies, Latin scholars, in the wake of Alain Michel, fostered a renewal in Cicero studies, breaking away from a pure literary reading of his orations, in an attempt to embed Cicero in European ethics, while, among Greek scholars literary historian and philologist Jacques Bompaigne, philologist and philosopher E. Dupréel and, somewhat later and in a more popular fashion, historian of literature Jacqueline de Romilly pioneered new studies in the Sophists and the Second Sophistic. The second generation of Classicists, often trained in philosophy as well (following Heidegger and Derrida, mainly), built on their work, with authors such as Marcel Detienne(now at Johns Hopkins), Nicole Loraux (d. in 2006), Medievalist and logician Alain De Libera (Geneva), Ciceronian scholar Carlos Lévy (Sorbonne, Paris) and Barbara Cassin (Collège international de philosophie, Paris). Sociologist of science Bruno Latour and economist Romain Laufer may also be considered part of, or close to this group. Links between the two strands, the literary and the philosophical, of the French school of rhetoric are strong and collaborative and bear witness to the revival of rhetoric in France.

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